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ART. I.—MAURITIUS.

1. *Sub-Tropical Rambles in the Land of the Aphanapteryx.* Personal Experiences, &c., in and around the Island of Mauritius. By NICHOLAS PIKE. London: Sampson Low, Marston, Low and Searle. 1873.
2. *An Account of the Island of Mauritius and its Dependencies.* By a late OFFICIAL RESIDENT. London: Published by the Author. 1842.

IT is proposed to describe an island belonging to the British Crown, which lies about twenty degrees south of the Equator and some five hundred miles eastward of Madagascar. It is a very small island; not forty miles at its greatest length, nor thirty-five at its greatest breadth; but for its fertility, wealth, large exports, dense population, and important naval position, it deserves to be considered by England as what its own inhabitants have long proudly styled it, "the gem of the Indian Ocean." It especially merits the regard of English Catholics. Here the Catholic religion was recognised, protected, and its ministers salaried by the English Government more than a quarter of a century before the Act of Emancipation gave the same religion, in England itself, permission to prosper, if it could. When the island was taken by the English in 1810, the language of the colonists and their customs were French; they themselves were mainly of French origin, and, it need scarcely be added, their religion was Catholic. In the supreme moment of surrender they were so far true to the traditions of their race, that they stipulated in Article VIII. of the Terms of Capitulation, for the preservation of "their religion, their laws, and their customs." And on their side, the

captors granted the Article unconditionally, and have honestly abided by the concession. An account of this Anglo-French colony can scarcely fail to be interesting. The history of the vicissitudes and present state of religion will, however, be reserved for a succeeding article, and the present one will be devoted to a sketch of the island itself, physically and socially.

Of the two books at the head of the article, the second has been placed there because it affords a ready test of the marvellously rapid social and commercial improvement made in Mauritius during the thirty years since its publication, rather than for its present value. Mr. Pike's volume is the most recent if not the only one, entirely devoted to Mauritius, in the English book market. The more ancient of these two works is a thin, unambitious looking octavo of 180 pages, in plain, sombre, brown binding; the newer, a bright-covered volume of more than 500 pages, with a plentiful supply of good engravings; a difference typical, it is not fanciful to think, of the prosperity of the island when each author wrote of it. Mr. Pike, who was American Consul for some years at Port Louis, is a naturalist, and on the fauna and flora of the island and kindred subjects is a valuable informant. He is a facile, chatty writer, easy to read and generally well-informed, always well-intentioned, and without the suspicion of bigotry. He has made, however, several conspicuous omissions on the subject of the prevailing religion. At the proper place, one or two of his unintentional mistakes (none of them of grave moment) will be referred to and corrected.

As an introduction to the island and to Mr. Pike simultaneously, the reader will be pleased to arrive in the company of the latter at Port Louis, the capital.

Day dawned on January, 12, 1867, bright and clear, and the sun rose brilliantly in a cloudless sky, as we hove in sight of Mauritius. On nearing the land, the fields of waving canes, topes of cocoas, and groves of casaurinas, gave a pleasing impression of the place; but when approaching Port Louis harbour the beauty of the view is unsurpassed and no easy task to describe.

The varied character of the ranges of basaltic hills reminded me of the far-famed Organ Mountains in South America. The city of Port Louis lies in an extensive valley; and as we approached the Bell Buoy, the outermost anchorage for ships, a glorious scene presented itself. In the far distance was the world-known Pieter Both Mountain; just behind the city rose the bold sweep of the mountain peak called the Pouce, to the height of 2847 feet, wooded to its summit; to the east lay the gentle slopes of the Citadel Hill, bastion crowned; to the west, abrupt and rugged, the steep cliff called Long Mountain Bluff reared its

signal-topped head (whence vessels are seen and signalled far out at sea)—all formed an entourage few cities can boast, and rendered it, when viewed from the sea, the most picturesque in the world (p. 55).

Port Louis city covers an area of ten square miles, and has a population of 65,800 in round numbers. It is the capital; also the residence of the English Governor, of the Catholic Bishop of Port Louis, and of the Anglican Bishop of Mauritius; the centre of such life and activity as there is in the island, whether civil or military, commercial or fashionable. It is built, as has been said, in a valley, on either hand of which is a range of hills that runs eastward from the shore; these form together an irregular triangle with the base to the sea, and unite as at the apex in the lofty Pouce Mountain. This last has its name from a striking resemblance to an upturned thumb. The city lies in the plain below, in a compact mass of streets that run, American fashion, in straight lines and cross each other at right angles, and stretches its more well-to-do houses in straggling lines up the hill-sides around. Towards the sea it surrounds part of the large bay which forms its magnificent natural harbour, offering ample anchorage for the fleet of heavy-burdened ships of all nations that are constantly entering or leaving it. The harbour is entered through the coral reefs that surround the whole island by a channel of from 30 to 40 feet deep, and well marked out by buoys; and from its noble granite quay the sugar produce of the island is shipped to every quarter of the world, and exports from almost all parts are brought hither for the sustenance and comfort of its inhabitants. Lying, as Port Louis does, almost half-way across the vast Indian Ocean, its harbour is frequently sought by eastward or homeward bound vessels as a place of revictualling, or a refuge from the dreaded tropical hurricanes, or a dock for repairing actual injuries inflicted by them. And although the shorter route to India and the East by way of the Suez Canal has lessened both this commercial importance of Port Louis and the military value of the island as a fortress for guarding the water thoroughfare between Europe and the East, yet it has only lessened them. The importance of Mauritius in these respects remains such that it is still true, as it was formerly, that the island must always be the possession of the Power which is supreme at sea.

Only a few points of a specially characteristic nature concerning Port Louis need be mentioned here. When the untravelled Englishman first lands on its wide quay, the picture presented by the vast crowd of human beings is as new and fantastic to him as the *bizarre* outlines of the volcano-shaped mountains in the distance beyond: an active, busy, noisy mass of almost every colour, nationality, and costume under the sun;

French and English and their descendants, Creoles and Coolies, Arabs and Cinghalese, Africans and the Malagasy, Indians of every caste and race, and a plentiful sprinkling of quaint Chinese. This heterogeneous mixture obtains over all the island, and is a fact which should be borne in mind when we consider its social and religious condition. The streets of the city are macadamized and clean, with raised footpaths; several streams from the mountains behind run through some of them to the sea, small enough in dry weather, but when much overfilled after heavy rains often doing damage to property within reach. Mr. Pike complains very loudly of the nastiness to eye and nose of the drains which run through the streets uncovered, and makes the grave charge that they form germ beds of fever infection in dry, hot seasons. Mauritians deny the first accusation: but open drains can scarcely, on any supposition, be supposed conducive to health. Little can be said of the architectural beauties of any of the houses, churches, or public buildings on the island. Older structures are chiefly of wood, and were built with more reference to needs and means than to style. Many newer houses and churches are of stone or brick, and the universal Z-shaped bars to the hurricane shutters on the houses are a conspicuous object to a stranger's eye. The Catholic Cathedral, in Government Street, has a large clock, the finest in Port Louis, whose solemn striking can be heard to almost every limit of the great city.

The shops next attract notice. How can this little island provide purchasers and wealth to buy all the conveniences and luxuries of European produce here exposed to sale? There are several streets, but perhaps pre-eminently one, the Chaussée, where the shops look very gay and are elegantly fitted in French style, and contain valuable stores of goods; those of the jewelers are particularly resplendent with objects of *bijouterie*, gold, silver, gems, and, above all, the diamond, the darling ornament of the Creole. Here, also, may be bought dresses, silks, hosiery, and elegancies of the toilette in latest Parisian fashion, and plainer necessities of clothing and use down to common English calico. Pianos, latest-improved machinery, furniture, ornaments, toys—all are in Port Louis in abundance. Stores of various kinds are numerous, and some of them large, clean, and plentifully supplied; but many of the small provision stores are strangely dirty and odorous. Many of the stores offer a most amusing variety of goods; “for instance, in your ironmonger’s you may order a ream of writing-paper with your saucepans, and seeds for your garden with the spade to dig it.” In the Chinese stores any kind of provisions or drink may be bought, the former retailed in the smallest possible quantities to suit

small means; salt fish, wine, oil, rice, lard, and a thousand other domestic necessities. It is the fault of his goods, and not his own, that John's store is often unpleasantly strong to the nose of a passer-by. Out of these business localities, away in the more leisurely suburbs, in the newer streets at the west end, in the better-built and tree-shaded avenues that stretch up the hill-sides, "in every angle of every street you will find John Chinaman in his one or at most two rooms, which serve for house and shop, with the inevitable rows of sardines, olive oil, porter, and Warren's blacking."

Port Louis has a theatre, whither a French company comes once a year; and a race-course, where horse races are held also once a year, on three days during a week, and generally now in the month of July. The course is the large Champ de Mars, once a volcano crater, now a beautiful grassy plain extending to the mountains, and as circled within them, presenting somewhat the appearance of a gigantic amphitheatre. Pretty cottages and larger villas, the residences of officials, merchants, and others, are scattered over the declivities, nestling picturesquely among the numerous and beautiful tropical trees. The last day of the races is a great fête day of the city—the greatest after New Year's Day—and the animated, varied, strange scene which the gathering of that day presented to the observant eye of the American Consul forms very pleasant reading in his book. But he speaks disparagingly of the horses:—

I doubt if the racing was ever much to boast of. It is true that for years fresh blood from Europe, the Cape, and Australia, has been imported; but, like the human race, the equine degenerates rapidly here (p. 83). The jockeys (save the mark! for only one I have seen who knew anything about riding) are dressed in such fantastic colours, it is enough to make the quietest horse shy when he is mounted, in astonishment at such a flutter of silks and ribands (p. 85).

But these two are the only items in the festa which were disappointing; the gentry in their private carriages, towns-people in hired vehicles, Indians in donkey carts, the great mass of people of every sort on foot, all flocked to the great plain to see and to enjoy themselves. The great display of fashion among the ladies and "elegants of all colours," enforced his admiration. The scene of enjoyment was gay and noisy; confectioners, fruit-sellers, and vendors of ice were there in abundance, and a motley crowd of young and old "Indians in native costume," or sometimes no costume, or in a soldier's cast-off red coat, shrill-voiced women, policemen melting in the burning sun as they shouted or cleared the course. In the centre of the course all kinds of games, swings, merry-go-rounds, and even Aunt Sally of Western renown, amused the

pleasure-loving crowd; and for the more prurient taste of the Indians, wretched Nautch girls sang and danced, whilst in the intervals of their song an old fakir related stories, which, fortunately for modest ears, were told in Hindu. The temperature at one of these festive scenes was at 90° in the day-time, falling to 75° in the evening!

Port Louis is well supplied with water; and is now the centre of a well-laid and well-conducted line of railway, which crosses the island diagonally from west to east, and skirts the coast both northward and southward. There are in the island, altogether 77 miles of railway with numerous stations, 82 miles of telegraph wire, and no less than 34 post offices.* The railway is largely used by passengers of all classes, but especially by the Indians. The facilities it affords have had much to do with the large exodus of former city residents to houses in the interior, and have greatly improved the "planters'" prospects by the cheap and rapid transit of their sugar from the plantations to the city warehouses and quays.

The island is sometimes described as oval-shaped, but its outline is most irregular and very far from that of any geometrical figure; it is, however, longer than broad, and lies lengthwise in the direction of north-east to south-west, the north-eastern extremity being somewhat attenuated with a much more irregular and broken coast than the southern half, which is broader, with precipitous shores and a more regular curve of outline. Two very large bays, or rather indentations of coast, containing several smaller bays, occupy opposite points, one on the north-west, the other on the south-east of the island. In a well-sheltered large bay in the former stands Port Louis, in the latter the old harbour of Grand Port. The latter was the first formed settlement and the chief town under the Dutch occupation, but was deserted by the French for the manifest advantages of the deep harboured Port Louis. The coral reefs around Grand Port Bay threaten, at no very distant period, to so fill it as that it will be unnavigable except by the smallest fishing craft. Masses of coral, sand, and shells drift in with every tide and south-eastern gale.

The contour of the island shows a large central plateau, rising to 1500 feet above the level of the sea, nearly surrounded by ranges of mountains; on the south-western and middle portion of the eastern coast these mountains descend more or less precipitously to the sea; on the remaining sides, however, they give place to lowlands and gently sloping plains of considerable extent. Out of the nine districts into which the island is

* "Whittaker's Almanack," 1879.

divided, three in the north and north-east (Pamplemousses, Riviere du Rempart, and Flacq), and two to the south (Savanne and Grand Port), give these outlying lowlands the great cane-growing districts. Two other districts, Plaines Wilhelms and Moka almost cover the area of the central table land. Over this last-named the temperature is several degrees cooler than at Port Louis or around the outlying coast. And upwards to this cool and healthy elevation, all those who can afford to leave Port Louis are coming to live; indeed, the city threatens to be ere long almost deserted of European residents. Plaines Wilhelms district has long had a greater proportion of European residents than any other part of the island. In it the nights are cool in summer, and it is stated that in winter, at Curepipe, for instance, a fire would be sometimes agreeable. *Would be*, generally; for it is said there are only one or two grates on the island. It would not pay to carry fire grates over 11,000 miles of sea for sale in a country where the annual mean temperature, from observations taken near Port Louis, was 86° in the day, and 72° at sunset, and the minimum thermometer height for the year $61^{\circ}5$. Mauritius, like most islands of the Indian Ocean, is of volcanic formation, although volcanic action has long ceased in it. Mr. Pike, who is very fond of these scientific matters, gives several arguments to show that the volcano was submarine, and the formation of the island, and its elevation above the sea level, slowly effected through successive ages. There are extinct craters of different periods over the island; one of them is the Champ de Mars already spoken of.

The mountains of the island generally, but especially those on the sea coast, point manifestly by their strange, abrupt outlines, rugged peaks, and rough heads of massive rock, by the frequent deep and straight clefts in their sides, to some convulsive formation. These Mauritian mountains may be divided into three straggling groups; the northern or Port Louis, the south-western, and the eastern group. The first group, with the city at its western extremity, stretches nearly across the island from west to east. The two best known peaks of this range are the Pouce, and the Pieter Both, both high and curiously shaped. The latter is perhaps the most remarkable on the island, and is formed of a mountainous spire, some 2840 feet high, "crowned by a dome of rock larger than the point on which it rests." How it came by its name is not recorded, but perhaps some brave Pieter Both, in the days when the Dutch held the land, climbed to its summit—or, perhaps, was the first who tried to do so, and failed; as did also one adventurous climber a few years ago. He had reached the projecting pinnacle and almost rounded it in safety when, weak or

dizzy, he lost his hold, and fell sheer into space, down to the bottom of the precipice, nearly two thousand feet below. No trace of him was ever found. A French mechanic, Claude Penthé, in 1790, scaled the formidable heights, reached the summit and planted the French flag there; and in 1832 a party of English officers with a large body of negroes, plenty of scaling ladders, ropes, &c., essayed an ascent, and on the second day gained the head and triumphantly substituted the British flag. Since then two or three ascents have been made in spite of the danger and the utter fruitlessness of success. The southwestern group of hills occupies all that corner of the island and comprises several ranges running in curiously bent lines and in unorderly arrangement. This group presents more features of interest and natural beauties than can even be mentioned here; a tour through it, such as that described by Mr. Pike, would well repay any one with a taste for beautiful scenery or natural science. Here are some of the highest and most picturesque mountains: the Piton, 2902 feet above the sea; the Trois Mamelles, so named from its triple peak of rock, rising almost perpendicularly and having "the appearance of being cut straight down from the summit to the shoulder," the highest ascendable point; the rugged square-topped Tamarind mountain. Well-wooded heights rise in the interior, but around the sea coast barren peaks and steep cliffs; the massive rugged Morne, that like a gigantic fort guards the extreme western point of the island, is nearly as difficult to climb as Pieter Both. In this district, too, are mysterious mountain caves, majestic waterfalls, and, lastly, charming lakes embosomed among the wooded uplands, their waters resplendent with reflected colours and outlines and alive with silver and golden fish. Grand Bassin, in Savanne, is one of these mountain lakes (another extinct crater) filled with the clearest, best spring water on the island, covering an area of 25 acres, and resting 2250 feet above the sea level. Of Chamarel, Tamarind, and Savanne Falls, each is supremely beautiful with its own special character and surroundings. Of the last, or Savanne Cascade, Mr. Pike says:

A wall of black basalt interrupts the course of the river of the same name, composed of the most regular geometrical prisms, by the action of the water separated and broken, and forming a thousand angular projections.

As the river surmounts the rocky barrier, and breaks into innumerable streams, flung back from point to point and sending up showers of spray, sparkling in the sun with rainbow rays, it equals in beauty any in the island, and even in the dry season is most romantic. As it descends into the basin below the waters meander peacefully along, bordered with the large-leaved *Nymphæas*, and overhung with

the elegant wild bananas, raffias, and bamboos, and the scene changes to one of the most perfect repose (p. 319).

The third or eastern—the Grand Port group of mountains—must be passed by with a mere mention. Like the last group, they are full of striking tableaux of great beauty and ever fresh variety.

It is interesting to know that one of the early French missionaries, the Abbé de la Caille, made the first geographical survey of the island on record, measured the mountain heights, and constructed the first map of Mauritius.

Some sixty rivers are counted on the island, but only two or three are large, and most of them mere streams or dry beds, except in the rainy season, when their sudden overflow does no little mischief. Many of them flow through precipitous ravines—deep clefts in the mountain ranges, sharp cut as by cyclopean hands in the days when volcanoes heaved upwards the island from beneath the sea. When, finally, the giant craters cooled and quiet reigned, some angel of plenty must have blessed the rocky mass. The ceaseless fertility of the land here is the source of Mauritian prosperity, and a wonder to all who first look on its stone-strewn fields. Rocks in smaller masses and stones are so plentiful on some of the sugar estates that they are heaped up in rows of three or four feet high and the sugar-cane planted in rows alternately with them; and when the land has borne a few crops of sugar, the lines of stones and sugar-canes change places. This abundance of scattered rocks has been an advantage; they have harboured the rains and preserved the ground moist beneath them.

Such is the island of Mauritius of marvellously beautiful scenery and wondrously fertile in every species of flower and plant and grain, blessed by God to please the eye and yield almost spontaneously the choicest foods for man. St. Patrick, too, might have visited and blessed this emerald isle, as he is said to have done his own northern one, for not any snake has ever been known here as native, though Long Island, not twenty-five miles distant, has them in abundance!

Early in the sixteenth century some bold Portuguese navigators, sailing for India, leaving the ordinary safer route around the coast of Africa, pushed out into the wide ocean, and on their way discovered this hitherto unknown and uninhabited island. They called it Cerné, it is supposed in reference to a strange bird they found here—the, now extinct, famous Dodo. They made little use of their acquisition and abandoned it about ninety years after. They left at least one trace of their presence—the fine deer which they introduced. These

graceful animals are still numerous in the jungles and woods over the island, and afford excellent sport. The hunting season is from May 15 to end of August, and the Mauritians are passionately fond of a *chasse*. The hunting grounds are strictly preserved, and each has its *hangar*, or hunting-box, which is the rendezvous for the hunters.

In 1593, the year in which the Portuguese deserted it, the Dutch took possession of the island, and named it Mauritius after their Stadtholder, Maurice of Nassau. Some years later they formed establishments at Grand Port and Flacq, both on the eastern coast. They left in 1712, doubtless to defend their more esteemed new possession at the Cape of Good Hope. But one account says they left it as unfit for colonization from the swarms of rats. Certainly rats are still too abundant, and a nuisance, eating out your larder, destroying the sugar-canes, and active at any other mischief, if not closely watched. You meet them in field, in house—even in church. It is not rare at High Mass to see them cross the sanctuary or altar steps to the great amusement of the little black choristers.*

The French took possession of Mauritius in 1712 and occupied it in 1722, calling it Isle de France, a name which it still bears as a sort of *alias*; though Mauritius is now its only official and recognized name. The effects of the French Revolution on the island colony will best be read in connection with religion. One guillotine was erected in Port Louis, but happily never stained with blood.

Although the island was thoroughly a French colony when the English took it in 1810, and had been so for some ninety years, the first settlers on it, between 1712 and 1722, though partly Frenchmen, were chiefly adventurers of every nationality, mostly pirates, who married the only women they could find hereabout—the negresses of Madagascar. The French East India Company encouraged French emigration to the new colony; but it did not prosper nor pay them until they sent out Mahé de Labourdonnais, the Peter the Great of Mauritius. This highly-gifted, patriotic man at once removed the seat of Government from Grand Port to Port Louis, planted sugar-cane, began manufactures and found a market for them

* One nuisance suggests another! In Mauritius, the lizard will watch you from the wall or roof at your dinner, and should you leave the room, scamper down and help himself to your delicacies. And then there are swarms of insatiable ants, always ready to march up your table legs and forage on sugar or whatever else you have in their line. The only way, indeed, to escape being plundered in places where they abound, is to set the legs of your dining-table in vessels of water: they do not understand fording dikes or swimming, and beat a retreat.

in Europe, roused the people to activity, cut and constructed roads, erected arsenals, fortifications, mills, offices, shops, aqueducts; made wet and dry docks, and built a ship of war at Port Louis and sent it to France to be admired. He was the founder of Mauritian prosperity. A local historian says (it is an anti-climax, but true), "His memory remains in every heart, his portrait in every house, his statue in the Place d'Armes." How highly the French came to esteem their distant colony may be learnt from M. de Cossigny, governor of it in 1791:—

I do declare it to be my opinion that the Isle of France will one day astonish Europe and Asia by its riches, the variety and abundance of its productions, and the resources of its numerous population: in the course of time it will have very great influence on the commerce of Europe in the Indies, and incalculably extend the advantages of the nation who possesses it, in that quarter of the globe.*

The Abbé Raynal had said that if the English obtained possession of it "they would drive all foreign nations out of the seas of Asia," and Frenchmen generally thought in the same strain. It is estimated that during ten years of the Anglo-French war, in midst of which this century opened, the value of British ships captured by cruisers from Mauritius amounted to two millions and a half sterling! In the face of this the French resigned it to the invaders almost without a struggle.

I am astonished at the ease with which it was conquered by the British—forts at every coin of vantage, men enough to man them, the prestige of the impregnability of the place in their favour, and hatred of the English supposed to inflame every breast, all make the nearly bloodless victory the more marvellous.†

The "Terms of Capitulation" proposed by General Decaën, stipulated for the return of French soldiers to their country, the continuance of property with its present owners, and, as has been seen, the preservation of their religion. The advent of the English to Port Louis was stained by no deeds of violence or plunder; and it brought freedom to the ships locked in the harbour, release to merchandise long stored unsaleable in warehouses and holds, peace to people tired of war, and a sudden return of occupation and prosperity. "Their flag was changed, but so little else for a long time that the change of masters was scarcely felt." The possession of the island was ratified to the English by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. There was a large section of inhabitants in Mauritius at that period to whom a change of masters brought no relief—the African slaves who worked the sugar estates and other industries. But for these,

* "An Account of the Mauritius," &c., p. 138.

† "Sub-Tropical Rambles," p. 292.

too, soon came the memorable Act of 1833, which was promulgated here the following year and came into operation Feb. 1, 1835. Counting from that date all slaves of six years old or more became apprenticed labourers until Feb. 1, 1841, if they were field labourers, but only until Feb., 1839, if unattached. And at that date there were on the island 39,464 men and boys, and 25,856 women and girls: a grand total of 65,320 slaves to be set free. The *classe affranchie* suddenly became a large factor for good or evil in Mauritian affairs. With the traditions of slavery and its horrors filling their memories, with the dazzling prospect of emancipation before them, and only the power—poor spirit-broken blacks, degraded by whippings and sellings—to half comprehend it, it is not surprising that they murmured and grew disaffected as the time of release grew near, and threatened they would not work for their former taskmasters. But it was, on their part, a great mistake and led to an act of their masters which has changed the social state of the island, and threatens still further to change it,—the importation of Coolies. Of this, however, more will be said presently.

The early French settlers had got slaves wherever they could procure them, but chiefly from the Mozambique coast; a race much superior to the other Africans from Madagascar, and not a few—the blackest of all—from the distant coast of Guinea. The descendants of these same settlers and slaves, and of their various intermarriages, the one with the other, still inhabit the colony. The elements of the Creole* composition are being further complicated by marriages with Chinese, and Indians, and different nationalities of Europe.

It will be interesting to point out the different social positions of the chief nationalities now resident here—English, French, African, Indian, and Chinese. The Englishman is either a Government official, soldier, or merchant. The Creoles, whether whites or *hommes de couleur*,† are to a large extent land and plantation owners; they are also the chief mechanics of the country, and their handicraft compares favourably with the best European specimens; and, finally, they are exclusively the working sugar planters and manufacturers. Englishmen may buy a sugar estate, but the management and administration is invariably entrusted to a Creole; he alone is “to the manner born” of its intricate working.

* It may be well to state that the term Creole signifies here, simply, one born on the island, whatever the race, complexion, or rank of the father or mother; and not necessarily the child of an European and an African, as some English books have it.

† Descendant of a white and black parent.

India supplies the large contingent of agricultural labourers, known as Coolies. They come chiefly from the districts of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta; those from the first two being preferred, as they are more healthy. Cholera is indigenous in the Delta of the Ganges; indeed, an immigrant ship from Calcutta in 1854 brought the cholera here, and it proved a dreadful scourge to the colony. At their first importation they came chiefly from the Malabar coast, and so on this island all Indians have come to be called Malabars. The Coolies dig the sugar fields, plant and tend the cane and cut it when ripe, pass it through the different processes of its manufacture into sugar, pack this into bags and cart them to the warehouses of Port Louis. When their five years' term of Coolie labour is over, some of them return home; a larger portion remain. They are intelligent, anxious to better themselves, and thrifty; vast numbers of them have bought small plots of land in the district around Port Louis, and also in other parts; built a hut, and cultivated the surrounding into a flourishing garden. Many of them are market-gardeners, some are cab-owners, a daily-increasing number are small shopkeepers, others again jobbers; some of these last commanding as many as 100 or 200 labourers each, whom they feed and lodge quite in the style of planters. The Indians formed at the close of 1877 more than two-thirds of the entire population of Mauritius. More Coolies are being yearly imported, and when once those who elect to remain buy a plot and settle, they are extremely tenacious of their hold. There are intelligent Creoles, who see clearly that eventually the island will become an Indian Colony. The Malabar appears content with his condition and treatment as a labourer; he certainly assumes for the first time a healthy, well-fed appearance during his Coolie engagement. The women are far from handsome according to Western standards, and, wherever they can afford it, seek borrowed charms in an absurd profusion of jewellery: rings through the lobe and at close intervals through all the border of each ear, necklaces of various sizes and patterns, armlets and bracelets, and, lastly—the finishing touch of elegance—a ring through one nostril of the nose. It is the height of feminine ambition to have one so large that the wearer can comfortably take her dinner through it. Malabar women do not work, but latterly some effort has been made to employ them in agricultural labour.

In treating of the African, it must be remembered that he is barely half a century emancipated: what civilization, education, and religion will do for the young generation remains to be seen. But the *classe affranchie* is by no means an uninteresting study. The negro has faults; but he has a good heart, and

much shrewdness and humour; he is sober, is gifted with an emotional nature and strong religious instincts. He works well, but is not so industrious as the Indian, and is not likely to win in the struggle with him; besides, he is inferior in numbers. The Indian, again, as has been said, is thrifty and anxious to accumulate wealth—the savings' banks are filled with his monies;* the African, on the contrary, has a gay carelessness of the morrow. He generally spends as fast as he earns, and sometimes has a propensity, not exclusively African, to spend even faster.

The Chinamen in the Mauritius are always of one of three trades—joiners, or pork-butchers, or shopkeepers (publican and grocer combined); generally the last. They are, in fact, pretty nearly the masters of the drink trade. Opium smoking and gambling, their two great temptations, are not entirely left behind. Reckless gambling at their festivals is the rule. The latter, indeed, is mentioned by almost every writer on Mauritius.

It is one of the boasts of Mauritius that it is as densely populated as the most flourishing spots on earth; and that of its large population many are very rich, and all comfortable. It has an area of only 676 square miles, and a population (1875) of 344,602—or the very large average of 509 inhabitants to the square mile.† Belgium has only an average of 469, whilst the Chinese Empire proper in its whole extent has an average of less than 300 to the mile,‡ and only in the densely-populated plain of the lower Yang-tse, which contains nearly one-half the entire Chinese people, does the average rise to the enormous figure 851.

The annual exports of Mauritius to the United Kingdom (and the major portion of its sugar crop goes to Australia and the Cape), comparatively with its area, are as large, it may be asserted larger, than those of any other English Eastern posses-

* Many of the Indians are frugal and manage to save enough to remit home to India, either for investment in land there or for the support of aged relatives; to invest in small stores here or to return to India. In 1869, there were 69,032*l.* standing to the credit of Indians in the savings' bank, and this sum is yearly steadily increasing as they begin to have confidence in the security of the Bank. No less than 17,158*l.* were remitted last year on behalf of immigrants to Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta. This does not include large sums sent home through merchants, or taken in specie by the immigrants themselves ("Sub-Tropical Rambles," p. 472).

† "Globe Encyclopædia." Edinburgh: Thos. C. Jack. 1878.

‡ Area of Chinese Empire, 1,533,991 square miles; population, 404,946,514. Area of the Yang-tse Basin, 210,000 square miles; population, 180,000,000 in round numbers ("Globe Encyclopædia," *sub voce* Chinese Empire).

sion; while they are half a million sterling more than those of Jamaica. Jamaica and Mauritius present many points of resemblance. Jamaica lies about the same parallel of latitude north of the equator as Mauritius does south; it has a similar disposition of central elevation, mountains, and coast plains, and is like it in temperature, rainfall, climate, and produce. But Jamaica has an area of 4256 square miles (six times that of Mauritius), and it has been an English possession for a much longer period.

The language of Mauritius is a very Babel of tongues. Besides French, English, and Creole, Tamil, Bengali, and Hindustani, and many other languages and dialects of India, Malagasy, and Chinese are spoken all over the island. English is naturally the language of all Government offices and courts, but is only *de rigueur* at trials in the criminal court. Here may be witnessed the amusing anomaly of a French judge who also speaks English, gravely listening to the testimony of a French witness as though his own language were utterly incomprehensible to him, and awaking to intelligence only when the testimony is repeated to him in the English of the official interpreter! In the police courts, however, language is only a medium, and any tongue is heard or used that can be understood; and the abolition of exclusive English in any court has long been mooted and is probably already effected. In passing, it may be observed that in accordance with the famous Article 8 already referred to, the basis of Mauritian law is French—is, indeed, the *Code Napoléon*, but with so complex a mixture of English alterations, precedents, and enactments, as to be a puzzle to all but the studious lawyer.

French is spoken everywhere by the landed proprietors and gentry of the island, who are mostly of French descent, in shops, offices, schools; it is used for newspapers, books, trade documents and the like, and is the one language of the Catholic pulpit. Creole is the solution in which all these diverse lingual elements meet together and combine; the common ground to which the ancient Indian or elegant European tongues descend for the necessities of working daily life. The Governor, the Bishop, the French lady, rule their households through it; in Creole the Chinaman bargains with an Indian or an Englishman.

This Creole is a patois, or rather a corruption of French—corrupted in the mouths, chiefly, of the African slaves. The changes in the mother tongue, although they have produced a language strange to even provincial French ears, have been accomplished so far methodically, that the Creole, as yet without a literature, merits a grammar for the benefit of English

and Frenchmen who come hither to reside. None of the well-known English accounts of Mauritius make any reference to this important item of Mauritius life; it will be interesting, therefore, to give some idea of it.

The Creoles, then, who formed it, adopted systematic letter changes—thus, French *u* is always changed to *i*; *eu* and *œu*, to *é*; *ch*, to *ç*; *g* and *j*, to *z*. Systematically, too, and with few exceptions, they formed their nouns by an amalgamation of the French noun and its article: as for dog they say *licien* (= *le chien*), for death, *lámort* (= *la mort*).^{*} Nouns which they heard more frequently with the partitive article have been joined to it: as *dipain* (= *du pain*) bread, *dibois* (*du bois*), *difé* (*du feu*). Their own indefinite article is *enne*: thus, a loaf is *enne dipain*; a fire, *enne difé*; a rat, *enne lérat*; but a cat is *enne çatte*. The definite article referring to a class or generality is not expressed: as *liciens mordé* (*le chien mord*), the dog bites; but “the dog” emphatic would be, *ça licien là*. Noun cases are not formed, either by prepositions or case-endings, a fact which sometimes begets confusion in their sentences. So, *lamain bon Dié* is, the hand of (the good) God, and *donne li ça licien la* is, give it to the dog. Many prepositions, however, such as *dans*, in; *lahaut*, upon; *enbas*, under; are in frequent use. The Creole says *lacase* for house, and never *maison*; so, the Bishop’s house, *lacase Monseigneur*; a fine house, *enne zoli lacase*.

Verbs have very frequently been formed by adopting the corresponding French noun; to fight is *lagerre* (*la guerre*); to steal is *coquin*. The personal pronouns are formed from the disjunctive forms of the parent grammar: thus, from *moi* has come *mon* or *mo*, I; from *toi*, to thou; from *lui*, *li*, he or she; the French *nous* and *vous* remain unchanged, and the third person plural is *zotte*, they. So: I die, is *mo mort*; they die, *zotte mort*; he steals, *li coquin*; you talk, *vous causé*. Verbs are conjugated by the curious interposition of the particles *ti*, *va*, &c.: thus, I died, *mo ti mort*; I shall die, *mo va mort*; I should have died, *mo ti va fine mort*.†

^{*} The spelling of the Creole here given is tentative (there is yet no standard or recognized practice) and as far phonetical as it could be, but retaining French vowel sounds and forms to show more readily its derivation.

† The verb *causé*, to talk—conjugated throughout.

Indicative present.

Mon causé, I talk.
To causé, thou talkest.
Li causé, &c.
Nous causé.
Vous causé.
Zotte causé.

The final *e* not accented if anything follows in the same sentence.

These particles often make the sentence look as verbose as the elegant French, *Qu'est-ce que c'est que cela*: thus, I should have gone if he had given me my money, *mon ti va fine allé, si li ti fine donne mon largent*. Some may think this mere jargon, but it may be remarked that the sentence is expressed by twelve Creole words, and needs eleven in English. Again: I will break your head if you continually beat me every day, *Mo va casse vous latete si vous batte batte moi tous les zours*, instances a Creole practice of expressing frequency by repeating the verb. Another peculiarity of this corruption of French is that it has a special form of the verb (used with *apres*) exactly equivalent to the English, I am, or, I was, conjugated with the present participle: as *mon apres causé*, I am talking; *mon apres ti causé*, I was talking.

The piety of the Creoles, especially perhaps of the *affranchis*, shows itself in a multitude of expressions, such as: *Bon Dié na pas content* (God is not pleased), for the thing is wrong. Again, in an uncertainty whether there is injustice or mischief doing which evades detection, they comfort themselves: *si li coquin, na rien ça*; *bon Dié va trouve li*, literally, if he steals, never mind, God will find him out. *Mo laisse li dans lamain bon Dié*, I leave him to God, is another of a number of similarly minded expressions that are frequent with them. Their wit, too, has found vent in not a few proverbs more or less original. They say, *Zacot moque son laqué* (la queue), literally, the monkey laughs at his tail—that is, he does not see that it belongs to himself; and they apply it when a person ridicules in another a fault of his own.

These examples show how French, in the mouths of a strange race, has begotten a new but kindred tongue, and may illustrate the process by which, further back in history, the Latin of the Empire became in its turn, in the mouths of the old Franks, a

Imperfect.

Mo ti causé. I talked, &c.

Perfect.

Mon fine causé.

Pluperfect.

Mon ti fine causé.

Future present.

Mon va causé. I shall talk.

Future past.

Mon va fine causé. I shall have talked.

Conditional present.

Mon ti va causé. I should talk.

Conditional past.

Mon ti va fine causé. I should have talked.

new but related language—the French of modern Europe. They will serve the further purpose of showing how the labour of English-speaking priests (who must preach in French) is increased by the necessity of learning Creole; for, in instructing a Malabar Creole or Chinaman, it must be employed. And their difficulty is further increased by the changes introduced by each nationality in the Creole. The Tamil-speaking Indian, rolls the “r’s” strongly, changes “f’s” into “p’s,” and gives sentences a Latin-like construction more suiting the genius of his own tongue. The Mozambique, on the contrary, cannot pronounce the “r,” but substitutes the letter “l,” thus, he says *paladon* for pardon, *cloile* for croire. And finally, to complete the confusion, comes the yellow, small-eyed Chinese, quaint as if he had just stepped from an old China plate; neither can he pronounce the “r,” nor most of the final syllables: these he omits until Creole is nearly as monosyllabic as his own tongue. He says *Quetien*, for Chretien; *lafoti*, for lafortune; *bapté* for bapteme. But the drollest feature of Creole by a Chinaman is that he chaunts it in a curious high-pitched sing-song, with frequent cadences, alternately about a sixth and a fourth above the general monotone. Sometimes John’s most violent attempts to speak clearly to you are simply enigmatical, except to one familiar with his ways. You are not one of these, and contemplate, for example, inviting a few friends to dinner, and you send to the nearest celestial shopkeeper to let you know what will be the cost of necessary articles for the feast. Ready and anxious, he at once waits on you bearing a written paper, from which he will read to you his choice of viands at lowest prices. He begins gaily with *folomá* at a marvellously cheap rate. But you ask, what *is* foloma at any price? And then with curious eye and mouth contortions and zealous effort, he endeavours to tell you more distinctly; but *folomá*, sung high and sung low is all your strained ears can catch. You try to read it on his paper—but the paper is in cursive Chinese. Shall you at a venture risk foloma for your friends? But there is danger in such blind trust—and your servant knows the man’s heathen ways, so he is brought in to your aid, and you learn that *folomá* was his best attempt to say fromage.

The heterogeneous mixture of money in use is in keeping with the variety of nationalities. The Government and standand reckoning is now in rupees, value about two shillings. But in daily dealings all manner of English coins, French livres and francs (though these are not now legal) gold doubloons and mohurs, silver dollars, cents, and among the Chinese a small thin coin, value three sous, called a marquee, are everywhere met with. You can buy at a Chinaman’s a

marquee's worth of anything that can be sufficiently subdivided.

It is needless to say much in description of the climate here below the line, with tropical heat and inverted seasons. It has already been said that the central plateau is cool enough generally to be pleasant, but the whole island round is, except for a month or two for some four hours from midday, endurable in the height of summer, and previously to the advent of yellow fever, was always mentioned as healthy to Europeans. Summer is from October to the following April; December when the sun is in the zenith of this island, being one of the dreadfully hot months. May is about the coolest of the year, indeed, cold sometimes on the highlands, and in July warm clothing is occasionally required. The south and south-east winds, prevalent for the greater part of the year, are cooling and agreeable; the north-west winds that set in generally about October are dry, hot, and disagreeable. The frequent rains both temper the heat and render the soil luxuriant; the sugar canes thrive on a fair general prevalence of showers, but too much rain, whilst it increases the quantity of juice deprives it of its proportion of saccharine. Two harvests of corn and most grains, vegetables, &c., can be grown in the year. Sugar canes, however, need from twelve to twenty months for their full growth.

The rainy season is from January to April, but showers fall any time; the hurricane and storm period nearly between the same months; the storms and heavy showers of the rainy season do for vegetation very much what the frosts and colds do in northern climes. As the trees here are not deciduous, it is only after a fierce hurricane that bare branches are to be seen. There is little difference in the length of the days all the year round; not more than two hours. In winter (the shortest days are at the June solstice) sun rises about 6 A.M., and sets about 5 P.M., which gives eleven hours of daylight; in summer (the longest days are at the December solstice) sun sets about 7 P.M., giving thirteen hours of day. There is no twilight, but the gorgeous magnificence of tropical sunsets, ever varying, are an unending delight for the observant eye and theme for poetical writers.

Hurricanes, regular visitants up to the end of the last century, are now rarer and less severe. But one of recent date—the cyclone of March, 1868—which raged for sixty hours will never be forgotten by those who witnessed it. Some 20,000 Malabar huts were carried away or blown down and thirteen hundred houses. Sixty-five bridges were destroyed; ninety human beings killed or fatally hurt. Thousands of buildings were injured,

warehouses unroofed, cattle carried away or killed, iron churches torn up and smashed to pieces; the Catholic church at Point aux Piments was terribly injured, as were others, and two iron girders of a bridge being built over Grand Riviere, each 200 feet long and nearly 300 tons weight, were blown off their columns into the river! The wind was as the fury of a god! It burst on the sea with the deafening report of near thunder-claps, drove the water in rapidly-revolving spirals high into the air; ships broke from their strong anchors and flew before the blast shuddering like stricken animals; Port Louis harbour was a scene of broken, ruined vessels, while on the land the securest, strongest works of man groaned and were torn like leaves from their fastenings, and terrified human beings trembled with awe of what might come. The epidemic was still rife, and wretched fever-stricken creatures, chiefly unhoused Malabars, crouched under rocks, or projecting storm *débris*, the victims of a double calamity. That dreadful epidemic of 1867 must now be briefly mentioned. Previously to it the climate was not prejudicial (as has been said) to the white population, but the fever has never since really left Port Louis—is, in fact, now endemic. Perhaps no less than 80 per cent. of the city residents now get the fever more or less severely. This is why all who can afford it are hurrying to the healthy inland elevation above the fatal fever zone; this is why city property has steadily depreciated in value since that year of infection and death.* The chief causes that led to the outburst of 1867 are generally said to have been overcrowding the island with Coolies—the Indians have a proclivity to febrile diseases and are of dirty habits; low-lying swamps, putrid stagnant waters, filth, emanations from open drains, and many other germ producers of malarial fever—many of these are complained of as being still rife, though remediable; and some add the over-extensive cutting down of the forests that once covered the island—but this has been perhaps of smaller influence, and has further, it is supposed, lessened the strength of hurricanes by diminishing the humidity of the atmosphere. The fever was actually severe in 1866, but in the early hot season of 1867 became a virulent epidemic. Port Louis was the most afflicted; population there had been 7413 to the square mile, and the death rate rose to 240 per day. The mortality of 1867 alone was nearly a decimation of the island, and taking the 36 months, 1866-8, the total deaths were 72,659

* A few years ago a large, good building was purchased for a Catholic school at a cost of 2600*l*. More money was after spent on repairs, &c. Enforced absence from the island obliged the proprietor, last year, to sell it, and it brought only 450*l*.

—a fifth of the entire population. The island became a vast pest-house; everywhere was death, or the fear of death or suffering worse than death. The fever brought dreadful complications, liver diseases, inflammation of stomach and lungs, and dropsy. Quinine was thought to be the grand specific, but its destructive action on the ague spores is equally destructive to muscles and mucous membranes when used in large quantities. The cure is as bad as the disease. Complete cinchonism, in fact, presents all the symptoms of a terrible malady. Quinine was then, and is yet, given here in doses of 10, 20, 30, even 50 grains daily. Irreparably injured stomachs, head affections, deafness, dropsy, are the frequent and often lasting results; and as a prophylactic (it is frequently used thus) it is said to be completely useless. The late lamented Bishop Hankinson was a victim to quinine; it is said that it was administered to him in as large doses as 80 grains a day! But the drug has an undoubted value at one stage of the fever, and in proper doses.

Almost every plant and herb which is indigenous to a tropical climate is to be found in Mauritius, and anything that will live in the tropics thrives on this marvellously fertile soil with the smallest amount of care. But the Mauritian neglects any cultivation for the market except that of sugar, and began to do so after the Act of Parliament of 1825 sanctioning the importation of colonial products into British markets. He now disdains any other as unworthy of a planter. Then it has brought the planters their great wealth: men are still making fortunes by it. All the elegancies, comforts, even luxuries of Europe are brought here, and find a ready market at an increase on their European price of at least 50 per cent: sugar gives the wealth to buy them. The Creoles call it their *vache à lait*.

The Mauritius now produces annually more than two hundred million pounds of sugar. The crop is steadily increasing: in 1863, a period of prosperity, it was 122,432 tons; in 1868, the hurricane and fever year, it fell to 70,000 tons; the crop of 1878-9 was 168,303 tons.* It would be wrong to conclude from this enormous quantity that the whole island is under sugar cultivation. Cane is not seen for several miles around Port Louis: from Port Louis to Grand Baie there is hardly any; in the higher lands the virgin forests have not quite disappeared—some large plains lie uncultivated at all. Perhaps not more than a twentieth part of the island is under sugar. But the soil has lent itself

* Speaking roughly, two-fifths of this is exported to Australia and the Cape, a fifth goes to India, another fifth to England, and the remainder in decreasing proportions to France and various places.

favourably to the cane, and gives a very large average crop to the acre. The present average is one to three tons per acre, most frequently about 2900 lbs.; but in past times so much as 12,000 lbs. has been known. Such immense quantities are no longer yielded by a hard-worked, even over-taxed, soil.

To become a sugar planter, or *habitant*, is the highest ambition of a successful Mauritian. The planter, however, requires large capital; may indeed realize a quick and enormous fortune, but runs the risk of losses on an equally gigantic scale. These gloomy reverses sometimes come rapid and destroying as their own hurricanes.

The planters of Mauritius are also manufacturers of the sugar. This increases their risks, multiplies tenfold the difficulty of administering the estates, and, adds Mr. Pike, is as imperfect a system as if a farmer in Europe were his own miller and baker! But facts seem to tell against this strong opinion: the machinery used by the Mauritians is the best that British or foreign works can turn out, and the prizes and gold medals of the large exhibitions find their way largely to this island.

Many estates are of about 1800 acres each, but some larger ones are as extensive as 5000 acres. And there are some 225 estates now at work on the island. The oversight of one of them is an engrossing and anxious task. There is an almost bewildering multiplicity of things to be watched and directed: fields, houses, and mills; the five or six hundred labourers, their wives and children; large herds of cattle and beasts of burden, pigs, goats, oxen from Madagascar, mules from Monte Video or Buenos Ayres. Then there is the irrigation and digging and manuring of the soil, and the vexed problem of *guanos versus* home manures to be solved practically, and the procuring, planting, and careful constant tending of the canes. A supply of new varieties of canes from New Caledonia has of late been imported, and the fields are being replanted with them. Early in the morning a bell calls up the establishment—labourers, masons, carpenters, smiths, drivers, sirdars, and officers. The rolls are called and then Coolies are marched off under their sirdars to their respective fields; drivers harness oxen and mules, all begin their respective portions of the vast work. Work goes on briskly till 9.30, when the bell calls to breakfast—which to men in distant fields is carried by their wives and children. At 4 o'clock work is over; sometimes the men labour by the piece, and some of them then manage to finish as early as 12 o'clock; but they are then free for the day.

When the harvest or *coupe* time arrives, a sugar estate is all animation, work, excitement; canes being cut, machinery

going, Coolies busy, and all the air pervaded with the odour of boiling sugar. After the canes have been crushed between the rollers, and their juice extracted, the expert planter can then calculate, very nearly, the amount of sugar it will yield. It is then passed through all the processes; is clarified, concentrated, and finally becomes the sugar of commerce. This is packed in vacoa bags for export. The dregs are sent to the distiller to be manufactured into rum, or are used as the treacle of commerce. There are over forty distilleries on the island yielding an annual quantity of 500,000 gallons. The crushed, juiceless cane fibre is called *bagasse*, and no part of it or of the new cut cane is allowed to waste. The leaves feed oxen and mules: the bagasse is stacked and serves as fuel to the engines and furnaces. And even the ashes from this fuel when it has fed the fires are kept with care; mixed with coral they make a most excellent mortar—the best, indeed, that can be had here.

The Mauritian planters undoubtedly over-taxed the energies of even their generous land, and the noteworthy diminution of the crops for some years after the enormous crop of 1863-4 was partly due to this cause. Over-manuring with an inappropriate substance (guano) and neglect of the great axiom of cultivation all the world over—a rotation of crops, were also influential causes. Canes and canes and nothing but canes, made the once fertile lands on the sea shore a desert. In several parts, thirty years ago, reputed the most fertile, the cane will not grow. The ruined mill and tall empty chimney standing as the last tokens of former prosperity. Any variety of cane, however, is deteriorated by the propagation from cuttings—the only available mode, as the seeds rarely ripen. The recent new varieties have helped largely the increased crops of late years.

Every sugar estate has its "camp" attached where the Malabar labourers reside. The huts are thatched with various palm leaves, but are neither architectural or picturesque. There is always an hospital attached, where medical attendance and duly certificated nurses are provided for the sick Coolies. And both are annually examined by officials and their condition reported to Government. On many estates, too, schools have been built, and are kept in working by the proprietors, for the Indian children of the estate.

The system of recruiting for Coolies is probably little known in England; it is superintended by Government, and none but willing recruits are allowed to sail for Mauritius. An intelligent sirdar, one gifted with an eloquent tongue, is picked out, is dressed well and sent to the district he is acquainted with in India; he makes a tour through towns and villages. Doubtless he sets forth in glowing terms the beauties and the riches

of this gem of the sea; and possibly not a little romantic exaggeration may be indulged in. The eyes of his audience are meanwhile carefully inspecting the comfortable and respectable appearance of the speaker. They note the real shillings sown on his vest for buttons, the massive silver rings around his neck and wrists; and their confidence is won by his presents to their children. But a more powerful argument with many of them is the number of returned Coolies who have brought home means, and bright accounts of their success, and who have proved their sincerity by *going back again* voluntarily to settle in Mauritius.

Those who engage themselves are taken to the nearest port and cared for in Government depots until the time of embarkation. Whatever bright visions they may come with, and never realize, it is certain the Coolies are better off, better paid, better fed than they were or would have been at home. There is a system of payment which leaves him free to return to his home in India without expense to himself; as has been seen, most of them choose to stay here, and more return again after leaving.

The Coolie learns on arriving here that Government is his protector, and that the Queen will redress all wrongs done to him. He knows where to complain if overworked, under-fed, or not paid according to agreement. There are magistrates especially for his benefit; he engages to a planter in presence of one of them, to whom appeal may be made, and by whom punishment will be adjudged if he violates the terms of his engagement. If a sugar estate becomes bankrupt, the Indian labourers stand the first creditors; to them banks, money-lenders, and what not, must all defer. In point of fact, the Indians rule the planter, rather than the planter the Indians. To the honour, however, of the Indian be it said that, as a rule, he is submissive, quiet, and hard-working, and thinks of his duties as much as of his rights. Often when the five years are over, and he is free to go, he prefers to remain under his master; many may be met who have been 28 or 30 years on the same estate. And to the honour of the masters be it said, that, when the epidemic of 1867 fell on the island, and not a tithe of the men could muster for work, and large estates were standing untouched because the hands that should have tilled and reaped them were paralyzed by death or helpless in the sad fever, the uniform kindness, attention, and care of the masters for their afflicted men and their families was as devoted as it was spontaneous. One such fact speaks abundantly.

Perhaps there are some readers who would be disappointed with an account of the Mauritius that contained no men-

tion of Bernardin St. Pierre's charming story, which has thrown a halo over the island and made some of its lovely scenery familiar to countless European readers. To the east of Port Louis lies the Vallée des Prêtres, now covered with market gardens for city supply, where Paul and Virginia lived; and a few yards only from the railway station at Pamplemousses are the tombs of the two lovers. History is in this case the destroyer of a pathetic romance; but, in its own turn, is scarcely less touching. St. Pierre's foundation for his story was the loss of the ship, *St. Géran*, in Tombeau Bay. This ship, laden with arms and provisions for the starving colonists, and having on board some 120 souls, left Lorient for Mauritius, March, 1744. She arrived within sight of Round Island in safety, but late in the evening; and after consultation, the captain, aware of the dangerous reefs, determined to tack about until morning. But at three o'clock in the morning the vessel struck the reefs outside Tombeau Bay, between land and the Isle d'Ambre, and the high sea drove it at once on the breakers. The masts came away with a crash and tore the bulwarks and carried off the boats. The keel soon snapped in two, and left the ship fixed on the reefs with her centre buried under water. Then, in the silent night, a cry of horror went up to the dark heavens, and men and women (most of them sick), some resigned, some murmuring, knelt down on deck and began to pray and to beg each other's pardon. At the captain's request, the chaplain on board gave them all the last absolution; and, amid the hissing and surging of the conquering waves, the doomed people sang together the *Ave Maris Stella*! It was their last earthly act, except silent, earnest prayer. A few men then tried to save themselves by swimming, or on rafts, but almost immediately perished. A painful suspense—and then the angry sea had washed down the last soul on board. Among the passengers were a young lady and her lover. They were to have been married on their arrival at Mauritius. He was agitated: she beautiful, calm, and resigned. He besought her to save herself on some frail spar with him; she preferred to await, in prayer, the doom that could not be averted. With his arm round her, as a fond but vain shield, he waited together with her the fate that soon overwhelmed them.

These are supposed to be the only historical foundations for Paul and Virginia. The rest is the writer's web of bright fancy. Much sentiment has been poured out over the tombs at Pamplemousses. That any bodies washed ashore could be recognized as those of the unfortunate lovers is unlikely; that any bodies at all were washed up from the wreck and received

sepulture on land is not recorded on any evidence: it is almost certain that at Pamplémousses no one is buried from the St. Gérân. One account of the island says: "Modern speculation has profited by the interest excited by their story, in the erection of two little monuments, entitled the tombs of Paul and Virginia." And another writer says that the tomb of Virginia was first erected, but the numerous pilgrims and visitors asking constantly for the other, not to disappoint them, the proprietor added that of Paul.

ART. II.—MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S "SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY."

(Being PART IX. of an *Examination of Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Psychology."*)

THE somewhat laborious task of minutely examining each section of every chapter* of Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Psychology" is now happily at an end. What remains to be considered may be handled differently.

* For the convenience of readers who may not have read the antecedent papers, I append the following references to them and to the work examined by them. Mr. Spencer's "Psychology" is a work in two volumes and eight parts, four parts being contained in his first volume. His Second Edition (the one examined) was published in 1872. The first six of these eight parts have now been examined in eight Essays, which have from time to time appeared in this REVIEW. The first Essay appeared in the DUBLIN REVIEW for Oct. 1874, pp. 476—508, and was devoted to an examination of the first part and the first chapter of the second part of Mr. Spencer's "Psychology." The second Essay appeared in the number for July, 1875, pp. 143—172, and concluded the examination of Mr. Spencer's second part. The third Essay was published in the DUBLIN REVIEW for Jan. 1877, pp. 192—219. It treated of the third part and the first six chapters of the fourth part of the "Psychology." The fourth Essay came out in April, 1877, p. 479, and reviewed the rest of Mr. Spencer's fourth part and the whole of his fifth part. The fifth and sixth Essays appeared respectively in Jan. 1878, pp. 157—194, and in Oct. 1878, p. 412. They treated of the first thirteen chapters of Mr. Spencer's sixth part, the examination of the rest of his sixth part being continued and concluded in the seventh and eighth Essays which were published, respectively in Jan. 1879, pp. 141—163, and in April, 1879, pp. 368—396. Thus, four Essays and 132 pages have been devoted to the examination of Mr. Spencer's first volume, and four Essays and 118 pages to that of the first part of his second volume, *i.e.*, to the sixth, and in many respects most important, part.

It has been deemed necessary so far to pursue the mode hitherto adopted, for two reasons: first, in order to guard as fully as possible against doing an injustice to the author criticized; secondly, because Mr. Spencer's whole metaphysical system avowedly reposes upon the special psychology he has developed, and no refutation of his philosophy could be satisfactory unless good evidence was given that his psychological views had been carefully considered and duly appreciated.

In the first six parts of his work all his fundamental principles are laid down, and all those facts and instances are given on which he relies for the support of his system. The various physiological and mental phenomena therein brought forward and his inferences from them have, therefore, seemed to require the most thorough and careful consideration possible.

In his seventh part, however, Mr. Spencer turns from considering the phenomena of animal life and of the human mind*

* As a new subject is thus entered upon it may be well to supply the reader with a brief enumeration of the contents of the earlier portions of Mr. Spencer's work.

The first part (*the Data of Psychology*) is an account of the essential and fundamental structure of the nervous system, with its supposed mode of action, together with the material conditions which influence such action, and contains statements as to the correlation of feeling and nervous conditions. Its contents may be thus summarized: Quantity and complexity of self-motion in animals vary with the mass and complexity of their nervous system (consisting of white conducting and grey quasi-explosive parts), which requires integrity, nutrition and warmth for its due action in pulsating intermittent nerve-reverberations—feelings running parallel to and follow the laws of nervous action.

His second part (*the Inductions of Psychology*) is an account of feelings from a subjective stand-point. The mind is therein represented as known only in states (each ultimately compound though seemingly simple), formed of feelings and relations (themselves feelings) between feelings segregated to their like in classes and sub-classes, according as they are simultaneous or successive, like or unlike—nothing being knowable except complexly segregated feelings transformed by repetition. A real objective cause, it is affirmed, is implied and must be assumed, but neither feelings nor relations are really equivalent to such objective nexus which is unknowable. Feelings and relations are said to be revivable and associable in the degree in which they are relational, and according to the conditions under which they are experienced. Pleasures and pains are represented as due to natural selection, which has evolved them in races which it has thus preserved.

His third part (*General Synthesis*) is an attempt, by a comparison of the phenomena of mind with those of organic life, to reinforce the argument of the two preceding parts. He attempts to show that all sense springs from primitive organic sensibility; that all the several senses spring similarly from primitive feeling; that similarly each special sense becomes more and more differentiated; that as sense-response is a correspondence of inner with outer relations, so intellectual response is but a further carrying out of the same process, and is separated from the

to the "consideration of the nature of human knowledge," and to criticisms of Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, to questions which admit of a more free mode of treatment, while, at the same time, they may not be without interest for the general reader.

former by no hiatus. Thus, he herein endeavours to show, by an elaborate comparison of Mind with Life, that the former, like the latter, is a correspondence between inner and outer relations, this correspondence increasing in speciality, generality, complexity, co-ordination and integration, as we advance from the lowest organisms up to civilized man—the highest mental acts arising by imperceptible gradations from primitive vital irritability.

In his fourth part (*Special Synthesis*) Mr. Spencer continues to apply his interpretation of mental states as phases and factors in the correspondence of inner to outer relations, to the various mental powers from reflex actions, through instinct and memory to reason, emotion and will. He tries to explain them as different degrees of such correspondence and different degrees and kinds of failure in adjustment, and so, from another point of view, to show that no hiatus exists between the lowest and the highest psychical states.

In his fifth part (*Physical Synthesis*) he tries to show that mental acts are interpretable in terms of matter and motion. He does so first by a sketch of a supposed mode of genesis of nervous systems, and then by showing how the various functions, translated into mental states, harmonize with the physical conception. The ultimate outcome of the teaching is that mental acts may be interpreted in terms of matter and motion, but that both these are alike unanalyzable, and are both caused by one inscrutable entity which is neither.

The gist of the five parts, which together form Mr. Spencer's first volume, may be shortly expressed thus:—

- I. Motion and feelings are parallelly correlated with nervous structure.
- II. Nothing is knowable but feelings which we must take as symbols of the unknowable, in the unanalyzable forms—mind, matter, motion.
- III. Mind is essentially the same as physiological activity.
- IV. There is no hiatus between the lowest and the highest psychical activities—the latter being the former; reiterated, accumulated, organized and inherited.
- V. Mental phenomena may be interpreted in terms of matter and motion—the latter being but symbols of the one unknowable cause of both mind and matter.

In the first volume, then, objective science is employed in attempting to explain the genesis and nature of the process of knowing.

In his sixth part (*Special Analysis*) Mr. Spencer proceeds to examine analytically the knowing process under all its forms, recognized by him, from the most complex to the most simple.

Thus, he therein treats of quantitative and qualitative reasoning and reasoning in general. Also classification, naming and recognition, the perception of objects, of space, of time, of motion, of resistance, and perception in general. This is followed by chapters on relations of similarity, co-intention, co-extension, connature and likeness, together with their opposites. Then follows a consideration of sequence and of consciousness in general, and the whole part concludes with a statement of what Mr. Spencer considers to be the legitimate results of what has preceded. The essence of this sixth part, then, is the contention that subjective psychology shows every thought or perception whatever to be a feeling of relations between relations, and all thoughts to be ultimately reducible to aggre-

But Mr. Spencer's philosophy has quite special claims on the interest and attention of Catholics, for there are many indications that it may be nothing less than the morning star heralding the dawn of a day of philosophical revival in England. Spencerism, like Lockism, may form a landmark in the history of Philosophy. Like Locke, Mr. Spencer has enunciated an ambiguous system—one capable of two distinct interpretations. It has been the fate of Locke to have been accepted and developed mainly in accordance with his negative and irrational side. It may be, and we trust it will be, Mr. Spencer's happier lot to be accepted and developed in harmony with those elements of truth which his system contains. Fatal and deplorable as are the errors he maintains, yet his inconsistencies may be so used as to neutralize each other, and the judicious application of a little "transverse vibration" to his system might rapidly and without violence convert it into an "allotropic state," in which its conspicuous characters would be startlingly diverse from those that it exhibits at present.

In fact, Mr. Spencer's system, by its inconsistencies and lacunæ, cries aloud for the scholastic philosophy to sustain and complete it, while it brings to the support of that philosophy a great variety of considerations, and helps to show how thoroughly it harmonizes with the most advanced science of the day—as fully with the science of the nineteenth century as with that of the thirteenth; indeed, in some respects, much more completely!

Spencerism also helps to refute and expose the shallowness of the philosophy of Descartes, and of all those who have followed in his footsteps (or in those of Locke) down to the present day; and so aids religion in another mode. For nothing is more common than to find religion assailed by means of attacks directed against views which the assailants believe to be essential to it; whereas, in truth, the views attacked are but philosophical errors which have descended from Descartes, but which may have been made use of, with more zeal than discretion, by some of the many

gated and segregated feelings of shock (supposed to be the psychical side of physiological nervous shocks), the ultimate psychical shock being either a feeling of unlikeness or of sequence, according to the direction taken by thought.

His seventh part (*General Analysis*), to the examination of which the present Essay is devoted, is occupied with an examination of different metaphysical systems and with the exposition of Mr. Spencer's own system.

In his eighth and last part (*Corollaries*) Mr. Spencer considers the classification of psychical powers and the development of conceptions, and treats of emotions and sentiments considered as preliminaries of the science of sociology.

good Christians who have adopted some or other form of Cartesianism instead of the older and emphatically Catholic philosophy.

Mr. Spencer, however, is evidently far from suspecting his own proximity to truth; and in the part of his psychology we are about to review, ignores in the most innocent way all philosophy save his own, and the various modified Cartesian philosophic heresies he attacks.

This mode of ignoring what it most behoves him to note, runs on all fours with the treatment he has again and again bestowed on psychological matters, as we have pointed out in the various preceding parts of this examination. Throughout, his fallacy has been that of presenting a part for the whole, and the part he has presented has ever been the part least important and significant. He is ever and again committing an error similar to that of describing "sculpture" as "stone breaking;" an ascent of Mont Blanc as composed of "a set of foot movements;" or "eating" as "muscular contractions."* His whole psychology is directed against the recognition of intellect and knowledge because he does not know how intellect and knowledge are possible, and because their unequivocal recognition would be fatal to his system. He therefore employs an exceptionally acute and powerful intellect, exceptionally stored with knowledge, in the task of proving we can neither acquire the latter nor employ the former since he thinks he has shown by the employment of both that neither have any existence. Thus, as has been again and again pointed out, he ignores our highest faculties altogether, and we have not yet met in his psychology with one explicit recognition of our power of apprehending truth, goodness, or beauty, or even with an apprehension of identity.

The recognition of such grave defects may seem inconsistent with what has been just said about the value of Mr. Spencer's system for Catholics,† and may support the question whether too much time and trouble is not being taken with the examination of his psychology. But in these defects our author does not stand alone; he inherits them from, and shares them with, the whole sensist school.‡ Mr. Herbert Spencer is the best representative man of a phase of modern philosophy, and his influence is extending not only throughout English-speaking countries—notably in the United States—but also in France. Mr. Spencer has been termed by Mr. Darwin "our great philosopher," and there is no doubt that he is regarded by many Darwinians and followers of Haeckel as the

* See DUBLIN REVIEW for Jan. 1879, p. 386.

† The writings of the late George Henry Lewes have perhaps even more value still for us, as justifying the scholastic philosophy.

‡ DUBLIN REVIEW, October, 1874, p. 476.

paramount authority on all philosophical questions. Nor am I disposed to question his intellectual achievements. Possessing as he does an acquaintance with almost all branches of physical science, together with a singular quickness in the detection of analogies, and much analytic power, he has the good fortune to be able to manifest his wealth of thought by a corresponding richness of diction, his style being clear and forcible, abounding in picturesque illustrations, aptly chosen for the purpose they are intended to subserve, and often possessing even a poetical beauty. Vigorous and well-exercised natural faculties have enabled him to gather up within his delicate yet nervous grasp, not only the multitudinous threads spun by the various discoverers in physical science, but also those more subtle fibres which our recent and best known psychologists have drawn forth; weaving the whole with dextrous skill into an intellectual fabric of great delicacy and apparent cohesion.

These great merits seem to call for recognition here and now, because we have been so long occupied in almost exclusive fault-finding (necessitated by the object and method pursued) that without such recognition the reader may go away with a false impression of Mr. Spencer's whole work, and commit the dangerous, no less than unjust, error of unduly despising a noble and powerful opponent.

Mr. Spencer has, indeed, so co-ordinated, supplemented, and developed the doctrines of his contemporaries and immediate predecessors that the philosophy he sets before us is the very culmination of their efforts—the bloom and fructification resulting from long-continued anterior processes of growth. Not only if his philosophy is true should we then be thankful to him for its promulgation, but also even though it be false, since we may be sure that if he fails to sustain his system his failure must be due to no deficiency on his part but to a fatal defect in his cause—a defect only made the more patent by the ability of its advocate.

In commencing his metaphysical controversy (his seventh part) he makes the statement that he has reached what he considers to be the "Final Question,"*—namely, the question as to

* This is the title of the first chapter of the seventh part, the contents of the sections of which may be thus shortly expressed:—§ 384. The problem to be investigated is that concerning the nature of human knowledge, a problem often dealt with first instead of last. § 385. A hopeless mode, since a true theory of knowledge involves a true theory of that which knows and a true theory of that which is known. § 386. The question is, can the ultimate assumptions which have been hitherto provisionally admitted, be verified with the coherent body of conclusions to which acceptance of them has led? § 387. In other words—is the relation assumed to exist between subject and object valid? If the idealist is right, the doctrine of evolution is a dream.

the possibility and validity of human knowledge,—the genesis and nature of the process of knowing, and the analytical examination of the knowing process having occupied the six preceding parts.*

* In order to be the better able to estimate the arguments "pro and con" which follow, it may be well to place before the reader a short restatement of the contentions raised by me against the views propounded by Mr. Spencer in the six parts above referred to.

As to his first part I have (DUBLIN REVIEW, October, 1874) objected to some errors and inaccuracies of detail, and to some very important "beggings" of the main question as to the distinction between thought and feeling. Also to some defects of analysis and a mode of treatment tending, by implication, to prejudice readers who are not on their guard, against truths which are but directly attached or even explicitly referred to.

Against his second part I have contended (DUBLIN REVIEW, July, 1875) that external things as well as feelings are really knowable, and that objective truth is revealed to us through the self-conscious Ego, which also shows us that there *is* an essential difference between mind and matter; which two entities are known to us intellectually. Also that the First Cause must be of the nature of that one of these two which possesses the power to know. Further, that this "power to know" being a power of each of us who is at once soul and body in one (a body subject to the laws of matter and motion), is *hic et nunc* accidentally bound in our intellect, to follow the laws of the mere imagination (its instrument), though it can indefinitely transcend the latter in its range. Further, that the nature of the action of the human mind is fundamentally different from the highest brute psychosis; and, finally, that it is not only gratuitous but unreasonable to assume one underlying base of which matter and mind are diverging forms.

Against his third part I have argued (DUBLIN REVIEW, January, 1877) that organic life, though it, of course, includes a series of correspondences between the organism and its environment, is something more than such correspondences themselves. That there is, of course, much analogy between mind and organic life, and that organic conditions supply the material of intellectual action, but that "sentience" really *is* more than "vital irritability," and that "intellect" is more than modified "sentience." That an ignorance of limits is no proof that limits do not exist; and that Mr. Spencer's inability to show the transitions he asserts, and his habit of silently introducing the very powers, the existence of which have to be explained, reinforce the other arguments in favour of the existence of a rational principle.

As to his fourth part, I say (DUBLIN REVIEW, April, 1877) that Mr. Spencer's attempt to bridge over the gulf between reason and sentience fails, because he takes no note of memory, reason, and will, as made known to us in their highest forms by our consciousness, although much that he advances may be usefully employed to elucidate the highest psychical powers of irrational animals, to elucidate the sensuous basis of true intellectual action, and intellectual action itself in so far as connected with the sensuous phantasmata of which it makes use. I contend that his law, or rule, of the growth of "intelligence" is in fact but a law, or rule of the growth of the imagination.

Against the attempt made by his fifth part to interpret mental phenomena in terms of matter and motion—symbols of an unknowable unity

The course which he has pursued in thus deferring to the last so fundamental a consideration as that of the validity of knowledge itself is, he contends, a most reasonable one, and is the one which mankind has unconsciously pursued. Knowledge, he says, truly enough, implies something known and something which knows, while a theory of knowledge must be a theory of the relation between these two. The first is objective science, the second subjective science, while the theory of the relation between them is a branch of metaphysics.

That the theories of the known and of the knowing have assumed their final shapes, and that a finished theory of knowing is now possible, Mr. Spencer deems an absurd assumption; but he considers that those who have followed him so far are in a better position for reconsidering the theory of knowledge, because the theories of things known and of the process of knowing have been reduced to a more systematic form.

The question before us is the question whether the ultimate dicta of reason, as reconsidered from the most advanced post gained by previous enquiries, can be harmonized into a consistent self-supporting doctrine, or whether we are compelled to entertain beliefs which contradict each other—whether, in a word, a

which is neither. I contend (DUBLIN REVIEW, April, 1877) that though sensation may be admitted to be a function of animated matter, and though mental phenomena cannot be experienced by us save through sensation, yet intellectual perceptions themselves are incapable of a material interpretation. That this is not at once evident in Mr. Spencer's book is due to the fact that he ignores our highest intellectual powers. I admit, however, that his account of the genesis of nervous structures of all degrees of complexity through physical agencies, and of the relations of sensitive functions to such structures, are most ingenious, instructive, and suggestive.

Against his sixth part I urge (DUBLIN REVIEW, Jan. 1879), that far from all our thoughts and perceptions being feelings—relations between relations—that intellect is occupied with the perception of facts and existences, and with relations cognised as facts real or ideal; that inference is a distinct process of which classing, naming, and recognition are not forms; that we have direct perceptions external and internal; that extension and duration are intuitions not to be analyzed into varied nervous shocks, and that our perceptions of likeness and sequence are not alone primordial, but our perceptions of identity, and of our own being are primordial also. I maintain that in all the illustrations used and in all representations given of our higher mental acts, the essential parts of the perceptions and thoughts are ever omitted, and the mere materials of thought represented as being the thought itself. Finally, I express my belief that the radical fault of Mr. Spencer's Psychology is his constant endeavour to resolve our higher faculties into our lower, an endeavour which necessarily results, if persevered in, in the misrepresentation of intellect, the ignoring of morality, and the denial and ultimate paralysis of the will.

consistent philosophy is possible, the reasonings of idealists and sceptics being proved fallacious.

To the task of showing that they are fallacious, he begins at once to address himself in his second chapter.* In taking this course, he, indeed, may be said to appear in the character of Satan casting out Satan; for (as we have partly seen already, and shall more clearly see later) his own system—apart from the transforming process we would apply to it—is as sceptical as need be, since (as will be ultimately pointed out) it logically involves the *denial of all truth whatever*.

He, however, begins his process of exorcism by taking idealist metaphysicians to task for preferring to trust to the long and complex mental processes he represents as "reason," rather than to the short and simple process of "perception," which ought to convince them of the existence of an external world; and he points out that the most fruitful reasoners (men of science) agree with the vulgar in preferring perception to reasoning, as is shown by their use of experimental verification to test the accuracy of their various calculations. He also justly remarks that metaphysicians can never argumentatively justify the validity of reason, since that must be already taken for granted in any argument by which the superior trustworthiness of reason is to be shown.

And here the utility—nay, the absolute need—of some such careful examination as we have made of Mr. Spencer's earlier parts will be at once apparent. For in his contention against the Idealists (in which he is both right and wrong) Mr. Spencer's errors spring in part from that misapprehension of his as to what the reasoning process is, which has been pointed out† in an earlier portion of this examination, to which earlier portion I must now refer the reader. I have there shown that he gives no evidence of either understanding the difference between ratiocination and direct intellectual apprehension, or of being

* The contents of the second chapter (entitled "The Assumptions of Metaphysicians") may be thus concisely represented. § 388. Why do metaphysicians trust their long and complex mental processes in preference to their short and simple mental processes? § 389. Because they tacitly assume the supreme authority of the reasoning process through which such marvellous results have been reached. § 390. This is a mere superstition, since "reasoning" is but the re-co-ordinating of states of consciousness already co-ordinated in simple ways, and "re-co-ordination" can give no more validity to its products than co-ordination can. § 391. But ordinary men and the most effective learners (men of science), both rather trust the short and simple process, as is shown by the practice of experimental verification; and metaphysicians can never justify their preference for reason rather than perception for the very validity of reason must be taken for granted in every argument about it.

† See DUBLIN REVIEW for January, 1878.

aware that no metaphysician worthy of the name considers the former of these processes to be higher or more valid than the latter, but that, on the contrary, such metaphysicians deem ratiocination to be an inferior process needed by the imperfection of our nature.

The true philosophy which he ignores (but into which his own, if it is to live, must be transformed) recognises the validity of *all* our faculties—sensitive, intuitive, and ratiocinative. Scepticism, indeed, necessarily results from the rejection of any one of them; that philosophy, then, supports him in his attack on those who would deny the validity of our perceptions (*e.g.*, of extension, duration, &c.) in favour of Idealism. But Mr. Spencer carries his attack too far, and unduly disparages reason. What else have we to trust to but our reason, and why should we distrust it? Although it would be, as he says, a *petitio principii* to attempt to prove its validity by argument, yet it is a reasonable course to endeavour to show that if all our ultimate powers are taken as co-ordinate, and all of them trusted, no self-contradiction ensues; but, on the contrary, that there results a mental harmony and a justification of that correspondence between our own perceptions and external things, for the existence of which our faculties spontaneously vouch—*i.e.*, for a true conformity between what our perceptions tell us are external things, and what our reflective self-consciousness tells us are our ideas of such things.

In examining such a question as the validity of our direct perception of external objects, it is impossible not to have recourse to reasoning. The question cannot be tested by what Mr. Herbert Spencer calls direct processes. To attempt to use such processes is to assume the very matter in dispute, and to be guilty of a *petitio principii* like that which would attend the argumentative proof of the validity of argument.

Moreover, Mr. Spencer himself attempts to subordinate the direct to the indirect process when he refuses to accept the objective reality of the shapes and densities of external objects, and still more so when he declines to admit the validity of our perception of our own being as a substance having "mental states," and uniting subject and object in one. He thus opens the door to all the very scepticism he reprobates.

But, as has been said, he unduly disparages reason when he represents our experimental verifications of our calculations, as an appeal from "reason" to something else. The fact is (as has been before shown) he not only, on the one hand, fails to distinguish between ratiocination and direct intellectual action, but he also, on the other hand, confounds the latter with sentience.

Now, in experimental verification the sensitive faculty is, of course, appealed to, but not as our really *ultimate* appeal. The ultimate appeal must be to reason acting in direct *intellectual* intuition. In such experiments, then, the ultimate appeal is not to sense, but to the *intellect*, which may doubt, and which criticizes and judges the actions and suggestions of the senses and the imagination. Though no knowledge is possible for us except as following upon sensation, yet the ground of all our developed knowledge is not sensational but intellectual, and its final justification depends, and *must* depend, not on "feelings," but on "thoughts"—that is, on our reason. "Certainty" does not exist at all *in feelings*, any more than doubt. Both belong to thought only. Reason, therefore, is our ultimate and absolute criterion. It is only by self-conscious thought that we *know* we have any feelings at all.

Much as we differ from the metaphysicians combated by Mr. Spencer, we must nevertheless affirm that he attacks them unjustly for making assumptions which no man who enters upon such a question at all can avoid making. Our reason is and must be an ultimate appeal both in its indirect process of ratiocination, "inference," and in its direct intellectual apprehensions, aided by sense presentations. These metaphysicians are not then to be blamed for their appeal to reason, though they are justly to be blamed for their distrust of the direct reports of their intellect acting through sense. A rational system of philosophy must recognise, as that of Balme does, the fact of certainty from the beginning, and not only accept the validity of our ratiocinative processes as certain, but also accept the certainty of all our faculties of apprehension when acting normally and under normal circumstances. Thus, as we said before, Mr. Spencer is both right and wrong in this incipient portion of his attack on the Idealists.

Mr. Spencer next proceeds to consider the "Words of Metaphysicians,"* and contends that their very expositions of Idealism cannot be expressed without the use of terms which imply the very realism they deny. He quotes Berkeley's expression: "*By*

* In his third chapter, which bears the above title. The following is a short statement of its contents:—§ 392. Every word has, besides its intrinsic, many extrinsic connotations. § 393. It is impossible to construct a sentence the words of which shall not imply real objective existence, and the Idealist's explanation of any idea is a most involved and cumbrous pseudo-explanation in which the term to be explained has to be over and over again assumed, and the word idea becomes devoid of meaning. § 394. Also Hume's term "impression," if it be not taken to connote two distinct existences, deprives any words which may be used with it of their meanings. § 395. Thus, language absolutely refuses to express the idealistic and sceptical hypotheses.

sight I have the ideas of light and of colours;" and taking the words *seriatim*, shows that each connotes both objective and subjective existence, and he affirms that the sentence quoted is really equivalent to saying, "Through clustered and connected ideas, adjusted in a certain ideal way to something else which must be an idea, I have an idea of colour." He also represents the idealist explanation of a term (such, *e.g.*, as colour) by an intentionally absurd algebraic equation, which expresses the value of an unknown quantity, in terms of itself and of other unknown quantities which involve it, *ad infinitum*. He then attacks Hume, and shows that in his explanation of the faint states of consciousness as "impressions" (which with faint states of consciousness, or ideas, make up all our mental furniture, according to that author), he either by that very term "impressions" implies objective as well as subjective existences, or else the words which are used along with it become deprived of meaning, and thus "*language absolutely refuses to express the idealistic and sceptical hypotheses.*"

In these criticisms Mr. Spencer has both common sense and reason substantially on his side. Of course a word cannot be used without implying the various categories of existence it does imply. Moreover, he has a good *argumentum ad hominem* against Berkeley, whom he has quoted as saying, "Whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape or colour. . . . And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract ideas whatsoever." Thus, Berkeley, by always insisting on thus reducing the abstract to the concrete, himself fatally ties down intellect to mere sense. It is much to be regretted that Mr. Spencer has never become acquainted with Catholic philosophy. He speaks of examining "the language used by metaphysicians," as if all metaphysicians were of the schools whose teaching he here controverts.

In examining (in Berkeley's sentence before quoted) the word "I," Mr. Spencer says, "We need not go into the vexed question of personal identity;" a question which it is very convenient indeed for him to shirk, for its thorough examination would upset his whole system by showing the certainty of our knowledge of our own continued existence. By the use of the very same mode of analysis as Mr. Spencer has made use of against Berkeley—namely, by analyzing the words of a proposition—I have elsewhere* shown that the sentence "a state of consciousness exists," is either a meaningless jumble of sounds or of

* "Lessons from Nature," chap. i. Murray, 1876.

characters, or else is the implicit affirmation of that enduring Ego—that substance of mind—which Mr. Spencer does not recognise the existence of. If language refuses to conform to Idealism, it no less refuses to conform to unmodified Spencerism. The choice to which we are reduced in his case, no less than in that of the Idealists, may be expressed in his own words (p. 335): "The choice is, in every case, between self-contradiction, or entire absence of meaning, or complete inversion of meaning." It is strange that a man of Mr. Spencer's acuteness and ability should so clearly expose the folly of others, and not see the force and effect of the very same exposition when applied to his own folly.

But his attack on Idealism is not entirely happy or altogether forcible. Thus, to the obvious reply that Idealists by the expression "ideas of colours" mean the ideas belonging to the class of ideas distinguished as colours, and that what Berkeley means, is to state that he has various classes of ideas which he distinguishes as those of touch, of taste, of smell, of sound, &c., each of which when it occurs he distinguishes as of, or belonging to, its class, Mr. Spencer rejoins as follows (p. 325): "That this is not what the words mean will be obvious on taking a parallel case. Suppose, referring to oysters, I call them the animals of mollusca; will it be admitted that I have correctly expressed myself as meaning animals of the class mollusca?" Surely an Idealist might surrejoin, "By oysters I mean ideas belonging to the group of ideas which I class under the idea mollusca, which I again class under the still wider idea animal, and so on." Mr. Spencer therefore is somewhat too absolute in his denial of meaning to the words of Idealists. Their use of words outrages the common sense of mankind, and, as I believe, true philosophy also, and ends logically in absolute scepticism, as Mr. Spencer's own system also does. Nevertheless, it is possible to give a non-natural meaning to their words, nor could such acute minds so long have persisted, and still continue to persist in Idealism, if it were the pure and simple nonsense which he represents it to be.

In this chapter there occurs, by the way, a passage which may be used to almost a *reductio ad absurdum* of sensism, and as showing that a "perception" cannot possibly be a group of impressions or sensations of any kind, but is an intellectual act by which the essence of a thing is abstracted from its phantasmata.

In his opposition to Hume, Mr. Spencer supposes the approach from a great distance, to a man whose image at first appears as a mere black dot on a distant mountain side, but ultimately so enlarges as it is approached, that, ultimately, the image of one

button of his dress with a small portion of cloth round it excludes all other visual images from the vision of the person so approaching. Other successively changing images are supposed to appear as his different parts are explored in succession by the person who has approached him, moving round him, and, finally, a continuous retreat reduces his image, by infinitesimal gradations, once more to a black dot. Mr. Spencer then asks, "What is my visual impression of a man? Three imaginable answers only can be given. It is the state of consciousness existing at any moment during the time in which consciousness is undergoing these changes; or it is a certain set of such states that occur during a certain part of the time; or it is the sum of the series of states occurring during the time" (p. 332). He replies by showing the absurdity to which we should be reduced by regarding these impressions without the objective implications, but says that when the latter are added they become comprehensible "as caused by the changing relations between two existences."

But no "relations" between sensations, any more than the "impressions" on sentience, can themselves give rise to an "idea" (such, *e.g.*, as "a man") except to an intellect. The idea is "a unity," while the sensation felt or unconsciously remembered, together with the various relations between them, are a multiplicity, and this multiplicity persists and exists alongside of that unity which it has served to elicit from the intellect. Mr. Spencer objects to Hume's view that mere "impressions" can explain the idea "a man" the following remark (p. 334): "To say that the existence which I call the impression of a man is the totality of all these changing phases of my consciousness, is to say that by unity I mean multiplicity; as is also to say that by a thing which exists, I mean an almost infinite series, the remoter members of which are absolutely different and no two of which are present together." But this very objection applies with all its force against Mr. Spencer's representation of our idea of a man. The only way out of the various difficulties is to recognise the active intellect as extracting and apprehending the essential unity from the co-existing and successive multitude of sensuous impressions and relations.

Thanking Mr. Spencer for this apt illustration of the insufficiency of sensism to explain even our simplest ideas, he may also be thanked for the chapter containing it, which is, as a whole, a good one; and although, as has been said, he is somewhat too hard upon Idealists, he yet speaks truly when he says, as he does in conclusion: "Language has, in fact, been throughout its development moulded to express all things under the fundamental relation of subject and object, just as much as the hand has been moulded into fitness for manipulating things presented

under this same fundamental relation ; and if detached from this fundamental relation, language becomes as absolutely impotent as an amputated limb in empty space."

Having now criticized the assumptions and words of metaphysicians, he next* addresses himself to consider their reasonings, as so many elaborate methods of rejecting the fundamental dicta of consciousness and affirming what is contrary to universal belief. Justly does he criticize and blame the metaphysicians he attacks, but they do not represent the only school thus blameworthy, but all those who reject the material and spontaneous declaration of reason in favour of the existence of both mind and matter, either because they cannot explain *how* the knowledge we have of them is come by, or because they do not like the religious consequences which follow from the admission of such existences. Of the people who, not content with the spontaneous certainty their nature gives them, fall into the absurdity of denying the existence of either mind or matter—not only those who by extraordinary intellectual gymnastics succeed in spinning out fantastic idealistic systems, but also those who by a process of ignoring all that is highest in themselves construct degrading materialistic systems—most absurd of all, however, are those who upon an idealistic basis erect a materialistic system, thus realizing a double absurdity to their own temporary glory and the wondering admiration of the educated vulgar.

It is the Idealists, however, who come in for Mr. Spencer's objurcation, and he naturally first attacks Berkeley, taking up his dialogue between *Hylas* and *Philonous*. Availing himself

* Chapter IV. "The Reasonings of Metaphysicians." The contents of this chapter may be thus summarized:—§ 396. Waiving the objections made as to words and assumptions, let us examine Berkeley's reasonings. § 397. His argument can be brought to a dead-lock at the outset, since he cannot argue against material substance without being forced to admit his consciousness of it ; for to be conscious of an absurdity it is needful to be conscious of two incongruous things, alleged to be congruous. § 398. Hume's divisions (1) of the "perceptions of the mind," into "impressions" and "ideas," and (2) of "all objects of human reason or inquiry," into "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact," and his mode of inquiry, which is in the teeth of his own principles, are both so illogical and incoherent that any conclusions he arrives at are invalidated by the badness of his principles. § 399. Similarly, Kant presents us with a doctrine which positively contradicts our primary cognitions, as a refuge from another doctrine which only doubts them. By a criticism of his doctrine as to Time and Space, we may see that a variety of impossibilities of thought are offered us to escape a supposed insurmountable, but really readily surmountable, difficulty of interpretation. § 400. The belief of Sir William Hamilton as to the subjectivity of space may be disproved by his own criterion. § 401. So worthless are the metaphysical reasonings of Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and Hamilton, who agree in rejecting some or many of the fundamental dicta of consciousness !

of Berkeley's position "that sensations are the only things immediately perceived," he shows that *Hylas* is over-hasty in admitting that "material substance is senseless without doubt;" and here we may quite agree with Mr. Spencer, for the living material substance of an animal is endowed with sense-perception. This, however, is not Mr. Spencer's point, but he endeavours to show that Berkeley's argument can be brought to a dead-lock at the outset, because he really recognises the existence of material substance in controverting its existence. A Berkeleyan, I think, would find little difficulty in disposing of Mr. Spencer's attack, but I am not called upon to take up the cudgels for the exemplary and acute Bishop whose system, however defensible, is, I conceive, fundamentally irrational and naturally leads to complete scepticism.

He next turns to Hume, and shows the imperfections of his classifications of "the perceptions of the mind," and "the objects of human reason and inquiry," and then considers his mode of arguing, making some remarks which may be usefully cited. He says (p. 347): "If, in a philosophical work, we come upon a chapter entitled 'Unhesitating faith in the operations of the understanding,' we should of course expect to find in it large claims. . . . Even in a chapter thus entitled, however, we should be taken aback by the assumption that we can know not only the ultimate truths presented by the universe as it exists, but also that we can know what would remain true if the universe did not exist. How, then, shall we express our amazement on finding such an assumption in a chapter entitled 'Sceptical doubts concerning the operation of the understanding?' Yet Hume makes this assumption. The test by which he professes to distinguish *relations of ideas* is, that their truth does not depend 'on what is anywhere existent in the universe'—they would remain true were there nothing in the universe. So that the understanding is supposed capable of perceiving what would hold under conditions which *do not exist*; while 'sceptical doubts' are entertained respecting its ability to perceive what holds under the conditions which *do exist*! And the marvellous fact is that this exalted faith in the understanding furnishes a *datum* for the argument which is to justify 'sceptical doubts' concerning it! On the belief in its transcendent power is based the proof of its utter impotence!" Mr. Spencer also asks a pertinent question. Hume teaches that the validity of any philosophical expression is to be tested by inquiring *from what impression it is derived*, and if it be impossible to assign any, the suspicion of its meaninglessness will be confirmed. Mr. Spencer asks from what "impression" is derived "the idea of a universe containing truths dependent on nothing in it."

He also attacks Hume's doctrine that our idea of *cause* is due to *habit*; and asks what is the "impression" from which the term "*habit*" is derived, and maintains that *experience* and *habit* cannot "be assigned as giving origin to the notion of *cause*, without involving the notion of cause in the explanation."

Mr. Spencer may be invited to ponder over this dilemma himself, as upon the evolutionary theory either (as we maintain) a rational nature suddenly appears in man with the idea of cause so latent that it springs into being on the occurrence of the perception of phenomenal changes, or else it must be latent in the "mind" of an "*ameeba*," nay, even in the spore of a fungus or a thread of *conferva*.

From Hume, Mr. Spencer proceeds to criticize Kant, especially attacking his doctrine that "*Space*" and "*Time*" are only subjective forms of intuition with which the mind clothes, as it were, the objects of its external perception. Mr. Spencer, on the other hand, contends (p. 352) that "consciousness of likeness and unlikeness is the only true 'form,' whether of intuition, or of understanding, or of reason; and that analysis shows it to be undeniable that subjective Time and Space are forms derived from this primordial form." . . . "Even when we reduce space-consciousness to its ultimate components, this necessary form of it is equally manifest, if not, indeed, more manifest. That two positions may be conceived as related, they must be conceived as like or unlike in distance, or direction, or both." It is strange that Mr. Spencer does not see that in his "ultimate components" we have already got that "*Space*" which he says is composed by them. To have the conception of two positions like or unlike "in distance or direction," the mind must already have either Kant's "form," or else have spontaneously abstracted the idea Space from the abstraction "*extension*," which it has at once abstracted in perceiving extended bodies.* Similarly with Time, it is impossible to be aware of Mr. Spencer's examples of the components of that "form," "the tickings of a clock or to feel one's pulse," without already either possessing it or else having abstracted the idea Time from the abstraction "*duration*," which the intellect has the power at once to abstract† in perceiving succeeding things.

Mr. Spencer then observes:‡ "The proposition on which the Kantian doctrine proceeds, that every sensation caused by an object is given in an intuition which has space for its form is not true;" and in a note he instances sound and odour, saying,

* See DUBLIN REVIEW for January, 1879, p. 144.

† DUBLIN REVIEW, l. c. p. 149.

‡ "Psychology," vol. ii. p. 354.

"Whoever thinks that sound and odour have space for their form of intuition may convince himself to the contrary by trying to find the right and left sides of a sound, or to imagine an odour turned the other way upwards." Now, I take it, a Kantist would have little difficulty in replying to an objection such as this, which might have been brought against his system by a school-boy; but as I have before lately pointed out,* according to Mr. Spencer's own system, we ought to be able to perceive "an extended sound" and "a solid smell."

In another criticism however he is, I think, fully justified. He quotes Kant as saying, "We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it;" and Mr. Spencer then observes that this proposition may be disputed, saying: "The space which remains after we have conceived all things to disappear, is the space in which they were *imagined*—the ideal space in which they were *represented*, and not the real space in which they were *presented*. The space said to survive its contents is the form in which *re-intuition* takes place; not the form in which *intuition* takes place. Kant says that the *sensation* (mark the word) produced by an object is the matter of intuition, and that space in which we perceive this matter is the form of intuition. To prove this, he turns from the space known through our open eyes, and in which the said intuition occurs, to the space known when our eyes are closed, and in which the re-intuition or imagination of things occur; and having alleged that the ideal space survives its contents, and therefore must be a form, leaves it to be inferred that the real space has been shown to be a form which survives its contents." He then makes an analogous criticism as to Time. But I believe that the notion which I have advocated in this REVIEW meets all the difficulties of the case—the notion, namely, that "space" is a mere abstraction from "extension." "Extension" itself is, of course, an abstraction from extended things, but accompanying the idea of "extension," there is always a vague image of some extended body. When we speak of "space," however, we mean "the quality of extension as completely abstracted from all bodies whatever, and thought of purely by itself." "Extension" is real and objective as a quality of real extended objects; Space is altogether ideal; and when we speak of bodies as "occupying space," it is a mere *façon de parler*, denoting the exclusion of one extended body by another. In the same way the conception of Time is altogether "ideal," an abstraction from the objective quality "succession," and meaning "suc-

* DUBLIN REVIEW, April, 1879, p. 384.

cession as completely abstracted from all objects and events, and thought of purely by itself," which is to a certain extent objective as "the *duration* of the mutual exclusions of all succeeding things."^{*}

I think therefore that Mr. Spencer fails to reduce Kant's "form" to his own supposed primordial form. He is more successful, however, in his endeavour to show that a belief that "Space" and "Time" are nothing but subjective forms, or properties of the Ego is a belief which conflicts with our reason.†

The Kantian doctrine not only compels us to dissociate from the *non-ego* these forms as we know them, but practically forbids us to recognise or suppose *any* forms for the *non-ego*. Kant says that "Space is *nothing else* than the forms of all phenomena of the external senses—that is, the subjective conditions of the sensibility under which alone external intuition is possible." That is a tacit affirmation that there is no form of objective existence to which it corresponds; since, if there were, it would be *something else* than the subjective condition of the sensibility. He says, too, that "Time is *nothing but* the form of our internal intuition . . . it inheres not in the objects themselves, but *solely* in the subject (or mind) which intuits them." And he distinctly shuts out the supposition that there are forms of the *non-ego* to which these forms of the *ego* correspond, by saying that "Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward experiences, . . . the representation of space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena through experience." Let us observe, then, the two alternative conclusions respecting the *non-ego* between which we have to choose. The first is that the *non-ego* is formless. Though, as existing internally, the matter of every intuition has its form, yet, as existing externally, the object to which this intuition relates has no form. As we have seen, Kant defines *form* as "that which effects that the content . . . can be arranged under certain relations." Understanding form in this sense, then, we must say that the *non-ego* cannot have its content arranged under certain relations. But to say this is to say that the *non-ego* has no parts, since to have parts is to have content arranged in relations; and it is equally to say that it is not a whole, for a whole necessarily implies

* See DUBLIN REVIEW for January, 1879, p. 150.

† Of course I shall not be suspected of the impertinent folly of implying by this any real disrespect for so great a thinker as Kant. But great as Kant was, he was in part the creation of his epoch, and was saturated with the poison of Cartesianism which had spread itself far and wide. Mr. Spencer's argument (p. 361) that "by no effort can any one separate, or think away, space and time from the objective world, and leave the objective world behind," and the other that "the implied statement that objects have an existence apart from space and time," is one which is "unthinkable and meaningless," is an argument which in one sense cannot fitly be addressed to Kant, because of course on Kant's hypothesis we *should* by no effort be able to do so, and the objective world, apart from these forms, *would* be unthinkable.

parts of which it is the sum. Whence the proposition amounts to this, that the *non-ego*, having neither whole nor parts, cannot be thought of as existing; and we are landed in Absolute Idealism, which is contrary to the hypothesis. The alternative proposition is that the *non-ego* has a form, but that this produces no effect on the *ego* in the act of experience. Though the objective existence contained under some objective forms is capable of impressing the subject, and producing sensation, yet this sensation is conditioned wholly by the subjective form: the objective form is completely inoperative. So that whatever arrangement there is in the content of the *non-ego*, the effect wrought on the *ego* has its content arranged purely according to the form of the *ego*. One arrangement of the *non-ego* is just as good as another, in so far as the *ego* is concerned. As it follows from this that no differences among our sensations are determined by any differences in the *non-ego* (for to say that they are so determined is to say that the form under which the *non-ego* exists produces an effect upon the *ego*); and as it similarly follows that the order of co-existence and sequence among these sensations is not determined by any order in the *non-ego*, we are compelled to conclude that all these differences and changes in the *ego* are self-determined. We are, as before, driven into Absolute Idealism, and the premises are contradicted.

Mr. Spencer then affirms that the facts of consciousness as to Space and Time are interpretable on the experience-hypothesis as modified by the doctrine of evolution. "If you suppose," he says (p. 363), "the modifications produced by experience to be inheritable, it must happen that if there are any universal forms of the *non-ego*, these must establish corresponding universal forms in the *ego*. These forms being embodied in the organization, will impress themselves on the first intuitions of the individual; and will thus appear to antecede all experience." Certainly it may be admitted cordially and willingly that this is so, and that thus brutes may acquire and have acquired a material apprehension (a sensuous cognition) of extended and succeeding things, but not *as* extended or *as* succeeding, and *à fortiori* not as existing (so to speak) in Space and Time. But if we grant this material apprehension to the merely sensitive nature, it will explain how the active intellect, with this as material, can abstract and intellectually apprehend things "as extended" and "as succeeding," and ultimately Space and Time. They are thus seen to be objective in one aspect, subjective in another; abstractions of abstractions, yet with a real foundation in things, which foundation we rational animals can intellectually apprehend as it really exists in things in themselves, and which foundation also acts on the sensitive nature of irrational animals so as to give them organized and co-ordinated series of sensations and groups of associations of sensations, amply sufficient for their needs.

Before concluding his criticisms of the reasonings of "meta-

physicians," Mr. Spencer has a word to say to Sir William Hamilton, and concisely shows that his belief as to the subjectivity of Space may be disproved by at least his own criterion. Sir William Hamilton had said in criticizing Brown, "*I cannot but believe that material things exist: I cannot but believe that the material reality is the object immediately known in perception.*" The former of these beliefs, explicitly argues Dr. Brown, in defending his system against the sceptic, *because irresistible, is true.* The latter of these beliefs, implicitly argues Dr. Brown, in establishing his system itself, *though irresistible, is false.*"

This Mr. Spencer turns against Hamilton thus: "*I cannot but believe that material things exist: I cannot but believe that the material reality is the object immediately known in perception: I cannot but believe that the space in which material realities are perceived is objectively real.*" The two former of these beliefs, explicitly argues Sir William Hamilton, in defending his system against the sceptic, *because irresistible, are true.* The latter of these beliefs, implicitly argues Sir William Hamilton, in establishing his system itself, *though irresistible, is false.*"

Mr. Spencer next* proceeds to his proof that Realism rests on evidence which has a greater validity than has the evidence of any counter-hypothesis. This he does by arguing from "priority," "simplicity," and "distinctness."

As to the first† he argues that the realistic conception is prior to the idealistic conception, so that in no mind whatever can the idealistic conception be reached except through the realistic one.

He begins his argument by calling attention to the ease with which microscopists acquire the power of so moving objects under a microscope as to neutralize the apparent inversions of their motions, so that when an erecting glass (which brings the visible motions into their ordinary relations with their tactual motions) has to be used, the microscopist is as much perplexed by the normal connection of the impressions as he originally was by the abnormal one. He compares this effect of habit with the attitude of mind generated by habit in "the metaphysician," whose postulate he tells us is (p. 369), "that we are primarily

* In Chapter V., entitled "Negative Justification of Realism," containing only one section. No. 402.

† This first argument occupies his Chapter VI., the contents of which may be put shortly thus: § 403. We can readily acquire the power of reversing the order in which we respond to our perceptions, as in viewing an object under the microscope. § 404. Our primary perceptions are not sensations, but objects. § 405. To have a sensation and to be conscious of having it are very different things. § 406. The realistic conception is everywhere, and always prior.

conscious of our sensations—that we certainly know we have these, and that if there be anything known beyond these serving as cause for them, it can be known only by inference from them." He adds: "I shall give much surprise to the metaphysical reader if I call in question this postulate; and the surprise will rise into astonishment if I distinctly deny it. Yet I must do this."

I confess to no little feeling of astonishment (which I doubt not many of my readers will share) at Mr. Spencer's innocent belief that he is original in holding a doctrine held by the overwhelming majority of students and teachers of metaphysics, both as estimated by time and by extent of geographical range. His view is, I believe, correct, but it is really too bad that he should be so ignorant of his environment as to deem it to be also "original!"

It is certain that the very existence of sensations is an hypothesis which cannot be framed until external existence is known, and he is quite true to nature in representing the urchin from the nursery saying, "Give Georgy," instead of "Give me," the object of his desires, though I believe that in the "Georgy" the "me" is really contained. But Mr. Spencer goes on to deny a knowledge of personal identity to the adult savage, in which denial he is certainly mistaken, and he denies it on grounds which would equally justify the denial of it in the minds either of Mr. Spencer himself or of his present critic, as will, I think, appear to any unprejudiced reader. His reasons are the three following ones:—

(1) "The uncivilized man has, indeed, got the belief in another self that goes away in dreams, and leaves the body for a longer time at death; but this other self, as conceived by him, is simply a duplicate, visible and tangible as the body is." In other words, that the "soul" can only be imagined in terms of the "body." Mr. Spencer probably does not believe with certainty in the survival of the soul after death, yet he can at least apprehend the conception. But can he think of it without such images as the mind of the uncivilized man needs? We, who do believe in the survival, nevertheless require such phantasmata for the conception, and cannot think of it without. But this is no matter of wonder. Every one knows that we cannot by imagination transcend experience. We have no experience of the life of the soul out of the body, and therefore we cannot imagine it, though we may both conceive it and believe in it.

(2) His second reason is, that the uncivilized man "has no name for that which is conscious, or for that aggregate of thoughts and feelings called by us consciousness." But he has a name for that which is conscious—his own name, or perhaps the

phrase "the here." It is the living man himself who is conscious. "Consciousness" is a thing which by itself does not really exist at all; what need has uncivilized man for a term for such a mere abstraction? Heaps of men and women amongst us have no such conception as "consciousness," but could easily have it aroused in them and could easily be made to understand it.

(3) His last reason is, that if uncivilized man "wants to convey the fact that he perceives something not present to the senses, he can do it only by likening his perception to external vision, and his internal power to an eye." But who amongst us is not, in this respect, in the same case as uncivilized man? Do we not speak of "seeing" the force of an argument, and of mental "vision?" And is there a single term, however refined, used by us, which has not a simply sensuous basis?

Another illustration used by him (p. 371), apt for his *present* purpose, but having another application which he does not seem to see, but which it may be well to point out. He says that if we tell a farm labourer "that the sound he hears from the bell of the village church exists in himself; and that in the absence of all creatures having ears, there would be no sound. When his look of blank amazement has waned, try and make him understand this truth which is clear to you. Explain that the vibrations of the bell are communicated to the air; that the air conveys them as waves or pulses; that these pulses successively strike the membrane of his ear, causing it to vibrate; and that what exist in the air as mechanical movements become in him the sensation of sound, which varies in pitch as these movements vary in their rapidity of succession. And now ask yourself, what are these things you are telling him about? When you speak to him of the bell, of the air, of the mechanical motions, do you mean so many of his ideas? If you do, you fall into the absurdity of supposing that he already has the conception which you are trying to give him. By the bell, the air, the vibrations, then, you mean just what he means—so many objective existences and actions."

This is quite true, and when Mr. Spencer speaks of "molecular oscillations" he must mean "movements to and fro," such as he has felt or seen, only very much smaller. When he speaks of the cause of the sound of the bell being something altogether different from his auditory sensations, he really means* it is more like his "muscular sensations." But can

* This he has before admitted, for at page 238 he said: "The liberty we have to think of light, heat, sound, &c., as in themselves different from our sensations of them, is due to our possession of other sensations by which to symbolize them—namely, those of mechanical force . . . that is, in terms of our muscular sensations."

the objective cause be a bit more like the latter than the former? Is not the clodhopper quite as near the truth as Mr. Spencer himself? May not a Theist believe that he is vastly *nearer* the truth, and that our faculties are in no way mendacious though they do not (as they need not, and indeed *could* not) tell us the *whole* story. As I have before* urged: "By abandoning our natural belief as to these qualities, we do not really explain them a bit more, or get the least nearer to objective truth. Such natural belief cannot at least be proved false, while to think of them as caused by muscular tensions is a manifest absurdity."

But I have just tried the experiment suggested upon a Sussex rustic of the neighbourhood where I am writing this, with the following effect:—

Myself. Lacey! You often hear Sir Spencer Wilson's clock strike?

Lacey. Bless you, sir, very often.

M. What do you think that sound is, something in the bell, something in the air, or something in your head?

L. Why, something in the bell, sir, of course; but the air has got something to do with it too, I think.

M. But when the clapper hits the bell it sets the bell shaking, that sets the air next it shaking, and so on to your ear; where it sets a very thin bit of skin shaking, and so you hear the sound.

L. Yes, sir.

M. Is there anything, then, in the bell altogether the same as your feeling of sound?

L. Of course not, sir. Can't be.

M. And yet you say the sound is in the bell?

L. Yes, sir.

M. Suppose every man and animal were dead, and the wind set the bell shaking, with no ears to hear it; would there be any sound?

L. I can't answer that directly, sir; that wants thinking over.

M. What was in the bell when it shook before would be in the bell when it shook now, wouldn't it?

L. Of course it would, sir.

M. You say, then, that the sound is in the bell, yet nothing is there altogether the same as your feeling of sound?

L. That's what I say, sir.

M. You must mean, then, that the cause of the sound is in the bell, and that that cause is like, but not altogether the same as, your feeling of sound?

* DUBLIN REVIEW for January, 1879, p. 161.

L. Yes, sir, that's just it ; but the air has something to do with it too.

It seems to me that this rustic would be recognised by Aristotle as perfectly right in his philosophy of sound, and I believe that he is far ahead of Berkeley, Kant, or any other Idealist, who has learnt to *s'égarer avec méthode*.

Returning from this digression of my own, I must advert to a digression of Mr. Spencer's (§ 405, p. 372), in which he points out the distinctness which exists between "having a sensation" and "being conscious of having a sensation." He says: "To be impressed by a colour, a sound, or an odour, and thereupon to perform some motion conducive to self-preservation, is a simple act perpetually performed by creatures of low grade—an act closely allied to reflex acts, and passing insensibly into these. We may figure its nature by imagining to ourselves, so far as we can, the process of sneezing, as occurring without a contemplating self to watch it and think about it." This is a true and useful representation. He goes on to say: "A sensation thus existing before there exists an introspective consciousness is a sensation of the kind spoken of by metaphysicians as being immediately given in consciousness, in contradistinction to the outer agent producing it, which can be but mediately given." But metaphysicians of the school I follow say nothing of the kind, but, on the contrary, that the outer agent itself is directly apprehended, and that even in animals their sensible cognition of objects is direct and immediate, and not by any process of inference—a process of which they are incapable. But the metaphysicians he attacks would not, I conceive, admit the validity of his representation of their views, and he should recollect that in such inquiries as they carry on, they *must* take the mind as it is in the inquirer himself—*i.e.*, in its fully-developed condition. What is either primary or ultimate (according to line of inquiry pursued) in our examination of the dicta of our own minds, is and must be developed thought, not the sensuous basis of such thought as existing in infants or the lower animals.

He continues: "Through immeasurably long and complex differentiations and integrations of such primordial sensations and derived ideas,* there develops a consciousness of self and a correlative not-self." Here, as in so many previous cases, the word "through" is ambiguous. If by "through" he meant

* It must not be forgotten that by an "idea" Mr. Spencer means only modified feelings which are distinguished from sensations by their faintness, but (as remarked in the very beginning of this examination) "ideas" are not recognised by us to be such by their *faintness* but by their representative character. They are reflexly recognised as making that which was past, present, ideally, once more.

"by means of"—such sensuous basis serving as material to the active intellect—then the assertion may pass; but if by "through" it be intended to imply that sensitivity with such differentiations and integrations is by itself sufficient, it must be strenuously denied. How can any amount of juggling with things of one kind produce a thing of an altogether different kind?

Nevertheless, Mr. Spencer's main contestation must be admitted—namely, that the realistic conception is everywhere and always, in child, in savage, in rustic, in the metaphysician himself, prior to the idealistic conception; and that in no mind whatever can the idealistic conception be reached except through the realistic one. Realism must be granted before a step can be taken towards the propounding of Idealism.

He next* argues for the truth of the realistic view, from its greater simplicity, saying: "If we compare the mental process which yields Realism with the mental process said to yield Idealism, or Scepticism, we see that, apart from other differences, the two differ immensely in their lengths. The one is so simple and direct as to appear at first sight undecomposable; while the other, long, involved and indirect, is not simply decomposable, but requires much ingenuity to compose it. Ought we then to hold that in the short and simple process there is less danger of going wrong than in the long and elaborate process, or the reverse?" To agree with "the metaphysician" in holding that there is less danger of error in the long and elaborate process is equivalent to holding that it is easier to hit a target at a thousand yards than at a hundred yards. The next argument† is one from distinctness, and is to the effect that as we trust our perceptions more than our recollections, *à fortiori* we should trust our direct perception of an external world rather than any involved process of reasoning (the very terms of which are necessarily but faintly apprehended) directed to shake our trust in that perception. An Idealist would of course reply that he did trust his perceptions,

* In Chapter VII., entitled "The Argument from Simplicity," which chapter consists of the three following sections:—§ 407. The process of direct perception is, apart from difference as to quality, enormously shorter than the idealistic inference. § 408. Idealist reasoning is complex and involved in the highest degree, yet Idealists object to realism on the ground that "perception" is an "inference." § 409. This amounts to saying that if there is doubtfulness in a single step of a given kind, there is less doubtfulness in many steps of this kind.

† In Chapter VIII., "The Argument from Distinctness." In this chapter it is urged—§ 410. That we trust our perceptions more than our recollections. § 411. That Idealism depends upon such imperfect symbols as words. And § 412. That the realistic deliverance is given in terms of the highest possible distinctness, while the idealistic affirms the things most faintly perceived to be the things most certainly known.

and so the argument would return to the question what "a perception" is—a question we lately considered.*

Moreover, Mr. Spencer speaks as if "sense" was more to be trusted than "reason," saying: "Deliverances of consciousness given in the vivid terms we call sensations, excite a confidence immeasurably exceeding the confidence excited by deliverances given in the faint terms we distinguish as ideas. If I think I left a book on the table in the next room, and on going to fetch it find it is not there, I do not suppose that the presence of the book on the table, as mentally represented, is comparable in certainty to its absence as actually observed." Of course not, but the conflict here is not between sensations and ideas, but between ideas which respectively have and have not the support of sensuous intuition. In recognising that the book *is not* on the table, the appeal is to sensation and thought, and the thought is ultimate and primary, as it is by thought I recognise the fact when I advert to it that I have the sensations I have; that I test them and satisfy myself that there is no sense-deception. With this passing remark we may proceed to Mr. Spencer's exposition† of the need of some criterion. He says (p. 385), there must be some flaw in the method pursued by "metaphysicians," since it is impossible to think that reason necessarily leads to unreasonable conclusions. "Clearly all metaphysics can be nothing but an analysis of our knowledge by means of our knowledge—an inquiry by our intelligence into the decisions of our intelligence. We cannot carry on such an inquiry without taking for granted the trustworthiness of our intelligence. . . . Intelligence cannot prove its own invalidity, because it must postulate its own validity in doing this." There must be, then, he contends, some primordial certainty greater than any reasoning can yield, some particular mode of perception which we may take as the guarantee of all other modes. Even those who deny the existence of anything innate, and refer the whole of every

* In the eighth part of this examination (DUBLIN REVIEW, April, 1879, p. 518), and also in the two antecedent parts.

† Forming his Chapter IX., entitled "A Criterion Wanted." The contents of this chapter may be thus summarized:—§ 413. The unreasonableness of Idealism as just shown makes it no wonder that unmetaphysical persons should feel contempt for metaphysics. § 414. But there must be some as yet unrecognised datum, the overlooking of which causes such a suicidal conflict. § 415. The assumption of the trustworthiness of consciousness in general is insufficient. § 416. Some particular mode of perception must be made the guarantee of all other modes. § 417. We must recognise some primordial certainty greater than any reasoning can yield. § 418. If no ultimate test of truth be recognised, then philosophy must confess itself baseless. § 419. Then some transcendent certainty must be found—a certainty which all sides will admit and accept.

mental phenomenon to experience, cannot escape "the conclusion that all rational thinking is governed by some principle which is established before rational thinking begins." This is, indeed, a true remark; intellectual faculties require to be innate and *in potentia* in order that sensations may excite them with acts, just as the various sensuous faculties require to be innate and their activities *in potentia*, in order that physical influences may excite sensations. He goes on (*l. c.* p. 390) to speak of experiences which accrue between birth and the age of introspection, and says of the associations thus induced: "Evidently, then, the natures of these, fixed long before the higher mental activities became possible, must govern the higher mental activities." But to say that our lower faculties govern our higher is in one sense true, in another false. It is only true in a sense similar to that in which we may say that the laws of physics and chemistry "govern" the functions of living organisms. Justly, however, does our author demand some criterion, and he rightly determines that it must be some pre-eminent form of direct perception. He does not, however, as we shall soon see, succeed in finding that of which he is in search, but in his pursuit strangely runs over it without seeming to see it. He carries on his search by examining* different "propositions," which he rightly treats as our intellectual units. And he classifies these as real or ideal, and as having the subject or object more or less permanently and completely united, and this introduces his "ultimate question," which is, how to ascertain the invariable existence of the predicates with their subjects in certain propositions. In a word, to find what propositions are, and must by all be admitted to be, absolute, certain, and primordial. To this question he addresses himself in his next chapter,† in which he asserts that "inconceiv-

* In his Chapter X., called "Propositions Qualitatively Distinguished." It contains:—§ 420. Exact comparisons are made by reducing things compared to a common denomination. § 421. Our units are propositions. § 422. Which, for our purpose, must each be resolved into the simpler propositions they may severally contain. § 423. We must also classify them according as their terms are real or ideal. § 424. In some cases the predicate never ceases to exist, while its subject is before consciousness, while in others it may cease to exist. § 425. The first class (which alone concerns us) consists of propositions we necessarily accept, and it contains two orders of propositions, (1) those in which the union of subject and object is but *temporarily* absolute, and (2) those in which the union of subject and object is *permanently* absolute.

† This is Chapter XI., entitled "The Universal Postulate." The following is a short statement of the contents of its sections:—§ 426. To ascertain whether with a certain subject, a certain predicate invariably exists, we must try to separate them—i.e., try to conceive the negative of the proposition in question. Inconceivability of negation is what shows a cognition to possess the highest rank. § 427. An "inconceivable pro-

ability" is the ultimate and supreme test of truth—a proposition the contrary of which cannot be conceived is, he says, to be admitted as certain.

Thus, he very properly accepts as ultimate and supreme, not "sensations" but "thoughts," and acknowledges* that the ultimate appeal is not to what is objective but to what is subjective. He carefully distinguishes inconceivable propositions from those which are merely unbelievable, and justly contends that a test is not to be abandoned merely because it may be used carelessly, or may be above the capacity of certain persons to use. But though he thus distinguishes between "unbelievable" and "inconceivable" propositions, he really means by the latter term nothing more than "unimaginable;" for he defines an inconceivable proposition as "one of which the terms cannot by any effort be brought together before consciousness in that relation which the proposition asserts between them." He thus bases our supreme and ultimate certainty on mere mental impotence—a mere passive incapacity of the imagination. Now, fully agreeing with Mr. Spencer as to the necessity of the acceptance of certain propositions as absolutely true and beyond question, I differ from him *toto cælo* as to the nature of such propositions. The propositions which I contend are to be taken as unquestionable are not those, the contraries of which are but negatively and passively inconceivable, but those which are evidently seen to be *positively* necessary, and the contraries of

position" is not a merely unbelievable one, but is one the subject and predicate of which cannot be united in the same intuition. § 428. Mill's objection (that propositions once accepted as of this kind have been since proved to be false) fails, because the propositions he refers to were complex ones. § 429. A test may fail from incapacity or carelessness on the part of those who use it, and if it were needful to abandon the test because an absolute guarantee against its misuse cannot be found, it would be still more needful to abandon logical principles. § 430. The laws of association must produce absolute relations between thoughts, and this *à fortiori* if the evolution of man be admitted, what is *à priori* in the individual being *à posteriori* in the race. Thus, inconceivableness of negation affords a far higher warrant for a cognition than does any enumeration of experiences. § 431. But Mill does really admit the test of inconceivableness after all. § 432. Sir William Hamilton's objections are valueless, because he uses language to express that to which no state of consciousness corresponds, and even he can be forced to admit inconceivableness as a test also. § 433. The summing-up of the foregoing arguments and representations shows that it is a corollary from the Experience-hypothesis, that an argument which questions the authority of such truths as mathematical axioms, can do so only by claiming for the less deeply-rooted necessities of thought, a validity which it denies to the more deeply-rooted necessities of thought.

* This he does expressly in the "Essays," vol. ii. p. 400. (Stereotyped edition.)

which are *actively* inconceivable because they are clearly known by the mind to be absolutely and universally impossible. The supreme propositions, therefore, are those which the mind sees to be everywhere and always, absolutely, *positively* necessary; and no one can deny that there are such propositions since so many men affirm that they have them, and even those who would deny them must implicitly assert them if they would argue against them. Yet propositions of this kind are not even referred to by Mr. Spencer, nor does he state the difference between propositions which are inconceivable and those which are unimaginable, which is very singular, since he can hardly have been ignorant of the controversy between Mill and Whewell on the subject.

And here we must not omit to notice another very important point. Mr. Spencer denies* the validity of the principle of contradiction as an ultimate truth. This is, indeed, a strange proceeding, since he cannot deny it without at the same time affirming it. He affirms it also in that which he represents to be absolutely fundamental and ultimate—namely, our inability to dis sever certain images. For, supposing we know that we *have* tried to dis sever them and *failed*, how can we be certain that at the very same time we have not tried and yet have *succeeded*? We can only be sure of it upon this very principle of contradiction.

I have elsewhere† gone at length into the question as to ultimate truths raised by Mr. Spencer in this chapter of his work, and I, to save space, must now refer my readers for further details‡ to my previous treatment of the matter, here confining myself to a summary of results:—

(1) Knowledge must rest on truths which are incapable of being proved, but are evident by their own intrinsic light.

* § 432, p. 425. "How do we *know* that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be? what is our criterion for *this* impossibility?" It is strange that any one should think the law of contradiction is derivative, or that it reposes on anything stronger and more fundamental than itself.

† See "Lessons from Nature," chapter ii. pp. 34–48. Murray, 1876.

‡ In the controversy between Mr. Spencer and Mr. Mill, it appears to me that both are right and both are wrong. Mr. Mill is right in affirming that there are inconceivabilities which may yet be believed, but wrong in denying that our subjective judgments as to impossibility and necessity are both objectively valid and supreme criteria of truth. Mr. Spencer is right in affirming that the ultimate declarations of our intellect are such supreme criteria of truth, but wrong in declining to attribute to such declarations absolute necessity and universal objective validity. But both Mr. Mill and Mr. Spencer err in failing to distinguish between (1) that negative inconceivability which comes from impotence or lack of experience; and (2) that positive, active perception of impossibility which comes from intellectual power and light.

(2) These fundamental truths must be subjectively evident.

(3) Such fundamental truths declare their objective, absolute, and universal truth.

(4) The intellect is thus carried by its own force from subjectivity to objectivity.

Mr. Spencer's examples of inconceivable propositions are unfortunate. Thus, he instances the offering resistance by what is unextended, a proposition which we Catholics have little difficulty indeed in conceiving, believing as we do in the action on matter of unextended spirits, and this is an example of how Revelation aids philosophy and supplements reason.

But the certainty which Mr. Spencer conceives as being induced by the incidence of cosmical activities on sentient organisms could evidently produce nothing but a blind instinct, and not even an apparent (even if mistaken) clear perception of positive universal and absolute necessity.

Mr. Spencer next considers* the test to be used in testing the validity of propositions, and contends that the conclusion is most certain which involves the assumption of the postulate the fewest times on account of the fallibility of our care, attention, &c., in carrying on our reasoning faculties. It may be noted in passing that Mr. Spencer admits (p. 430) that "from non-agreement between subject and object, the inconceivable and impossible may not correspond even within our mental range," and that it is possible to assume that the universal postulate may not be a perfect warrant for any one single act of thought. It is true, he says, that he admits this only "for argument's sake," but on his principles, that our thoughts are merely the results of incident forces on a sentient organism, and not the acts of an intellectual principle; he *cannot* refuse to admit the possibility of such non-conformity as a very real and true possibility, and not merely "for argument's sake."

He then enumerates certain corollaries.† Let any one contem-

* In his XIIth Chapter, on "The Test of Relative Validity." § 434. Conflicting arguments are to be appraised by resolving compound propositions into their constituents. § 435. Whether the universal postulate be absolutely trustworthy or not, that conclusion at which we arrive by the fewest assumptions of the postulate must be the most certain. § 436. On account of the treachery of thought as ordinarily carried on. § 437. Therefore the most certain conclusion is that which involves the postulate the fewest times.

† Chapter XIII., "Its Corollaries." The contents of this chapter are as follows:—§ 438. While we look at an object, our belief in its external reality possesses the highest validity possible. § 439. Our consciousness of subject and object are not absolutely simultaneous. Perception, however complex originally, has become simple to the developed intelligence. § 440. But the simplest propositions of even hypothetical Realism postulate not only an object, but also the subject and a relation

plate an object—e.g., a book—and he will find he is conscious of it as existing apart from himself without any notion about sensations or any "image" of the book—an undecomposable act which he cannot reverse. "Hence, while he continues looking at the book, his belief in it as an external reality possesses the highest validity possible." Mr. Spencer controverts Ferrier and Hamilton, and denies that the object of knowledge always is and must be the object with the addition of oneself, and regards the self and not-self as rather the elements of an unceasing rhythm in consciousness, adding that sometimes we may be absorbed entirely in the object or absorbed with self. This may be admitted, but it must be maintained that the object cannot be thought of *as* an object without a glance at the self as subject. He goes on to maintain that even hypothetical Realism and *à fortiori* Idealism and Scepticism must be regarded as unreasonable and invalid conceptions compared with Realism, since in them the universal postulate is assumed so many more times than in Realism,* and he concludes that reason is utterly incapable of showing the unreasonableness of those primary deliverances of consciousness which yield subject and object as independent existences. He contends that any doubtfulness which may exist in Realism must be greatly exceeded by the doubtfulness of every other system, and thus he deems Realism to be negatively justified. There is no need (though it would be very easy) to controvert this contention, although it is based on that misconception of the ultimate test of truth which consists in relying upon mental impotence instead of the subjective evidence of absolute and universal truth.

He next proceeds† to his positive justification of Realism, which he tells us will be obtained if we find it to be a necessary product of thought, proceeding according to laws of thought, which

between them, and depend on language, so that by it the universal postulate has to be assumed a number of times, and this is still more the case with Idealism and Scepticism. § 441. Therefore reason cannot show the unreasonableness of these primary deliverances of consciousness which yield subject and object as independent existences.

* In his contention he speaks of "that highly complex conception—self." This, however, is surely as "simple" to "the developed intelligence" as is the perception "a book."

† In his XIVth Chapter, entitled "Positive Justification of Realism," the sections of which are:—§ 442. If states of consciousness are held adequate to frame a disproof of objective existence, they must be held adequate to frame a proof of it. § 443. The absolute validity of Realism will be established, if we find it to be a necessary product of thought proceeding according to laws of thought which are universal. § 444. In examining the fabric of consciousness, to show this we must shut out (as far as we can do so) the realistic interpretation of our states of consciousness.

are universal. During the inquiry about to be undertaken we shall, he tells us, have to shut out, so far as may be, the ordinary implications of thought, and try to regard our states of consciousness merely as such carrying on the process from the subjective standpoint. In following out this inquiry* he finds that certain propositions can be torn asunder (the predicate and subject separated in thought) much more easily than others, and some cannot be so sundered; these latter are the propositions distinguished as necessary—thus still dwelling on mere mental impotence. He contends that reasoning is "a trial of strength between different connections in consciousness—a systematic struggle serving to determine which are the least coherent states of consciousness." But this is a very inadequate account, and altogether omits the main element of ratiocination, which is the seeing that one proposition necessary follows from the junction of two others, making that truth explicit which was before implicit. From all this he draws as a corollary the identical proposition that for each man "if certain states of consciousness absolutely cohere in certain ways, he is obliged to think them in those ways." If Mr. Spencer means that what we see to be evidently true necessarily, we must believe to be true, he is of course right; but his whole line of argument shows that he really means that whatever is indissolubly united in any man's imagination, that, such man must believe. This, however, I altogether deny. The outer boundary of anything is necessarily connected in my imagination with another thing bounding it, and this applies equally if that anything is the whole material universe or its abstract, space. Yet I for one have no difficulty in believing that space (or the material universe) is really finite and has terminations with nothing beyond, though I cannot picture to myself such a condition of things; and no wonder I cannot, since the requisite experience neither I nor any other man has ever had. This is an example

* Which he does in Chapter XV., entitled "The Dynamics of Consciousness," the contents of which may be thus epitomized:—§ 445. Looking at propositions from the subjective side only, the observer sees that some states of consciousness are so welded together that all other links in the chain of consciousness will give way first. § 446. Reasoning is a systematic struggle to determine which are the least coherent states of consciousness. § 447. Therefore, what we must think, we must think. § 448. Though we may not be able to say what objective existence is, yet we must be conscious of its reality, and this is the all-sufficient warrant for the assertion of its existence. § 449. While reasoning can neither verify nor falsify this deliverance of consciousness it can account for it. We must therefore examine the cohesions of consciousness to see if there are any absolute cohesions by which its elements are aggregated into two antithetical halves standing for subject and object.

of mental limitation and relative impotence. Similarly, I cannot of course imagine myself annihilated, but I can and do believe that Almighty God could annihilate me, though I see clearly that even He could not make two parallel straight lines meet from a *positive* intuition of absolute, universal, objective necessity. The slavery of sense is the lot of the mere animal—it is also no privation, it is its happiness; but *our* reason rises above the presentations of sense, which it makes use of, but at the same time criticizes and judges. Mr. Spencer's "dicta of consciousness" are nothing more than such presentations of sense surviving and recurring in complexly related clusters, and having no real hold on objectivity. No wonder, then, that Mr. Spencer says (p. 452), as to any rational conclusion at which any man may have arrived, "It matters not what name he gives to his conclusion—whether he calls it a belief, a theory, a fact, or a truth. *These words can be themselves only names for certain relations amongst his states of consciousness.*" (The italics are mine). Here we see plainly foreshadowed the desolate scepticism into which Mr. Spencer's "Realism" ultimately collapses. If "truth" and "fact" are "*only*" names for states of consciousness, we have no warrant for believing any truth or trusting any fact; we are in absolute Idealism after all, and one of the worst possible kind, an Idealism which denies ideas and affirms mere sensations and blind instincts alike unaccountable and untrustworthy.

But if there is no warrant for "truth" or "fact," what warrant can there be for Mr. Spencer's system, and how can a disciple of his, without intellectual suicide, believe it to be true? But every sane man who consents even to argue sincerely as to the trustworthiness of his faculties, thereby accepts the objective character of truth, and as Mr. Spencer has earlier said (§ 439, p. 437) of perception, whatever may have been its origin it has acquired a new significance to the developed intelligence which uses it. Starting, as Mr. Spencer here does, from pure subjectivity, nothing can be more certain than that the mind declares certain propositions to be "true" and to express "facts," and it is no less certain that the mind declares it means by those terms something more than that it has a certain state of consciousness to which it gives these names. Here we see the folly of all systems of metaphysics which do not begin with recognising our convictions of "truth" and "fact," and our evident certainty that they have real objective validity altogether beyond and independent of the mind which recognises and thinks about them.

Mr. Spencer then goes on to examine* the cohesions among the

* This he does in Chapter XVI, entitled "Partial Differentiation of Subject and Object." It contains the following sections:—§ 450. States

elements of consciousness with a view to elucidating the formation of the two conceptions called subject and object. For this purpose, he imagines himself sitting by the sea-shore and experiencing a number of simultaneous and successive states of consciousness, which looked at from the subjective standpoint arrange themselves as vivid (sensations from external objects) and faint (reminiscences, imagination, and thoughts). He finds successively that these two groups distinguish themselves not only as vivid and faint, but also as predecessors or originals, and as successors or copies; as unchangeable at will and as changeable at will; as parts of a whole vivid aggregate, and as parts of a faint aggregate whole; as one aggregate quite independent of the other, and as another only partially independent of the other; as having antecedents that may or may not be traceable, and as having antecedents that are always traceable; and, finally, as belonging to a whole of unknown extent, and as belonging to a whole restricted to what we call memory.

But Mr. Spencer would not, of course, deny that he cannot altogether succeed in restricting himself to a subjective world, but must be ever looking out on that objective world which for the time he is endeavouring to ignore. And in the pictures he draws of the vivid states of consciousness he supposes himself to experience—the sunlight, the smell of sea-weed, the sound of breakers, the distant headland "with its white cliff and sweep of green above," the sea-fog, the stone thrown, the brayings of a three-boy band, &c.—he really means not sensations merely, but *perceptions*, and in these perceptions, even according to *his own system*, not merely vivid states enter as components, but faint states also—namely, variously aggregate and clustered feelings of relation. *A fortiori*, according to the philosophy which has been here defended, there is, indeed, more than sensations.* Moreover, it may be confidently denied that the

of consciousness divide themselves into the relatively vivid and the relatively faint. § 451. The former, are original; the latter, are derived. § 452. The former, can be altered by volition; the latter, cannot. § 453. The former, are parts of a vivid aggregate, never known to be broken; the latter, form parts of an aggregate also never known to be broken, but more or less pliable. § 454. The former, are completely independent of the latter; while the latter, are partially dependent on the former. § 455. Each aggregation has its own laws of co-existence and succession. § 456. The former, may or may not have antecedents within consciousness; the latter, always have. § 457. The former, are parts of a whole of unknown extent; the latter, belong to a restricted whole. § 458. Recapitulation. § 459. Thus all sensations and relations gravitate round two centres—the vivid round one centre, the faint round the other.

* See *ante*, the review of the Chapter on "Perception in General," in the eighth part of this examination, published in the DUBLIN REVIEW for April, 1879.

imaginings, reminiscences, and ideas are always less vivid than the other series of states; he says himself (p. 459), "The sight of the lady with the book may rise into a predominance, and gain a momentum so great that the stream of vivid states scarcely affects it." But the mere thought of a lady which a tune played by the "three-boy band" calls up, may be so intensely vivid and absorbing as to cause temporary blindness and deafness to all surrounding objects.

Thus, perceptions and thoughts must ever be in danger of running, and must frequently run indistinguishably one into the other. But what, then, comes of Mr. Spencer's all-fundamental distinction? In fact, however, what Mr. Spencer really means is not to distinguish between "vividness and faintness" of "feeling," but between "clearness" and "obscurity" of "perceptions"—a widely different matter.

Nevertheless, I by no means intend to sneer at Mr. Spencer's sixteenth chapter, which is an able and clear exposition of the way in which a sensuous differentiation between itself and the surrounding world may take place in brutes. Such an unconscious, relatively passive differentiation and integration of feelings probably does take place in them.

Here, then, Mr. Spencer is only consistent with himself in ignoring the action of that intellect which he himself uses, but the existence of which he persistently refuses to recognise. Continuing his process of examination,* he proceeds to explain how, according to his system, subject and object become completely differentiated. But in the very beginning of this chapter his distinction between the two great series of states, the vivid and the faint, suddenly breaks down in considering emotions which he admits are some of them vivid and some of them faint. In calling attention, as I just now did, to the vividness of feeling

* He continues it in Chapter XVII., headed "Completed Differentiation of Subject and Object," which contains the following sections:—§ 460. Emotions, though vivid, belong to the faint series. § 461. A specially differentiated portion of the vivid aggregate (*i.e.*, the body) is somehow attached to the faint aggregate. § 462. This special part of the vivid aggregate becomes known as that through which the faint aggregate acts on the rest of the vivid aggregate, and the rest of the vivid aggregate, on the faint aggregate. § 463. Parts of this special part (*i.e.*, of the body) can be both simultaneously and successively generative and recipient of vivid states (*i.e.*, be active and passive), and so produce feelings of resistance and effort. § 464. The association thus produced gives rise to feelings of resistance and effort on the part of the rest of the vivid aggregate. § 465. The active energies of the latter make these feelings still stronger, and give rise to the ideas of power separated from, but in some way akin to, the power which the faint aggregate perpetually evolves within itself.

which a remembered melody may induce, I anticipate the admission he here makes. But I deny that emotions are the only mental states, properly so called, which may be vivid; for I might have instanced some purely intellectual problem which might be suggested by the chance juxtaposition of some pebbles, but which might take entire possession of consciousness and rise to a high degree of vividness. It is a singular and noteworthy thing, that after establishing vividness and faintness as the main distinguishing character of a complete division of all states of consciousness—a division giving rise to the primary distinction between subject and object—Mr. Spencer after all should have expressly to say (p. 468), "the classification by intensity here fails!" Hume seems, then, to have more reason on his side than Mr. Spencer in his classification of emotions and desires with the other vivid feelings which he calls impressions.

Mr. Spencer ranks vivid emotions, however, with the great mass of faint feelings, on the ground that they generally cohere rather with other faint states than with other vivid states; that, like the former, their antecedents are traceable; that they conform to the laws of the faint states and depend upon the latter, and are similarly limited. This classification of emotions, however, lends force to a suspicion which can hardly but have obtruded itself on the reader. It is this: Mr. Spencer knows as well as other men the difference between "thoughts and feelings" and "real objective material objects," and the suspicion can hardly be avoided that he has not really classified his "states of consciousness" from their subjective aspects, but rather according to this very clear and obvious knowledge. He goes on to endeavour to show how the perception of our own body and of its efforts and resistances gives rise to the ideas resistance and force, to the sense of power in ourselves, and to the idea of power in an external world. And here, again, this chapter may be warmly commended as an excellent exposition of what may be the mode of origin of such sensuous perceptions of external things as brutes possess. But here, as in so many other places, Mr. Spencer silently introduces those very conceptions the existence of which have to be explained. He appears to have no eyes for the abyss which yawns between the most complex associations of feelings of touch and resistance and an intellectual perception of solidity.* He represents us as becoming conscious,

* Thus, in his second part, Mr. Spencer confounded "the mental shock felt in passing from one feeling to another" with "the dissimilarity itself." This feeling of shock is one thing, the perception of dissimilarity is indeed another.

through mutual explorations of parts of our own body, of a power to effect changes in the external world. But how can we ever be so conscious without having the ideas "power," "substance," "existence of self," &c.?

Throughout, Mr. Spencer uses the expression, "states of consciousness," to denote such feelings as those of an amœba (which even he would admit to be unconscious feelings) as well as the perceptions of a distinctly self-conscious intellect; and having given the same name to both it becomes easy work to show that they are different forms of one mode of existence. But, in fact, it is necessary every time Mr. Spencer uses the delusive words "states of consciousness" to examine and see from the context what his real meaning is—whether he is referring to mere sensations and imaginations, or to intellectual activity. Evidently Mr. Spencer's Realism is fast slipping away into a most advanced Idealism—at least his explanation of our perceptions of external objects, their powers and properties, and even our perception of our own body, is such as any Idealist might perfectly accept, and is, in fact, but the old story of Locke and his successors elaborated and improved by a more advanced physiology. That touches and pressures, pinchings and finger-pullings, serve to elicit from animals a sensuous perception of their environment sufficient for their needs, and also serve to elicit from our intellect its latent perceptions and judgments as to objective being and its various categories, is most true, and we may see how, by the addition of a distinct recognition of the active sympathetic intellect, Mr. Spencer's system may be transformed from a contradictory jumble of inconsistent notions into a stable and valid system of realistic philosophy.

The same system of exposition he pursues still further, in a manner which, as usual, is superficially satisfactory but fundamentally erroneous, setting forth his views as to the nature and genesis of our ideas, "existence" and "matter."* As to the former, he tells us (p. 482) that the word existence

* In Chapter XVIII., entitled "Developed Conception of the Object," the contents of which may be summarized as follows:—§ 466. The root conception of existence beyond consciousness, becomes that of resistance plus some force which resistance measures. § 467. The idea, existence, becomes developed by distinguishing between the transitory and the permanent. § 468. All these experiences unite to form a conception of something beyond consciousness and uniting independence, permanence, and force—i.e., we get "matter." § 469. Similarly the subject is built up as the unknown permanent nexus which holds states of consciousness together, but the permanent existence of a substantial *ego* is an hypothesis without evidence. § 470. Thus the normal processes of thought inevitably originate a consciousness of something beyond consciousness symbolized by what is within it.

"has no other meaning" than "duration as distinguished from transitoriness." But the idea "existence" or "being," examined by the developed intellect, is seen to be clear, distinct, and unanalyzable, and one which must be present, though not necessarily be adverted to, in every perception whatever, and in every thought, whether of subject or object, of external things or of their quantities, qualities, or relations, and even in the thought of things not as existing actually but only potentially. Everything which has appeared to us, however instantaneously, is known by us to have "existed," and so is everything the rapidity of which is so great that no sense of ours can take cognizance of it, though our intellect tells us it must have been for an unimaginable moment. Moreover, it is obviously impossible to compare the relative duration of things without knowing that they exist, and therefore without our already having the idea of "existence." That sensations of different degrees of persistence may be the means of evoking into activity the idea of existence latent in our synthetic intellect is possible or probable, but that the idea when got "has no other meaning" than that here assigned to it will, I think, be recognised as an utter mistake by every unprejudiced and competent mind carefully examining its own ideas. He seems (§ 468) also unduly to regard "matter" and "the object" as equivalent terms, but on his own system we have no reason to regard the minds of others as more material than our own—not but that he represents, as alone permanent, the material substance of the body. He says (p. 485) of ideas, they "have no more a continued existence than we have found the impressions to have. They are like the successive chords and cadences brought out from a piano, which successively die away as others are sounded. And it would be as proper to say that these passing chords and cadences thereafter exist in the piano, as it is proper to say that passing ideas thereafter exist in the brain. In the one case, as in the other, the actual existence is the structure which, under like conditions, again evolves like combinations."

Now, of course we, no more than Mr. Spencer, would allow that mental states persist, but we affirm that a substantial *ego* persists, the mind which has the states. I do not recollect to have met elsewhere in Mr. Spencer's writings such an unequivocal declaration of materialism as the assertion that the "structure" ("piano" or "brain") is "the actual existence." I affirm, on the other hand, that "the actual existence" is the soul which gives form to the material structure, which, unlike the soul, does not even persist during life, but changes continually, and has neither "independence" nor "force" save as informed by the persisting soul.

We now reach the final result* and outcome of all the foregoing chapters of the seven parts through which we have followed Mr. Spencer's reasonings and expositions. After a recapitulation of the reasonings and conclusions of the preceding eighteen chapters, Mr. Spencer gives us a full explanation of his philosophy, to which he gives the name "Transfigured Realism," which we shall find to be marvellously like the Idealism he has combated. He asks (p. 493), what is the Realism at which we have arrived? "Is it the Realism of common life—the Realism of the child or the rustic? By no means." And he refers to his earlier chapters† as having shown that "what we are conscious of as properties of matter, even down to its weight and resistances, are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies which are unknown and unknowable;" and he also tells us that his Realism "simply asserts objective existence as separate from, and independent of, subjective existence." How dare Mr. Spencer, then, attack Berkeley as unreasonable? He asserted that fully. The only difference between Berkeley's system and Spencerism, as thus stated, is that the latter commits the absurdity of calling his known objective reality "unknowable," while Berkeley, with far greater reason, concludes it to be Almighty God Himself. Mr. Spencer does not seem to know his own mind, but plays fast and loose, trying to obtain what he deems the advantages of both Idealism and Realism, while his system has really the merits of neither, though, as before said, it is capable of conversion into a Rational Realism.

By his contentions against the schools of Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, and his assertions that their very terms imply the Realism they deny, he has naturally led us to infer that the common belief that the numbers, shapes, solidities, and motions of bodies, really exist objectively as we understand them to exist. It must

* In Chapter XIX., "Transfigured Realism," the contents of which may be thus stated:—§ 471. Recapitulation of Mr. Spencer's seventh part. § 472. The Realism arrived at is "Transfigured Realism," which simply asserts an objective existence, but does not affirm that either any modes or connexions between modes in it, are objectively what they seem. § 473. A diagram representing the reflexion of a cube upon a convex surface may serve to explain the system of Transfigured Realism, and to show the folly of all other systems. § 474. The various idealist and sceptical systems have not been really held (because they could not be) by those who thought they held them. § 475. Thus the existence of subject and object originally assumed, has become a verified truth, and we are once more brought to the conclusion that behind all manifestations of inner and outer is the one permanent unknowable reality.

† On the "Relativity of Feelings," and of "Relations between Feelings," in the second part, in his first volume. I must here refer the reader to the DUBLIN REVIEW for July, 1875, where he will find my criticism of those earlier chapters of Mr. Spencer's work.


be so, since no system can be deemed either *primitive, simple, or distinct* which asserts that neither extension, nor figure, nor number is in reality what it appears, or which affirms (as Mr. Spencer does) that no perception of ours can resemble or be in any way akin to any external object or relation. Yet Mr. Spencer has denied the objective validity of our ideas of quantity, quality, and relation, even our perception of "difference;" and he tells us dogmatically (p. 494) that "no relation in consciousness can resemble or be in any way akin to its source beyond consciousness." Thus the universe, as we know it, disappears not merely from our gaze, but from our very thought. Not only the sights and sounds of Nature cease for us to be realities, but even the solidity of the very ground we tread on—nay, even the coherence and integrity of our own material frame—dissolve from us, and leave us vaguely floating in an insensible ocean of unknowable potentiality. And *this* is REALISM; this is what is justified to us as being primitive, simple, and distinct, as being prior to Idealism, "everywhere and always, in child, in savage, in rustic, in the metaphysician himself" (p. 374). Mr. Spencer may well call this "Transfigured Realism." If he were to invite hungry men to a feast, and having discoursed to them on the digestibility of sauces and meats, the relations of appetite, digestion, and nutrition, then led them into a room not furnished with tables supporting the meats themselves, but hung round instead with tables of the chemical formulæ of alimentary substances, the disappointment of his guests would hardly be greater than that of many readers who, having read his arguments from priority, simplicity, and distinctness, come finally upon "Transfigured Realism" as the result. Mr. Spencer can, of course, draw various distinctions* between what he calls "Crude Realism" and his own system, but he can urge nothing against the unquestionable fact that our reason assures us that the number, figure, and extension of objects are just as certainly real as is the existence of anything beyond consciousness at all.

But his own system need not by any means be so sceptical as he makes it. Let us first see his own exposition of it. He graphically represents it by a diagram (on p. 496), which he describes, after first recalling to his reader's recollection the explanation of the theory of perspective. He says his reader "remembers that, looking through the window at some object—say a trunk lying on the ground outside—he may, keeping his eye fixed, make dots with pen and ink on the glass so that each dot hides an angle of the trunk; and may then join these dots by

* For Mr. Spencer's self-defence against a charge of the nature here made, see the *Fortnightly Review* for November, 1873.

lines, each of which hides one of the edges of the trunk. This done, he has on the surface of the glass an outline representation such as we call a perspective view of the trunk—a representation of its form not as conceived,* but as actually seen. If now he considers the relation between this figure and the trunk itself, he finds the two variously contrasted. The one occupies space of three dimensions, and the other space of two dimensions; the lines of the one are far longer than those of the other; the ratios among the lines of the one are unlike the ratios among the lines of the other; the directions in space of the representative lines are wholly different from those of the actual lines; the angles they make with one another are dissimilar; and so on. Nevertheless, representation and reality are so connected that the positions of his eye, the glass, and the trunk, being given, no other figure is possible; and if the trunk is changed in altitude or distance, the changes in the figure are such that from them the changes in the trunk may be known. Here, then, he has a case of a symbolization such that, along with extreme unlikeness between the symbol and the actuality, there is an exact though indirect correspondence between the varying relations among the components of the one and the varying relations among the components of the other.

"A more involved case of the same general nature may now be taken. Suppose A B C D is the surface of a cylinder; suppose E is a cube, in front of it; and suppose that from some point



beyond F there radiate the lines shown, severally passing through the angles of the cube, as well as other lines not shown, passing through all the points which form the edges of the cube. Then

* Note this most important "word conceived," which contains a great admission.

these lines, when intercepted by the curved surface, will form a projected image of the cube, as shown at *c*. Then it is observable, as before, that the length, ratios, directions, &c., of the lines in the image are wholly different from those in the solid; that the angles also, both absolutely and in their relations to one another, are different; and that so, too, are the surfaces, both in their shapes and in their relative directions. But beyond this it is observable that lines which are straight in the cube are curved in its image; and that the flat surfaces of the one are represented by curved surfaces in the other. Yet further, it is to be noted that the laws of variation among the lines in the image here become greatly involved; if the cube be so moved laterally that the projected image falls very much on the retreating surface of the cylinder, some of the representative lines begin to elongate at much greater rates than the others; and even the remoter parts of each line elongate at greater rates than the nearer parts. Nevertheless, in this case, as in the simpler one first described, there is an absolutely definite system of correspondences. Given as fixed, the cylinder, the dimensions of the cube, and the point whence the lines radiate, and for every position, distance, or attitude of the cube, there is a corresponding figure on the cylinder; and no change in the place of the cube or in its attitude can be made but what has an exactly answering change in the figure—a change so exactly answering, that from the new figure the new place or attitude of the cube could be determined.

"Thus we have a symbolization in which neither the components of the symbol, nor their relations, nor the laws of variation among these relations, are in the least like the components, their relations, and the laws of variation among these relations, in the thing symbolized.* And yet reality and symbol are so connected that for every possible re-arrangement in the *plexus* constituting the one, there is an exactly equivalent re-arrangement in the *plexus* constituting the other.

"The analogy to be drawn is so obvious that it is scarcely needful to point it out in detail. The cube stands for the object of perception; the cylindrical surface stands for the receptive area of consciousness; the projected figure of the cube stands for that state of consciousness we call a perception of the object."

Now I must altogether deny that the "cylindrical surface" can "stand for the receptive area of consciousness." It must stand for the *organism*, and its *sense organs*, *internal and external*. If the organism be informed and vivified by an active

* Thus all, even our sensational, knowledge being "symbolical," according to Mr. Spencer, what becomes of the great distinction drawn by him (in his "First Principles") between "symbolical conceptions" and "real conceptions"?

intellect, that intellect it must at least be admitted *may* have the power of so reading the impressions made upon it as thereby to perceive external objects and the relations between them as they really are in themselves. Mr. Spencer admits that our ultimate appeal is to our subjective certainty, and our intellect affirms that it has that power which we see we cannot deny that it may have. It affirms by its most positive declarations the real objectivity, not only of an external world, but also the objectivity of the solidity, extension, number, figure, &c., of its several parts. To doubt this is to be logically an absolute sceptic. To accept its declarations, on the other hand, carries with such acceptance the affirmation of a power in us which can transcend subjectivity and know things as they really are in themselves, and the existence of such a power is congruous with and implies the existence of such an intellectual soul as that which theologians and rational philosophers affirm the existence of. What is the difficulty of accepting this at once natural and philosophic view? Let it be granted that in every perception there is not only the action of the object but also what poor Mr. Lewes calls "the greeting of the spirit," does any impossibility thence arise of our knowing things "in themselves"? Not a bit! Our intellect has the power of subtracting its own subjective element. Let the perception in its genesis be conceded to be $x + y$, x being the *ego* and y the object. The mind has the power of supplying its own— x , so we get through the conjunction of the mind and the object $x - x + y$, or y pure and simple. I repeat "What is the difficulty of accepting this view?" Is it more wonderful that the mind should be endowed with the power of truly perceiving, than that it should be endowed with the power of having sensations such as we know we have? What can be more wonderful than the phenomena of our vision, consider them how you may? Mr. Spencer admits we have the mental form "likeness" or "difference." What can be more amazing than that such "states of consciousness" should be at all? If those ideas, difference and likeness, have no objective validity, our whole knowledge is a dream; and if they have objective validity, they carry us at once out of mere subjectivity in one thing—why should not our faculties be enabled to carry us beyond it in other things?

Mr. Spencer goes on to point out how his diagram explains the errors of Crude Realism, Idealism, and Scepticism, and in so doing he tells us: "Crude Realism assumes that the lines and angles and areas on the curved surface are actually like the lines and angles and areas of the cube." All I can say is, I should like to meet with a "Crude Realist." It has never yet been my lot to find one. Mr. Spencer says: "There is no kinship of nature whatever between the cube and the projected image."

But who says there is any such kinship of nature? I have never known any one so to affirm.

Mr. Spencer goes on to say: "The projected figure contains no element, relation, or law, that is like any element, relation, or law in the cube." This is far too strong. How could Mr. Spencer call it an "image" of the cube if such were the case? A certain "likeness" he must admit. Again he says (p. 499): "The projected figure can never have within it any trait whatever, either of the actual cube from which it is projected or the actual surface on which it is projected." But Mr. Spencer must admit that the parts of the image are curved like the surface on which it is projected. Thus, by his own illustration, the "image" has relations of real conformity both with the object and with the subject; but, according to my philosophy, the living principle of the cylinder does not "know" the image at all (except by a process of complex reasoning); it knows directly the cube through its impressions—the image only represents it in the sense of *making it present* to the perceiving mind, which directly apprehends it, its real relations and its essential nature.

But this mere *relativity* of knowledge which Mr. Spencer here, as before in his second part, so unequivocally asserts, shows that, as I said in the beginning of this article, *his system involves the denial of all truth, and stultifies itself.*

As I have just said, he emphatically asserts again and again, at the end as at the beginning of his "Psychology," the *relativity*—the merely phenomenal character—of all our knowledge. That we can know nothing but phenomena, that everything absolute escapes us—as being for ever unknowable and beyond the ken of the human intellect—is a cardinal principle with him; for he tells us (p. 493) that all "objective agencies" productive of "subjective affections," are not only "unknown" but also "unknowable."

But every philosophy, every system of knowledge, must start with the assumption (implied or expressed) that something is really "knowable"—that something is "absolutely true;" and Mr. Spencer evidently means us to understand that his doctrine of the "relativity of all our knowledge" is really and absolutely true. But if nothing that we can know corresponds with reality, if nothing we can assert has a more than relative or phenomenal value, why does not this character also appertain to the doctrine of the relativity of all knowledge? Either this system of philosophy itself is relative and phenomenal only, or it is absolutely and objectively true. But it must be merely phenomenal if everything known is merely phenomenal. Its value, then, can be only relative and phenomenal—that is, it has no absolute value, does not correspond with objective reality, and is there-

fore false. But if it is false that our knowledge is only relative, then some of our knowledge must be absolute; but this negatives the fundamental position of the whole philosophy.

Any philosophy, then, which starts with the assertion that all our knowledge is merely phenomenal refutes itself, and is necessarily suicidal. Everyasserter of such a philosophy must be in the position of a man who saws across the branch of a tree on which he actually sits, at a point between himself and the trunk. If he would save himself he must refrain from destroying that which alone sustains him in his elevated position. The validity of the human intellect then asserts itself by the very reasoning of those who would explicitly deny its competency to apprehend what is "absolutely true," and who would confine it to the "relative" and the "phenomenal"; by a just retribution they are hoisted with their own petard.

We may now summarize the results of our prolonged examination of Mr. Spencer's "*Psychology*," and of the philosophy it is directed to support. In spite of the genius of its author it possesses, as expounded by himself, the following grave defects:—

(1) It fails to account for or harmonize with the dicta of consciousness as to the substantiality and persistence of the *ego*.

(2) It fails correctly to interpret the ultimate and fundamental declarations of consciousness as to necessary truth.

(3) It denies the validity of that power of intensifying a motive by a voluntary act of selective attention of which power our own minds are conscious.

(4) It does not accept as valid the principle of contradiction, deprived of which our intellectual state becomes necessarily chaotic.

(5) It negatives the declarations of idealist philosophers upon grounds which would justify the popular belief as to objectivity, and yet it denies to such belief all truth and reality.

(6) It makes no essential distinction between the self-conscious intellect of man, manifested by a language expressing general conceptions, and the acquisition of sensible perceptions, as cognized by the sentient faculties of animals which are capable of expressing themselves by emotional signs only.

(7) It takes no cognizance of our perception of truth, goodness, and beauty, as such, nor of our apprehension of the relatedness of relations.

(8) It is absolutely fatal to every germ of morality.

(9) It entirely negatives every form of religion.

(10) It absolutely stultifies itself by proclaiming its own untruth, as included in its operation that all our knowledge is but phenomenal and relative.

The philosophy which accepts the existence of a distinct intellectual principle in man, on the other hand—

(1) Accounts for and harmonizes with the dicta of consciousness as to the *ego*.

(2) It readily accepts the declaration of reason as to ultimate and necessary truths.

(3) It asserts that power of election which our reason and perception of responsibility make known to us.

(4) It accepts the principle of contradiction, and thereby induces order into our intellectual cognitions.

(5) It accords with the teaching of common sense, without being bound down within its limits.*

(6) It establishes the distinction between reason and instinct, and between language and emotional expressions.

(7) It takes cognizance of our highest perceptions, including those of truth, goodness, and beauty, as such.

(8) It supports and enforces moral teaching.

(9) It harmonizes with the declarations of religion, both natural and revealed.

(10) It asserts its own truth in affirming the validity of our primary intuitions.

With these summaries before his eyes, the reader may wonder what the meaning could have been of the declaration made in the beginning of the paper as to the value and importance of Mr. Spencer's philosophy. Before concluding, then, I desire to point out that a variety of positions maintained by Mr. Spencer are not only both important and true, but may by a philosophical development consistent with them, transform his whole system into a satisfactory, intellectual Realism. Thus he makes his ultimate appeal to what can be shown to be really propositions seen by the intellect to be necessarily true. He admits the validity of our intuition of an external world. Also, in spite of his seeming denial of the substantial *ego*, he admits that we are compelled to think that something "persists in spite of all changes," and he "maintains the unity of the aggregate in spite of all efforts to divide it." Even as regards recognition of time relations, he admits (vol. i. p. 326) that these are "scarcely more than foreshadowed among the higher animals;" and as to acts in anticipation of future events he allows (*l. c.* p. 338) that "only when we come to the human race are correspondences of this degree of speciality exhibited with distinctness and frequency."

* The assertion that common sense is right, by no means carries with it the assertion that other things cannot be which common sense does not ordinarily or ever apprehend. It is enough that our faculties are not mendacious; no one pretends but that there may be existences of varied kinds which our faculties cannot perceive.

He thus approximates to that recognition of the difference between "sensuous perception" and "intellectual apprehension," the carrying out of which would change his philosophy into almost all that we could desire. Similarly, Mr. Spencer's theology has its hopeful side. He even refers to an "ultimate cause," most mysterious and incomprehensible, to which he gives the self-contradictory name "the unknowable." To this supreme and inscrutable Being we must assign no limits,* and (most important of all) if Mr. Spencer declines to affirm "personality" of this Being, it is because (p. 109) any conception we can form of "personality" is inadequate, because *below* the unspeakable reality.

A consideration of these favourable characteristics will commend not only Mr. Spencer's system, but Mr. Spencer himself, to the goodwill of Catholics. Would that he could be persuaded for a time, if only hypothetically, to believe in the "relativity" of his own system as he understands it, and to open his mind to an unprejudiced examination of philosophy, uncorrupted by the errors of Descartes and his successors! Far more still is it to be desired that he would open his mind to Catholic theology; therein he would find all that would reconcile the philosophic and scientific truths he holds, and would meet with that "universal congruity," which he says† is "the goal" which philosophy can alone aspire to reach, and which would lead him to join with us in the adoring exclamation: "*Ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia—Spes nostra, salus nostra, honor noster, ô beata Trinitas!*"

ST. GEORGE MIVART.

* "First Principles," vol. i. p. 99.

† "Psychology," vol. ii. p. 502.

ART. III.—THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

PART III.

1. *Œuvres complètes de Voltaire*. Sixty-two Vols. Paris : chez Renouard, 1819-1822.
2. *Œuvres complètes de J. J. Rousseau*. Thirty-eight Vols. Paris : chez Poinçot, 1788-1793.
3. *Mémoires de Madame du Hausset*. Paris, 1824.
4. *La Femme au Dix-huitième Siècle*. Par E. et J. DE GONCOURT. Paris, 1878.
5. *Rousseau*. By JOHN MORLEY. London, 1878.
6. *Voltaire*. By JOHN MORLEY. London, 1878.
7. *Works of John Locke, with Life*. Eleventh Edition. Ten Vols. London, 1812.

I PROPOSE in this Paper to offer some remarks upon the condition of European thought in the eighteenth century, and it will be necessary for me, by way of introduction, to refer to two Articles of mine which have already been published in this REVIEW. In the first, which appeared in April last, I observed that when I speak of the eighteenth century I must be understood to mean the century which intervenes between the English Revolution often—and, on the whole, I think, justly—designated glorious, and the great French Revolution, to which no such epithet is prefixed: the hundred years between 1688 and 1788. I further observed, “I regard that century as the closing years of a period in the history of Europe: as the years in which the ideas animating that period are to be seen in their ultimate development and final resolution: the period which began with the movement known, according as one or another of its aspects is contemplated, as the Protestant Reformation, the Revival of Letters, the Rise of the New Monarchy, and which may with much propriety be designated the Renaissance Epoch. For this movement was essentially a rebirth, and that which was reborn was Materialism.” I went on to remark how this character is written upon it, as in every other department of life, so in the intellectual province and in the political: how in the one its negation of the supernatural order centring round the Apostolic Chair, strips truth of its objective character, and throws men back upon the individual reason as the only arbiter: while in politics it is a reproduction of the ancient Cæsarism, whose only basis was brute force.

And then I went on to sketch, in outline, the action of Renaissance ideas both in the public order and in the philosophical. The first stage in their history, I pointed out, might be considered, roughly speaking, to terminate with the sixteenth century: the publication of Montaigne's *Essays* in 1580, and the ruin of the Catholic League by the battle of Ivry, marking their firm establishment. The seventeenth century I regarded as their second stage, the period of their systematic development, of which the Monarchy of Louis XIV. and the philosophy of Locke might be taken as types. And this brought me to the threshold of my proper subject—the eighteenth century. “I shall have to consider,” I wrote, “first the progress of the Renaissance political idea, next of the philosophical, in Continental Europe during the last century, and then I shall glance at our own country and try to indicate the position which it occupied with respect to those ideas, and the influence which it exercised upon their career.”* The first part of this task I endeavoured to accomplish in a Paper which appeared in the last number of this REVIEW. I shall now be occupied with the second portion of it. The third I must leave to a future occasion.

The eighteenth century is as emphatically “le siècle Français” in the intellectual order as in the political. It may be designated both conveniently and accurately, so far as its spiritual and moral characteristics are concerned, the age of the *philosophes*, for the school of French thinkers known by that name gave it its distinctive tone and colour. They were everywhere read and admired, and the whole Continent was penetrated by their ideas. Other countries exercised but little influence on the world's thought. Germany may be said to have been dumb from Leibnitz to Lessing, for the voices of Spener and Semler, of Wolf and Moses Mendelssohn, were not world voices: never penetrating beyond their narrow Teutonic range, their echoes soon died away. Leibnitz and Lessing are thinkers of a very different calibre, but of them it is not necessary for me to speak. The great opponent of Locke quite failed to check the progress of the tide of scepticism, and the precursor of the Auf-Klärung belongs to the new school whose beginnings must indeed be referred to the last century, but whose work has been done in this. The south of Europe was sunk in mental torpor. Intellectually considered, Italy and Spain were during the eighteenth century a great void. England, it is true, produced a school of writers whose influence upon European thought was of the greatest moment. It was, however, through the medium of the French intellect that this influence was

* DUBLIN REVIEW, October, 1879, p. 330.

exercised. The doctrines dominant throughout Europe a hundred years ago may all be traced from Locke's famous Essay. But Europe learnt them, not from the English thinker, but from his French disciples, who bettered his instruction.

The name of Locke is one of great importance in the moral and spiritual history of our race. It is not that his personal endowments, natural or acquired, were transcendently great; far from it. But they were exactly of the kind required for the work which he performed. Dry, prosaic, unimaginative, of no wide culture, and indeed of a nature not susceptible of much culture, he was admirably fitted to become the oracle of a system of metaphysics built upon that side of human nature of which alone he had knowledge, and ignoring or denying the existence of any other side. Mr. Mill reckons him the founder of "the analytical philosophy of the human mind," meaning thereby, I suppose, pretty much what was meant by d'Alembert's assertion that "he reduced metaphysics to what it ought to be, the experimental physics of the mind." So Voltaire eulogizes him as having been the first to pursue the true method in treating of the soul. Great philosophers before him, in Voltaire's judgment, had given very positive decisions on the subject; but since they knew nothing whatever about it their conclusions were naturally widely divergent.

Tant de raisonneurs (he goes on) ayant fait le roman de l'âme, un sage est venu qui en a fait modestement l'histoire. Locke a développé à l'homme la raison humaine, comme un excellent anatomiste explique les ressorts du corps humain. Il s'aide partout par le flambeau de la physique; il ose quelquefois parler affirmativement, mais il ose aussi douter.

And again he writes:—

Locke, après avoir ruiné les idées innées, après avoir bien renoncé à la vanité de croire qu'on pense toujours, ayant bien établi que toutes nos idées nous viennent par les sens, ayant examiné nos idées simples, celles qui sont composées, ayant suivi l'esprit de l'homme dans toutes ses opérations, ayant fait voir combien les langues que les hommes parlent sont imparfaites, et quel abus nous faisons des termes à tout moment; Locke, dis-je, considère enfin l'étendue, ou plutôt le néant des connaissances humaines. C'est dans ce chapitre qu'il ose avancer modestement ces paroles: Nous ne serons peut-être jamais capables de connaître si un être purement matériel pense ou non.*

This is the account given of Locke by the chief of the *philosophes*, with his unflinching clearness, vigour, and incisiveness. And it is in the main a true account. Personally a religious man, according to the conceptions of religion in which he had

* "Lettres sur les Anglais," xiii. "Œuvres," t. xxiv. p. 63.

been reared, Locke must be held to be the initiator of the sceptical movement in the ultimate phase which bolder and more logical minds worked out. No doubt earlier thinkers held many or all of the opinions which were most distinctive of him. But Locke was the first to formulate, systematize, and popularize the theory which we find in the "Essay on the Human Understanding." His system is the logical embodiment of the principle of self; of that doctrine of the independence and all-sufficiency of the human reason which is the *raison d'être*, the soul of Protestantism. He claims that the individual—the centre of his system—shall comprehend and explain everything, and accept no principles until "fully convinced of their certainty;" and in this, as he judges, "consists the freedom of the understanding." With him the senses are all in all. They are not merely the windows through which the soul looks out on the external world, but the actual sources of cognition. The mind is not the active judge, but the passive recipient of their impressions. The will is not, in truth, free* for him, nor is it an instrument of knowledge; neither is faith an intellectual act, its object truth, its result certitude. His method is purely physical, and everything in our compound nature which does not come within its scope—the immaterial, the supersensual, the mysterious—he ignores. That there is any sentient power in man, inherent and independent of sensation, any *αἰσθησις τῆς ψυχῆς*, any *sensus intimus* our first and surest source of knowledge, he does not understand. He puts aside those "prima principia quorum cognitio est nobis innata"† of which S. Thomas speaks; he knows nothing of what a grave author of his own age denominates "rational instincts," "anticipations,

* I mean he does not recognize freewill as "a spiritual supersensuous force in man."

† "Prima principia quorum cognitio est nobis innata sunt quedam similitudines increatæ veritatis, unde secundum quod per eas de aliis judicamus, dicimur judicare de rebus per rationes immutabiles vel veritatem increatam."—De Mente, Art. 6. ad 6m. I think it right to add that these words, which are part of an answer to an objection No. 6, taken from St. Augustine, do not fully represent St. Thomas's doctrine as it is set forth in the body of the article to which they are subjoined, and which concludes as follows:—"Scientiam a sensibilibus mens nostra accipit: nihilominus tamen ipsa anima in se similitudines rerum format in quantum per lumen intellectus agentis efficiuntur formæ a sensibilibus abstractæ intelligibiles actu, ut in intellectu possibili recipi possint. Et sic etiam in lumine intellectus agentis nobis est quodammodo omni scientia originaliter indita, mediantibus uni versalibus conceptionibus, quæ statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur, per quas sicut per universalia principia judicamus de aliis et ea præcognoscimus in ipsis. Et secundum hoc illa opinio veritatem habet, quæ ponit nos ea quæ addiscimus ante in notitia habuisse."

prenotions, or sentiments, characterized and engraven in the soul, born with it, and growing up with it."* These things belong to a region of our nature which he did not frequent, and he dismisses them as dreams, not understanding that, in truth—

We are such stuff
As dreams are made of.

And thus, the ideal and spiritual world shut off, he conceives of man (to use Coleridge's words) "as an animal endowed with a memory of appearances and facts," and from that point of view unfolds his theory of the Human Understanding. He is the S. Thomas of *Renaissance* thought. Nor could the radical differences between the philosophical systems of Catholicism and Protestantism be better illustrated than by a comparison between the founder of the school of experimental psychologists and the Angelic Doctor.

Locke's application of his own method was partial and inconsistent, nor was it in this country that it received its full development. Its effects upon English thought were indeed of very great importance, but with these I am not now concerned. At present I turn to France, where it was carried with ruthless logic to its necessary consequences, and whence it penetrated the European mind. The wide difference between the tone of French speculation in the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth is very striking. In the former the Cartesian influence is predominant, and philosophy is essentially metaphysical and idealistic. In the latter it is essentially naturalistic and materialistic. And to Locke this change is mainly due. The *philosophes* of the eighteenth century were doubtless to some extent influenced by earlier writers of their own country, and especially by Montaigne and Bayle: but Locke was their great master, as they were never tired of confessing. The only difference between him and those of them whose teaching would have filled him with the most dismay, is

* Sir Matthew Hale's "Primitive Origination of Mankind," a book which, however antiquated in parts, deserves a better fate than the oblivion into which it has fallen. The following is the passage from which my citation is taken:—I come now to consider of those rational Instincts as I call them, the connate Principles engraven in the human Soul; which though they are Truths acquirable and deducible by rational consequence and argumentation, yet they seem to be inscribed in the very crasis and texture of the Soul antecedent to any acquisition by industry or the exercise of the discursive faculty in man, and therefore they may be well called anticipations, prenotions, or sentiments characterized and engraven in the Soul, born with it, and growing up with it till they receive a check by ill customs or educations, or an improvement and advancement by the due exercise of the faculties. I shall shew first what they are: secondly, what moves me to think that such are connatural.—p. 66.

that he less consistently expounds his own principles. For Locke, man is still a being endowed with reflection and sensibility, and although he reckons passive sensation the common source of our ideas, he judges that the mind is the chief agent in their development. Before a hundred years have passed away, Condillac, taxing him with inexactness—because reflection on his own showing is nothing in its principle, but sensation itself, and because it is less a source of ideas than a canal through which they flow from sense—boldly reduces all our knowledge to sensation. Condillac does indeed maintain in theory a distinction between soul and body; but he holds that sensation envelops all the faculties of the soul, that the judgment, reflection, the passions, are only sensation transforming itself. It is, therefore, obviously but a short and a natural step from his teaching to that of St. Lambert, that man is “une masse organisée et sensible qui reçoit l’esprit de tout qui l’environne, et de ses besoins,” and to the unadorned materialism of Cabanis who defines thought to be a secretion of the brain. Thus mind disappears in matter, and the doctrine refuted by the lips of the dying Socrates, that the soul is the result of the corporeal organization, reappears as the last word of the Lockian ideology. Such is, in fact, and as matter of history, the issue of the great sensualistic negation of the eighteenth century, and we can trace accurately its course in the manifold forms which it assumed from its first formulation to its final resolution. Thus we have the cynical Deism of Voltaire, the coarse Pantheism of Diderot, the sentimental Protestantism of Rousseau, the swinish Naturalism of Holbach, the full-fed Atheism of Helvetius, and many other developments which “prudens prætereo.” But in all worketh one and the selfsame spirit: all are the offspring of a way of thinking about the supernatural originally derived from Locke, either directly or through the school of English Deists which he unwittingly founded. The *philosophes* are all of one family and bear an unmistakable family likeness.

The greatest names of the *philosophe* sect are confessedly those of Voltaire and Rousseau. The thought of the eighteenth century, in the form in which it most potently affected the world, is summed up in these two men. Let us consider them a little. Let us see what their message to the human race was: what were the causes why it had such free course and was glorified, and what its practical fruits. And first, as to Voltaire, supreme literary excellence must, I suppose, on all hands be conceded to him. He knew exactly what he meant; he knew the words which could most perspicuously convey his meaning, and he knew, by the happy

instinct of genius, the most effective way in which to dispose and order them. There is no French like his in its incisive clearness, its perfect polish, its exhilarating grace. Casting about for similitudes, one might compare it to a bright flashing Damascus blade in the hands of a consummate master of fence: it is as hard, as bright, as a diamond of the purest ray: it is like "the foaming grape of Eastern France" with delicate bubbles dancing airily in the glass and subtle fumes ascending to the brain and stealing away the judgment. But if we go on from his style to his thought, we discover that that one secret of his power is the simplicity of his doctrine. It may be said of him, as he said of his master Locke, "he has no great possessions," "but his substance," such as it is, "is well assured." His lucidity is, in great measure, due to his tenuity. He is not hampered by that sentiment of the infinite which is at the root of religion, heroism, and, in the high sense of the word, poetry. He has one and only one test of truth. Can the thing of which there is question be seen, tasted, handled? "Sworn foe to mystery," he holds the supernatural as mere priestcraft, and looks upon the supersensual as an idle tale. Hence Christianity, as being the great system of spiritualism, and as being ostensibly in possession of the world's intellect, is the object pursued by him with unremitting enmity throughout his long life. It is the Infâme which he attacks with every weapon available to him "from the pamphlet to the folio, from the epigram to the sophism." But of all his arms the favourite and the most deadly was ridicule. I do not know who has more fairly estimated his work than Mr. Carlyle in the following passage:—

With Voltaire . . . by nature or by practice, mockery has grown to be the irresistible basis of his disposition; so that for him, in all matters, the first question is, not what is true, but what is false; not what is to be loved and held fast, and earnestly laid to heart, but what is to be contemned, and derided, and sportfully cast out of doors. Here, truly, he earns abundant triumph as an image-breaker, but pockets little real wealth. Vanity with its adjuncts, as we have said, finds rich solacement; but for aught better, there is not much. Reverence, the highest feeling that man's nature is capable of, the crown of his whole moral manhood, and precious, like fine gold, were it in the rudest forms, he seems not to understand, or have heard of even by credible tradition. The glory of knowing and believing is all but a stranger to him; only with that of questioning and qualifying is he familiar. Accordingly, he sees but a little way into Nature; the Mighty All, in its beauty, and infinite mysterious grandeur, humbling the small *me* into nothingness, has never even for moments been revealed to him; only this or that other atom of it, and the differences and discrepancies of these two had he looked into and noted down. His theory

of the world, his picture of man and man's life is little; for a poet and philosopher even pitiful. Examine it in its highest developments, you find it an altogether vulgar picture; simply a reflex, with more or fewer mirrors, of self and the poor interests of self. The 'Divine Idea, that which lies at the bottom of Appearance,' was never more invisible to any man. He reads history, not with the eye of a devout seer, or even of a critic; but through a pair of mere anti-catholic spectacles. It is not a mighty drama, enacted on the theatre of infinitude with suns for lamps, and eternity as a background; whose author is God, and whose purport and thousand-fold moral leads us up to the 'dark with excess of light' of the throne of God; but a poor wearisome debating-club dispute, spun through ten centuries, between the *Encyclopédie* and the Sorbonne. Wisdom or folly, nobleness or baseness, are merely superstitious or unbelieving; God's universe is a larger patrimony of St. Peter, from which it were well and pleasant to hunt out the Pope.*

In Voltaire we have the logical development, with supreme skill, of the idea which is of the essence of Protestantism. Mr. John Morley has observed, and justly, that through him, "the free and protesting genius of the Reformation," "late and changed, but directly of descent," "made its decisive entry into France."† His negations go further than those of the sixteenth century, further than those of Locke; but they are identically the same in principle.‡ He appeals to the private judgment, to common sense as the supreme arbiter, and holds the individual intellect bound to dismiss contemptuously all that it cannot master. He will not hear of any logic of the affections: of those reasons of the heart which the reason knows not,§ he is ever the bitter mocker. Again, reason, whose chief office the wisdom of the ancient world held to be the subduing of the passions, he regards merely as a weapon wherewith to combat superstitions. And by superstitions he

* "Miscellaneous Essays," vol. ii. p. 15.

† Morley's "Voltaire," p. 66.

‡ This has been admirably pointed out by Comte, in the fifth volume of his "Cours de Philosophie Positive," "C'est ce," he writes, "que la raison publique a depuis longtemps essentiellement reconnu, d'une manière implicite mais irrécusable, en consacrant, d'un aveu unanime, la dénomination très expressive de protestantisme, qui, bien que restreinte ordinairement au premier état d'une telle doctrine, ne convient pas moins, au fond, à l'ensemble total de la philosophie révolutionnaire. En effet, cette philosophie, depuis le simple luthéranisme primitif, jusqu'au déisme du siècle dernier, et sans même excepter ce qu'on nomme l'athéisme systématique, qui en constitue la plus extrême phase, n'a jamais pu être historiquement qu'une protestation croissante et de plus en plus méthodique contre les bases intellectuelles de l'ancien ordre social, ultérieurement étendue, par une suite nécessaire de sa nature absolue, à toute véritable organisation quelconque."—p. 540.

§ "Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît pas."—Pascal.

means not only all religious beliefs, hopes, emotions, but all thoughts which transcend the seen and actual, all that concerns itself with the spiritual side of man's nature. He holds metaphysics in hardly less contempt than theology :

Ces beaux-esprits dont le savant caprice,
D'un monde imaginaire a bâti l'édifice,*

are the objects of his unceasing and indiscriminating attacks. In some instances he quite fails to comprehend even the alphabets of their systems. Within certain limits his vision was superlatively clear, but those limits were narrow, and his favourite device is to mask his intellectual shortsightedness by an assumption of contempt for what is unknown to him. He understood in perfection the art of exhibiting the things which he did not understand as unworthy of being understood. Take the verses in which he accumulates his flouts and gibes upon Spinoza :—

Alors un petit juif, au long nez, au teint blême,
Pauvre mais satisfait, pensif et retiré,
Esprit subtil et creux, moins lu que célébré,
Caché sous le manteau de Descartes son maître,
Marchant à pas comptés s'approcha du Grand Être,
Pardonnez-moi, dit-il, en lui parlant tout bas,
Mais je pense, entre nous, que vous n'existez pas. †

What can be wittier than the picture here drawn of this great genius and his philosophy? What more ignorant? Whatever judgment we may form of Spinoza, certainly nothing can be more erroneous than the view which represents as an atheist "this God-intoxicated man," as Novalis calls him, "the writer who, more than any one else, resembles the unknown author of the *"Imitation,"* as Cousin judges. The truth is that Spinoza lived in heights far above, out of Voltaire's sight, who could only conclude that "he did not recognize any God, and only made use of the word in order not to frighten people." It is an eminently characteristic conclusion, and is, in itself, a revelation of the mind which arrived at it. Not less valuable from this point of view are Voltaire's notes on Pascal. Maine de Biran justly observes that they might have been expressly written to expose the littleness, the wretchedness, the puerility of the writer's

* "*Les Systèmes*," *"Œuvres*," t. xii. p. 204. This short poem seems to me to be an epitome of Voltaire's mind. A most instructive parallel might be drawn between this embodiment of persiflage and the terrible verses on the Last Judgment, belonging to the same age, into which a far profounder genius seems to have emptied all the *sæva indignatio* of his lacerated heart.

† "*Les Systèmes*," *ubi supra*.

system, and bring into strong relief the elevation and greatness of a philosophy opposed to that of sensation.* And he elsewhere remarks :—

Voulez-vous trouver un exemple frappant du contraste qu'il y a entre le caractère grave, sérieux et méditatif qui appartient au beau siècle de la philosophie en France, et le ton léger, frivole, cavalier, qui caractérise le siècle de l'irréflexion? Lisez l'article 6 des *Pensées* de Pascal § 5 et la note de Voltaire, qui ne conçoit pas ce qui est la pensée, et comme elle constitue toute la dignité humaine cela est curieux et instructif pour l'histoire de la philosophie.†

It is most curious and instructive, for it is a fair specimen of a thinker, whose influence over the European mind no man has ever equalled.

Next to Voltaire, Rousseau undoubtedly fills the chief place among the *philosophes*. In mental constitution, in personal character, in tastes, temper, method, and style, as in the accidents of life, the two men were very far apart. But they have this in common, that they both represent the same idea. I spoke of Rousseau's system just now as "sentimental Protestantism," and I used the expression advisedly. It is his hereditary Genevan Calvinism, with its dogmatic element eliminated, and nothing but the emotion left. It is a religion, not of persons and things, but of phrases and feelings. We have in it the realization of that "undogmatic Christianity" the praises of which are in the mouths of so many eminent men of the present day. If, let me say, Dean Stanley and Professor Jowett should attempt to embody their theological "views" in any symbolic document (I trust I may be allowed to put the purely imaginary case without offence to those popular and prudent divines), I venture to assert that the result at which they would arrive would not differ materially from "The Savoyard Vicar's Profession of Faith." The substance of Rousseau's teaching, as of Voltaire's, is the assertion of those usurpations of the reason which he calls its rights. They are at one upon the cardinal point of Renaissance philosophy, the self-sufficiency of man in the order of thought and the order of action. This is the great principle which underlies all Rousseau's speculations. Hence, no less

* Maine de Biran, "Sa Vie at ses *Pensées*," p. 162.

† Ibid. p. 194. L'homme n'est qu'un roseau le plus faible de la nature; mais c'est un roseau pensant. Il ne faut pas que l'univers entier s'arme pour l'écraser. Mais quand l'univers l'écraserait, l'homme serait encore plus noble que ce qui le tue, parcequ'il sait qu'il meurt, et l'avantage que l'univers a sur lui, l'univers n'en sait rien (Pascal).—En quoi quelques idées regnes dans un cerveau sont-elles préférables à l'univers matériel? (Voltaire.)

than Voltaire, he is the foe of Christian doctrines and mysteries, the uncompromising enemy of the cult, the ministers, the institutions of the Catholic Church. The very able writer to whom the world is indebted for the most recent biography of him claims, indeed, for his scepticism a great superiority over that of Voltaire's, as being a far more powerful solvent of dogma. "The latter," says Mr. Morley, "only revolted and irritated all serious temperaments, to whom religion is a matter of honest concern; while the former appealed to his doubts, and the more intelligent and sincere their belief happened to be, the more surely would Rousseau's gravely urged objections dissolve the hard particles of dogmatic belief." His objections, Mr. Morley is pleased to add, "were on a moral level with the best side of the religion he assumed; those of Voltaire were only on a level with its lowest side."* Comparisons of this kind are of frequent occurrence with Mr. Morley, and induce a doubt whether his conceptions of Christianity are not chiefly derived at second-hand through its assailants, who have found in him so thorough-going an apologist. Still, the passage which I have just quoted no doubt contains a truth. Voltaire's biting sarcasm appealed chiefly to the more superficial, unreflecting, and corrupt, in an age of which superficiality, irreflection, and corruption were the chief notes. Rousseau's sentimentalism at least "did not revolt the moral sense; it did not afflict the firmness of intelligence, nor did it silence the diviner melodies of the soul."† In the melancholy philosopher of Geneva we have the "sober brow" spoken of by the poet, which no "damned error" ever lacks, ready

to bless it and approve it with a text,
Hiding the grossness with fair ornament.

The reactionary guise which his teaching wore only served to render it more effectively iconoclastic. His writings, their essentially naturalistic character veiled by a turbid and inconsequent spiritualism, appeared when the time of Voltaire's greatest activity was over; and "souls weary of the fierce mockeries, that had so long been flying like fiery shafts against the far Jehovah of the Hebrews, and the silent Christ of the later doctors and dignitaries, and weary too of the orthodox demonstrations that did not demonstrate, and leaden refutations that did not refute, may well have turned"‡ longingly to this new Gospel. Alas! it was a Gospel of the kind of which the Apostle speaks—*aliud Evangelium quod non est aliud*; no Revelation from on high, but the fantasy of a diseased heart

* Morley's "Rousseau," p. 409. † Ibid. p. 404. ‡ Ibid. p. 403.

and a troubled conscience, a creation as hollow and unsubstantial as that which the Goddess of Dulness devised when

Empty words she gave and sounding strain,
But senseless, lifeless! idol void and vain!

No doubt there was an element of intense reality about Rousseau's writings which principally contributed to their vast influence. But that element, if we narrowly examine it, is egotism of a quite portentous kind. No man probably was ever "sick of self-love" to the same degree. Whether we consider his political or religious speculations, the central figure is everywhere Jean Jacques Rousseau. But even in this he is but "falsely true." It is not the real Jean Jacques whom we see as he existed in this world, "a moral dwarf mounted on stilts,"* his enthusiasm of humanity largely tempered by vanity, irritability, selfishness, mendacity, pruriency, cowardice, and ignorance, but a quite transcendental Jean Jacques, highly exemplary† and altogether philanthropic,

lecturing all mankind

On the soft passion and the taste refined,

pointing afflicted humanity forward to a visionary new heaven and new earth, wherein dwell a shadowy Être Suprême and the Contrat Social, or backwards to an equally visionary "state of nature." I shall have again to touch upon Rousseau's attempts at construction. At present I would merely point out that, wholly illusory as they were, they did much to accelerate the downfall of the old order. In his zeal to clear the ground for his projected Temple of Humanity and to possess himself of such fragments of the existing religious and social structure as he judged might with advantage be built therein, he was no less destructive than Voltaire, whose "rage to overthrow without rebuilding" was the constant theme of his complaints. It may be truly said of him:—

Nothing is more imperfect than his way of thought. It is empty, superficial, mocking, dissolvent, good to destroy and nothing more. There is neither depth in it, nor height, nor unity, nor future; nothing capable of serving as a foundation or as a bond.‡

It was not of Rousseau, but of Voltaire, that Rivarol spoke these words, but they are as applicable to the one as to the

* "Un nain moral sur des échasses." It was Madame de Epinay's judgment of him.

† See the curious passage at the beginning of the Confessions, where he challenges all the human race to produce any one who can truly say, "je fus meilleur que cet homme-là."

‡ Œuvres de Rivarol, p. 238.

other. More, they are truly descriptive of the whole sect of the *philosophes*. Negation is the substance of their teaching; it is nothing but a negation of the past, present, and future of the human race.

Such was the sceptical philosophy which possessed itself of the intellect of France and diffused itself from Paris through the whole of Europe. The *philosophes* anticipated, after their manner, the victories of the future Revolutionary hosts, and in truth the triumphs of the Encyclopædists, are by far the more wonderful than those of Napoleon. It is one of the most striking phenomena in history that a doctrine so flimsy, logic so shallow, conceptions so mean, should have been everywhere received as though they were self-evident and irrefragable truth. The "esprit infini" of Voltaire, the literary excellences long below his, it is true, but yet very considerable, of Rousseau, Diderot, Helvetius, Grimm, are quite insufficient to account for the success of the *philosophes*. It is only when we consider the moral and religious state of France when their sect arose that we find, I do not say a complete revelation of the causes which enabled it to effect so great an intellectual and spiritual revolution, but if not a complete revelation, at all events clear and decisive indications of them.

It is beyond question that the decay so conspicuously exhibited in the public order of France during the last quarter of a century of Louis XIV.'s reign, extended to every department of life. The decadence socially and religiously was just as great as it was politically, and may in large measure be attributed to the same cause. The supreme arrogance of the Cæsarism which sought to merge all individuality, all power, in its own greatness, exercised a fatal influence alike upon the domestic virtues, and the religious institutions of the country. It is not easy to overrate the corrupting effect produced upon the nation at large by the brilliant Court which ministered at Versailles to the pride of the monarch. The representatives of the great families of France were withdrawn from the duties, which are best fitted to form a manly character, to the enervating and debasing career of courtier life. It was a life led under the control of an etiquette as oppressive as military discipline, but void of all that gives to military discipline its value, and compensates for the surrender of individuality and personal freedom. Nor was the mischief confined to those who were most directly and immediately affected, for the influence and example of the Court were of potent operation throughout the country. It may be truly said,

hac fonte derivata clades
In patriam populumque fluxit.

That *relâchement des mœurs* which is so signal a characteristic of the eighteenth century may be traced directly to this source. And behind the veil of decent hypocrisy which hangs over the last years of Louis XIV. only too abundant evidence may be found how far the relaxation had proceeded before that monarch passed away.

The Cæsarism of Louis XIV. was even of more disastrous operation in the religious sphere. Whether we consider it as manifested in his treatment of Protestantism, of Jansenism, or the Holy See, it was fraught with the direst evils. The effect of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes and the dragonnades—not to speak of their baneful influence upon the position of Catholics in this and other countries—was to galvanize for a brief time into new life the older forms of Protestantism, and to send the clergy of France to confront the age of Voltaire and Rousseau, defiled by the stains of blood and the taint of the charnel house. Jansenism again was persecuted with a severity which was no less unwise. The more profound our conviction of the mischief inherent in a system which was in fact but disguised fatalism, the more lamentable will appear the policy which made martyrs of those who had fallen into that unlovely heresy, and which attracted towards it the sympathies of the enemies of Absolutism. The truth is that here, as in his monstrous cruelties towards the Protestants, Louis XIV. was in the main animated by his overmastering egotism. It was “the king’s religion” which it was attempted to dragoon into his Huguenot subjects, and his chief objection to the Jansenites was grounded upon the supposed republican tendency of their doctrine: “le vrai Janséniste,” it was said, “ne relève que de Dieu.” So too in his contests with the Holy See, the ambition of the French Monarch was to arrogate to himself a supremacy not very unlike that which Henry VIII. attained in this country. Not only was the king’s religion to be accepted by all men, but all men’s religion was to be the king’s. Louis XIV.’s ecclesiastical policy was all of a piece, and his severities against the Jansenist and Protestant dissidents were closely connected with the Gallican revolt against the Supreme Pastor. They were, in fact, the bribe offered to the clergy to betray to the civil power the Vicar of Christ. And the bribe was accepted. The Four Articles were the price of blood. The effect of an alliance with Absolutism, effected upon such conditions, was fatal to the position of the spirituality in France. From the baptism of Clovis until the seventeenth century was far advanced, the French Church had been the most popular of the institutions of the country, and she had merited her popularity. For she had been the pioneer of progress, the nurse of nationality, the champion

of conscience, the fosterer of freedom, and the protector of the poor. "Whole in herself a common good," her loyalty to the Holy See had been the condition and the bulwark of her independence. With her loyalty to Rome that independence vanished, and with it her popular power vanished too. A century passed away before the ecclesiastical order reaped in the civil constitution of the clergy the full harvest which they had sown in their acceptance of the Four Articles: before they themselves experienced the application of the law which they had rashly sanctioned against themselves* in their exultation at the confiscation of the Protestant Consistories. Their history during the whole of that interval is a history of ever-increasing decadence. Even before the death of Louis XIV. that decadence had gone very far; the moral and intellectual guidance of the country had slipped from their grasp, and religion shared in the contempt which had fallen upon its ministers. S. Simon tells us in his *Memoirs* that when the Duke of Orleans was setting out for Spain to join the Duke of Berwick the King asked him whom he proposed to take with him. Among others the Duke named M. de Fonterpuis. "What, my nephew!" exclaimed the King, much moved; "the son of that mad woman who was for ever running after M. Arnauld! a Jansenist!" "Nay, sire," replied the duke, "he does not believe in God at all." "Is it possible?" the King said. "Do you really tell me that? Well, if that is the case there is no great harm. Take him by all means." On en a ri fort à la cour et à la ville, adds S. Simon. It has been truly observed that in those laughs of the court and the town we have the whole spirit of the eighteenth century in germ.

The death of Louis XIV. was the signal for the open manifestation of this spirit to the world. It is not necessary to dwell upon the gross profligacy and cynical impiety which have made the period of the Regency proverbial for license and blasphemy. We read in the† introduction to *Madame du*

* *Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam.*

† La différence, à l'égard de la pratique de la religion, durant le règne de Louis XIV. et celui de son successeur, quoique frappante, n'a pas été peut-être assez sentie. Pendant le premier, il ne meurt, ni personnage important, ni homme célèbre quelconque, qu'on ne cite la manière plus ou moins édifiante dont il a fini. La réconciliation d'un mourant avec l'Eglise, et son repentir, semblent consoler ses amis de sa perte. La Fontaine déclare, en présence de plusieurs membres de l'Académie française qui, à sa prière, s'étaient rendus chez lui, son extrême repentir du scandale qu'il avait donné par ses contes; et après sa mort, on le trouva revêtu d'un cilice qu'il portait depuis longtemps. Racine, dans ses dernières années, ne paraît occupé que de pratiques religieuses et d'exercices de piété; il renonçait la veille des grandes fêtes, à toute occupation,

Hausset's Memoirs how in ten years a change of two centuries seemed to have come over France: how a torrent of ridicule was poured upon devotion and the devout: how the most scandalous occurrences excited no surprise. It was then that the sect of which Voltaire may be reckoned the chief arose to provide a philosophy congruous to the spirit of the age; and in the doctrine of Locke he found a suitable foundation for it. Man in his deepest degradation is ever willing to justify himself; to fit to his practice a theory of life. To the French society of the epoch, a method which dealt with man as a wholly sensual being, putting aside the God it had ceased to honour, the supernatural voice of conscience to which it had grown deaf, the moral law to which even the tribute of hypocrisy was no longer paid, was supremely grateful. It is a true saying—whoever said it—that “*les Passions sont athées* :” they darken the spiritual intuitions and religious instincts of man's nature. Voltaire, with his experimental psychology, taught men to laugh at those instincts and intuitions, and it was in that guise of persiflage that the philosophy of sensation came to France: its political tendencies did not appear until much later. It is quite clear that Voltaire was no revolutionist, in the sense of deliberately wishing and intending to bring about the overthrow of the public order as it existed. Although “*gaudens popularibus auris*,” there was nothing of the demagogue about him. He did not write for lacqueys or the mob, as he contemptuously announced, and there are few more curious instances of the irony of events than his quasi-canonicalization by the *profanum vulgus* whom he ever hated and kept at a distance. “*Voltairism*,” remarks Mr. Morley, “was primarily and directly altogether an intellectual movement, for this reason, that it was primarily and directly a reaction against the subordination of the intellectual to the moral side of man.”* It is as true as it is tersely put. And it was precisely because the new philosophy presented itself in such an aspect, making the

à toute affaire. On voit encore, dans les lettres que j'ai citées, comme dans d'autres, combien les prédicateurs étaient suivis et les livres de dévotion recherchés. Sous la régence, le ridicule fut versé à pleines mains sur les dévots et la dévotion; et il semblait, dix ans après la mort de Louis XIV., qu'il y eût deux siècles entre son règne et celui de Louis XV., du moins quant à la religion.

Les lettres de Mademoiselle Ayssé, réimprimées en 1805, contiennent des anecdotes assez curieuses, et donnent une juste idée des mœurs pendant la régence. Elles étaient devenues tellement désordonnées, que les événements les plus scandaleux semblaient ne pas étonner les contemporains. Mémoires de Madame du Hausset. Int. p. 9. The writer goes on to give some curious specimens of these “événements scandaleux.”

* Morley's “*Voltaire*,” p. 25.

individual reason, which, in practice, is apt to mean the individual appetite, the sole rule of life, that it won so ready a reception among men weary of "creeds that refuse and restrain."

The spirit of the age, then, whose "dull sound of subterranean impiety," long before it mixed itself with life, had fallen upon the keenly attuned ears of Bossuet, and filled the prescient genius of Pascal with those vague alarms which betray themselves in the febrile uneasiness of his writings, received from Voltaire its formulation and logical embodiment. In his hand it became a tremendous weapon which there was nothing left in France to resist. There arose none like unto Bossuet and Pascal among their discredited and degenerate successors. The clergy who were confronted with the new philosophy were as men sleeping upon the walls of the spiritual city of which they were the watchmen, unconscious of the hosts gathered together for its overthrow: and if they dimly awake from time to time to an apprehension of peril, they display an utter inability to discern the course of the century and the signs of the times. Their only resource is in the secular power. In reversal of the Apostolic word, it may be said that the weapons of their warfare are not spiritual but carnal, and impotent to the pulling down of strongholds. There was hardly one of their general assemblies during the reigns of Louis XV. and Louis XVI. in which demands for fresh severities against dissidents were not addressed by them to the king; demands mingled with servile adulation of the monarch, and constant iteration of the Gallican doctrine of his absolute and immediate divine right. At the same time their tone towards the Supreme Pastor is in the highest degree arrogant and disloyal, while their practical disregard of him is sufficiently evidenced by the fact that the great liturgical revolution of 1738 was effected without one word of reference to Rome. Meanwhile fresh fetters are heaped upon them by the civil power. As though the interdiction of their assemblies without the royal license, the prohibition of correspondence between Bishops and the Apostolic See, the multiplication of *appels comme d'abus*, the requirement of the registration of Bulls by the Council of State, the control of Episcopal Mandements, were not sufficient infringements of the liberties of the Church, the constant endeavour of the Parliaments throughout the century is to reduce the spirituality to entire submission and the lowest depth of humiliation. It is not necessary for me to follow the deadly conflicts between the great judicial corporations and the clergy, which are so marked a feature of the reign of Louis XV., and the true bearing of which upon the public order appears to have been discerned by that monarch,

through the "solid darkness" which encompassed his soul.* I am here merely concerned to point out how the pretensions of the Parliaments to regulate the administration of the Sacraments under pain of the galleys, to suppress or burn Papal and Episcopal documents treating of purely doctrinal matters, to revise the list of General Councils, and to sit in judgment upon canonized saints,† afforded infinite matter for the sneers of the *philosophes*, and vastly added to the ever-increasing discredit of religion. One great cause of that discredit lay in the hierarchy itself. The abbeys and bishoprics of the Church were filled chiefly with courtiers, often of scandalous lives, who had succeeded in winning the good graces of a minister or a mistress, and who were usually as eager to shirk the duties as to obtain the temporalities of their preferments. The parochial clergy shared in the prevailing degeneracy. They were for the most part, it is true, of blameless conduct, but they were seldom men of solid learning, or active zeal, or a spirit ecclesiastical. As to the religious orders, there is an immense amount of evidence which establishes only too clearly the deplorable relaxation of their discipline,‡ the Trappists, Cistercians, and Jesuits being, indeed, bright exceptions. Such were the accredited defenders of the faith in the eighteenth century; and, in truth, they were only a little less infected than their opponents by the new philosophy. They had drunk deeply into that dry, analytical,

* Mme. du Hausset in her Memoirs relates the following scene:—"Un jour, le *maître* (Louis XV.) entra tout échauffé. Je me retirai, mais j'écoutai de mon poste.—Qu'avez-vous? lui dit *Madame* (Mme. de Pompadour).—Ces grandes robes et le clergé, répondit-il, sont toujours aux couteaux tirés; ils me désolent par leurs querelles; mais je déteste bien plus les grandes robes. Mon clergé, au fond, m'est attaché et fidèle; les autres voudraient me mettre en tutelle.—La fermeté, lui dit Madame, peut seule les réduire.—Robert de Saint-Vincent est un boute-feu que je voudrais pouvoir exiler, mais ce sera un train terrible. D'un autre côté, l'archevêque est une tête de fer qui cherche querelle.—M. de Gontaut entra. . . . Le roi se promenait agité; puis tout d'un coup il dit:—Le régent a eu bien tort de leur rendre le droit de faire des remontrances; ils finiront par perdre l'Etat.—Ah! Sire, dit M. de Gontaut, il est bien fort pour que de petits robins puissent l'ébranler.—Vous ne savez ce qu'ils font et ce qu'ils pensent, reprit le roi: c'est une assemblée de républicains. En voilà au reste assez; les choses comme elles sont dureront autant que moi. . . ." p. 94.

† The Parliament of Paris excluded from the list of General Councils those of Florence and the Lateran, and struck out from the Calendar the Feast of S. Vincent de Paul.

‡ Things went on growing steadily worse, up to the outbreak of the French Revolution. As an example of what they had come to, thirteen years before that event, I may mention a petition addressed to the king in 1765 by twenty-eight monks of S. Germain des Prés, praying to be released from the obligation of saying the night office, of abstaining from flesh, and of wearing their habit.

sensualistic spirit of the age which they were called upon to resist. Not only in France, but throughout Europe, the super-sensual character of Christianity seems to have been forgotten by its teachers: its mysteries are spoken of, if at all, apologetically and with bated breath: its dogmas are veiled: its essential mission as a manifestation of the supernatural ignored: materialism has invaded the very citadel of the most spiritual of religions. Theology loses itself in evidences which, it may be safely affirmed, never carried conviction to any human soul. We look in vain for any large philosophic conception of the Catholic faith, for any apprehension of the irrefragable foundation which, as Pascal had shown, it possesses in our spiritual intuitions and in the accordance of Revelation with the wants of human nature; nay, even for any appreciation of it as the great historical fact of the modern world. These things are no more to be found in the defenders of Christianity than in its adversaries. It is curious and significant how the favourite ground chosen by Voltaire is tacitly accepted by his opponents. Half his attacks are directed against a doctrine of the inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures, which is, indeed, essential to the old "orthodox" Protestantism, but which has no sanction from the Catholic Church—nay, more, which is in truth quite out of harmony with her system. The upholders of Christianity, however, Catholic and Protestant alike, with scarcely an exception, take their stand upon the letter of those venerable documents of the faith, and, it must be owned, are in most cases ignominiously discomfited. The *philosophes* succeeded through the moral, intellectual, and spiritual weakness of their adversaries far more than through their own strength. In truth, the position of the clergy throughout the century is rather that of a victim than that of a combatant; and Voltaire turned in contempt from them to the giant* (as he termed him) of an elder generation, in whom at all events he recognized a worthier adversary. M. Sainte-Beuve has observed†, and I believe correctly, that among the French clergy not one was found to answer the attack upon the "Pensées." Comment would only dull the significance of such a fact.

* Voltaire writes to Formont in 1734:—"Il y a longtemps que j'ai envie de combattre ce géant." M. Sainte-Beuve observes: "Voltaire comprit que Pascal était le grand rival qui gênait la philosophie, et il l'attaqua de front. Pourquoi alla-t-il s'attaquer à Pascal plutôt qu'à Bossuet ou à tout autre? Voilà, selon moi, l'honneur singulier de Pascal et la preuve qu'il est au cœur du Christianisme même."

† "Port Royal," t. iii. p. 322. M. Sainte-Beuve says that the only champion who entered the lists with Voltaire in defence of the author of the "Pensées" was one Boullier, a Protestant, whose work I have not seen. Sainte-Beuve credits it with vigour and gravity.

Thus much in elucidation of the easy victory achieved by the Renaissance philosophical idea, in its ultimate development, over the intellect of France. Let us consider a little its practical fruits. The inquiry is not of merely bygone interest. History ought to be what the trite old saying affirms it is, philosophy teaching by example. And here we have, in fact, the materials for the answer to the question proposed of late by a brilliant writer and widely discussed, in every variety of key, in the organs of public opinion:—Eliminate the Christian religion from a society which has been penetrated by it and is life worth living? It is worthy of note that the *philosophe* doctrine is in all essentials at one with the Positivism of the present day. That we do not know, and that no one knows, whether there is an invisible world or not; that it is mere waste of time to think about it; that all religions and all metaphysics are chimerical and vain; that the only possible science is that of the physical world, its facts and its laws; such are the main positions of what is called "modern thought."* And such were the doctrines dominant in France a hundred years ago, not only in the upper classes of society among whom they were at first diffused, but throughout the intelligence of the country. What, as a matter of fact, was the practical outcome of these doctrines?

I suppose we may take it, as Mr. Carlyle says, that "a man's religion is the chief fact about him: a man's or a nation of men's. . . . The thing a man does practically believe . . . concerning his vital relations to this mysterious universe, and his duty and destinies there, that is in all cases the primary thing for him, and creatively determines all the rest. That is his religion, and it may be his mere scepticism and no religion: the manner in which he feels himself to be related to the unseen world or no world."† Now looking at the France of a hundred years ago, when *philosophism* had had its perfect work, we find the teaching of Rousseau on this matter predominant. The destroyer Voltaire had done his part. Rousseau was to create—to make all things new. The task before him was to preserve religion as a sentiment, while rejecting the supernatural facts and the authoritative dogmas of revelation. And he set himself to this task with indubitable earnestness. He was well aware of the existence of that in man which was hidden from the eyes of most of the

* Such is M. Littré's account of the Positive philosophy:—"La philosophie positive est l'ensemble du savoir humain, disposé suivant un certain ordre. . . . Mais comment définirons-nous le savoir humain? Nous le définirons l'étude des forces qui appartiennent à la matière et des conditions ou lois qui régissent ces forces." "Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive," p. 42.

† "Lectures on Heroes," Lec. i.

philosophes. The religious aspirations and affections which they derided as mere illusions and fables were for him an integral part of our nature, the necessary foundation of all morality, the only stable basis of the public order.* Nay, sometimes he quite outstrips the bounds of the experimental philosophy in his inconsequent ardour, and insists upon the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and a future life, as "incontestable verities and sacred dogmas." And in a remarkable passage of the "*Emile*," inveighing against the scepticism which he describes truly enough as a hundred times more affirmative and dogmatic than the teaching which proceeded from its adversaries, he denounces those who, under the lofty pretext of enlightenment, take from the wretched the last consolation of their misery, from the powerful and rich the only curb of their passions: who tear out from men's hearts the remorse of crime, the hope of virtue, and yet vaunt themselves the benefactors of the human race.† Never had Deism such a prophet; and men tried hard to believe him, but they could not. Faith is, after all, an intellectual act, and the intellect could not lay hold of his fugitive dreams. Mr. Morley justly remarks that—

His teaching was cold and inanimate, in its essence a doctrine of self-complacent individualism, from which society has little to hope, and with which there is little chance of the bulk of society ever sympathizing. The common people (he further observes, with a touch of contempt very characteristic of his school of thought) are wont to crave a revelation, or else they find Atheism a rather better synthesis than any other. They either cling to the miraculously transmitted message with its hopes of recompense, and its daily communication of the Divine Voice in Prayer and Sacrament, or else they make a world which moves through space as a black monstrous ship with no steersman.‡

* In his *Lettre à d'Alembert sur les Spectacles*, he writes:—"Je n'entends pas qu'on puisse être vertueux sans Religion; j'eus longtemps cette opinion trompeuse, dont je suis bien désabusé." And in the "*Contrat Social*" (l. iv. c. viii.): "Jamais État ne fut fondé, que la Religion ne lui servit de base." It would be easy to multiply passages to the same effect, or indeed to a quite opposite effect.

† "*Emile*," tom. iii.

‡ Morley's "*Voltaire*," p. 200. I cannot deny myself the pleasure of here quoting the following passage from this admirable writer:—"In truth, one can scarcely call [Deism] a creed. It is mainly a name for a particular mood of fine spiritual exaltation: the expression of a state of indefinite aspiration and supreme feeling for lofty things. Are you going to convert the new barbarians of our western world with this fair word of emptiness? will you sweeten the lives of suffering men, and take its heaviness from that droning piteous chronicle of wrong and cruelty and despair, which everlastingly saddens the compassionating ear like moaning of a midnight sea; will you animate the stout of heart with new fire, and the firm of hand with fresh joy of battle, by the thought of a being without intelligible attributes, a mere abstract creation of meta-

As a matter of fact we have the practical outcome of Rousseau's Deism, a very few years later, in the Fête of the Être Supreme with his disciple Robespierre, as ministering High Priest, and in the worship of the Goddess of Reason symbolized, apt emblem ! by a naked prostitute. It was the only serious attempt at construction in the religious domain made by the *philosophes*. Construction, indeed, is no part of the work of what Mr. Mill calls "the analytical philosophy of the human mind." It is a profoundly true observation of Maine de Biran :—

Le sentiment de l'infini est identique au sentiment religieux ou il en est la base. . . . Dans un siècle où l'on raisonne de tout, où l'on demande que tout soit démontré, il ne peut y avoir de religion ni aucune institution proprement dite; l'analyse fait évaporer le sentiment. Si elle veut remonter jusqu' à la source où il se rattache et en mettre la base à nu, elle ne trouvera rien, elle niera la réalité de cette base, sans s'apercevoir qu'elle n'est pas de son ressort.*

The philosophical idea of the Renaissance was tried by "Time the old Judge" with inexorable justice, however slow the process, and reduced to its true resolution. And as the last century draws to its close in France we have its ultimate issue in a de-Christianized nation, making the experiment whether life is worth living upon the basis of Atheism.

If religion be the first fact about a people, the position of woman is the second. And in the modern world the position of woman has been determined by religion, and made an integral part of it. The family, as it still exists in Europe, is the creation of the Church. Marriage, monogamous, indissoluble, sacramental, is the basis upon which she has reared the social order. And the great guardian of marriage, as she conceives of it, is that virtue of purity to which she attaches so transcendent an importance—a virtue the very idea of which may be said to have well-nigh vanished from the ancient world when the religion of Jesus Christ appeared, and which, I suppose, I may take as universally admitted to be quite a unique feature of the Catholic faith. So the *philosophes* viewed it. Chastity they judged to be a mere monkish superstition, altogether incompat-

physic, whose mercy is not as our mercy, nor his justice as our justice, nor his fatherhood as the fatherhood of men? It was not by a cold, a cheerless, a radically depraving conception such as this, that the Church became the refuge of humanity in the dark times of old, but by the representation to men sitting in bondage and confusion, of godlike natures moving among them under figure of the most eternally touching of human relations; a tender mother ever interceding for them, and an elder brother laying down his life that their burdens might be loosened."

* "Vie et Pensées," p. 191.

ible with the fair ideal of human life proposed to the world in the "Pucelle," and their constant endeavour was to pour contempt upon it and to root it out from society. Let me again quote Mr. Morley, who in a curious passage puts this point with a certain amount of candour:—

The peculiarity of the licence of France in the middle of the eighteenth century is, that it was looked upon with complacency by the great intellectual leaders of opinion. It took its place in the progressive formula. What austerity was to other forward movements, licence was to this. It is not difficult to perceive how so extraordinary a circumstance came to pass. Chastity was the supreme virtue in the eyes of the Church, the mystic key to Christian holiness. Continence was one of the most sacred of the pretensions by which the organized preachers of superstition claimed the reverence of men and women. It was identified, therefore, in a particular manner with that Infamous, against which the main assault of the time was directed. So men contended, more or less expressly, first, that continence was no commanding chief among virtues; then that it was a very superficial and easily practised virtue; finally, that it was no virtue at all, but if sometimes a convenience, generally an impediment to free human happiness.*

Such, according to their latest apologist, was the formal teaching of the *philosophes* as to the relations between the sexes. Nor is there any room for doubt as to what came of it. There is an overwhelming mass of evidence regarding the ever-increasing degradation of woman as the "analytical philosophy of the human mind" pursued its victorious course. For my present purpose it will be sufficient to refer to the MM. de Goncourt's work "*La Femme au XVIII. siècle*," a book which, so far as my own researches enable me to judge, amply merits the praise bestowed upon it by M. Scherer as† a revelation of the century with which it deals, initiating us into its inner life and moral character. The burden of their volume is the

* Morley's "Voltaire," p. 108.

† Le volume de MM. de Goncourt est un des ouvrages qui nous font le mieux connaître le siècle auquel ils se rapportent, qui du moins nous font le mieux entrer dans sa vie intime, dans son caractère moral. On ne sait pas tout d'une époque lorsqu'on en connaît la littérature; il ne suffit pas même de lire les Mémoires des personnes qui y ont vécu; il y a en outre une foule de détails d'usage, de ton, de costume, mille renseignements sur les diverses classes de la société et leur condition, mille riens, inaperçus comme l'air même que l'on respire, mais qui ont leur valeur et qui contribuent à l'effet total. Or, voilà ce que MM. de Goncourt ont recueilli avec un zèle et un *soin* dignes d'éloge. Ils ont fait pour le dix-huitième siècle ce que des savants en *us* font avec moins de ressources, mais non pas avec plus de sagacité, pour des civilisations disparues: ils l'ont reconstruit par les monuments. Scherer's "*Nouvelles Études sur la Littérature Contemporaine*," p. 96.

complete revolution which was effected in woman by the new doctrine.

À se voir (they tell us) à ses leçons, la femme réforme son cœur et renouvelle son esprit. Ses sentiments natifs, son besoin de foi, d'appui, de plénitude, par une croyance, un dévouement, la règle dont l'éducation du couvent lui avait donné l'habitude, elle dépouille toutes ces faiblesses de son passé, comme elle dépouillerait l'enfance de son âme. Elle s'allege de tout idée sérieuse, pour s'élever à ce nouveau point de vue d'où le monde considère la vie de si haut, en ne mesurant ce qu'elle renferme qu'à ces deux mesures : l'ennui ou l'agrément. Repoussant ce qu'on appelle "des fantômes de modestie et de bienséance" renonçant à toutes les religions, à toutes les préoccupations dont son sexe avait eu en d'autres siècles les charges, les pratiques, les tristesses assombrissantes, la femme se met au niveau et au ton des nouvelles doctrines ; et elle arrive à afficher la facilité de cette sagesse mondaine qui ne voit dans l'existence humaine, débarrassée de toute obligation sévère qu'un grand droit, qu'un seul but providentiel : l'amusement ; qui ne voit dans la femme, délivrée de la servitude du mariage, des habitudes du ménage, qu'un être dont le seul devoir est de mettre dans la société l'image du plaisir, de l'offrir et de la donner à tous.*

Let us turn from this general view to the chapter entitled *L'Amour*. Up to the death of Louis XIV., we read, France seemed determined to etherealize love : to make of it a theoretic passion, a dogma surrounded with an adoring reverence which resembled a religious cultus, to veil its materiality by an immateriality of sentiment. Even in its perversion it strove to wear some appearance of virtue : to put on a semblance of greatness and generosity, of courage and delicacy. "Ses fautes, ses hontes mêmes, gardent une politesse et une excuse, presque une pudeur." Such was the ideal which, transmitted from the age of chivalry, still lingered in France until the eighteenth century.

Mais au dix-huitième siècle que devient cet idéal ? L'idéal de l'amour au temps de Louis XV. n'est plus rien que le désir, et l'amour est la volupté. Volupté ! c'est le mot du dix-huitième siècle ; c'est son secret, son charme, son âme. Il respire la volupté, il la dégage. La volupté est l'air dont il se nourrit et qui l'anime. Elle est son atmosphère et son souffle. Elle est son élément et son inspiration, sa vie et son génie. . . . La femme alors n'est que volupté. . . . Le dix-huitième siècle, en disant : *Je vous aime*, ne veut point faire entendre autre chose que : *Je vous désire*. Avoir pour les hommes, enlever pour les femmes, c'est tout le jeu ce sont toutes les ambitions de ce nouvel amour. . . . Le siècle est arrivé "au vrai des choses," il a rendu "le mouvement aux sens." Il a supprimé, et s'en vante, les exagérations, les grimaces, et les affectations. . . . La morale du temps . . . encourage la femme à la franchise de la galanterie, à

* "Nouvelles Etudes sur la Littérature Contemporaine," p. 40.

l'audace de l'inconduite, par des principes commodes et appropriés à ses instincts. Des pensées qui circulent, de la philosophie régnante, des habitudes et des doctrines conjurées contre les préjugés de toute sorte et de tout ordre, de ce grand changement dans les esprits qui ébranle ou renouvelle, dans la société, toutes les vérités morales, il s'élève une théorie qui cherche à élargir la conscience de la femme, en la sortant des petitesse de son sexe. C'est toute une autre règle de son honnêteté, et comme un déplacement de son honneur, qu'on fait indépendant de sa pudeur, de ses mérites, de ses devoirs. Modestie, bienséance, le dix-huitième siècle travaille à dispenser la femme de ces misères. Et pour remplacer toutes les vertus imposées jusqu'à son caractère, demandées à sa nature, il n'exige, plus d'elle que les vertus d'un honnête homme. . . . Les sophismes commodes, les apologies de la honte, les leçons d'impudeur flottent dans le temps, descendent des intelligences dans les cœurs, enlèvent peu à peu le remords à la femme éclairée, enhardie, étourdie, conviée aux facilités par les systèmes, les idées qui tombent du plus haut de ce monde, qui s'échappent des bouches les plus célèbres, des âmes les plus grandes, des génies les plus honnêtes. Et l'amour proclamé par le naturalisme et le matérialisme, pratiqué par Helvétius avant son mariage avec Mlle. de Ligneville, glorifié par Buffon dans sa phrase fameuse: "Il n'y a de bon dans l'amour que le physique,"—l'amour physique finit par apparaître, chez la femme même, dans sa brutalité.*

This was the woman of the eighteenth century as she existed in French society under *philosophe* teaching. Those who care to consult the MM. de Goncourt's pages will find there a full account of what marriage and maternity became in her hands. I turn from these writers to their accomplished critic, M. Scherer, and shall borrow his words to trace the effect upon French society of this transformation. He has been speaking of the *salon* of the age, and of all those graces of conversation, those refinements of wit and manners, that perfect elegance and *bon ton* which gave to it its inimitable character:

La vie se passe difficilement d'un but sérieux; elle offre cette contradiction éternelle que, tendant au bonheur, elle ne peut s'y attacher comme à son objet propre, sans, par cela même, en détruire les conditions. Ces hommes, ces femmes, qui semblaient n'exister que pour les choses qui paraissent le plus dignes d'envie, la grâce et l'honneur, l'amour et l'intelligence, ces gens avaient tari en eux les sources de l'intelligence et de l'amour. Cet épicurisme consommé allait à contre-fin. Ces vertus, bornées aux vertus de sociabilité, se montraient insuffisantes à supporter la société. Cette activité, dans laquelle le devoir, l'effort, le sacrifice n'avaient point de place, se dévorait elle-même. On a éteint l'âme, la conscience, comme des lumières inutiles, et voici, il se trouve que tout est obscur. L'esprit devait tenir lieu

* "Etudes sur la Littérature Contemporaine," pp. 151-174.

de tout, et l'esprit n'a servi qu'à tout flétrir et à se flétrir tout le premier. On n'a demandé qu'une chose à la destinée humaine, le plaisir, et c'est l'ennui qui a répondu.

Ce mal incurable de l'ennui, le dix-huitième siècle le porte partout. C'est là son fond, j'allais dire son principe. C'est par là que s'expliquent ses agitations, ses dégoûts, ses tristesses cachées, l'audace de ces vices. Il flotte sans trouver à quoi s'attacher. Il se prend à tout pour retomber toujours dans un désenchantement plus profond. Chacun des fruits auxquels il mord lui laisse un goût de cendres plus amer. Il se donne des secousses, et il ne parvient pas à se sentir vivre. Il est triste, triste comme la morte, et il n'a pas même la grandeur de la mélancolie. Tout ne lui est plus qu'un spectacle, lui-même il se regarde vivre, et ce spectacle a cessé de l'intéresser. Lassitude, aridité intérieure, prostration de toutes les forces de la vie, voilà à quoi il en est venu. C'est alors qu'on voit un phénomène bien connu se produire. L'homme ne s'arrête jamais, il creuse toujours, il creuse le vide même : ne croyant plus à rien, il cherche encore un je ne sais quoi qui lui échappe. La débauche, elle aussi, poursuit son rêve insaisissable. Elle demande aux sens ce qu'ils ne peuvent lui donner. Irritée de ses mécomptes, elle invente des raffinements. Elle assaisonne le libertinage de toutes sortes d'infamies. Elle devient féroce. Elle se plaît à faire souffrir les êtres qu'elle perd. Elle jouit des remords, de la honte de ses victimes. Elle met sa vanité à compromettre les femmes, à leur briser le cœur, à les dépraver s'il se peut. La galanterie se change ainsi en cynisme de méchanceté. On se pique de cruauté et de calcul dans la cruauté. Le bon ton affiche la noirceur. Mais cela même n'est pas encore assez. Les insatiables appétits demanderont au crime la saveur que le vice a perdue pour eux. "Il est, disent fort bien MM. de Goncourt, il est une logique inexorable qui commande aux mauvaises passions de l'humanité d'aller au bout d'elles-mêmes, et d'éclater dans une horreur finale et absolue. Cette logique avait assigné à la méchanceté voluptueuse du dix-huitième siècle son couronnement monstrueux. Il y avait eu dans les esprits une trop grande habitude de la cruauté morale pour que cette cruauté demeurât dans la tête et ne descendît pas jusqu'aux sens. On avait trop joué avec la souffrance du cœur de la femme, pour n'être pas tenté de la faire souffrir plus sûrement et plus visiblement. Pourquoi, après avoir épuisé les tortures sur son âme, ne pas les essayer sur son corps ? Pourquoi ne pas chercher tout crûment dans son sang les jouissances que donnaient ses larmes ? C'est une doctrine qui naît, qui se formule ; doctrine vers laquelle tout le siècle est allé sans le savoir, et qui n'est, au fond, que la matérialisation de ses appétits ; et n'était-il pas fatal que ce dernier mot fût dit, que l'éréthisme de la férocité s'affirmât comme un principe, comme une révélation, et qu'au bout de cette décadence raffinée et galante, après tout ces acheminements au supplice de la femme, M. de Sade vint pour mettre, avec le sang des guillotines, la Terreur dans l'Amour."*

* "Etudes sur la Littérature Contemporaine," p. 101.

Such was the effect of the philosophy of sensation upon woman. All that distinguished her position in the modern world from that which she held in Pagan antiquity had come to her from Christianity. And with Christianity it vanished, leaving her poor indeed—stripped of the robe of grace and glory wherewith the Catholic religion had decked her—naked, and not ashamed. Thus, while the monarchs of the age were triumphing over the last remains of mediæval liberty, and carrying to its complete development the Cæsarism, which is the political idea of the Renaissance, its intellectual idea, embodied in the doctrines of the *philosophes*, had issued in ferocious animalism. The social edifice was at the same time overweighted with Absolutism, and shorn of the two main foundations, God and the Family, upon which the Church had reared it. Liberty and Freewill, those two great lights, ruling, the one in the political order and the other in the moral, die before the “uncreating word” of Materialism; for matter knows no laws but the physical and mathematical. And then is realized the picture traced by the deepest thinker England ever produced:—

Then everything includes itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite;
And appetite, an universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And, last, eat up himself.

All systems of philosophy may be reduced to two great classes. Everything depends upon the point of departure. The recognition of the consciousness of the Ego by itself, or the non-recognition—such is the radical difference. There lies a whole universe between the philosophy which starts from the soul as the true Ego,* the form of the body, and the philosophy which starts from the physical organism. “Ex fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos” applies as truly to the thoughts of men’s hearts as to their external actions. Philosophy is in a very real sense the guide of life; and the unique value of the history of the eighteenth century is that it shows by a pregnant example whither the philosophy of sensation leads mankind.

W. S. LILLY.

* “Ego, ego animus. S. Augustini Confes.” L. x. c. 9.

ART. IV.—ETHICS IN ITS BEARING ON THEISM.

VERY little will be found in the ensuing article, which has not been said under one shape or other in the earlier portion of our series. In order, however, that we may exhibit in its due force that very important part of our reasoning which is connected with ethical doctrine, it is requisite that we disentangle this part from the many incidental controversies with which it has inevitably become intermixed. It is requisite that we place before our readers in due arrangement what may be called our trunk-line of argument, concerning the relation of Ethics to Theism; and (as part of the same task) that we trace back that argument to its first premisses. This is what we propose on the present occasion.

The purpose of our series as a whole (we need hardly repeat) is the argumentative establishment of Theism against contemporary infidels. The true doctrine on Ethics ranks (in our humble judgment) among the most important premisses of Theistic doctrine; and it is essential therefore that we duly treat it. At the same time we are not otherwise of course directly concerned with Ethics, than in its bearing on Theism; nor shall we attempt, except in a very few incidental remarks, to cover wider ground. But even when our scope is thus confined, the proof of true ethical doctrine pre-supposes two logically prior principles. These principles concern (1) the authority of intuitions, and (2) the existence and character of necessary truths. We will consider then successively these two principles, and recapitulate part of what we have said concerning them on earlier occasions.

THE AUTHORITY OF INTUITIONS.

The indictment ordinarily brought by the Phenomenist against Intuitionists is, that throughout their philosophy their one procedure is the erecting gratuitously, into the rank of objective truths, the mere subjective impressions of their own mind. Accordingly, a contrast is energetically insisted on between the arbitrariness, vagueness, capriciousness of Intuitionism, and the firmness, solidity, security of Phenomenistic philosophy. The latter, it is maintained, rests on that impregnable ground, the study of phenomena, pursued systematically by a mutually consulting body of trained observers; whereas the former—so the Phenomenist continues—has no firmer basis to support it, than those idiosyncracies of the individual philosopher, which he chooses to dignify by the name of intuitions. Nor in any other instance

is this objection so urgently and vehemently pressed, as when an *ethical* theory is founded on the alleged dictates of a moral faculty. To this large indictment we have always replied, that nothing, indeed, can be more reasonable, than to examine with keenest jealousy the question, whether this or that alleged intuition be really such; but that to repudiate *in toto* the authority of intuitions—to affirm that none are cognizable as genuine and reliable—is a course simply suicidal. Phenomenists and Intuitionists alike—we maintain—always do and always must base their arguments on an intuitional foundation. The only difference between the two is, that the latter herein do but act in accordance with their avowed principles, while the former tread theirs, we must say, unblushingly under foot.

As one illustration of what we intend by this statement, let us ask the two following questions:—(1) What philosophical result can reasonably ensue from that study of phenomena which is our opponents' boast, unless they assume as their constant premiss *the uniformity of nature*? And (2) How can the uniformity of nature be reasonably maintained, except by calling in the ministrative aid of this or that intuition? We will insist briefly on these two successive questions; and we will choose for our illustration, at random, one of the ten thousand physical truths which modern research has brought to light—viz., the combustibleness of diamonds. We would thus, then, address our Phenomenistic opponent:—

You lay down as a truth of science, that all diamonds are combustible; or, in other words, that all objects, possessing those attributes which are connoted by the name "diamond," possess that further attribute of being combustible. Now, taking the whole body of scientists together, we should like to know on how many individual diamonds the experiment has been tried. To put the matter greatly within bounds, it has been tried on a number of diamonds, indefinitely less than a thousandth part of those which exist in the world. On what ground, then, do you affirm this proposition as true in regard to that vast majority of diamonds— $\frac{999}{1000}$ + ever so many more—on which the experiment has *not* been tried? Of course in virtue of a certain general principle, called "the uniformity of nature," or "the law of causation;"* the principle, that similar phenomenal antecedents are universally followed by

* We explained in April (p. 307) that the word "causation" is used by Phenomenists, in a sense fundamentally different from that given to it by Intuitionists.

similar phenomenal consequents.* In a former article of our series, we challenged Mr. Mill to prove this principle if he could, without the help of some intuitional assumption; and at a later period we replied to his reply. See October, 1871, pp. 311-317; and January, 1874, pp. 32-38. The controversy was prematurely closed by Mr. Mill's death, and we cannot, therefore, guess what rejoinder he would have made on our reasoning. But as the matter stands, we must say we should be a good deal surprised, if any Phenomenist of ordinary candour were to profess himself satisfied with Mr. Mill's argumentative position on the subject.

Let us even suppose, however, that Mr. Mill had so far proved his point: a greater—nay, an incomparably greater—difficulty still oppresses the Phenomenist. "At last," as Dr. Bain observes, "all our interest in physical science is concentrated on *what has yet to be*: its present and its past are of value, only as a clue to the events that are to come; and experimental investigation is worthless, except so far as it unveils the secret of the future no less than of the present." On what possible ground—if intuitional premisses be excluded—have philosophers a right to lay down as even faintly probable, that the future will resemble the past and present? Dr. Bain for one—and he no subordinate or obscure member of the Phenomenistic school—sees no such ground as possible. He speaks of the "assumption" that "what has uniformly been in the past will be in the future." "Without this assumption," he adds, "we can do nothing; with it we can do anything. Our only error is in proposing to *give any reason or justification of it*; to treat it otherwise than as *begged at the very outset*." ("Deductive Logic," pp. 273, 4). It is Dr. Bain's judgment then, and not ours only, that if physical science is to have any practical value whatever, it must rest on an intuitional basis.† And if corroboration of his view be needed, it will most certainly be found in the complete breakdown of such attempts as have been made by two Phenomenistic writers to overthrow his position. See "Mind" for April and October, 1876. If any Intuitionist had been weak enough, in an inconsiderate moment, to perpetrate the incredibly shallow fallacy contained in the two papers to which we refer, he would

* "The one ultimate premiss of all induction," says Dr. Bain, "is nature's uniformity."

† In October, 1878 (p. 395), we said that this doctrine of nature's uniformity "may be called the opprobrium of modern Phenomenistic philosophy: so confidently is it assumed, and so inadequately established." In April last (p. 310, note,) we expressed our own humble opinion, as the way of satisfactorily proving the doctrine.

not speedily have heard the last of it from his contemptuous opponents.*

But we have been in the habit of pressing our point still more closely home. It is not merely that *experimental* science (in order to be reasonable) must rest on an intuitional foundation : all science, all argument of every kind, nay all thought (in order to be reasonable) must rest on such a foundation. For consider the position of Phenomenistic thinkers. In constructing their philosophy they make vigorous use—no men more so—of their intellectual faculties. But on what reasonable ground (if, as their principle requires, they reject indiscriminately the authority of intuitions) can they allege that the trustworthiness of those faculties is—we will not say say certain—but ever so faintly probable? Professor Huxley has suggested as an easily supposable hypothesis, that some powerful and malicious being may have power over me, and find pleasure in making a fool of me; and that he may often enjoy this amusement—as in other ways—so also by means of compelling my faculties to

* Any one who observes either the language or the general tone of Phenomenistic philosophers, will see clearly (we think) that they do not *in fact* rest their belief in the uniformity of nature on any argumentative basis whatever, which they can distinctly contemplate and defend. The truth of the doctrine is made clear to them by reasons, which they do not attempt to analyze, and which they could not analyze if they did attempt to do so. The uniformity of nature is borne in upon them (if we may so express ourselves) by the every-day experience of their active life. Every day they receive fresh proofs of it, and live (as we may say) in contact with it. Accordingly, if ever they give their mind to an inquiry as to what those arguments are on which the doctrine can reasonably be based—one may see that they pursue the examination in a spirit of languid indifference. They are already profoundly convinced of the doctrine, before they have even asked themselves any question as to its reasonable basis.

Now on this we have three remarks to make. (1) We think that their procedure so far is entirely reasonable. We are confident there are several truths of vital importance to mankind, which are reasonably accepted as certain on *implicit* grounds of assurance. They are reasonably accepted, we say, as certain, on grounds of assurance, which have not as yet been scientifically analyzed; nay, of which, perhaps, scientific analysis transcends the power of the human mind. See what Catholic philosophers say on the "*sensus communis nature*."

But then (2) these philosophers are not less than wildly unreasonable, when (as they are so fond of doing) they contrast their own speculative method with others, as being characteristically precise, logical, scientific. On the contrary, it is in these very qualities that their speculation is as yet so conspicuously wanting. Here is a doctrine of their philosophy so fundamental—so simply at the root of their whole investigations—that unless it be known as certainly true, their whole system is one organised sham and pretence. Yet it is this very doctrine, for which they are unable to produce any precise, logical, scientific basis whatever.

testify what is false. What imaginable disproof can Mr. Huxley suggest of this supposition? But apart from it altogether, there are ten thousand physical agencies (for aught we know) which may possibly land my faculties in this or that entirely false avouchment. Professor Huxley makes vigorous and unintermittent use of his *reasoning* faculty. But if he repudiate the authority of intuitions as such—how can he reasonably even guess, that this faculty is not a mere instrument of delusion? The illustration, to which we have ourselves more commonly had recourse in this connection, has been the faculty, not of reasoning, but of *remembering*. The physical scientist tells us that he has just been witnessing a very important experiment. How do you know, we ask him, how can you even guess, that you have witnessed any experiment of the kind? You reply, that you have the keenest and most articulate *memory* of the fact. Well, we do not doubt at all that you have that present *impression*, which you call a most clear and articulate memory. But how do you know—how can you legitimately even guess—that your present impression corre-

And (3) they show themselves still more narrow, prejudiced, and bigoted, when they assume (which they often do) as a kind of first principle, that this method of implicit reasoning, which is so indispensably necessary for themselves, is in its nature insufficient for the certain establishment of conclusions. As one out of a thousand instances, consider what are sometimes called the "internal evidences" of religion. Even Protestants may in their measure (we are confident) reasonably appeal to these; but we will ourselves, of course, exhibit what we mean, as exemplified by a Catholic. Take then the case of a Catholic, who habitually frequents the Sacraments, who practises regular self-examination and moral discipline, who makes it one chief work of his life to discover and correct his faults, who constantly remembers God's Presence, and trusts to His strength in his own efforts to acquire virtue. We say with complete confidence, that such a person possesses a quasi-experimental acquaintance with the Existence, Power, and Holiness of some Great Supernatural Being; an acquaintance entirely analogous to that knowledge, which scientists possess of their fundamental principle, the uniformity of nature. Of course these philosophers are at full liberty to deny our allegation, and refute it if they can. But what we are here denouncing as so intolerably prejudiced and illogical is, that they will *not* take the trouble to examine and (if they can) refute it; that they stigmatise it as being self-evidently irrational and fanatical. The unreason and fanaticism are really on *their* side.

In one particular, the argumentative grounds which exist for Theism possess a marked superiority over those which (as yet at least) exist for the uniformity of nature. For the former—apart altogether from implicit reasoning—there exists (we maintain) a substantial, cogent, conclusive chain of explicit argument. No such chain of argument has hitherto been set forth by any Phenomenist, for the establishment of his one fundamental scientific premiss.

We wish we had space to exhibit the considerations on which we have here touched, in the fullness and detail which their importance, we think, deserves.

sponds with a past fact? See what a tremendous proposition this is which you, who call yourself a cautious man of science, coolly and unscrupulously take for granted. You have been so wonderfully endowed—such is your bold assumption—that, in every successive case, your clear and articulate present *impression* and *belief* of something as past corresponds with a *past fact*. That this should happen even once is surely (on your principles) a very remarkable coincidence: but you assume it as happening some thousand times in every hour of your waking life.

In truth the distinction is fundamental, between my knowledge of my *present* and my *past* experience. "I am conscious of a most clear and articulate *impression*, that a very short time ago I was suffering cold;" this is one judgment: "a very short time ago I was suffering cold;" this is another judgment fundamentally distinct from the former. That I know my present *impression*, by no manner of means implies that I know my past feeling. Here for instance, are two judgments: (1) "It is wrong to eat beef": (2) "*the Hindoo thinks* that it is wrong to eat beef." These two judgments, it will be admitted, fundamentally and clamorously differ from each other. Yet they do not differ from each other *more* fundamentally and clamorously, than the judgment,—"*I have a present impression of having been cold,*"—differs from the judgment,—"*I was cold.*" The former of these two judgments—we entirely admit—is honestly borne out by experience. But on what ground can the *latter* judgment be reasonably formed, by one who repudiates intuitions? Let men once deny the authority of intuitions—such is our argument—and it follows that they have no means of knowing, or even reasonably guessing, anything of any kind whatever, except the facts of their immediately present consciousness. Their knowledge is less than that possessed by the brutes.*

We have had no hesitation in using the words "intuition," "intuitional," because all our readers will have understood, with sufficient clearness for our purpose, what we intend to express by those terms. Here, however, we may as well set

* We have before now made an explanation, which it will be better here to repeat. Those avouchments of memory, on which we dwell for the purpose of illustrating our principle, are those only which concern my *quite recent* experience. Thus we have spoken of "the keen certitude with which I know that I experienced those sensations of a few minutes back, which my memory vividly testifies." We do not of course deny, that men's memory of what took place a long time ago is often far from infallible. Nor have we failed to explain in former articles, how easily reconcilable is this fact with (what we have called) the principle of intrinsic certitude.

forth their meaning precisely. On a former occasion we defined an intuition to be, "an intellectual avouchment, reliably declaring as immediately evident some truth, other than the mere existence and characteristics of such avouchment." There cannot be a better illustration of this, than the very instance of *memory* on which we have been insisting. Here is an act of memory:—"A very short time ago I felt cold." In this one act, (1) I experience a consciousness, and (2) I elicit an intuition. The consciousness which I experience, is simply the present impression, of which I am conscious, that a very short time ago I felt cold. Now if this were the whole value of the mental phenomenon, I should have no means of knowing, or even reasonably guessing, that I *did* feel cold at the moment to which my memory refers. It is precisely because every act of memory contains an *intuition*, as well as a consciousness, that knowledge (properly so-called) of any kind is possible. It is precisely because my act of memory contains an intuition, that I know with certainty—not merely my present *impression* of having been cold—but the past *fact* of my *having* been cold. If Professor Huxley, or any one else, affirms the broad general thesis that there are no genuine intuitions at all—that men cannot reasonably trust any intellectual avouchment except that of consciousness—he simply excludes himself from the possibility of reasonable and consistent thought on any theme whatever. If, on the contrary, he merely says that there *are* such mental phenomena, no doubt, as genuine intuitions; but that in each given case great jealousy should be exercised, lest we unwarily admit as genuine intuitions what are not really such,—then (with due explanations) he and we are so far in entire concordance.

The more such considerations as these are pondered by any competent thinker, the more inevitable, we are confident, he will find it to fall back on that principle of certitude, which we for ourselves have consistently maintained. This principle was held in one shape or other, we believe, by the whole body of Catholic philosophers, down to the time of that arch-revolutionist, Descartes. And it has quite recently been set forth with especial clearness by F. Kleutgen: see our article on "The Rule and Motive of Certitude," in July, 1871. We have called it the principle of "intrinsic" certitude, in order to distinguish it from two suicidal theories, which in more recent times have attempted to usurp its place. One of these would base my trust in my faculties on my knowledge of God's Veracity; the other would base that trust on the authority of my fellow-men. But both these theories, as we have said, are suicidal. They are suicidal, because it is obviously impossible for me reasonably even

to guess either that God or my fellow-men exist, unless I begin by trusting my faculties, and continue to do so during my whole investigation. The true theory then, we say, is the theory of intrinsic certitude; the theory, that my faculties authenticate *their own* veracity, in virtue of that intrinsic mental endowment, which Catholic philosophers have called "the light of reason." The particular shape in which we exhibited this theory (July, 1871) was moulded on F. Kleutgen's statements, which we largely cited; and we may thus express our thesis, with sufficient completeness for our present purpose. "Whatever my existent faculties (if rightly interrogated and interpreted) declare to be self-evident, is thereby instinctively known to me as self-evident.*

Now, this principle once heartily accepted, we proceed very readily to the conclusions which we desire, concerning (1) necessary truths, and (2) the reasonable basis of Ethics. Indeed Phenomenists are perhaps more or less clearly aware, how ruinous to them is the true principle of certitude: and they labour accordingly to throw obstacles in the way of its explicit reception. Mr. Stuart Mill for one—if we were to take his statements in their one obvious sense†—would stand sponsor for a singular theory. For his words seem to mean, that no declaration of a man's cognitive faculties is trustworthy, unless it be one which those faculties would have elicited, when he was "an infant;" when he "first opened his eyes to the light." In other words he affirms, that no argument is valid, unless it would have been recognized as valid by a newborn infant; and that no avouchment of memory is trust-

* As to this word "instinctively," we explained it on one occasion "as expressing the irresistible and (as it were) piercing character of the conviction to which we refer." "Let any one consider," we added, "the keen certitude with which he knows that he experienced those sensations of ten minutes back, which his memory vividly testifies."

We will also add another explanation, which we made in July, 1876. The principle of intrinsic certitude is not a "logical," but what may be called an "implicit and concomitant" first principle. No syllogism, *e.g.*, of the following kind passes through my mind: "Whatever my faculties declare as self-evident is really self-evident: but they declare such and such things as self-evident: ergo, &c." On the contrary—taking the case of memory as an instance—I am far more immediately certain of the proposition, that I was cold a short time ago,—than I am of the general proposition, that whatever my cognitive faculties avouch as self-evident is really so. The present act of memory is immediately known by me, with keenest certitude, to correspond with a fact truly past: and I *infer* the general principle of intrinsic certitude, by means of reflecting on this and a thousand similar data. This remark tends to mutually harmonise certain dicta of different Catholic philosophers, which on the surface present an appearance of discrepancy.

† See the passages we cited from him in July, 1873, pp. 22, 23.

worthy, unless the memory of a new-born infant would have securely carried that infant so far back. But we will do Mr. Mill more justice than he has done himself, and state his contention in a form less revolting to common sense. We will understand him to mean then, that it is not what my faculties *now* testify as self-evident which I can with reason so regard; but rather, what they *would* have testified as self-evident, had they grown to maturity under their own intrinsic laws of development, without being denaturalized and artificialized by that great body of experience, which has accrued to them since their infancy. It is of fundamental importance in the interests of philosophy, that the extravagance of this theory be duly appreciated; and we argued against it therefore, in July, 1873, pp. 23-26; in January, 1874, pp. 24-27. Here we will but briefly suggest the considerations, which we there more fully developed. We will use the phrase "*primordial faculties*," to express the human faculties as they would have existed in that imaginary state which Mr. Mill has hypothesized. And this being understood, the question at issue is as follows. We contend, that the rule of certitude is the *actual* avouchment of men's *existent* faculties; whereas Mr. Mill contends, that the rule of certitude is the *hypothetical* avouchment of men's *primordial* faculties. Let us now briefly exhibit the wildness of this latter theory.

We will once more recur to our old illustration, derived from *memory*. As we have so often shown—unless Mr. Mill had been able reasonably to trust the fresh avouchments of his memory, his knowledge would have been much less than that of the brutes. Yet, on his principles, how can a disciple of Mr. Mill's reasonably trust his memory? How can he know—how can he reasonably even guess—that his memory is not one of those faculties, which have been denaturalized and artificialized by the past facts of his life? He experiences, *e.g.*, a thought, which he takes to be a clear and keen remembrance of the fact, that a very short time ago he was feeling cold. If, under these circumstances, he is not certain that a very short time ago he *was* feeling cold—he can be certain of nothing whatever in the whole world, outside his consciousness of the present moment. Yet what is more abundantly possible (on his principles) than the supposition that his memory is delusive? He may well, *e.g.*, have suffered so frequently and intensely from cold when he was young, that his existent memory has become denaturalized and artificialized on the subject; that his existent memory often points to coldness as having been experienced at some recent period, when no such coldness was experienced at all. Until he has assured himself

that his faculty of memory has not been impaired, he cannot reasonably (on his principles) even so much as guess that its vouchments are true. Yet how can he so much as begin setting about to prove the trustworthiness of his existent memory, unless he has first *made up his mind to trust it* throughout the whole course of his investigations. The whole procedure implies from first to last, not some grave philosophical theory, but rather what Englishmen unkindly denominate an Irish bull.

Then here is another point. Mr. Mill throughout regards it as a more simple and obvious hypothesis that my *primordial* faculties would have been trustworthy, than that my *existent* faculties possess that attribute. But what even colourable ground is there for such a thesis? By denying indeed the trustworthiness of his *existent* faculties, he has cut away from himself all power of reasonably holding that men's *primordial* faculties would have been trustworthy at all. See our remarks in July, 1873, p. 25. Only by taking for granted that my *existent* faculties are veracious, can I arrive at any conclusion whatever, concerning the hypothetical trustworthiness of my *primordial* faculties.

We will call Mr. Mill's theory "the theory of primordial certitude." And it might not unnaturally have been thought that no other theory on the subject could possibly be so wild, had not one still wilder been invented by Mr. Herbert Spencer. This we will call "the theory of *ancestral* certitude." As regards, *e.g.*, the matter of *Ethics* on which we are presently to speak,—Mr. Spencer admits most frankly, that there exist in the human mind "certain fundamental moral intuitions," "quite independent of conscious experience" ("The Data of Ethics," p. 123.) He considers that certain "nervous modifications" of the past have now become in man "faculties of moral intuition, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility." On what possible ground, then, does Mr. Spencer refuse to accept those objective truths, which such intuitions declare? Because in his view no authority is due to any mental declarations, however unmistakeable and emphatic, which can be traced back to hereditary causes. No existent intuitions (we repeat) are, on Mr. Spencer's theory, to be accounted authentic, unless the philosopher can show that they are not derived from the mental phenomena of former generations by a process of psychological or cerebral law and development. Let me exemplify this by our old instance. Mr. Spencer cannot in consistency know or even conjecture that he was cold a few minutes ago—however clamorously his memory may avouch the fact—until he can first prove a certain necessary premiss. He cannot know that

he was cold a few minutes ago, until he can prove that his ancestors did not experience frequent and intense sensations of cold, which may have affected the faculty of memory as possessed by their descendants, and imbued that faculty with a morbid tendency to be for ever falsely avouching the past existence of cold. Exactly the same thing may be said—not only concerning the past experience of cold—but concerning every past event which memory testifies. And exactly the same thing may also be said—not concerning memory alone—but concerning every intellectual faculty whatever, which Mr. Spencer is in the habit of trusting. Everything which Mr. Spencer considers himself to know, which extends one step beyond what his dog knows, he is bound in reason to regard as a mere dream and delusion,—as the baseless fabric of a vision,—unless he is prepared to renounce and trample on his fundamental principle.*

Both Mr. Mill and Mr. Spencer are in many respects writers of great power and subtlety, and they have thrown much light on various branches of psychology. It is the more remarkable, therefore, that they have been betrayed into these almost incredible aberrations, without any suspicion of their real character. And our sense will be intensified of the great gratitude due to the mediæval writers, if we consider the historical origin of these aberrations. For it is a plain matter of fact, that aberrations of this kind date from Descartes's repudiation of that theory concerning certitude, which (under one shape or

* Mr. Spencer's doctrine on the foundation of certitude is this: Those propositions, and those only, may be accepted as immediately known to me, which are such, that on the one hand they are undecomposable, while on the other hand their negation is inconceivable. For our own part, we entirely deny that all such propositions are *true*. See July, 1871, pp. 57—60. But we here wish to insist on the converse. We wish to point out how fatal a mistake it is to suppose, that no proposition can be immediately known to me, which does not possess these two attributes. Take, *e.g.*, the two following theses: "I was created by a mendacious being, who has endowed me with entirely delusive faculties:" "My memory often deceives me, in what it declares me to have experienced a minute ago." No one can possibly maintain that these theses are inconceivable, or even that there is the slightest difficulty in understanding what they mean. Consequently, according to Mr. Spencer, their contradictories are not immediately known to me. But Mr. Spencer would not himself allege that these contradictories are *inferentially* known to me; and he, therefore, cannot consistently maintain that they are known to me at all. He cannot consistently maintain that I have any knowledge of the fact, that my faculties are other than mere instruments of delusion; or of the fact, that my memory truly testifies my experience of two minutes ago. We need hardly point out that, if these truths were *not* known to me,—if it were not known to me that my faculties are trustworthy,—my possible knowledge would be inferior to that of the brutes.

another) had been the unanimous teaching of those philosophers who preceded him.

We have now, therefore, laid down a sufficient foundation for what is to follow. In subsequent portions of our article we are to establish, (1) that there exist certain self-evidently necessary verities, and (2) that there are certain self-evident *ethical* verities in the number. In order to show that these two theses are certain, it is requisite—but it is also sufficient—to show that my existent faculties, when rightly interrogated and interpreted, so declare. We have nothing whatever to do with the question, whether my existent judgment on either thesis may have originated in some antecedent phenomena, appertaining either to myself or to my ancestors. If I attached any, even the slightest, weight to any such consideration, I should be (so far) sanctioning a theory, which (whether in Mr. Mill's or Mr. Spencer's hands) issues in exquisite and unparalleled absurdity. The question before us (we say) is not at all how this or that avouchment of my existent faculties may have *originated*, but exclusively (as a matter of fact) what it *is*.*

NECESSARY TRUTHS.

In what we have to say on necessary truths, the first question we have to consider is, of course, what is *meant* by this term "necessary." We consider—as we have stated in former articles—that the idea "necessary" is a simple idea, not composed of any others; and on the other hand that it is a purely intellectual idea, not a copy of anything experienced by the senses.† Now of course there is a certain difficulty in explaining an idea of this kind. Were it a copy of some sensation, we could content ourselves with referring to such sensation. Were it composed of simpler ideas, we could explain it by reciting those simpler ideas. As it is, all we can do by the very nature of the case is so to express ourselves, that we may best enable our readers to recognize an idea, which (we are confident) is a very prominent part of their mental furniture. In order to do this, we will draw their attention to what we consider a co-extensive idea, of which we have made frequent use in preceding articles. A "necessary truth" then, we will say, is "a truth of which Omnipotence could not effect the reversal."‡

* Mr. Henry Sidgwick has introduced a very serviceable terminology. He distinguishes "psychological" from "psychogonical" inquiries.

† See on this head F. Kleutgen's first "Dissertation on the Scholastic Philosophy," p. 643 of the French translation; and our remarks in January, 1874, p. 32.

‡ In saying that these two ideas are "coextensive,"—we purposely avoid saying that they are precisely equivalent, as though the latter could be taken as a definition of the former. We mean (1) that all necessary

And if some readers should at first fail to recognise clearly and distinctly in their mind what it is which we here intend, we cannot doubt that they *will* recognize (if they possess ordinary education and intelligence) by following the course of our argument.

Next, what are those theses concerning necessary truths, which are required for our present purpose? There are two: one fundamentally important, the other less vital. We begin with the former.

Adopting Sir W. Hamilton's phraseology, we divide propositions into three classes. There are (1) "identical propositions" or "truisms;" in which the predicate expresses no more, than has been explicitly expressed by the subject: as "this apple is an apple." There are (2) "explicative propositions;" in which the predicate expresses no more, than has been implicitly expressed by the subject: as "this hard substance resists pressure," or "this square is not circular." And there are (3) "ampliative" propositions; in which the predicate expresses what has neither explicitly nor implicitly been expressed by the subject: as "diamonds are combustible;" or "the angle in a semicircle is a right angle." Now we do not concern ourselves with "identical" or "explicative" propositions. The thesis on which we lay stress is, that certain "ampliative" propositions are cognisable, as expressing self-evidently necessary truths.

We need hardly say, that this thesis is entirely denied by Phenomenists: and indeed its denial may almost be called their characteristic tenet. Moreover, it has commonly been thought by philosophers on either side, that (for more reasons than one) the field of *mathematical axioms* is the one, on which this vital conflict between Intuitionists and Phenomenists may be best fought out. Accordingly we confronted Mr. Mill on this field in October, 1871; July, 1873; January, 1874. Feeling (as we have ever done) and expressing great respect for many of Mr. Mill's characteristics—we nevertheless felt it our duty to state with unabashed emphasis, what we sincerely believed to be the issue of the fight. "We are deliberately of

truths are such, that Omnipotence could not effect their reversal; and (2) conversely, that all truths, of which Omnipotence could not effect the reversal, are necessary.

A Catholic critic, a few years ago, objected to the phrase we use concerning Omnipotence, as "most dangerous." We cited in reply (July, 1875, p. 61) Suarez's dictum, that what is intrinsically repugnant is "extra objectum Omnipotentiae." Take, therefore, any one of that inexhaustible mass, demonstrable mathematical verities. To effect the contradictory of that verity, would be accounted by Suarez as "outside the object of Omnipotence."

opinion," we said (July, 1873, p. 5)—"not that there is more to be said on our side than on Mr. Mill's—but that he is utterly and simply in the wrong; that not one of his arguments has the slightest force, and hardly one of them the slightest appearance of force." On a subsequent occasion—in the "Contemporary Review" for March, 1875—we repelled an assault directed against us on the same battle-ground by Mr. Fitzjames (now Mr. Justice) Stephen;* and we cannot honestly say that we consider ourselves to have been less successful against *him*, than against Mr. Mill. Here, therefore, we shall assume that we have conclusively proved the thesis, which so essentially distinguishes Intuitionists from Phenomenists. Nor need we trouble ourselves by recapitulating any part of our prolonged discussions; except that we will here draw attention to one particular premiss, on which throughout we laid emphatic stress.

That premiss is the following:—"If in any case I know, by merely pondering on my conception of some *ens*, that a certain attribute, not *included* in that conception, is truly predicable of that *ens*—then such predication expresses a self-evidently necessary ampliative truth." The certainty of this principle must be obvious to any one, who shall choose to consider it. Thus let it be assumed that, by pondering on my very conception of a trilateral figure, I know its triangularity. Consider then any trilateral whatever, which can be formed by Omnipotence itself. I know infallibly that this trilateral is triangular. We repeat. Concerning any trilateral which can be formed by Omnipotence itself,—I know it to be literally inevitable, that such trilateral shall be triangular. Or (in other words) it is outside the sphere of Omnipotence, to make a trilateral which shall not be triangular. Consequently the triangularity of trilaterals is a necessary truth.

We need hardly say indeed, that there are innumerable necessary ampliative truths, which are *not* known to me by merely pondering on my conception of their subject: as, *e.g.*, the whole mass of demonstrated geometrical theorems. Such truths as those just mentioned we have called "*self-evidently* necessary ampliative truths;" or again "*axioms.*"†

We said just now, that there are two theses concerning

* This paper was appended to our number for April, 1875.

† We have more than once expressed our own humble judgment (see, *e.g.*, July, 1871, pp. 55—60) that certain Intuitionists have acted very unwisely, in alleging "inconceivableness" as a proof of "intrinsic impossibility." We venture to think that, by such language, they most gratuitously and unnecessarily expose their position to hostile onslaught.

On "Philosophical Axioms" see our number for July, 1869.

necessary truths, which we need for our present purpose : one fundamental, the other less vital. We have now sufficiently set forth that one which we account fundamental ; and also one particular premiss, on which we have laid stress as adducible in its defence. We now proceed to that other which we regard as less vital. We may add that this second thesis is by no means universally accepted by Intuitionists, though to us it seems both certainly true and of great philosophical importance. Dr. M'Cosh has (we think) done excellent service, by dwelling on it in detail. Here it is.

Those "axioms," or "self-evidently necessary ampliative truths," of which we just now spoke, are not ordinarily intueed at first in an universal but in an individual shape. Let us take as our first illustration some arithmetical axiom. I hold seven pebbles in one hand and four in the other, and then transfer one from the larger to the smaller group. Or again—without actually doing this—I *imagine* myself to do it. I intue at once, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that the new $5 + 6 =$ the old $4 + 7$; that not even Omnipotence could make the case otherwise. On reflection, I perceive that the same truth holds, not of these particular pebbles only, but of all pebbles ; and not of pebbles only but of all numerable things. Still further, reflection enables me to intue the still more general axiom $a + b = (a + 1) + (b - 1)$; and the more general axiom still, $a + b = (a + m) + (b - m)$, where a , b , and m , may be any whole numbers whatever, so that m be not greater than b . Again, let us take a geometrical axiom. I place before my imagination some individual trilateral, and intue as a self-evidently necessary truth that it is triangular. On reflection, indeed, I observe that what is true of this trilateral is true of any other possible trilateral. Certainly ; but I recognized the necessity of the truth in one particular instance, before I recognized that necessity in the universal proposition. *Capability* of being universalized is of course a characteristic of self-evidently necessary truths ; but we should be quite mistaken (we are confident) if we supposed, that they are intueed *in the first instance* as universal. Indeed we incline to think that the immense majority of mankind, while again and again accepting some axiom in its individual shape, will seldom be found to universalize it.

Before we conclude this brief section on necessary truths, a few words are desirable—in order to prevent the possibility of misconception—on the relation which exists between necessary truths and the One Necessary Being. We need hardly add, however, that this is an explanation addressed to Theists, and no part of our argument against Antitheists. We may exhibit our remarks, in the shape of answering an objection. How, it may

be asked, can He be called Omnipotent, who has no power of reversing whatever is included in this vast mass of necessary truths? On former occasions we have given two different answers to this question. Firstly then we say, that *He* is Omnipotent, Who can do whatever falls within the sphere of power. But the contradictory of a necessary truth is not an "ens possibile;" it involves a contradiction in terms. Now to create that which is intrinsically impossible—that which involves a contradiction in terms—does not of course fall within the sphere of power. But there is a second answer to the question we have raised, which of the two we rather prefer; because we think it exhibits more fully the whole doctrine on the matter. Necessary truths are founded on the Nature of God. They are what they are, because He is what He is. In a most true sense they depend on Him; though they depend on His Nature, and not on any exercise of his Power.*

SOME FIRST PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL SCIENCE.

At last then we are in a position to approach more nearly the special and culminating theme of our present paper. We should be glad if our readers at this point would peruse our article on "The Foundation of Morality," which appeared in January, 1872. Even, however, supposing them to have done so, it will be important to exhibit once more those particular parts of it, on which our purpose requires us especially to insist. And we begin with drawing attention to those psychical phenomena, which stand at the foundation of our argument.

The human mind, as a matter of fact, forms a very large number of what we will call "moral judgments." "I am bound to do what I am paid for doing." "How conscientious a man is H!" "K behaved far better than L under those circumstances." "M is really an unmitigated scoundrel." "No praise can be too great for N's noble sacrifice." "O treats his children in a way which won't bear thinking of." "It was a matter of strict obligation on P to pay his debt at that particular time." "Of course if God gives a command, it is man's duty to obey," &c., &c., &c. All these moral judgments, which so constantly occur, are reducible directly or indirectly to one or other of three types. (1) "Act A is virtuous in this or that degree;" (2)

* This is the expressed doctrine both of Cardinal Franzelin and of F. Kleutgen. The Cardinal's words are these:—"Totus ordo metaphysicus constituitur legibus necessariis essentialium; que leges ideo sunt necessariae, quia Divina Essentia eas postulat. Unde ipsa Essentia Divina, non libera voluntate, sed ex necessaria sua perfectione, est fons et mensura totius etiam veritatis ordinis metaphysici." "De Deo," p. 316.

"Act B is wrong in this or that degree;"* (3) "Act C is more virtuous than Act D."† There is hardly any other question (we think) in all philosophy so momentous, as that which concerns the true nature and the authoritativeness of such judgments. In order the better to fix our thoughts in its discussion, we will imagine (as we did in 1872) a concrete case. It is founded on, but much exaggerated beyond, Lord Macaulay's exposition of Lord Bacon's conduct.

A politician of high and unblemished character, with whose public principles I am heartily in accordance, has admitted me to his friendship, loaded me with benefits, and trusted me with his dearest secrets. I find, however, as time goes on, that my best chance of advancement lies in attaching myself to the opposite side. Filled with passionate desire for such advancement, I make political capital by disclosing my benefactor's confidences to the adverse party; and I embark heartily in a course of enterprise, which has for its end his ruin. As I am about to reap the worldly fruit of my labours, I am seized with a violent illness. The crisis of the illness having passed away, in the tedious hours of slow recovery "I enter into myself," as ascetical writers would say. I judge that my successive acts have been signally wrong and wicked. Now let us fix our attention on some one in particular of these judgments. For instance, let us take the following:—"That past act, in which I divulged my benefactor's secrets to the opposite party for the sake of my own advancement, was an intensely wrong act." Let us take this moral judgment as the specimen instance, whereby to test alternative ethical theories.

Firstly, we maintain that the idea "wrong"—or its correlative "virtuous"—is an entirely simple idea; entirely incapable of being analyzed into component parts. There are many Intuitionists, we are well aware, who differ from us on this head; but we are very confident, nevertheless, that our thesis is true. And as (in our humble opinion) the importance of this thesis, in the Theistic controversy, is unspeakably great, we must not fail—even at the risk of tedium—to place arguments before our readers which shall suffice to exhibit it conclusively. This we shall best do, by first passing under review some one antagonistic theory in particular. A certain number then of those Intuitionists who

* We use the word "wrong" as the best single word we can think of, to express the idea "anti-virtuous." But it is not quite a satisfactory word.

† When it is said in common parlance that this or that act is "of obligation," no more is meant (we think) than that to omit the act would be wrong. Whether in *scientific* language this is a proper use of the term "obligation," we need not here inquire. See January, 1872, p. 4.

deny that the idea "virtuous" is simple, analyze it thus: "A 'virtuous' act," they say, "means a 'free, act directed by me to my true ultimate end;'" and a 'wrong' act means 'a free act oppositely directed.'" We need hardly explain how entirely we agree to the proposition, that "every free act directed by me to my true end is 'virtuous.'"* What we affirm, however, is, that the term "virtuous" does not *mean* "freely directed to my true end;" but, on the contrary, expresses an idea distinct from, and superadded to, that other idea. Let us turn then to our specimen instance, and see whether the proposed analysis will hold water.

Surely not. When, under my new impressions, I first reflect on the baseness of that particular act in my past history,—I clearly recognize that baseness, before I so much as begin to think of the end for which I was created. At one and the same moment, there starts up in my mind a keen emotion of bitter shame, and (in company with that emotion) the clearest and most pungent perception, how foully and atrociously I have acted. We repeat. I perceive *at once* with piercing clearness, that I have acted most wrongly, wickedly, basely. *Afterwards*, no doubt, I may begin to think about my ultimate end. I may reflect that I was created for something very different from this; and that my having so gravely thwarted my high vocation, has been a grievous calamity. But this is felt by me as a *new* reflection; a reflection entirely distinct from, though very directly founded on, my original reflection, that my conduct has been wrong, wicked, base.

In real truth, however, it is only necessary to exhibit in logical shape the tenet we are opposing, in order that every one may see its falsehood. According to this tenet, the term "a wrong act" means neither more nor less than "a free act put forth in opposition to my true ultimate end." Now consider the following proposition: "It is wrong for me to put forth freely an act, in opposition to my true ultimate end." According to the tenet which we are opposing, this proposition means neither more nor less than the following:—"to put forth a free act in opposition to my true ultimate end, is to put forth a free act in opposition to my true ultimate end." The proposition then—according to the tenet which we oppose—is as simple and bare a truism, as the proposition that "a chair is a chair," or "a triangle is a triangle," or "an apple is an apple." When the matter is put in this shape, surely no reader of ordinary intelligence can be taken in by so preposterous a notion. When I say "it is wrong in me to put forth a free act in

* We assume, of course, that there is no flaw in what Catholics call its "object" and "circumstances."

opposition to my true ultimate end"—every person of ordinary intelligence will understand me to mean something very different from a bald and naked truism. Every one will see that I am uttering an ampliative proposition, and one of considerable importance. In other words, every one will see that the idea "wrong" is not *identical* with the idea "freely put forth in opposition to my ultimate end," but entirely *distinct* from the latter. And this is the precise thesis which we wished to establish.

An argument in every respect similar may be most easily drawn out, against any *other* suggested analysis of the idea "virtuous." We consider ourselves then to have sufficiently established our first thesis; viz., that "virtuous" is a simple idea. Secondly, we would point out, that the reality which that idea represents is absolutely "metempirical."* In the course of our series we have already maintained this, concerning the two ideas "necessary" and "cause:" here we are to exhibit the same truth, as regards the idea "virtuous." Of course the idea itself, as existing in the mind, is a psychical phenomenon; but what we say is, that the *objective attribute*, which that idea represents, is entirely metempirical. Suppose I form the judgment, that such or such a course of conduct will probably preserve me in good health; or will conduce otherwise to my worldly advantage; or that it will obtain for me special help here and a special reward hereafter from some Invisible Being. In all such instances, the attribute which I predicate† is intelligible to me (so far as it is intelligible) by direct or indirect reference to phenomena of my experience. But when I form the judgment that such or such a course of conduct is "virtuous," and its contradictory "wrong,"—the attribute which I predicate cannot be even approximately represented in terms of phenomena at all. And yet—though such is undeniably the case—the meaning of this attribute "virtuous" is as clearly and readily intelligible to me, as is the most simple phenomenon in the whole world. For the truth of this last statement, we refer to the only possible standard of appeal—the testimony of each man's consciousness. In every moral judgment then, the subject is a certain phenomenal act, or certain phenomenal acts; and the judgment itself ascribes a certain metempirical *attribute* to that act or those acts. This is our second thesis on the present occasion.

* The word "metempirical" was invented by a Phenomenistic philosopher—the late Mr. G. H. Lewes—to express "external to the sphere of phenomena." We entirely agree with Mr. H. W. Lucas, that the word is a very useful addition to philosophical terminology.

† For convenience sake, we have always used the terms "subject," "predicate," concerning *judgments* no less than concerning *propositions*.

Our third thesis is, that certain moral truths are self-evidently necessary.* Let us here revert to our pattern specimen, "That past act of mine, wherein for my own selfish purposes I betrayed my benefactor's confidence, was a wrong act." Now in the preceding section of our article we mentioned one particular premiss, as having often been employed by us for the purpose of showing, that this or that truth is a necessary one. The premiss (it may be remembered) runs thus: If in any case, by merely pondering on my conception of some *ens*, I know that a certain attribute (not included in that conception) is truly predicable of that *ens*, then such predication expresses a self-evidently necessary ampliative truth. Moreover, when we cited this premiss, we trust we sufficiently showed how incontestable is its soundness. Now it can hardly be needful for us to say, how obviously applicable is this premiss to the case in hand. I ponder on this past phenomenal act of mine, as I remember myself to have perpetrated it. And, by the mere process of thus pondering, I come to know that the attribute "wrong,"—which is not included in my *conception* of the phenomenal act,—is nevertheless truly predicable thereof. Consequently, the proposition,—“that act was wrong,”—expresses a self-evidently necessary truth.

The Phenomenist, in replying to this argument, sometimes urges a consideration, which we are bound, no doubt, carefully to bear in mind. Inferences from experience, he urges, are often so obviously and spontaneously drawn, that they may most easily be mistaken for intuitions. We have always entirely admitted the force of this consideration, which indeed has a very important bearing on questions concerning the existent divergence of moral standards. We have always fully admitted, that we have no right to treat any given judgment as intuitive, until we have clearly shown that it is not inferential. But without at all denying that many moral judgments are inferential, it is evident on a moment's consideration, that (if our previous theses be admitted) *some* moral judgments are most certainly immediate. Take the case of some inferential moral judgment. Its predicate (as we have shown) is one or other exhibition of a certain simple and metempirical idea: "virtuous" or "wrong." Now such an idea cannot possibly be found in the conclusion of a syllogism, unless it be found in one of the premisses.†

* By "moral truths," we need hardly say, we mean "the objects of true moral judgments."

† If "virtuous" were a complex idea, it might imaginably be found in the conclusion of a syllogism, without appearing in the premisses except as regards its constituent elements. But here the idea *has* no constituent elements.

Some one of its premisses, therefore, is a moral judgment. If this premiss be itself a conclusion, we are only thrown back on some earlier premiss. In due course, therefore, we must by absolute necessity arrive at some moral judgment, which is immediate, not inferential. And there are no moral judgments which we *allege* to be intuitive, unless they belong to this class.

Our fourth thesis (in accordance with our view on axioms in general) is, that self-evidently necessary moral truths are first intueed in the individual case. When reflecting on my past life, I intue, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that this particular past act of treachery to my benefactor was wrong, base, foul. No doubt I may carry my speculations further. I may come to intue, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that *any one else*, who under circumstances precisely similar should do precisely what I did, would also act wrongly, basely, foully. But we incline to think, that in a vast majority of cases the agent does not carry his speculations so far. Moral axioms, like other axioms, are *potentially* universal; but we much doubt whether ordinary men commonly intue them as such. This particular question, however, is one of no great practical importance that we can see.

But there is a view, not uncommonly taken by Intuitionists, which is of far greater practical moment; and from which we must dissent with some confidence. In considering that judgment of mine whereby I recognise the intense baseness of my past act, they would deny that this judgment is immediate and self-evident. They would regard it on the contrary as an *inference* from more vague and general judgments, which they do regard as self-evidently necessary. "Benefactors ought not to be harmed;" "secrets ought not to be disclosed;" "men ought not to pursue their own advancement at another man's expense;" &c., &c. On our side we need not here inquire, to what extent a list of general moral propositions can be drawn out, which shall be reasonably accepted as self-evidently necessary, and as admitting therefore of no exception.* But we submit with great confidence, that such an individual moral judgment,

* Mr. Sidgwick discusses this question with great care and signal ability, in his "Methods of Ethics," Book iii., chaps. 4—11. We think that his remarks deserve most serious attention from all ethical students. For ourselves, we will here only say that we are very clear indeed on one point. Mr. Sidgwick's arguments against Intuitionism, we are confident, would be quite immeasurably less plausible than they are, if he more distinctly confronted Intuitionism under the shape exhibited in our text. He recognises that phase of doctrine indeed, as one existing in many minds; but (for whatever reason) does not argumentatively confront it.

as we have taken for our pattern specimen, is in no way an inference from any general moral judgment. Of no syllogism can the conclusion be more keenly manifest to me, than are the premisses.* Yet it is with indefinitely more keenness manifest to me that my past act was base, than that those general propositions are true which we just now recited.

We have no space to pursue this particular question further; but we venture to think it of quite critical importance, in the controversy against Utilitarians and other Phenomenists. For our own immediate purpose, however, the matter is comparatively irrelevant. Whatever be held concerning our fourth thesis, the three earlier theses remain; and we have established, therefore, that there are certain self-evidently necessary moral axioms. Now on this fact ethical science is founded. These axioms, as is evident, may be made premisses in many a different chain of reasoning; and thus a large number of moral judgments will result by way of inference, in regard to which it is certain or probable (accordingly as the reasoning may have been more or less cogent) that they are necessarily true. Then, again, my "moral sense," in proportion as it is "properly cultivated" (to use F. O'Reilly's phrase), largely increases the number of moral judgments, which to me are self-evident as necessarily true. And it is by these various methods (as we look at the matter) that the great fabric of ethical science receives verification and enlargement.†

A Catholic moralist, as distinct at all events from a non-Christian, has to make a further point. The Church claims to teach infallibly concerning moral truth; nor indeed do we see how it can be denied by any believer in Scripture, that the Apostles claimed the same power. A Christian philosopher then has to show, as he very easily can, that this claim of infallible moral teaching involves no interference with the legitimate rights of reason. We merely mention this episodically, to shew that we have not forgotten it; but the matter has no bearing on our argument, and we have no space to enter on it. For the same reason,—want of space,—we will not here attempt a reply to two different objections urged against our thesis, which we have sufficiently met on earlier occasions. The first of these objections is directed "*ad homines*" against Christians, on the ground of God's apparent interferences, as recorded in Scripture, with those ethical verities which we maintain to be necessary and immutable. This objection we briefly answered, by help of Catholic theologians, in January,

* We are supposing of course, that the conclusion is no *otherwise* known to me, than as resulting from those premisses.

† See F. O'Reilly's statements in January, 1876, p. 95. See also our own remarks in January, 1872, pp. 66, 67.

1872, pp. 51-52; and Dr. Ward has treated the question in his "Philosophical Introduction," pp. 165-190. The second of the objections to which we refer, is the notable divergence of *moral standard*, which has existed in different times and countries. On this we must be content with referring our readers to our detailed reply in January, 1872, pp. 62-70.

THE BEARING OF ETHICAL SCIENCE ON THEISM.

We are now, in conclusion, to exhibit the bearing on Theism of those fundamental ethical verities, which we have laboured to establish. And we might commence this task by mentioning one ethical truth in particular, which all men will accept as self-evidently necessary, who believe that there *is* such a thing as necessary truth. If a Holy Creator exist, it is wrong, base, wicked, to refuse Him unreserved obedience, love,* &c., &c. Then we might further refer to the doctrine already mentioned, that all necessary truths, and moral truths therefore inclusively, are founded on the Nature of God; that they are what they are, because He is what He is. These are doubtless ethical truths closely bearing on Theism. Yet they are not exactly in the number of those which we are here considering. We are considering those ethical truths only, which tend to the *argumentative establishment* of Theism.

Now there is more than one class of ethical truths, which directly or indirectly tend to the establishment of Theism. It is only, however, the chief one of these, on which we are able to insist in our present article. What we would here then urge, is a consideration of all which is involved in that most unique and signally significant idea "virtuous," with its correlative "wrong." We ventured to say in January, 1872, p. 48,—and subsequent reflection has but confirmed us in our opinion,—that there is probably no other psychical fact whatever so pregnant with momentous consequences in the existing state of philosophy, as man's possession of this idea. In this statement however we include of course, not merely his *possession* of the idea, but his cognizance of its correspondence with an objective reality.

Before setting forth at greater length what we here mean, we must make an introductory remark on a doctrine which has occupied us in our two preceding philosophical papers; the doctrine of Free Will. Let us go back to our pattern instance of a moral judgment: the reflections of a repenting

* It is a very singular fact, that non-Catholic Theistic writers so often omit all reference to duties *towards God* in their ethical discussions. They speak of what are now called "egoism" and "altruism;" but apparently forget that there are other fundamental duties, besides those owing to myself and to my fellow-men.

politician on his bed of sickness. In recognizing the fact that this or that past act of treachery was on his part wrong and base, he intues (as we have been urging) that the baseness of this act is a self-evidently necessary truth. It is not *only*, however, this moral truth which he recognizes. At the same moment he recognizes another verity; the verity that those past acts were *free*. We urged this in April, 1874, p. 359. As to the *former* verity,—he intues it through that endowment of the human faculties, whereby they are enabled to recognize certain self-evidently necessary truths. As to the *latter* verity,—of that he is most intimately cognizant through his close and unintermittent familiarity with his own mental phenomena.

Whereas, then, self-intimacy acquaints me with the fact, that I am true master of my own actions—that the conduct of my life depends on my own free choice—my various moral judgments instruct me, with varying degrees of certainty, in the all-important lesson what that conduct ought to be. These judgments, taken individually, direct me in individual acts. But it is not our present purpose to dwell on them in this point of view.* What we here wish to urge, is concerned, not with individual moral judgments, but with my moral judgments, taken collectively. As time goes on then,—this, that, and the other act are successively known to me as not permissible—as wrong, base, wicked—whatever their attractiveness to my inclinations. Again, this act is known to me as more virtuous than that, whichever of the two—exercising my liberty—I may choose to perform. In proportion, therefore, as I give more attention to the ethical conduct of my life—in that proportion the number of such necessary moral truths brought within my cognizance increases unintermittently and inexhaustibly. I thus obtain an ever clearer perception of the fact, that I am in contact with a certain necessarily existing and pervasive Supreme Rule of life;† from which indeed, as regards its actual injunctions,‡ I cannot swerve, without wrong-doing and wickedness. No other motive of action has any claim on me at all so paramount, as the claim of this Rule. No other course of action is so reasonable, as that

* The question in itself is of course very momentous, how my various moral judgments may acquire increasing clearness and rectitude on matters of detail. On this see our article, January, 1872, pp. 66, 67; and for a fuller treatment, Dr. Ward's "Philosophical Introduction," pp. 119-161.

† We cannot of course refer to the Natural *Law*, without assuming the Existence of God.

‡ When we mention the "actual injunctions" of this Rule, we refer to those particular moral judgments which are of the type, "act B is wrong."

of conforming myself more and more with its counsels; nor can any other thing be so intensely unreasonable, as the doing that which it pronounces to be intrinsically evil.* We have already, therefore, arrived at a very remarkable and noteworthy conclusion. There is a certain purely invisible and metempirical standard, which claims to be the only true measure and arbiter of man's whole conduct in this visible scene. Man is proverbially monarch of the visible world; and it is precisely, man who is *de jure* subject to the authoritative judgments of an invisible tribunal.†

Here we take a further and most momentous step forward. This Supreme Rule is no mere catalogue of metempirical moral truths, but a *Law* imposed on me by *rightful personal authority*. Or, to express the same proposition in somewhat different terms,—what-

* One or two collateral points here emerge, on which we would refer for our view to Dr. Ward's "Philosophical Introduction."

Thus (1) the case is imaginable, that, by doing what my moral judgment dictates, I shall impair my own permanent felicity. Dr. Ward submits (pp. 419-421) that such a case—though conceivable—is metaphysically impossible.

Then (2) some Intuitionists express themselves as though they held, that men cannot pursue virtuousness for its own sake, but merely as a *means* to beatitude or felicity. We do not think that this is in general intended by such writers, though they certainly express themselves obscurely. Dr. Ward at all events (pp. 409-417) exhibits strong theological authority in the opposite direction. He cites Scotus, Suarez, Vasquez, Viva, and other writers of name. See also pp. 404-409.

† Our argument will be interestingly illustrated, if we quote a few of Bishop Butler's expressions, concerning what he calls "the principle of reflection or conscience," and its due authority.

"The very constitution of our nature requires, that we bring our whole conduct before this supreme faculty; wait its determination; enforce upon ourselves its authority; and make it the business of our lives to conform ourselves to it."

"This is the most intimate of obligations; which a man cannot transgress without being self-condemned, and (unless he has corrupted his nature) without real self-dislike."

The superior principle "without being consulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns the doer of certain actions; and if not forcibly stopped, naturally and as of course goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own."

"Had it strength as it has right—had it power as it has manifest authority—it would absolutely govern the world."

There is one important difference between Bishop Butler's position and our own; viz., that he throughout assumes the Existence of God. But we think he lays very little stress on this in his argument.

Among the very many imperishable services which Cardinal Newman has rendered to the cause of Christianity and of Catholicity, none (to our mind) exceeds the example he has given, in always laying such prominent and emphatic stress on man's naturally implanted sense of right and wrong.

ever is known by my reason to be intrinsically and necessarily wrong, is also known by my reason to be necessarily forbidden by some Superior Being, who possesses over me rightful jurisdiction.

Before entering, however, on our grounds for this vitally important conclusion, it is of extreme moment, that we guard against a possible misconception of what is involved therein. We must on no account be misunderstood as alleging, that the idea "wrong" is equivalent to the idea "forbidden by some Superior Being," &c.; and (by parity) that the idea "virtuous" is equivalent to the idea "approved by some such Person." We have already argued, —conclusively, we trust,—that "virtuous" and "wrong," while mutually correlative, are at the same time absolutely simple ideas. Still there is one particular shape wherein a denial of this latter truth has been embodied, which to us seems so full of most serious evil consequences, that we cannot be contented without considering it expressly and at some little length.

It has been held then by some Intuitionists, that the idea "wrong" is equivalent to the idea "forbidden by my Creator:" and that the former idea, therefore, is complex; being correctly analyzed into the latter. To this allegation we have already given, we trust, one amply sufficient answer. Take this very fundamental and momentous proposition: "It is wrong to disobey my Creator." According to the allegation which we are opposing, this proposition would not be momentous at all: it would be a bald and naked truism, with no more significance than the proposition that an apple is an apple, and a chair a chair. For, according to the allegation which we are opposing, the proposition we have just mentioned would mean neither more nor less than this: "To disobey my Creator is to disobey my Creator." Such a supposition, we need not say, is among the absurdest which can be conceived. It is most plain then, that the term "wrong" introduces into the proposition some new idea, which is *not* identical with the idea of "disobeying my Creator."*

Here then is our first argument against the allegation, that

* An explanation should here be appended. Is it a self-evidently necessary and universal truth, that "it is wrong to disobey my Creator"? We submit that this is not the case, unless the attribute "Holy" be known as appertaining to the Creator. The supposition is conceivable—though of course intrinsically impossible—that some not perfectly virtuous being possesses creative power. Such a creator might impose some immoral command; and if so, assuredly could not be obeyed by me without my doing what is wrong. See our remarks in January, 1872, pp. 72, 73.

The proposition then, as amended, stands thus: "It is wrong to disobey my perfectly Holy Creator." We have already explained, that we account this a self-evidently necessary ampliative proposition.

the word "wrong" means "forbidden by my Creator;" or "forbidden by my Holy Creator." A second is urged by F. Liberatore with great force; though perhaps it is hardly more than the preceding argument displayed in a somewhat different shape. Theists themselves must admit—such is F. Liberatore's argument—that even after God has issued some command, the act commanded will still be destitute of obligation, unless an *antecedent* premiss be assumed: unless it be assumed, that "to disobey God is wrong, sinful, wicked." If you can say nothing more than that "to disobey God is to disobey God," you will have given morality no foundation whatever (*Ethica*, nn. 27, 29).*

There is a third argument, however, which has frequently been adduced for our conclusion, and on which for ourselves we would always lay greater stress than on either of the preceding. It is addressed of course to Theists, and we put it thus: Consider any one of God's Attributes; say His Omnipotence. This is an Attribute entirely analogous to the attribute "power," as possessed by a creature: entirely analogous, but existing in an infinite degree. In like manner consider God's attribute "Infinite Holiness." This is entirely analogous to the attribute "virtuous," as possessed by a reasonable creature: entirely analogous, but existing in an infinite degree. Now, if "virtuous" merely meant "conformable with my Creator's Will," then the Uncreated could have no Attribute of "Holiness" at all; and would lose (as one may say) the brightest jewel of His crown.

We must maintain it then as most certain, and even most evident, that that attribute, which is designated by the word "wrong," includes in its notion no reference whatever to God or to any Superior Being. Yet—as we just now alleged—there is another fact in the opposite direction, which is not less certain, and perhaps even hardly less evident. This is the fact to which we urgently solicit our readers' careful attention. We suppose throughout (it will be remembered) that the genuine avouchment of my faculties is entirely trustworthy and without appeal. Now it is surely an undeniable matter of fact, that when I contemplate a black catalogue of evil actions committed by me in time past, I contemplate them, not merely as intrinsically wrong and wicked, but as offences—as a rebellion—against some Superior Being, whose displeasure I have thereby incurred. Cardinal Newman expresses, with

* F. Liberatore's expressed thesis is merely, that morality does not depend on the *Free Will* of God. But those who read the sections to which we refer in our text, will see that he is also emphatically opposed to the doctrine that (as he expresses it in n. 27) "*God's Will*,"—not merely God's *Free Will*,—"is the first root and source of morality."

unsurpassable force and clearness, those experienced facts of human nature, which bear in this direction. We italicise a few words and clauses.

No fear is felt by any one who recognizes that his conduct has not been *beautiful*, though he may be mortified at himself, if perhaps he has thereby forfeited some advantage. But, if he has been betrayed into any kind of *immorality*, he has a lively sense of responsibility and guilt, though the act be no offence against society;—of distress and apprehension, even though it may be of present service to him;—of compunction and regret, though in itself it be most pleasurable;—of *confusion of face, though it may have no witness*. These various perturbations of mind, which are characteristic of a bad conscience, and may be very considerable,—self-reproach, poignant shame, haunting remorse, chill dismay at the prospect of the future,—and their contraries, when the conscience is good, as real though less forcible, self-approval, inward peace, lightness of heart, and the like,—these emotions constitute a generic difference between conscience* and our other intellectual senses,—common sense, good sense, sense of expedience, taste, sense of honour, and the like

Conscience . . . always involves the recognition of a living object, towards which it is directed. Inanimate things cannot stir our affections: these are correlative with persons. If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, *this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible*, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong, we feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind, the same soothing satisfactory delight, which follows on our receiving praise from a father;—*we certainly have within us the image of some person*, to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and waste away. These feelings within us are such as *require for their exciting cause an intelligent being*. We are not affectionate towards a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse or compunction on breaking mere human law; yet, so it is, conscience excites all these painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and on the other hand it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a resignation, and a hope, which there is no sensible, no earthly object to elicit. "The wicked flees when no one pursueth:" then why does he flee? and whence his terror? *Who is it that he sees in solitude, in*

* We have avoided the word "conscience" in our whole discussion, for reasons which we gave in January, 1872, p. 46. From the best study we could give to Cardinal Newman's writings, we had always understood him to mean by this word—as is so often meant by it—"man's natural sense of right and wrong." It was pointed out, however, in a letter sent to the "Tablet" with Cardinal Newman's implied sanction, that we had importantly misapprehended his terminology. See our number for April, 1876, pp. 483—486.

darkness, in the hidden chambers of his heart? If the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the object to which his perception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine; and thus the phenomena of conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, Holy, Just, Powerful, All-seeing, Retributive; and *is the creative principle of religion.**

Similarly F. Liberatore—whom we have seen so firmly opposing the notion that the word “wrong” means “prohibited by God”—nevertheless uses such language as this: “Natural reason itself,” he says, “in discerning actions as suitable or repugnant to human nature, places before us a *Divine prohibition or command*” (n. 79). “This dictate of [moral] reason is so perceived by man with a certain internal auscultation (*auditum quodam interno*), that he feels himself truly bound by a *certain command* To which *voice interiorly commanding* if any man refuse obedience, he is so pierced by the stings” of conscience “as to expect some penalty from some Supreme Authority” (p. 80). In moral judgments “there is always involved the obscure at least and indistinct perception of *some hidden power*, which objectively considered is no other than God” (n. 73). So again F. Kleutgen: “God makes Himself felt within us by His Moral Law, as an August Power to which we are subject.”

Here we must explain, as accurately as we can, the exact point on which we are at this moment insisting. We suppose ourselves of course preliminarily to have established our *earlier* doctrine—the doctrine, that there exists most indubitably a certain Supreme Rule of life, the precepts of which, so far as known to me, cannot be disobeyed without wrong-doing and wickedness. If any men then choose to live in moral callousness and obduracy, they act on one hand with monstrous wickedness, and on the other hand with extremest unreasonableness. Nor do we here maintain that such men as these have any means of arriving explicitly at the further cognition on which we wish to insist, unless they begin to amend their ways, and to act more in accordance with sound reason. But we make *this* allegation. If I be not altogether morally callous and obdurate—if I practise a certain sedulousness in avoiding whatever I know to be wrong—or even if I keep alive in my mind the express remembrance that wrong is wrong—then I come to cognize with ever increasing clearness the ampliative truth, that all acts of wickedness are acts of rebellion against some Superior Being. So universal, intrinsic, irresistible, is this conviction among all men who are not morally callous and obdurate, that (if man’s intellec-

* “Grammar of Assent,” Fourth Edition, pp. 108-110.

tual faculties are really trustworthy) the conviction *must* be well-founded. Either the judgment is intuitive, or it is an inference so universal and inevitable as to be tantamount in authority with an intuition. Those who believe in an intrinsic and necessarily existing distinction between right and wrong,—and who keep alive in their mind the remembrance of that belief,—are quite invariably found *also* to believe, that acts intrinsically wrong are forbidden by some Superior Being. We must not fail indeed to set forth what seems to us the true account of that psychical process, which issues in this universal dictate of reason. Still we entreat our readers to bear in mind, that the *existence* of this dictate is a fact indefinitely more undeniable, than is the correctness of any given theory which may be suggested; and it is on the universal existence of this dictate that we base our conclusion. Our own theory on its genesis would be the following.

Cognitions of every kind may be explicit or implicit. If they are explicit, I am explicitly conscious of them; if implicit, I am implicitly conscious (or, as it is now sometimes called, “sub-conscious”) of them. Suppose I am interrupted in my literary work by the roar of a neighbouring cannon: if I were asked whether I *heard* it, I should laugh at my interrogator’s joke. But if he asks me whether I have heard a certain low rumbling sound which has gone on near me for some time—my first impression perhaps will be that I have *not* heard it: yet, by carefully examining my recent consciousness, I may find that the sound did in fact reach me. My cognition of it then was real but implicit.

Now take the case of some moral judgment: “this my past act of treachery to my benefactor was wrong, wicked, base.” This judgment is most explicit, we need not say. But we submit that such a judgment is always in fact accompanied by another, though this other is *not* always explicit. We should thus express the second judgment: “That past act of treachery was an act of rebellion against some Superior Being, who possesses over me rightful jurisdiction.” This judgment, when I contemplate merely some one evil act, may possibly enough be altogether implicit: but when I contemplate a *series* of past evil acts, it assumes more and more an explicit shape. In defence of this conclusion, we argue as follows:

Let us first repeat what we have already said. By means of my various moral judgments, this, that, and the other act is successively cognized by me, as not permissible—as wrong, base, wicked—whatever may be its tendency to worldly advantage. In proportion as I give more attention to the ethical conduct of my life, in that proportion the number of moral truths brought

within my cognizance increases in a more rapid ratio. And I am thus brought into a constantly clearer perception of the truth, that I am in contact with a certain metempirical and pervasive Rule of Life, from which I cannot swerve without wrongness, wickedness, baseness; that the whole conduct of my life is *de jure* subject to the pronouncements of a certain invisible tribunal. Such was our earlier statement.* But as soon as I have arrived at the conviction expressed by that statement, a further step is strictly inevitable and irresistible. The notion of a Supreme Rule from which I cannot swerve without wickedness, passes inevitably and irresistibly into the *further* notion of a Law imposed on me by some Superior Being. The notion of an invisible tribunal, by which my actions are authoritatively praised or blamed, passes into the further notion of some Personal Judge sitting on that tribunal. To dwell on the earlier of the two convictions without passing into the later—to remain content with the notion of a Supreme Rule, without carrying it forward to the notion of a Natural Law—is as impossible psychically, as to pass my life standing on one leg is impossible physically. If ever there were a genuine intuition, it is that on which we are insisting. That Rule, to which profound, continuous, unreserved allegiance is due from free and reasonable beings, cannot be a mere *abstraction*; it must be the Law of some personal Superior possessing rightful authority.†

* We do not here refer to those other moral judgments included in the Supreme Rule, which are of the type "act A is virtuous," "act C is more virtuous than act D." We abstain from this, because our argument (though applicable to all these judgments) is exhibited with more irresistible clearness in the case of those particular judgments, which are of the type "act B is wrong."

† We submitted in January, 1872, that the view we have put forward is serviceable, on two doctrinal heads, in harmonizing Catholic writers with themselves, with each other, and with facts. Thus they hold on one hand that God (according to human modes of conception) cognizes any given act as intrinsically evil, antecedently to prohibiting it by the Natural Law; and yet they hold that in intuiting an act as morally evil, men spontaneously and inevitably cognize the fact of its being prohibited by some Supreme Legislator. Both these truths are provided for in what we have said.

Then for another matter of doctrine. The vast majority of theologians follow S. Thomas, in holding that God's Existence is not "*per se nota quoad nos*;" though they regard it as a truth very obviously and readily *deducible* from first principles. On the other hand, it is maintained by them all that a large number of moral axioms is self-evident; and they commonly add that some vague and obscure cognition of God is involved in the cognition of moral axioms. We harmonize these two doctrines by submitting that the Existence of a Supreme Legislator is an *inference*—though a very prompt and obvious one—from the self-evident truths of morality.

Of course our whole train of reasoning from first to last is entirely futile, unless inquirers admit what we have called "the principle of intrinsic certitude." But then, as we have so often argued, those who refuse to admit that principle, descend to the level of brutes—nay, to a level below that of brutes—as regards the knowledge which they can consistently claim to possess. Their knowledge (were it possible for them to carry out their principle faithfully) would be strictly limited to the passing consciousness of each individual moment. On the other hand, if persons admit the genuineness and trustworthiness of those particular intuitions which are called acts of memory,—they have no pretext for refusing to admit the genuineness and trustworthiness of those *other* intuitions, which are undeniably no *less* immediate declarations of the human mind than are acts of memory themselves. It is on such intuitions that we have constructed our argument. Those which we have alleged for our purpose, are divisible (our reader will remember) into two classes. The first class consists of those intuitions which declare, that certain moral judgments possess self-evidently necessary truth; while the second consists of those which declare, as a self-evidently necessary truth, that all wrong acts are prohibited by a certain Superior Being.

Now further. Since it is a necessary truth that all wrong acts are prohibited by a certain Superior Being,—and since it is very certain that wrong acts *are* committed,—it manifestly results, that the Existence itself of that Being is a necessary truth.

Moreover—as Viva argues—this Superior Being has on me such paramount claims, that though all other beings in the universe solicited me in the opposite direction, my indispensable duty would in no way be affected, of submitting myself unreservedly to His command. His will then is more peremptorily authoritative, than the united will of all existent or possible persons who are not He.

Once more. As F. Franzelin puts it, moral laws hold good for all persons existent or possible. All other persons, therefore, existent or possible, are no less unreservedly subject to the command of this Being than I am. Consequently he is Supreme Legislator over the universe of reasonable and free individuals.

We are thus landed in the conclusion, that there is a certain Necessary Being—faultlessly Holy—possessing authority rightful, absolutely supreme, exclusive, without appeal, over the whole existent or possible universe of rational and free individuals. We are well aware, of course, that objections more or less plausible may be raised against the reasoning which issues in this conclusion. But then we are also confident, that a review of these objections will only make the force of our arguments

more obviously certain and irresistible. Any such review, however, must be deferred to a future occasion.

Here then for the moment we terminate our discussion; having arrived at the threshold, and indeed at some little distance beyond the threshold, of that disquisition, to which all our preceding articles have been introductory. The next stage in our argument will be to engage in direct conflict with Agnosticism as such; to examine those arguments which have been adduced for the conclusion, that nothing of practical importance can be certainly known concerning the Great First Cause. On this head we shall take Mr. Herbert Spencer as representing the Agnostic party; and they will certainly admit, that we could not choose a more powerful expositor of their doctrine. We expect, however, that our readers will be greatly amazed, when they see the extraordinary weakness and futility of the Agnostic position: a position, which not even Mr. Spencer's genius can invest with so much as superficial plausibility.

Before we begin this controversy, however, some supplementary remarks (as we mentioned last April) must be placed before our Catholic readers, on one important portion of the Free Will doctrine; a portion which we were not able to discuss until we had gone over part of the ground covered by our present article.

After we had finished the preceding pages in their first draft, we read Mr. Balfour's volume on "*Philosophical Doubt*." This volume, in more than one particular, goes over the ground which we have trodden in this and preceding papers. And it is otherwise so remarkable, that we have written a notice of it, which appears in our present number.

W. G. WARD.

ART. V.—THE LAND QUESTION AND LAW REFORM.

1. *Free Trade in Land.* By JOSEPH KAY, Q.C. London : 1879.
2. *The Succession Laws of Christian Countries, with Special Reference to the Law of Primogeniture as it Exists in England.* By EYRE LLOYD, B.A. London : 1877.
3. *The Landed Interest and the Supply of Food.* By JAMES CAIRD. London : 1878.
4. *Report from the Select Committee on Land Titles and Transfer, together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, and Appendix.* Ordered by the House of Commons to be Printed, 16th July, 1878.
5. *Report from the Select Committee on Land Titles and Transfer, together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, and Appendix.* Ordered by the House of Commons to be Printed, 24th June, 1879.
6. *The Irish Land Question.* By STEPHEN M. LANIGAN, A.B., T.C.D. London and Dublin : 1879.

AGRICULTURE is the most important of our national industries ; it exceeds every other both in the number of persons to whom it furnishes employment, and in the amount of capital which it engages ; its welfare is so closely bound up with that of commerce, that depression in either is sure to be followed by a sympathetic movement in the other. Commerce finds a market for its manufactures in the rural population ; agriculture pours its riches into the crowded cities. Yet, in spite of this natural bond of union, there is a broad division of parties into commercial and agricultural, which corresponds very closely with that of Liberal and Conservative. Between these parties, between town and country, there exists political antagonism, and in this antagonism is to be found the secret of the land question. The people of the town, or, as we shall call them, the Liberals, possessing no land themselves, feel dissatisfied with the way in which the actual owners hold and manage their properties, and would reform their customs whether they wish it or not. This is a most suggestive fact, that the principal demand for reform springs from without, and not from within, the landed interest. What the Liberals desire may be summed up in the title of the work which we have placed at the head of this article, "Free Trade in Land," and

this may be explained in the words of a recognized leader of Liberal opinion :—

It means the abolition of the law of primogeniture, and the limitation of the system of entails and settlements, so that life interests may be for the most part got rid of, and a real ownership substituted for them. It means also that it shall be as easy to buy or sell land as to buy and sell a ship, or at least as easy as it is in Australia, and in many, or in all the States of the American Union.

From this it would appear that cheap transfer, and certain alterations in the law are the desiderata. But, surely, there must be some hidden motive, some expectation of great consequences to ensue from their introduction, to explain the passionate eagerness for these suggested reforms. Such a motive is not far to seek. The ownership of land is at present restricted to a limited class. The great estates of the aristocracy are odious in the eyes of a Manchester reformer, and he hopes, by the operation of "Free Trade in Land," to break down the "monopoly," to distribute the lands among a larger number, and to create, to some extent at least, a class of peasant proprietors. This motive underlies and explains the action of all such land-law reformers. That reform of some kind is desirable we do not deny, of its feasibility we have our doubts; but, while we cannot admit that reform in the direction indicated would produce the expected results, we must reprobate the spirit of animosity towards an existing class which furnishes the chief incentive to the ultra-radicals.

We propose in the following pages to examine the question of land transfer, and the proposed alterations in the general law, which taken together constitute the land question; and we shall then offer a few remarks on the merits of the system of small proprietors, which it is the professed object of reformers to introduce, at least partially, into this country. The laws of real property have been for the last half-century the subject of continuous amendment; many anomalies have been removed; some flagrant injustices have been remedied; the enjoyment of property has been made more secure, its recovery more simple, and its liabilities more definite. Great advances have also been made towards simplifying the forms of conveyance, but there is still room, in this particular, for considerable improvement. The transfer of land is, at the present day, admittedly in an unsatisfactory condition. Delay, expense and uncertainty are the subjects of complaint. These have no doubt been mitigated in recent times by the general improvement in the law; yet with reference to certain kinds of property the lesser evils have become more intolerable. Difficulties of transfer are a speculative grievance to the man who does

not contemplate a sale ; but urban and suburban land has become more and more an article of commerce, and has increased in relative importance with the extension of towns. The ownership of such land is in a state of perpetual flux, and it is here that the evils of the existing system press most heavily ; unfortunately, it is here too that the application of the remedy is most difficult. Liberals and Conservatives are alike constrained to admit the existence of a defect ; for a Land Transfer Act has been passed by each, and in each case it has proved almost wholly inoperative. It becomes, then, an interesting subject of inquiry, how far it is possible to amend, or reconstruct either of these Acts so as to give security of title and cheapness of transfer. This, it must be observed, is not the land question in any party sense ; both sides desire facility of transfer, both have introduced measures to effect it, both have lamentably failed ; but, while Lord Cairns deals with the subject as a purely legal problem, a great many Liberals have come to identify facility of transfer with re-distribution of land. In this we think they are wholly mistaken. The aggregation of land in the hands of a few is owing to the operation of social and economical causes quite independent of conveyancing cost. Even if the sale of a farm were as simple as that of a horse and its deed of transfer to fit on a visiting card, the contest between the large and the small capitalist would remain as unequal as before. The latter cannot afford the luxury of being a land-owner ; so long as land brings social position and political power the purchase-money will be increased to pay for these advantages ; and the man whose capital is small, and who would fain, first of all things, live, must not invest in such unremunerative shadows. We shall have an opportunity, however, of discussing the social bearings of the land question at a later stage, and now proceed to the consideration of Land transfer, and the several incidental reforms which have been suggested to render simple transfer a possibility.

Taking broad bands of history, the transfer of land has in this country been subject to strange vicissitudes. In the earliest feudal times the knight, whether he held his land in fee-simple, in tail, or for life, was not able to transfer his interest to a stranger. There were usually certain personal services to be rendered to the feudal superior, and he was not bound to accept those of a substitute. By slow degrees, however, the rigour of this restriction was worn down, until, in the beginning of the reign of Henry III., the right of what was called *sub-infeudation* was completely established. The Barons of Edward I., finding the privileges of their order compromised thereby, passed the celebrated Statute *de donis conditionalibus*, which

absolutely prohibited the alienation of estates tail. This amounted to tying up in perpetuity, as was then thought, a considerable part of the land of the kingdom. For two hundred years this Act of Parliament was permitted to work the evil which its authors intended; and it was not until the reign of Edward IV. that the trammels of landowners were cut asunder by a decision of the judges. In this instance the lawyers deserve the gratitude of their fellow-countrymen: by inventing "Recoveries" they restored to the market more than half the land in England; but the means by which this desirable end was achieved are shocking to common sense. A recovery was a mock action in which the plaintiff, or "demandant," recovered the land, and left the parties whose interests were barred to seek redress against the *common vouchee*, who was usually the crier of the court. The whole proceeding was a solemn farce, and the necessity of the case must have been grievous indeed, to compel justice to walk in such devious paths. For nearly two centuries after Taltarum's case (for Taltarum was the person who achieved immortality as the first "demandant") the land of England was less hampered by difficulties of transfer than it has ever been before or since. The modern system of settlement was then undiscovered, and each generation possessed complete dominion, although by a cumbrous procedure, over the fee-simple of the land. But with the gradual decay of the feudal system the conditions of property and the desires of individuals were completely changed. Men began to yearn for perpetuities. To found a family became an object of ambition to the *nouveaux riches*, and an excusable vanity made them desire to insure to their remotest issue the enjoyment of hereditary estates. Contingent remainders, at one time regarded as void, were welcomed by the subtle lawyers of the sixteenth century. Their validity was fully established in the time of Coke, and by their help a settlement was (after a fashion) capable of being made; but the unborn issue remained at the mercy of their parent, who, by a feoffment, was able to grant the settled estate to a purchaser freed from the claims of the remaindermen. These contingent remainders were of very perishable stuff, for they were liable to destruction in a variety of ways, which it is unnecessary to enumerate; but the net result was that the issue had but a poor hold on the property. This defect was remedied about the time of the Commonwealth. Sir Orlando Bridgman, afterwards Lord Keeper, who has been styled "the father of modern conveyancing," hit upon the contrivance of putting into the settlement trustees to preserve the contingent remainders; who, taking no beneficial interest themselves, yet by their living presence

protected the future interests of the children. The practice was eagerly followed, and the land of England was, once again, to a considerable extent withdrawn from the market. This time, however, the result was achieved, not against the will of the holders, as in the case of the statute *de donis*, but at their instigation. The landowner was so beset by posthumous ambition, that nothing short of an indefeasible entail streaming far away into the future was at all satisfactory to his aspirations. However, in the words of Coke:—

These perpetuities were born under some unfortunate constellation ; for they, in so great a number of suits concerning them in all the courts in Westminster, never had any judgment given for them, but many judgments given against them. 10 Rep. 320.

They have furnished to the lawyers a goodly harvest ; for it was not until the present century that, after a vast amount of litigation, the rule was finally established that the extreme limit of suspense is twenty-one years after existing lives. In the most common case of a marriage settlement, the vesting of the estate cannot be postponed beyond the majority of the children ; or, as it is usually expressed, beyond lives in being and twenty-one years afterwards.

The following account of the prevailing modern custom of settlement is extracted from Mr. Williams's standard work on the Law of Real Property :—

In the event of a marriage a life estate merely is given to the husband ; the wife has an allowance for pin-money during the marriage, and a rent charge or annuity by way of jointure for her life, in case she should survive her husband. Subject to the payment of this jointure, and such sums as may be agreed on for the portions of the daughters and younger sons of the marriage, the eldest son who may be born of the marriage is made by the settlement tenant in tail. In case of his decease without issue, it is provided that the second son, and then the third, should in like manner be tenant in tail ; and so on to the others, and in default of sons, the estate is usually given to the daughters. By this means the estate is tied up until some tenant in tail attains the age of twenty-one years ; when he is able, with the consent of his father, who is tenant for life, to bar the entail with all the remainders. Dominion is thus again acquired over the property, which dominion is usually exercised in a re-settlement on the next generation ; and thus the property is preserved in the family (p. 50).

Whether from the gradual accumulation of legal subtleties, or because of a change in the requirements of society, the state of real property law was about fifty years ago discovered to have become intolerable. Accordingly, commissioners were appointed to inquire and report. No men ever brought to their task more learning and diligence. They described the existing

law, pointed out its defects, and suggested remedies. Most of their suggestions have been since carried out by a slow process of piecemeal legislation; but in one important particular, namely, the registration of deeds, their reports have hitherto produced no result. On this subject they say:—

This has appeared to us to exceed in magnitude and importance all the other subjects within the scope of our commission; it has excited general interest; and we have found it to be so connected with almost every part of the law of real property, that the nature and details of any improvements to be proposed by us must greatly depend on the question, whether all deeds and instruments affecting the title to land shall be registered, or whether the security of title is still to rest on other expedients.*

This was, indeed, no novel suggestion; for the question of a general registry had engaged the attention of Parliament for several years during the Commonwealth, and had, at intervals, been discussed, and the measure all but passed on several subsequent occasions. Systems of registration have existed in Middlesex, Yorkshire, Scotland, and Ireland for more than one hundred and fifty years; and it seems strange that they have not been long since either extended to the whole of England, or abolished as useless in the localities where they prevail. What is good in Yorkshire ought to be equally good in Somerset or Devon; what has failed in Middlesex can scarcely be efficacious in Manchester. That a registry of deeds has not been established for the whole of England must be ascribed, not to any general dissent from the opinion of the Real Property Commissioners, but to the intrinsic difficulties of the problem. No branch of law reform has excited more attention; none has produced more instances of abortive legislation;† yet it is still regarded by many as a panacea for all the disorders of the existing system; and the committee, whose final report was presented to Parliament towards the close of last session, once more recommend its establishment, with a modification which has been many times considered, and as often condemned, namely the substitution of local registries for one central office. We shall presently offer some remarks upon this report, but before doing so it will be necessary to place clearly before our readers the objects of registration and the difficulties which oppose themselves to its successful operation.

* Second Report of Real Property Commissioners, p. 3.

† At the date of the Report of the Commissioners on the Registration of Title (1857), upwards of twenty bills had within as many years been brought into Parliament for the purpose of establishing a system of registration.

We must at the outset distinguish between two kinds of registration—the one of deeds, or more properly of assurances; the other of title. The former aims at establishing a complete record of every transaction affecting land, so as to give to an intending purchaser notice of any prior claim. The registration of title is a more ambitious scheme: carried out in its most perfect form, it would not only furnish a list of owners, but entry on the register would be equivalent to ownership; so that land would be transferred like ships, or stock, by the alteration of a name. Intermediate between these two systems is one which possesses some of the qualities of both. Its essential characteristic is that all deeds should not only be registered, but grouped; so that, on turning to a particular page, the searcher would find the legal history of the property. The objects of registration are, firstly, to make all dealings with land simpler, and consequently, cheaper; and secondly, to give to a purchaser or mortgagee greater security against latent defects than he now enjoys. That the present expenses of land transfer are high is undoubtedly true, that they would be diminished by a simple register of assurances is by no means self-evident. The opponents of such a system go farther, and say that it would only create additional cost. The examples of Middlesex, Yorkshire and Ireland support this contention; while in Scotland alone has registration been so manipulated as to prove a useful handmaiden to conveyancing. A perfect register of titles would fulfil to the utmost both the objects which we have mentioned; but we believe such a register could only be attained by a reform amounting to a revolution. Security of title is an element of wealth. A property with a slur on its pedigree is deteriorated in the market; but we may be called on to pay too high a price for absolute perfection; and we do not allude to the actual cost involved in establishing and maintaining such a gigantic system as would be necessary for the purpose, but to the violent alteration which it would necessitate, not only in our laws, but also in the habits and sentiments of society. A purchaser under the present *régime* is scarcely ever dispossessed of a property which he has bought; he is practically safe if he exercises moderate caution; but mortgages stand on a somewhat different footing, and the lender of money is more or less at the mercy of a fraudulent mortgagor. Instances occur from time to time of a trustee, or solicitor abusing his trust, and then there arises an unfortunate contest for priority between innocent victims. In a recent case an ingenious swindler, by forging duplicates of the conveyance to himself, succeeded in actually selling a property seven or eight times over to different persons. But considering the vast

number of transactions which take place, it must be admitted that the cases of hardship bear but a small proportion to the whole; and a serious question therefore arises, whether it is expedient to create an entirely new system in order to baffle the designs of a few unprincipled persons.

If all landowners were possessed of a clear fee-simple, if every field were surrounded by an immutable boundary, and if the dealings with land were not extremely numerous, registration of title would be the simplest thing imaginable. Nothing more would be necessary than to construct an official map on a scale sufficiently large to show the sub-divisions of property, and by a number or letter connect each enclosure on the map with a corresponding page of the ledger, where the ownership and its changes should be recorded. It would then be perfectly easy, and this is the desideratum in every purchase, to pass from the outward and visible estate to the abstract right of the vendor to dispose of it. The three suppositions which we have made as to the tenure of estates, the certainty of boundaries, and the number of transactions, inasmuch as they are in violent contradiction to the actual condition of things, indicate the three cardinal objections to the establishment in this country of any satisfactory system of registration of title.

We are, in the first place, confronted by the custom of settlement, which, if it does not affect the majority of titles, certainly extends to the larger part of the area of the country. All the "broad acres" are tied up as rigidly as the law will allow; and, in addition, are subject to jointures and portions, and perhaps mortgages and charges of various kinds as well; so that the ownership of any particular field may be divided between a number of persons—tenants for life and in tail, trustees, mortgagees and lessees, all of whom are required to make up the abstract idea of a complete owner. It is manifest that the interests of all these people must be registered, or protected in some way.

To avoid this complication of co-existent interests, it was proposed by the late Lord Westbury, when he first propounded the idea of registration of title, as opposed to registration of deeds, that only absolute owners, or trustees with a power of sale, should be recorded on the register; but he afterwards changed his opinion, for in explaining to the House of Lords the measure which became law in 1862, he spoke in disparaging terms of his former scheme:*

But that plan consisted merely of this—the putting of certain names upon the registry as if they were the absolute owners of the fee

* "Hansard's Debates," 3rd series, vol. clxv. p. 361.

simple of the estate, and letting all persons who had partial interests in the property depend for their security upon the system of *caveats* and checks. A registry so constructed gives no proof whatever of any equitable interest, nor does it in the smallest degree facilitate the proof of title to any equitable estate.

The distinctive characteristic of Lord Westbury's Act then was the registration of equities, and to this attempted recognition of the complexity of actual fact may be attributed its almost total collapse. In fifteen years only 410 titles were registered; and it is matter of surprise to many competent authorities that the number was so large. A Royal Commission, appointed in 1868 to inquire into its working, unequivocally condemned it; and recommended (not however unanimously) a registration of absolute ownership. Lord Selborne, then Lord Chancellor, embodied this suggestion in a Bill, which re-appeared in several subsequent sessions, and after searching criticism and successive amendments for five years, it was ultimately passed by the present Lord Chancellor.

The principle of this Act is, as far as possible, to ignore the existence of troublesome complications, and to require that upon registration some person shall be named as absolute owner, the interests of all other persons being somewhat loosely guarded by caveats and inhibitions. But the failure of this measure has been even more marked than that of its predecessor. Its noble author, who was examined as a witness before the Committee on Land Titles and Transfer, fully admitted its want of success, and pointed out that his object was quite different from Lord Westbury's.

Lord Westbury's idea, he said, was that a conspectus of the state of the title, and of all the interests, would be an excellent thing to have upon the register. The object of the registration as I understand it is to make land transferable—the great object is to keep such interests off.*

Between these extreme views of the end to be achieved by registration there seems to be no mean. We must either have the simplicity of bare ownership, or the tangled skein of equitable interests. Both Acts are unrepealed to the present day, but both are equally inoperative. Perhaps the most discouraging feature of the recent inquiry is, that no one had any fault to find with Lord Cairns' Act, or any amendment to suggest for the improvement of its general plan. Learned conveyancers and solicitors practically familiar with its details were unanimously of opinion that it was as perfect as the nature of the case would permit, and that the only change which could be made to further

* "Report of Committee on Land Titles and Transfer, 1879." Minutes of Evidence, p. 149.

its adoption would be the introduction of a compulsory clause. But if there were no other objections to such a course—and there are many—it would be a strange specimen of remedial legislation to compel all to accept what not one in 20,000 will voluntarily adopt.

The second difficulty in the way of a register of titles arises from the uncertainty of boundaries. There is not much use in conferring an indefeasible title unless you define the subject matter to which it extends. This is not in all cases easy. It involves, at least, local inquiries and a judicial process, and, eventually, the possibility of taking a slice of one man's land and giving it to another. Under Lord Westbury's Act the duty of this determination devolved upon the registrar, and this was one of its most glaring defects. Lord Cairns has in his measure avoided the difficulty by providing that entry on the register shall *not* be conclusive as to boundaries. This gets rid of troublesome notices to adjoining owners, which are always likely to awaken dormant claims, but leaves the registered owner in possession of only an indefeasible nucleus surrounded by a questionable fringe. The boundary is frequently of vital importance; and the expression is so elastic that it may mean much or little. Such questions are, of course, liable to arise under the ordinary system of conveyancing as well as under the registry; but any scheme which does not fix boundaries by some competent tribunal falls very far short of perfection. In Ireland the Landed Estates Court supplies adequate machinery for this purpose, and it has so far succeeded as to have attained a practical monopoly of the sales in that country. It is somewhat surprising that the example has not been hitherto followed in England. The advantages possessed by this system are that a property emerges from the Court with no shadow of suspicion lurking round it—bright and clean as a new coin from the mint; and that the dignity of a judicial investigation inspires the public with such confidence that they eagerly grasp at the opportunity of buying and selling under its auspices; while the dangers, as against adjoining owners, of conferring an indefeasible title are reduced to a minimum. The drawbacks are that the extra expense is considerable, which must eventually fall as a tax upon the landowner; that it is practically applicable only to the case of a sale; that after the title has been once cleared, the inevitable dealings with the land immediately begin to encrust its title with all its former obscurity, until after the lapse of a few years the whole proceeding has to be again undertaken; and lastly, that it is problematical how far such a system would adapt itself to sales of either very large or very small properties. The magnitude of the former might overstrain the

machinery of the Court, while the necessary expenses of the latter might swamp the owner.

A further difficulty is thrown in the way of a general registry—and this applies with equal force to a registry of assurances, as to a registry of title—by the enormous number of transactions which would require registration. It is estimated that about one thousand deeds relating to land are executed daily in England and Wales. Such a mass of matter would be more than any one office could record and classify. Any system that could be devised would be crushed by the dead weight of so great an accumulation, unless it had been introduced by degrees, and perfected by experience. The effectiveness of a register depends altogether on its index, and the difficulties of arrangement increase in an increasing ratio with the number of items to be arranged. Every traveller knows how hopelessly he is perplexed if he has to trace his intended journey through the labyrinth of “Bradshaw,” while the time-tables of the separate railway systems are easily comprehended.

Such are some of the difficulties which beset the problem of registration, and which the Select Committee on Land Titles and Transfer were forced to confront. Although the reference* to that Committee was sufficiently general to embrace the entire body of real property law, they excluded from their inquiry all subjects which might involve troubled questions of public policy. Some innovations in the general law they do, indeed, suggest; the value of which would depend in great measure on the stringency of the Act introducing them; for, having regard to the past, we cannot expect much from voluntary reforms.

The distinct issue between registration of deeds and registration of title was raised by the Reports prepared, respectively, by the Chairman, Mr. Osborne Morgan, and by Mr. Shaw Lefevre; and on a division the Committee declared in favour of the former, but only by a majority of two. As this Report may furnish the basis of future legislation, we shall endeavour to explain to our readers its recommendations and their probable results. It first devotes itself to an inquiry into the causes of previous failures, which it is, of course, most important to detect and avoid; and, as Lord Westbury's measure had been already arraigned before a Royal Commission and condemned by it, the Committee deal almost exclusively with Lord Cairns'

* They were appointed “to inquire and report whether any and what steps ought to be taken to simplify the Title to Land, and to facilitate the transfer thereof, and to prevent frauds on purchasers and mortgagees of land.”

Act of 1875. Many explanations were given in the evidence, but the "Committee cannot suppose that they by any means account for the total collapse of the system inaugurated by the Act of 1875." Their own conclusion is—

That the Act has failed, because, rightly or wrongly, the public or their professional advisers have deliberately made up their minds that the advantages offered by the new system of registration are too speculative and remote to compensate for the immediate and certain outlay and trouble which are inseparable from it. To a certain extent, too, the result may be attributed partly to an almost superstitious reverence for title deeds which prevails in this country, and partly to the preference which Englishmen, as a rule, feel for managing their own affairs in their own way.

These reasons, it must be observed, apply as forcibly to any possible scheme for the Registration of Title, as to that which has been recently tried and practically rejected. It may indicate a short-sighted adherence on the part of landowners to familiar forms, but this has its foundation in the habits and modes of thought of the average Englishman. The reverence for title deeds has survived the satire of Hogarth, and is fully justified by the importance which the law attaches to their possession. "Put your deeds in a box, and sit on the box," was the advice given by Lord Eldon to a man who consulted him as to the defence of his title; and no doubt it is very difficult to eject a person who thus acts on the defensive. Still, if the owner wishes to sell or mortgage his estate, he must produce his muniments, and it is then extremely inconvenient to depend on things which have been described as "difficult to read, impossible to understand, and disgusting to touch."

The Committee, while admitting that registration of title is in the abstract to be preferred to registration of assurances, are compelled to come to the conclusion that, in the existing state of the law, the former is more or less unattainable. Simplicity of transfer presupposes simplicity of title, and to legislate for registration of titles without, as a preliminary step, simplifying the titles to be registered is to begin at the wrong end. They do not, however, propose the repeal of the two acts which at present languidly maintain an impracticable system. In this we think they are mistaken. It would be better at once to accept defeat, withdraw from the assault of an impregnable position, and begin a new campaign under more favourable circumstances. We also disapprove of the suggestion that a registry of assurances should be established. This plan has in recent years found little favour in comparison with registry of title. Whatever advantages it possessed were eclipsed by the attractive completeness of its rival. Two Royal Commissions

pronounced emphatically against it, and furnished reasons in support of their views which are not answered by the present Committee. It has been tried in Ireland, in Middlesex, in Yorkshire, and in Scotland; and in the last country alone has it met with any degree of success. In Ireland and Yorkshire the system appears to be endurable, although productive of additional expense; while in Middlesex matters have become so deplorably bad, that it is hopeless to search against a person with a common name or a large property. The Lord Chancellor expressed in his evidence before the Committee the following strong opinion on the subject:—

I have no doubt that registration of deeds would afford some protection at an enormous cost against fraud. This country will pay under a system of registration of deeds something like a million a year as an insurance against frauds, which, at the utmost, would never amount to one-hundredth part of that sum; but after all that is done, I think you will find in human affairs that a great deal will always be done upon the credit of individuals, and that where there is any person in whom people trust, he will be able to get great command of money by the faith people put in him, and if he proves untrustworthy, no system of registration will protect you.*

The Committee, however, believe that it "might be made perfectly self-supporting at a greatly reduced and very trifling cost to the public." Distribute this cost as you may, it must be ultimately borne by the land, which can ill afford any extra burthens. It is useless to assert that machinery can be provided for registering 300,000 deeds per annum at a "very trifling cost." Such a gigantic labour must involve a corresponding outlay, and the expense will be still further augmented by subdivision into districts.†

An argument from analogy is generally very misleading; for unless all the circumstances are identical, some essential element may be absent, and thereby destroy the correctness of the inference. It is particularly dangerous in passing from one country to another, for the habits of a people are an important ingredient in the success of a system. We suspect that the Committee have been influenced rather too much in favour of a registry of deeds by the seductive picture of Scottish conveyancing presented by Mr. Brodie, the keeper of the Register of Sasines in Edinburgh. They state in alluding to his evidence:

Not only is Scotland politically united to England, but the habits of society and conditions of life are very much the same in both countries, while the laws of real property, and the title to land is, or

* Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee in 1879, p. 151.

† "Second Report of Real Property Commissioners," p. 27.

until lately was, as complicated in the former as in the latter country. Yet it is stated by a very competent witness that in Scotland the cost of transferring land is comparatively small, while it is agreed on all hands that in that country land frauds, such as those which have recently started and alarmed English purchasers and mortgagees, are absolutely unknown.

Now, this result can obviously not be attributed to the mere registration of deeds, which Scotland has possessed for centuries; but must have proceeded from the improvements in their system of conveyancing which have been recently introduced. Unless, in England, we succeed in enforcing similar innovations, it will be vain to attempt registration; moreover, our real property law must be completely assimilated to that of Scotland, before we can be certain of the success of our new experiment. There is also this important fact disturbing the analogy between the two countries. In Scotland, there are only about 31,000 deeds to be registered in the course of a year, or about one-tenth of the number in England. But passing by the incompleteness of the analogy, let us see what changes have been introduced in Scotland, and whether similar reforms might not be made in English conveyancing. The first consisted in shortening deeds, which were formerly even longer than in England, to about one-tenth of their previous length. This was effected by furnishing statutory forms of conveyance which seem to have been readily adopted, for now an ordinary "disposition" fits on a sheet of paper. The second reform was the abolition of all local and peculiar tenures, and their conversion into the one common form of "feu-holding." The shortening of deeds, however, was far more important, and that it was possible must be ascribed to the practice which had sprung up of paying solicitors and conveyancers on an *ad valorem* scale. So long as men are paid by the length of their work, verbiage will, we fear, continue to be the rule, and not the exception. No amount of Parliamentary interference suffices to restrain conveyancers within a reasonable compass. Lord Brougham and Lord Cranworth vainly attempted to solve the problem by giving statutory forms which might or might not be made use of. They were naturally rejected as deficient in this or that respect, by the profession who would lose so many guineas by their adoption. As a preliminary step, therefore, to the establishment of registers the Committee recommend;—

I. The abolition of the present scale of conveyancing charges, and the substitution for it in all cases where it is possible of a graduated *ad valorem* scale of payment.

II. The compulsory use, as far as practicable, of short statutory forms, analogous to those used in Scotland.

We do not like these expressions, "where it is possible," and "as far as practicable," being convinced that any reform in conveyancing practice to be real must be compulsory. The owner is indifferent; he has become a fatalist as to costs; and the interests of two professions are distinctly opposed to his. We are told by Sir R. Torrens,* that the introduction of his system of registration into South Australia was ruinous to the entire body of solicitors, and that they had accordingly opposed it very vigorously. No such sweeping measure is contemplated, or possible in this country, and therefore the legal profession need not tremble for the total loss of their conveyancing charges; but these charges constitute at present a heavy land tax, which should be promptly abated by compulsory legislation, and we should take it as a healthy indication if the measure were "opposed very vigorously" by those whose interests it would affect. We do not believe in the efficacy of unobjectionable reforms. What is greeted with universal approbation is not likely to restrain a prevalent abuse. The existence of an evil implies that some class of the community is reaping an undue harvest, of which we seek to deprive it. If the reform, then, is worth anything, it will be bitterly opposed by the class whose interests appear to be compromised by it.

The Committee further recommend the substitution of a simple charge for the present form of mortgage; the appointment of a real representative who should have the same power over freeholds, as the executor now possesses over leaseholds; and, lastly, the repeal of the Statute of Uses.

These are the reforms which the Committee rely upon to simplify conveyancing to such an extent that registration shall become a benefit to the community, instead of an unattainable ideal as it has hitherto remained. We do not believe that, even if they were loyally accepted in practice, and not minimized by the ingenuity of conveyancers, they would produce so great a revolution as has been quietly effected in Scotland. Deeds and abstracts of title might, no doubt, be shortened by a change in the mode of remunerating solicitors, and by the *prohibition* of the present form of mortgage; and the appointment of a real representative would diminish the number of actions for the administration of estates; but there would still remain in the English Land Laws a unique complication, which greatly increases the difficulties of transfer and registration—we allude to the double title to land, or the doctrine of legal and equitable estates. This distinction had its origin in the diversity of our Courts of Law and Equity, was stereotyped by the Statute of

* "Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee in 1878," p. 155.

Uses, and became so firmly rooted that it seems to have survived the fusion of the Courts. Mr. Williams, indeed, in the last edition of his valuable treatise on the Law of Real Property has changed "is" into "was" in the statement of the doctrine; but we fear that neither a judge, nor a prudent conveyancer could be found who would disregard this absurd distinction. We do not see why it should not be abolished. It exists in no other country in the world, and though its removal might involve some reconstruction of our land laws, that can scarcely be regarded as an objection in an age which yearns for codification. The existence of trusts is a necessity, but there is no connection between trusts and a legal estate: in fact, the notion of an "estate" in land different from the receipt of the rents, or the right of occupation or sale, is a metaphysical conception, part of an over-elaborated system transmitted to us by our ancestors as one of the many burthens of the land.

We will illustrate by an example the evil of which we speak.

If land is conveyed unto and to the use of A and his heirs upon trust for B and his heirs, A takes a legal estate in fee, B only an equitable. A having no express duties with reference to the estate, B can compel A to convey this legal estate to him. But suppose—and this is what usually occurs—that B neglects to do so; settles, mortgages and deals with the property for years as if he were the absolute owner. All goes smoothly until the day of reckoning arrives, a sale is made, and the keen eye of the purchaser's conveyancer sparkles with pleasure at "an outstanding legal estate." Can it be believed, this unreality, this phantom of a legal estate must be tracked through wills and heirships, until it is captured, possibly, in an infant descendant of the original A, when it must be made secure by a court of equity. This, it is evident, is no visionary evil. It entails considerable expense, delay, and complication; but, still worse, the actual rights of parties are made in some cases to depend upon the possession of this abstraction.

The doctrine of "tacking" finds favour with no one, yet it exists. It means shortly this—that where an estate is mortgaged above its value, and there is a conflict between the victims, he who succeeds in getting the "legal estate," or, as it is called by Lord Hale, "the creditors' *tabula in naufragio*," will be paid in full before the other mortgagees get anything. The admitted principle is—"Where equities are equal the law shall prevail;" yet, in spite of recent legislation turning all the Courts into Courts of Equity, this system of "tacking" is treated as still subsisting. This, we submit, should not be so; and we may

cite Lord Hardwicke's authority in confirmation of our opinion. He says on this subject: "It could not happen in any other country but this; because the jurisdiction of law and equity is administered here in different Courts, and creates different kinds of rights in estates." So that it would seem without a separate jurisdiction "tacking" could not happen. And again, he states it still more explicitly: "For if the law and equity are administered by the same jurisdiction, the rule, *qui prior est tempore potior est jure*, must hold."*

But whether the Courts might, after the passing of the Judicature Act, have held that the distinction between legal and equitable estates had been abrogated, does not now concern us. They have not done so; and the dualism of title has survived the amalgamation of the Courts. Very closely connected with this subject is the suggestion of the Committee that the Statute of Uses should be repealed. They stigmatize it as "a pitfall for the unwary," and as "a stronghold of conveyancing pedantry;" but, according to Mr. Williams, "All that was ultimately effected by the Statute of Uses was to import into the rules of law some of the then existing doctrines of the Courts of Equity, and, to add three words, *to the use*, to every conveyance."† The real evil which has been wrought by the Statute consists in the subtleties which have been founded upon it in connection with the doctrine of the legal estate. These would not now be affected by its repeal. And it must be remembered that it is essentially an enabling Statute. It confers power which does not exist at common law, and which would no longer exist if it were repealed—of giving an estate at a future time, or shifting it from one person to another upon the happening of any contingency. The meaning of the Committee probably is, that these results should be made to follow from any expression of intention, without the use of apt and technical language; but this would depend rather upon the abrogation of certain common law doctrines, than upon the repeal of the Statute of Uses; and could scarcely be effected with safety except by a reconstruction of the entire fabric. It is time, indeed, that an attempt at least should be made to codify our real property laws. An enormous benefit would result to the community from the abolition of what is called the "common law," and the substitution of a uniform system founded on the idea of "rights" instead of "estates." The criminal law has been reduced into a code, which only waits the necessary period of incubation to emerge as an Act of Parlia-

* *Wortley v. Birkhead*, 2 Ves. 571.

† Williams's "Law of Real Property," p. 159.

ment. This was not nearly so much required as a code of land laws, for the complication was less, and, also, men have generally a very good idea of what is a crime and what is not, since the boundary line runs roughly parallel to that between right and wrong. But the miserable landowner has no such guide, and he must submit to be piloted by men who can, practically, charge what they like for saving him from shoals and quicksands of their own creation. It is needless to observe that codification does not necessarily imply reform, although the occasion is eminently suitable for its introduction. Such a code as we have suggested might be so constructed as to leave the practical enjoyment of property precisely as it is, while it got rid of all the complexity engendered by an obsolete system.

We have hitherto treated land transfer from a purely legal point of view, and have come to the conclusion that, in the present state of the law, Registration of title is impracticable, while Registration of assurances would be worse than useless; that the recommendations of the Committee, although good in themselves, are of too trivial a character to effect the overthrow of the present conveyancing system; and that no greater boon could be conferred on the country than a really exhaustive code of real property law, in which no trace of feudalism should be discoverable. It is now time that we should glance at some of the social and political aspects of the land question, which are indirectly involved in cheap and easy transfer.

If we have advocated reforms it has been in the interest of those entitled to the first consideration—namely, the owners of property. Very different is the object of those who seek to stimulate their followers by the attractive, but delusive cry, "Free Trade in Land." With them, simplicity of transfer is joined with the abolition of settlements, and the repeal of the law of primogeniture, as the machinery for accomplishing a social revolution. They look upon these measures as forces to overthrow what is styled "a monopoly of the land" in the hands of the rich; and to establish through the length and breadth of the kingdom a system of peasant proprietorship. They stand in acknowledged hostility to the actual owners, and call upon them to answer for almost every defect in our complicated society. The land question is for such persons an agrarian war, in which they seek to dispossess the present holders, and to substitute for them a democracy of landowners on the model of certain Continental States. None, indeed, but the most enthusiastic or indiscreet openly avow that such is their object; but the changes are rung with monotonous persistency upon the evils of the "monopoly," and the advantages of small proprietors, till we feel convinced that "Free Trade in

Land" must mean the soil for the tiller. These remarks are especially applicable to the work before us by the late Mr. Kay, the title of which we have prefixed to this Article. As a careful lawyer he avoids straining or overstating his case, and accordingly we find no suggestions for the abolition of the aristocracy, or even of large estates, nothing in fact—to adopt Mr. Bright's expression—"to alarm intelligent owners of land." He only pleads for such changes in the law as he thinks will produce fewer large estates, and some peasant proprietors. But where are we to stop? Who shall say to this extent, and no farther, shall the subdivision of land extend? All foreign examples point to this conclusion, that the social forces tending to break up estates, once set in motion, are uncontrollable; and the process must go on till the extreme limit of subsistence is attained.

Mr. Kay did not live to complete his task, and it is now presented to the public under the auspices of Mr. Bright, who has written a preface expressing his approval of the views maintained:

The author (he says) is always just; he seeks to give that freedom to the soil which our laws have given to its produce, and which they give to personal property of every kind; he would leave to their free action the natural forces which tend to the accumulation of landed property on the one hand, as well as those which tend to its dispersion on the other; he would so change our laws as to give to every present generation an absolute control over the soil, free from the paralyzing influences which afflict it now from the ignorance, the folly, the obstinacy, or the pride of the generations which have passed away.

Mr. Kay first addresses himself to "the actual condition of things which the present land laws have produced." The accumulation of land in the hands of a few owners, which he regards as an unmitigated evil, is the only condition, however, that he cares to consider. By the help of the recently published "Doomsday Books" he arrives at some startling results as to the distribution of landed property in the three kingdoms. For example:—"Two-thirds of the whole of England and Wales are held by only 10,207 persons. Two-thirds of the whole of Scotland are held by only 330 persons. Two-thirds of the whole of Ireland are held by 1,942 persons." Now, these figures, and others which he quotes, represent, undoubtedly, the aggregation of great tracts of land in the hands of a few owners; but he does not propose a compulsory division, and admits that there are powerful motives urging landowners to increase their territories. It is part of his complaint against the existing system that small freeholds are every day being

"devoured" by the great owners, and that in the auction-room a man with a small capital has no chance in the struggle against the wealth of the local magnate, who will give much more than the agricultural value of a farm, in order to complete the symmetry of his estate, or add a few acres to his already extensive domains. Supposing for a moment that it is true that the number of small freeholders is continually diminishing, we may well ask how will the alteration of a law like primogeniture, which the landowner has it in his power to adopt or exclude, deprive land of its attractiveness so as to prevent the process of aggregation being carried on to its fullest extent? We look in vain for an answer, for this assuredly is not one,—

If the laws of primogeniture and settlements were altered, and if the dead man's arrangements were not allowed to bind the land long after his death, many of these estates would come into the market, and would in order to fetch the best prices, divide and sell in smaller plots just as they have done to some extent in Ireland, under the Encumbered Estates and Land Acts, spite of primogeniture and settlements.

This is prophecy, not argument; and there is, in fact, no lack of land in the market. Every day large estates are advertized for sale in every part of the country, yet we do not see them broken up in small plots, for the simple reason that they sell better as a whole; and so they would continue to do even if the alterations which are here proposed were effected. The fact of vast territories being owned by a few wealthy men cannot be explained as a consequence of law, but is a necessary result of our entire social system. Land possesses collateral advantages which make it worth more than if it were a mere article of commerce, and therefore the man who has to support life on its produce is out-bid for the proprietorship.

We do not, however, admit that the figures quoted above adequately represent the distribution of land in this country. Previously to the Parliamentary Returns recently published on the subject, the wildest statements were current as to the number of persons who monopolized the land of England. In the census of 1861, owing to errors of description and other causes, only 30,000 persons appeared as landowners, while in that of 1871 the number was still less;* and it was frequently asserted that this figure represented the actual number of owners. In order to dissipate these erroneous views, a return was moved for by Lord Derby of the number of landowners in

* We may illustrate the incompleteness of any deduction from the statements in the census returns, by mentioning the fact that only 214 Members of Parliament, and 228 Peers are described as such in the census of 1871.

each of the three kingdoms, distinguishing those who held more than one acre from those who held less. The result was the Blue Books published in 1875 and 1876, which furnished a complete refutation of the theory of monopoly; for we find that in England there are 269,547 owners of more than one acre, and 703,289 owners of an acre and under, or an aggregate of nearly a million persons returned as landowners. Even if we exclude the whole class of owners holding less than an acre as not being properly agricultural, we are forced to the conclusion that if there is a considerable aggregation of land in the possession of the few, there is also a very considerable distribution of what is left among the many. But we lay no stress on figures: the "actual condition of things" cannot be made apparent in Blue Books, and we therefore turn from them with pleasure to the pages of Mr. Caird's interesting volume, to discover whether "the Landed Interest" is really to be regarded as a tyrannical oligarchy, a monopoly from which those possessing the justest claims are excluded. Mr. Kay's facts he would not deny: "The distribution of landed property in England, *so far as ownership is concerned*, is, by the growing wealth of the country, constantly tending to a reduction in the number of the small estates."* The words which we have *italicized* suggest an important omission in Mr. Kay's estimate of the "actual condition of things," namely—that "ownership" in our agricultural system does not exhaust the beneficial interest in the land, but may be reduced so as to be worth only an annual peppercorn, and a place in the "Doomsday Book."

But the tenant-farmers (Mr. Caird continues) are entitled also to be reckoned as part owners of agricultural property; for, in the crops and live and dead stock, they own equal to one-fifth of the whole capital value of the land.

As cultivators they employ and possess individually a larger capital than the peasant proprietors of other countries in their double capacity, as owners and cultivators. They are 1,160,000 in number.†

And he estimates the amount of this capital, which is quite distinct from that of the landowner, at the enormous figure of 400,000,000*l.* Such vast interests should not, we think, be ignored in reviewing the condition of the land as the result of its laws.

We now pass from the consideration of the "existing evils" to their causes and remedies. Mr. Kay believes that:

* "The Landed Interest," p. 41.

† *Ibid.* p. 44.

No matter how these great estates were originally formed, the main causes which at the present day keep them together, and prevent many of them coming into the market, are the laws which allow the owners to make deeds and wills which for many years, and often long after the owners' deaths, prevent the land from being sold, or the estate from being divided, no matter how expedient it may be that it should be sold, or no matter how foolish or extravagant the owner may be.*

The prime offender is thus the law of settlement, but primogeniture and even the power of granting long leases are indicted as accessories. The last can scarcely be regarded as a serious accusation, for the longer the lease the more it approaches to being the absolute transfer of the property, the purchase money being paid as an annuity, instead of as a lump sum. Primogeniture, too, may be acquitted after a very brief trial—that is to say, the law, not the custom of primogeniture; for the latter is rather a phase of English feeling, and an incident of settlements, than anything definite to be restrained by legislation. The law of primogeniture is part of the ancient and unwritten law of England, and it is by virtue of this law that the real property of an intestate owner descends to his eldest son, and not to all his children equally. This may be unjust, but it cannot be said to be injurious, for it rarely occurs. We have, unfortunately, no statistics on these subjects, but it is agreed on all hands that the amount of land descending to "heirs-at-law" is extremely small. Whether it is desirable to alter this law or not must depend on considerations other than the diffusion of property; and such a discussion, therefore, is somewhat beside our present purpose; but we may remark that the question has been exalted to a position very much beyond its intrinsic importance. If this law were repealed next Session of Parliament, and equal partibility substituted in its place, the interests of individuals would not be appreciably affected, for intestacy is, in this country, almost always an accident.

We must now briefly discuss the most difficult problem connected with land—entails and settlements. The custom is interwoven with every fibre of our social structure, and appears all but a necessity in the case of hereditary titles. But we do not desire to defend its universality on the ground of its benefit to any class, however exalted. We are not enamoured of the system; but, until the difficulties which we shall indicate are otherwise provided for, we must strenuously oppose any alteration of the law. It is in its agricultural

* "Free Trade in Land," p. 29.

aspect that the law of entail, as it is commonly called, is least defensible. We agree with much that may be urged as to the deplorable position of a tenant for life whose estate is so heavily burthened with charges, mortgages, and jointures that but little is left to him of his annual rents. His position is pitiable, but that of the land is worse, for there is no capital forthcoming to effect any necessary improvements; so that marshes remain unreclaimed, cottages are unbuilt, and the family mansion is perhaps fast falling into ruin. A timely sale of part of the property would probably have cleared the whole, and left the tenant for life the enjoyment of an unencumbered though diminished estate, to the improvement of which his means might have been adequate. A sale is, at all times, more advantageous to agriculture than a mortgage, for the latter diminishes the owner's available resources, while the former concentrates them upon a smaller area. Why, then, do we object to render land freely saleable at all times? Because it is not possible to have free land and limited interests; and without limited interests you cannot have marriage settlements. The whole question really hinges on the expediency of permitting land to be settled on marriage. If it is settled in any way so as to provide for the wife, and the issue of the marriage, it must be rendered inalienable until the eldest child at least shall have attained his majority; or else the virtual ownership of the property must be handed over to trustees. At one time, as we have already shown, there were no settlements of real estate, the holder for the time being usually retaining the absolute control; but at that time no dealing with the property could deprive the widow of her dower; and it is a pertinent fact that the claims of creditors upon the land of their deceased debtor were then very partially recognized.

The principal object of every marriage settlement is to secure the wife and her children against the improvidence of the husband. Its effect is to preserve the capital of the family for the next generation; and the absence of some such provision would throw the most serious difficulties in the way of marriage, and entail poverty and privation upon many innocent persons. We anticipate two objections to our argument: one, that if a woman entrusts herself to her husband, she may confide in his care for her material interests; the other, that we are by the settlement robbing the creditors that the widow and children may live in affluence. To the former it is enough to reply that for one man who is so dissolute or ill-conditioned as to render matrimony a grievous burthen to his consort, there are a thousand who are dangerously facile in their disposal of property. In a word, a man may be an excellent husband, and a

very bad manager. The second objection is still more easily disposed of, for settlements are so common that creditors must be assumed to contract with reference to a life interest; and if they suffer from the inflated credit of a man in possession of a large establishment, they are only reaping the fruits of their own folly. We believe that the exigencies of modern society require that land may be settled on the trusts of an ordinary marriage settlement: beyond that, we do not care to press our argument, for it really postpones the vesting of the property to the full time at present allowed by law. The fact that a very large proportion—most of those best informed on the subject, say nine-tenths—of the land of the country is under settlement, proves conclusively that any restraint upon such a course of dealing would run counter to the habits and feelings of the majority of landowners. After all, they are the persons most entitled to consideration in any discussion of the question; for though the country at large has an intimate concern in the welfare of agriculture, and successive life estates do not promote its prosperity, yet we must regard the problem as a mixed one, and inquire whether the evils complained of are not infinitesimal in comparison with those which might be introduced in their stead. The Author of "Free Trade in Land" attributes to the operation of these "land laws" the magnitude of estates, and the gradual absorption of small farms; and he anticipates from their repeal the most beneficial results in the sale of great properties, and their distribution among a class of small owners who would themselves cultivate the parcel of land which they might possess. In fact, he hopes that a gradual and partial establishment of peasant proprietorship would result as a consequence of free trade in land. Accordingly, a large part of his volume is occupied by encomiums upon that mode of cultivation, with illustrations of its beneficial effects in the various Continental countries where it prevails. This, indeed, is the motive by which all land-law reformers are actuated; and we shall therefore conclude this Paper by a brief examination of the relative merits of the two systems.

It may be premised that the question of large or small farming, although intimately connected, is not identical with that of peasant proprietorship; for there may be the utmost subdivision of land among mere tenants, although a system of peasant proprietors necessarily involves small farms. Agriculture on a very limited scale, or *la petite culture*, finds few advocates in modern times where the ownership is dissociated from the occupation of the soil; yet where the reverse is the case the position is upheld with all the ardour of enthusiasm. "A small proprietor," says Adam Smith, in a passage which has

been frequently quoted, "who knows every part of his little territory, who views it with all the affection which property, especially small property, naturally inspires, and who, upon that account, takes pleasure not only in cultivating, but adorning it, is generally of all improvers the most industrious, the most intelligent, and the most successful."

Arthur Young, the celebrated agriculturist, was no friend to *la petite culture*, yet he never fails to pay the tribute of his admiration to the golden results of ownership. Writing towards the close of the last century he says:

Going out of Gange, I was surprised to find by far the greatest exertion in irrigation which I have yet seen in France; and then passed by some steep mountains, highly cultivated in terraces. Much watering at St. Lawrence. The scenery very interesting to a farmer. From Gange to the mountain of rough ground which I crossed, the ride has been the most interesting which I have taken in France; the efforts of industry the most vigorous; the animation the most lively. An activity has been here that has swept away all difficulties before it, and has clothed the very rocks with verdure. It would be a disgrace to common sense to ask the cause; the enjoyment of property must have done it. Give a man the secure possession of a bleak rock, and he will turn it into a garden; give him a nine years' lease of a garden, and he will convert it into a desert.*

The same impartial observer ascribes to the "Magic of Property," the transformation of the blowing *dune* sand of Dunkirk into productive gardens; and the wonderful fertility of the country of Béarn. We cannot resist the temptation of extracting a few sentences from his account of the latter, for it presents perhaps the most perfect picture of peasant proprietorship at its best.

Take the road to Moneng, and come presently to a scene which was so new to me in France, that I could hardly believe my own eyes. A succession of many well-built, tight, and comfortable farming cottages built of stone and covered with tiles; each having its little garden, enclosed by clipped thorn hedges, with plenty of peach and other fruit-trees, some fine oaks scattered in the hedges, and young trees nursed up with so much care, that nothing but the fostering attention of the owner could effect anything like it. To every house belongs a farm, perfectly well enclosed, with grass borders mown and neatly kept around the corn fields, with gates to pass from one enclosure to another. . . . An air of neatness, warmth and comfort breathes over the whole. It is visible in their new-built houses and stables; in their little gardens; in their hedges; in the courts before the doors; even in the coops for their poultry, and the sties for their hogs.

* "Travels in France," vol. i. p. 51.

We readily concede that this is an attractive picture of rural life, and that a philanthropist might well be excused for desiring to establish such an Arcadia in his own country. But, is it possible? How much of the successful farming of the Béarnais is to be attributed to the fertility of the soil, the nature of its productions, and the perfection of its climate? Have not our "Yeomen" died out, because they could not contend with a system better suited to the peculiar conditions of agriculture in this country? Wordsworth* describes a community of small proprietors, the upper dalesmen of Westmoreland, as a republic of shepherds, producing sufficient corn and wool to feed and clothe them—no more; "existing in the midst of a powerful empire like an ideal society," in which "neither high-born nobleman, knight, nor esquire" was to be found; their chapel, "the only edifice that presided over these dwellings, the supreme head of this pure commonwealth." But the description leaves a painful impression of the absence of all the aims of life save living; and even the poet cannot infuse into it a single element of picturesqueness, so striking in the peasant life of Southern countries.

"It is especially Switzerland," writes Sismondi,† "which we should traverse and study in order to judge of the happiness of peasant proprietors;" and he then gives an eloquent description of their dwellings, agriculture, provisions, &c., and concludes that if wealth is a subject of pride to other nations, Switzerland may always boast of her peasants. Other writers‡ praise in extravagant terms the industry, frugality, and independence of this people, and the sedulous care which they devote to their farms. A vast mass of evidence is collected in the form of an appendix to Mr. Kay's book,§ all directed to the one end of glorifying the institution of peasant proprietorship. This appeared separately so long ago as 1850, in the first volume of "The Social Condition and Education of the People in England and Europe," and represents great diligence and still greater enthusiasm. A man who sets out with a theory is not likely to bring home truth; such a witness only sees the clean cottages and comfortable aspect of Saxony; while, on crossing the frontier into landlord-ridden Bohemia, his senses become keenly alive to dirt and discomfort. A series of Essays,|| published under

* "A Description of the Scenery of the Lakes in the North of England." Prose Works, vol. ii. pp. 263, 268.

† "Studies in Political Economy."

‡ See "Switzerland, the South of France, and the Pyrenees in 1830," by H. D. Inglis; and "A Plea for Peasant Proprietors," by W. T. Thornton, p. 91.

§ "Free Trade in Land," by Joseph Kay, Q.C.

|| "System of Land Tenure in Various Countries."

the sanction of The Cobden Club, appeared in 1870, the general drift of which may be described as an appeal for Free Trade in land, and a laboured argument in favour of peasant proprietors and *la petite culture*. This is especially remarkable in the Essay on "The Land System of Belgium and Holland," by M. de Laveleye, who seems to think no argument too transparently fallacious to bolster up the credit of his pet project.

We are fortunately not left on this important subject to the *ex parte* statements of skilful essayists, or the still more misleading effusions of mild enthusiasts. We possess in "The Reports from Her Majesty's Representatives respecting the Tenure of Land in the several Countries of Europe,"* a mine of authentic information about the land systems of the countries to which they relate. These Reports were prepared by men who had been long resident in the several countries, who were familiar with their institutions, and were free from the influence of local or national prejudice. They are written without bias, or colouring of any description, and in many cases are of singular ability. They were called forth by the Irish land legislation of 1870, and a certain uniformity of plan is secured by a Foreign Office circular of suggestive questions. To these pages, then, we turn with full confidence for an impartial estimate of peasant proprietorship, and we find that, the glamour of poetic description being removed, and its practical results only recorded, it cannot be regarded as a sovereign remedy for all the evils of agriculture. We have already given to the reader the most flattering picture of this system in the words of Arthur Young; we may now be permitted to present to his mind the darkest, the most deplorable example of European agriculture, which is still the companion of peasant proprietorship:—

Agriculture in Greece is carried on by peasant proprietors. Free trade in land may be said to exist in Greece. The truth is, small proprietors have little security to offer, and are consequently obliged to have recourse to money-lenders and usurers to whom they pay from 12 to 18 per cent. interest per annum, and sometimes, it is said, even more. About three-fourths of the landed property in Greece is mortgaged for its full saleable value. The mode of cultivation is primitive in the extreme. Oxen are generally used in tilling the land. The plough usually still employed is of the same simple construction as in the days of Hesiod, and is too light for any but the poorest soils (often not weighing more than the yoke), the ploughshare merely scratching the earth. Even threshing machines are unknown in Attica, and the

* Parliamentary Papers, 1870.

corn in the neighbourhood of Athens is still trodden out by horses as it was in the most primitive times.*

We do not charge peasant proprietorship with all the evils here disclosed, we merely desire to show that it is consistent with the maximum of misery, and cannot be relied on as a universal specific. But it is very apparent from these Reports that such a system brings one of two evils in its train, and often both; the peasant either subdivides or mortgages his land. In France *morcellement* has been carried to such an extent that there are more than 7,500,000 owners of land in that country, of whom about 5,000,000 hold on an average only six acres,† and some "parcels" are not more than a rood in extent. In Wurtemberg the subdivision of land has been carried to its greatest extreme, and public opinion ascribes to this, "its sad experience of recent years of scarcity;" and in many of the other States of Germany the evidence is of a similar character. In Sweden, Norway, Holland, Belgium, and Portugal the land is heavily mortgaged, and the worst aspect of these mortgages is that they are effected not to provide improvements; but, usually, either to purchase more land, or to avert ruinous subdivision on the death of an owner, by money payments to all the children save one. Thus primogeniture is practically re-established at the very bottom of the agricultural scale. In France the interest payable on mortgages is estimated at about ten per cent. of the annual value of the land; while in Germany the burthen is not less than one-half its total value. But we do not condemn the system so much for the results that inevitably flow from it, as on account of the higher good which it excludes. It limits us to small fields and to one social grade. It is a system which admits of no change. If the population increases the farms are divided or mortgaged, and comfort is replaced by squalid poverty; if, on the other hand, the population diminishes the farms aggregate into estates, and the peasant becomes an employer of labour. The family group is the unit of the system, but in a few years one family is replaced by several and they have no choice but exile, or division. Let us take the institution in its most flourishing condition, and postulate a happy and industrious population cultivating each man his own small farm. There is no rent to be paid, the produce of the soil suffices to feed and

* "Report by Consul Merlin respecting the Tenure of Land in Greece," p. 24.

† M. de Lavergne gives the following figures:—50,000 owners averaging 300 hectares, 500,000 averaging 30, and 5,000,000 with an average of only 3 hectares. A hectare is equivalent to about two acres and a half.—"Économie Rurale de la France," par L. G. Léonce de Lavergne.

clothe the family, and their time is fully occupied by their little property. This is, however, merely a dead level of material comfort. When the comparison is made with this country, so much to the advantage of the foreigner, it is apt to be forgotten that only the lowest class of our agricultural community is selected for the purpose. The peasant-owner is contrasted with the farm labourer, and the philanthropic reformer is jubilant at the chiaroscuro of his picture; but in order to judge fairly of the two systems, some weight must be attached to the existence of two other classes which are, in this country, engaged in agriculture, and which can, of course, find no place in a land of peasant proprietors—the owners of large estates and the farmers.

Our agricultural scheme has almost universally three terms, the owner, the farmer, and the labourer. The first supplies most of the capital, the second some capital, some skill, and some labour, and the last labour alone. We have thus a three-fold agricultural population; and we are entitled to reckon in our sum of benefits, the advantages accruing to the community from the existence of these three classes. The condition of the agricultural labourer, it must be admitted, was until recently a reproach to our civilization; but it has improved considerably in recent years, and as “compared with the labourer in towns his position is one of greater comfort.”* Although education, facilities for emigration, and a consequent rise in wages have done much, there remains a great deal still to be done, especially in the way of improved cottages, before even his material condition can be regarded as at all satisfactory. The distinguishing feature of our system consists in the existence of a class of tenant farmers, who occupy farms of various extent and work them by means of hired labour.† They have some peculiarities in the three divisions of the kingdom, which it is necessary to point out. In England the all but universal tenure is a tenancy from year to year, and the farmer is liable to be turned out on six months’ notice; whereas in Scotland nineteen years leases are the rule. In the former case the tenant enjoys (except in cases under the Agricultural Holdings Act) no security for any improvements which he may desire to make; while the drawback of the latter is that the tenant will probably rack the land towards the close of his term, and deliver up possession of a sadly deteriorated farm.

* “The Landed Interest,” p. 65.

† This class, according to Mr. Caird, numbers 1,160,000 farmers, 75 per cent. of whose farms are under 50 acres, 12 per cent. between 50 and 100 acres, and 18 per cent. more than 100 acres.—“The Landed Interest,” p. 63.

In Ireland the position of affairs is peculiar and anomalous. There, leases are the exception, but fixity of tenure the rule; rent is reserved, but frequently not paid; tenant-right often brings more than the value of the fee-simple, and the tenancy may be described as closely resembling inchoate copyhold.

In the thoughtful and temperate essay by Mr. Lanigan, which we have placed at the head of this article, the claims of the Irish tenant for still greater "fixity of tenure" than he at present possesses find an earnest advocate. Mr. Lanigan points out that the Land Act of 1870 recognized that, from an English point of view, the circumstances of the Irish tenant were "exceptional;" but that it failed to give a complete remedy, because it stopped short of absolute fixity of tenure. He examines the Report of the Select Committee appointed in 1878 to inquire into the working of the "Bright clauses" of the Act, which recommends, "a substantial increase in the number of small proprietors." With such a solution of the difficulty he is not satisfied, for it would be partial in its operation, and, if universal, would be disastrous. He appreciates too thoroughly the value of the example and prestige of a resident gentry, to wish for the annihilation of the landlord class; but he finds in the Report the expression of the great desideratum—increased security for the tenant. This he would effect, not by giving the tenant additional facilities for the purchase of the fee-simple, but by converting his precarious interest into a perpetual lease, the *fair* rent, and the amount to be paid to the landlord for the speculative increment of value, being determined by a permanent commission. Whether such a plan, founded on the *Beklem-regt* of Groningen, would work well in Ireland could only be determined by experiment: but any suggestion for the amelioration of the troubled relations between landlord and tenant in Ireland is, at the present moment, entitled to attentive consideration.

In a country occupied by peasant owners, the rudiments of learning are perhaps more diffused, but higher education is unknown; fewer suffer from actual want, but none is endowed with leisure to be great. Life is materialized into a perpetual conflict with nature, and its aims limited, after securing subsistence, to the paltry arena of village politics. If such a system had prevailed here, should we ever have heard of the Bakewell breed of sheep, or the restorative qualities of artificial manure? What peasant could afford to play the *role* of Mr. Lawes as an experimental farmer? Could the steam plough, and the countless other applications of machinery to the purposes of farming, ever have been produced under the *petite culture*? Not only could they have not been invented under that system, but they

cannot be used with advantage and economy upon small farms. It is a general complaint in the reports from foreign countries to which we have already referred, that machinery cannot be brought into use, where the land is subdivided among many owners; and this is itself sufficient to condemn the system, at least for countries whose chief productions are grass and corn; for the Lombard proverb—

Se l'aratro ha il vomero di ferro;
La vanga ha la punta d'oro.

(If the ploughshare is of iron made,
Still a point of gold has the peasant's spade.)

is only true where the soil is exceptionally productive, and the crops of such a nature as to require for each plant the personal attention of the owner. For most of our productions the soil is best prepared by machinery. One reaping machine can do the work of ten men, and the steam plough that of ten men and twenty horses; but so dependent is the latter upon the *grande culture*, that the ploughing of two fields of five acres costs once and a half as much as if the two fields formed but one enclosure, and, moreover, consumes twice the time.

We may, perhaps, be considered rash in selecting the present moment for the comparison of our agricultural system with the *petite culture*. Foreign competition and a series of bad harvests have diminished the price and the quantity of farm produce; the increase in local taxation and the rise in labourer's wages have narrowed the margin of profit; there are even instances in which the business of farming has been carried on at a positive loss, so that landlords find difficulty in procuring tenants, and farms are in danger of being left untilled. Discontent is felt with the game laws, and the laws of fixtures, and distress; and the farmer with just cause complains of the absence of security for improvements; while in the sister kingdom there is an additional complication in the unsatisfactory relations between landlord and tenant, and the political agitation which seeks to make capital out of the country's distress.

But we believe these to be transient and temporary evils; and we trust that, with the return of good harvests, and the revival of trade, we shall see the restoration of prosperity to every branch of the landed interest. However severe the depression, and whatever the trials still in store for both landlords and tenants, we deny that a system of peasant proprietors would obviate or mitigate them. We believe, indeed, that under such a system the crisis which we are passing through would have been an incalculable

disaster. What would have been the results of the Irish potato famine if its visitation had fallen upon a land of peasant owners? We ask the advocates of the system to endeavour to realize its dread consequences in such an event, and weigh them well against its fanciful benefits.

Men are masters of their own actions, not of the long results that flow from them. We cannot predict the momentous changes which an apparently trivial enactment may effect in a few generations. In the effort to control the future course of history we are dealing with unknown forces, and the alteration of the whole structure of society is necessarily a perilous experiment. What is suitable to the requirements of one country may be destruction to another, under altered circumstances of climate, character, and products. A fearful responsibility is therefore incurred by those who rashly advocate the overthrow of an existing system in order to substitute a Utopia.

AUBREY ST. JOHN CLERKE.

ART. VI.—LEGENDS OF THE SAXON SAINTS.

Legends of the Saxon Saints. By AUBREY DE VERE. London : C. Kegan Paul & Co. 1879.

IN two books of "Legends" the same poet has now recorded his impressions of the dawn of faith upon two nations. The "Legends of St. Patrick" formed a series of pictures of Ireland's evangelization—one man's apostolic labours among a "race high-dowered," to whom, as the poet well says, the Gospel was as something remembered, and God's kingdom as their native haunt. The "Legends of the Saxon Saints" describe the corresponding period for England, beginning with the coming of St. Augustine, passing through "the golden age of Anglo-Saxon sanctity," and ending with the last hour of its historian, the Venerable Bede. Both periods correspond in the one great event, but not in the manner of its accomplishment, nor in its character, nor in its results. The two peoples were both, indeed, predestined races, with a marvellous work to do in the world's history; both, even in their first fervour, were to begin the apostolate for others. But one was to be tried by centuries of suffering, the other by ages of material prosperity; and from the very outset one had the martyr spirit—swift to love much, enthusiastic, heroic in devotedness; while—if we may venture to make a parallel—the other showed

the spirit of the confessor—a willing spirit despite earthly weakness, patient, firm, slowly conquering self, struggling, losing and gaining silently, silently and deeply athirst for heaven. Even in the golden age of Saxon England the faith of the nation passed through many vicissitudes; while it flagged and failed in one kingdom, it was brightest in another, and with the people collectively as with individuals, the return to faith frequently outshone even the glory of first fervour; it was wont to be a return in accordance with the national character, justice-loving, solid, abiding, resolute in labour, frankly generous. The time may come when such partial and temporary lapses from the right will be found to have foreshadowed the later age of error; and the old ardour for the re-asserted truth may appear as an early type of the nation's return to a second fervour of justice sought* and duty done—a life-long expiation, fruitful in deeds not words, like the sorrow of a great soul. So it is that the coming of Christianity to the Sister Countries, though widely different in lasting results, is not to be hastily judged less glorious to one nation than to the other. For Ireland it was the majestic sunrise of a day that shines unchanged from the fifth century to the nineteenth, and onward unsetting through the ages.† For Saxon England conversion was a slowly-growing dawn, leading to alternate gloom and splendour. But it was a morning of promise too marvellous to be forgotten. Eight centuries later there came, not night, but eclipse. Now that the shadow is at last moving with all but imperceptible slowness from the land, we call to remembrance that morning of Saxon holiness; and unless new elements have altered the very basis of the nation's character, the early golden age may be taken to measure the possible glories of faith restored. Measuring by such a standard, we scarcely dare to picture what the second era of fervour might be, in the land that became Mary's dowry in Saxon times by its grandeur of earnestness and its wealth of sanctity.

As the Irish Celtic and English Saxon races differed in character, in destiny, and in the tale history was to tell of them, so did their annals of conversion differ widely, each nation reflecting its own mind in the telling of the story as much as in the story told. The tripartite life of St. Patrick and Venerable

* Even already in the England of these dark days, the liberty of the Church is more assured and the energy of her apostolate more unfettered than in any other country of the old Christendom.

† "May my Lord never permit me to lose His people, whom He has gained in the ends of the earth."—The prayer of St. Patrick in his famous "Confession"—a prayer which, so far, promises to be fulfilled in its widest significance.

Bede's records of the Saxon Church are the earliest histories of the faith in the two countries. The contrast between the books is like a revelation of the difference between the races. Both are true history, true copies of the life and events of a remote age; but they differ in kind, as a painting differs from a photograph. The photograph may be more satisfactory to the student of facts; but he who wants the impressions created by facts must rather study the painting; it may be less accurate in details, but for all that it is more true, because it reveals more of the truth as a whole, and, passing it through a human medium, reveals it more intelligibly and more richly. The tripartite life of the Apostle of the Irish bears still the warmth of its first enthusiasm; it seems to hurry in breathless exultation; it is at times legendary and figurative; it is sublime at one moment, in the next commonplace, but it always has the loud rough ring of an old triumphal poem. The signs of the supernatural startle us on every page. It seems an age and a land of miracles, where faith moves mountains. Human affections glow through the tissue of wonders, and homely ways and words mingle with the signs and marvels of a most familiar world unseen. The old Irish records, invaluable as they are to the student, can never be appreciated unless he who studies them is a Christian and a poet. But when we turn from the old Celtic remains, the work of many hands, to the work of the monk who wrote the one history of the early Saxon Church, and wrote it in her own immortal language, we perceive a contrast, which is all implied in the one word that its attractions are not for the poet but for the Christian student alone. It is a calm, circumstantial, unimpassioned history. Its value is inestimable, but its beauty scant; if its beauty were greater its value would be less, and historians and controversialists could ill afford the exchange. There may be in its pages "better poetry than is to be found in the professed poetry of a materialistic age," but it is of the same nature as that which is contained in the simplest episode of Christian life; it takes but little warmth from the emotions of the chronicler; it has but little colour to guide the imagination. His records have, indeed, their own freshness and joyousness: how could it be otherwise when he wrote in an age of faith? And thoughtful reading shows that "the chief human affections, things far deeper than the passions, are abundantly illustrated;" yet so are they by the least poetic history that ever had to deal with individual lives. In a word, it is the book of a painstaking historian, whom an innate bias of poetry was not wont to carry out of his way either in the choice of subjects or of language.

When we contrast thus the old Celtic writings and the Latin history of the Saxon monk, we are contrasting the materials

which are the basis for all accounts of Ireland's and England's conversion. If the account were to be given in verse, there can scarcely be question where the poet's more congenial task would lie. In the case of the author of the "Legends" there may never have been an actual choice; and even if there was, other reasons may have determined it; and certainly there was, apart from all other motives, a fitness in telling first the story of Ireland's earlier conversion. But whatever ruled the preference, the easier task was done more than seven years ago in the admirable "Legends of St. Patrick;" and it is clear that a far more difficult work was undertaken in transforming into poetry "Legends of the Saxon Saints," based chiefly upon Bede. But the author who essayed it is well known to be a student as much as a poet; and instead of being content with giving versified sketches from St. Augustine's time to that of Venerable Bede, he conceived the wider design of picturing at the same time the England of the Saxon saints. The plan is fully explained in a few lines of the preface. The aim of the "Legends," it says, is—

To illustrate England, her different races and predominant characteristics, during the century of her conversion to Christianity, and in doing this to indicate what circumstances had proved favourable or unfavourable to the reception of the faith. It became desirable thus to revert to the early emigration of that "Barbaric" race of which the Anglo-Saxon was a scion, making the shadow of Odin pass in succession over the background of the several pictures presented, and to show how the religion which bore his name was fitted at once to predispose its nobler votaries to Christianity, and to infuriate against it those who but valued their faith for what it contained of degenerate. It seemed also expedient to select for treatment not only those records abounding in the picturesque and poetic, but likewise others useful as illustrating the chief representatives of a many-sided society; the Pagan king and the British warrior, the bard of Odin and the prophetess of Odin, the Gaelic missionary and the Roman missionary, the poet and the historian of Anglo-Saxon Christianity.

The design is faithfully followed. There is a scholarly groundwork, and more historical narrative than description. Had the book proved merely attractive and not instructive it would have failed of its object, which was to give a general idea of the truth in its entirety, and not of its most beautiful isolated fragments. Frequently the author has sacrificed himself to his purpose. Though the basis of the Irish "Legends" was in itself far more poetical, the Saxon history has been more carefully reproduced. There are many imaginative incidents, but these, for the most part, occur where the details of the legend failed; they do not embellish its whole length, or enrich it beyond cautiously set limits. And if we leave the useful element

out of account, and judge the whole as a poetical creation, the imaginative passages stand out in bright relief. The spirit of the facts seems to be more inspiring than the facts themselves; and, at the risk of praising a poet to the dispraise of his subject, we must declare the freedom of his fancy to be the almost invariable measure of poetical value in the work. We say of poetical value, because there is another kind of worth to which the author gives equal place, if not precedence. He wished not merely to amuse an idle hour, but to impart a taste for the period of his study, and to teach what that period was. And if beauty is less evenly distributed than utility, it is by the author's own choice. He, avowedly, did not confine his selection of episodes to "the picturesque and poetic;" and one must not expect from the result a character which it was never meant to possess—the character of being in all parts poetical and picturesque. Thus, not only is the subject hitherto untrodden ground, but the plan of venturing upon it is in itself original.

There is a prevalent custom of reversing the order of things and reading the preface last. But in this case half the meaning of the after-text would be missed without the preface. Nor is it only a necessary key to the "Legends;" it is in itself an excellent essay on the Anglo-Saxon primitive religion, and the characteristics of their race, and of their conversion. The information is far more happily given in that form than in foot-notes; it was, perhaps, the only way in which it could be given at all, for without it there are certain legends, that for the general reader would have required a small dictionary of foot-notes; and how few there are who have enough patience and poetical perception to bear the constant interruption of verse, and to preserve even their inclination to appreciate it. The preface deals largely with the tradition which underlies the opening poem or prologue—"Odin the Man." Odin the god was only the deformed gigantic shadow of the man, his memory personified and exaggerated. The human Odin is exalted by a tradition scarcely to be surpassed for grandeur; and, if his religion had anything like the degree of primeval purity here ascribed to it, there is a halo of heroism about his name. In the far East, upon the plains of Scythia, there dwelt in the vague twilight of history a barbaric race, long invulnerable even to Rome. Conquered at last, instead of submitting to the world-wide yoke, Odin, their chief, led them by long transition northward to the uncoveted regions of pine-forest, and ice, and snow. There, simplicity strengthened them, endurance hardened them; and thence, after four centuries, the "Barbarians" of the North swept down upon Rome in their day of vengeance. From that same hardy stock, once led northward by Odin the man, and after-

wards fallen to the worship of Odin the god, was descended, amongst other Teutonic and Scandinavian tribes, the strong root of the English race, the Anglo-Saxons. Their Valhalla was peopled with the Scandinavian gods; warfare was a virtue, being necessary to immortal honour. A wild and dark mythology obscured all vestiges of the earlier belief. It had been far different in the old days; then a bright reflection of the truth was preserved among the Northern nations. As the most ancient lore of Iceland proves, there once had been a time when they looked up to one God, omnipotent, omniscient, all-just, who was to be worshipped only beneath the unbounded heaven, and imaged under no bodily form. Like other peoples of the ancient world, they had kept, even in their farthest wanderings, a remnant of the great birthright; so long as they preserved their portion, they had the pledge of a glorious restoration of all. To take a beautiful figure from the text:—

Each nation from Man's great stem
Issuing, had with it borne one Word divine,
Rapt from God's starry volume in the skies:
Each word a separate Truth, that, angel-like,
Before them winging, on their faces flung
Splendour of destined morn.

It is before the mind of the race suffered degeneration, before the true was changed to false, that we are shown "Odin the Man." A heroic subject here inspires a poem entirely imaginative. Odin is represented of exalted character, having learned from Persia to worship one God upon the heights, and having either a tinge of prophecy in his wisdom, or else that iron strength of resolution which makes the will outspoken sound prophetic. Rome gives him four days to surrender. He answers, that he will take not four days but four centuries to bide his vengeance. But before he leads northward the storm-tossed race—"image of greatness that disdains to die"—he pours forth to them an impassioned address, not so much in lament as in menace against the Power that drives them to self-exile. There was for himself, he declares, a time when a shock of anguish set him free, and he awoke, a man.

My people too shall wake:

They shall have icy crags for myrtle banks,
Sharp rocks for couches. Strength! I must have strength;
Not splenetic sallies of a woman's courage,
But hearts to which self-pity is unknown:
Hard life to them must be as mighty wine
Gladdening the strong: the death on battle fields
Must seem the natural honest close of life;
Their fear must be to die without a wound,

And miss Life's after-banquet. Wooden shield
Whole winter nights, shall lie their covering sole :
Thereon the boy shall stem the ocean wave :
Thereon the youth shall slide with speed of winds
Loud-laughing down the snowy mountain-slope :
To him the sire shall whisper as he bleeds,
"Remember the revenge! Thy son must prove
More strong, more hard than thou!"

"The revenge," planned by Odin with the determination of a seer who looks beyond the centuries, gives a new power to the chief figure of the tradition. He will not have for his people wealth, for it begets luxury; nor splendour of learning, wherein lurks heart-pollution; he will give them an inheritance of the cold North alone, where they may be strengthened by sufferings, hardened "from clay to stone, from stone to adamant." They are not to play at States, but to be a Race—the Race of Man. They are to build no stone-walled house, no cedar-roofed temple, gathering cities about gilded shrines. Their adoration is to be for none but God the Unknown, and like Persia in her day of strength they are to pray upon the mountain tops—"And see ye pray for vengeance!"

Four hundred years—

Ye shali find savage races in your path :
Be ye barbaric, ay, but savage not :
Hew down the baser lest they drag you down ;
Ye cannot raise them ; they fulfil their fates.

The earth is God's, not Man's : that Man from Him
Holds it whose valour earns it. Time shall come,
It may be, when the warfare shall be past,
The reign triumphant of the brave and just
In peace consolidated. Time may come
When that long winter of the Northern Land
Shall find its spring. Where spreads the black morass
Harvest all gold may glitter ; cities rise
Where roamed the elk ; and nations set their thrones ;
Nations not like those empires known till now,
But wise and pure. Let such their temples build
And worship Truth, if Truth should e'er to man
Show her full face.

There is no need to discuss whether the Odin of so sublime a mandate would not be something more than "the Man." It is a fine conception, justified sufficiently by the story of the migration and by extant records revealing vestiges of a pure religion in the North. And even though the prophetic character be unhistorical, and the whole Odin a poetic creation, it is the privilege of the poet to reproduce the spirit rather than the

letter of history. His "Man" is not meant for the man's self, but as the symbol of his influence.

One branch of the race thus set apart in rugged simplicity and hardihood is the Anglo-Saxon people of an after age. To them in the predestined time comes the golden era, which the poet's Odin predicted as a dim possibility. The full face of Truth is shown to them. Augustine comes with the Roman missionaries; others from Gaul and from Ireland follow in his steps. The race with its cities and its "harvests all gold" becomes a nation wise and pure, and builds its temples, and worships the Truth, but not as their barbaric forefathers dreamed of it. It is the shadow of the Crucified that stretches slowly across the land; they begin a new existence, worshipping Him who is the Truth and the Life. The children of Odin's warriors learn the lesson of sacrifice. The race bred in simple hardihood is ready for the highest, whitest summits of the Christian life. Conversion seems to be synonymous with holiness. Cloisters arise to shelter not their tens but their hundreds. Whole families become halo-crowned. Saints shine out not singly so often as in wandering lines and familiar groups, like the star-clusters of a wintry night; and as in a winter's night, too, there is a depth of darkness behind their splendour—it is the darkness of lingering and struggling Paganism, where the sons of Odin the man are still the worshippers of Odin the god.

The final victory of the Christian light over the darkness of Paganism had long been foretold in a dim and confused manner by the oldest of the traditions of the North. It forms the subject of the strangest and strongest of the "Legends,"—"King Sigebert of East Anglia, and Heida the Prophetess." King Sigebert, once exiled in France, where he had heard tidings of the faith, has been visited by St. Fursey, one of the Irish apostles who in those days shared largely, revived, or completed the work of the Roman and Saxon missionaries. Startled and disturbed by what he has heard, he recounts it all to Heida the Prophetess; and she recognizes the coming fulfilment of the earliest and most terrible prophecy of her race, the Voluspà, the prediction of the final battle of the gods against the greater Power that is to destroy them.

Upon her breast
Came down the fire divine. With lifted hands
She stood: she sang a death-song centuries old,
The dirge prophetic both of gods and men

What Heida sings is in substance and often in precise detail the dim foreshadowing of the end known to the Northern nations, the destruction of the world by fire, the new state of the race immortalized, the earth "holier and happier," and the heavenly

Asgard with its palace of gold. The interpretation of the prophecy dawns gradually upon Heida, and is only gradually accepted by the King, at first with defiance, then with resignation. The rendering of the battle description, closely parallel with the Icelandic record, is one of the most spirited passages. There is a majestic force and barbaric strength about it, well suited to the scenes described in the battle chaunt; there is just enough embellishment to suggest that the conflict is passing before her vision and too much to disguise in poetry the characteristic roughness and briefness of the *Voluspa* itself. The charge from Valhalla, judged from that point of view, is very felicitous:—

“The warder of the Gods

Soundeth the Gjallar trumpet, never heard
Before by gods or mortals: from their feast
The everlasting synod of the gods
Rush forth, gold armed, with chariot and with horse:
First rides the Father of the flock divine
Odin, our King, and, at his right hand, Thor,
Whose thunder-hammer splits the mountain crags
And level lays the summits of the world;
Heimdall and Bragi, Uller, Njord, and Tyr,
Behind them throng; with these the concourse huge
Of lesser gods, and heroes snatched from earth,
Since man's first battle, part to bear with gods
In this their greatest. From their halls of ice
To meet them stride the mighty Giant-Brood,
The moving mountains of old Jötunheim,
Strong with all strengths of Nature, flood or fire,—
Glacier, or stream volcanic from red hills
Cutting through grass-green billows;—on they throng
Topping the clouds, and, leagues before them, flinging
Huge shade, like shade of mountains cast o'er wastes
When sets the sun.”

The position of the legend of Heida the Prophetess with regard to the rest reminds us of that of “St. Patrick and Oisín” among the legends of Ireland. Both rest on different bases; and one is in ballad metre, the other in the uniform blank verse of this volume. But they have the similarity, that they typify and describe in each case partly from the Pagan point of view the victory of the Cross over the vanishing myths.

To turn to the “Legends” of Saxon Christianity, we find the subjects selected are—The Coming of St. Augustine; the midnight Consecration of Westminster Abbey; the night-watch of St. Laurence, whom St. Peter warns in a vision not to abandon his See; the tales of Sigebert of Essex and Oswald of Northumbria, both taken in detail from Bede, and more

fruitful in history than in poetry; Ceadmon the Cowherd, the first English poet; King Oswy's crime in slaying Oswin, and the Wife's Victory over his impenitence: the opposition of the monks of a Mercian Abbey to admitting the relics of the saintly Oswald of Northumbria, a legend to be included among those most characteristic of the time, but not among the most poetical; St. Cuthbert's Pentecost at Carlisle—like the epilogue, to a great extent a picture of the Christian ministry among the simple ranks of the people; the flight of the Virgin Frideswida to Oxenford; the Banquet-hall of Wessex, chiefly an illustration of the turbulent animosity of the Pagans, and their anxiety to suppress by force the faith that supplants theirs by meekness; and lastly, a picture of the missionary labours and death of the great Historian of the Anglo-Saxon Church—a picture of Bede, the teacher of the people, the monk of Jarrow, amassing written treasure to the last; the old man surrounded by his sons of the cloister, and yielding up his soul amid their labours, prayers and tears. Of all these "Legends," "King Oswy of Northumbria, or the Wife's Victory," seems to be the one which has the largest scope to illustrate the period, and which at the same time is the best representative of the book. It deals largely in historical narrative, and takes care to do its teaching part by explaining all the facts and circumstances. Its imaginative passages are sometimes very beautiful: they suggest what the author has sacrificed, in denying himself elsewhere naturally attractive currents of thought, in order to follow hard paths and fulfil his strictly-defined plan. The legend opens with the question, "Who loved not Oswin?" and it is justified by the description of the King of Deira, "young, beauteous, brave," and so meek, that Aidan the Bishop predicts of him—hiding the sad prophecy under his native Western speech—"God will not leave such meekness long on earth!" The other portion of Northumbria, Bernicia, is ruled by Oswy, "a man of storms," fierce, half Pagan, though in youth baptized to Christ. He comes down upon the kingdom of Deira; and its meek king, seeing his people like a little flock among countless wolves, asks, Why should they perish for him? Let them disperse in peace: for their sake he will return to exile whence he came, "or gladder die." He rides to Gilling Tower, and thither Oswy, the Man of Storms, marches next day and slays him, unarmed. Twelve days after, Aidan the Bishop dies at Bamborough, beside a half-built church, and pillowing his head against a buttress. His grave is made at Lindisfarne, while Oswin's is in after days a place of pilgrimage and of sanctuary under the name of "Oswin's Peace." The murderer, King Oswy, has for his wife the kinswoman of the dead king.

We see her "kneeling on the rain-washed ground" near Gilling's Keep, weeping and praying, and with passionate tenderness and remorse kissing the earth over the new-made grave; and we hear in retrospect how it happened that the pagan-hearted king ever won and wedded so gentle a queen. Oswy now surprises her in her prayer—

"Up, wife of mine! If Oswin had not died
His gracious ways had filched from me my realm,
The base so loved his meekness!" Turning not,
She answered low: "He died an unarmed man."
And Oswy: "Fool that fought not when he might;
At least his slaughtered troop had decked his grave!"

He is still hard in the scorn and hatred that prompted the deed. The voice of the Church has denounced his crime; but he calls rebuke madness, and goes his way. The year runs on, and autumn gives place to winter. He knows the queen weeps in secret, but he never sees her tears. Near him her face is pale but bright, her service loving. She chides him neither by words, nor by looks, nor by silence. But taking all reproach into her heart—

Like some penitent she walked
That mourns her own great sin.

Oswy, we are told, though remorseless now, "had moods of passionate love." He is the great king, the ruthless slayer of his enemies, but he has before now held the dying head of a plague-stricken soldier, cheering the deserted man's last hour "with songs of Odin strangely blent with Christian hymns." The naming of such an incident is a touch of art, for it shows how the sequel is possible, and makes us ready to believe in the sudden change and softening of his strong passionate nature. Then comes an admirable picture, a marvellous story told in a few words. The telling has a characteristic briefness; it is a finished idyll of faith; while it may be that the vision we are given of Eanfleda is meant by its poetic smoothness and brightness to contrast with the narrative portions and the harsher war scenes, just as her secret sanctified grief contrasts with the rough war-ring life of the king. Oswy, returning from a distant chase, is overtaken by the darkness, and he has to pass Oswin's grave.

The snow, new-fallen,
Whitened the precinct. In the blast she knelt,
While coldly glared the broad and bitter moon
Upon those flying flakes that on her hair
Settled, or on her thin, light raiment clung.
She heard him not draw nigh. She only beat
Her breast, and, praying, wept: "Our sin, our sin!"

There as the monarch stood, a change came o'er him :
 Old exiled days in Alba as a dream
 Redawned upon his spirit, and that look
 In Aidan's eyes, when, binding first that cross
 Long by his pupil craved around his neck,
 He whispered : " He who serveth Christ his Lord
 Must love his fellow-man." As when a stream,
 The ice dissolved, grows audible once more,
 So came to him those words. They dragged him down :
 He knelt beside his wife, and beat his breast,
 And said, " My sin, my sin !"

. . . . Aloud she cried :
 " Our prayer is heard : our penitence finds grace :"
 Then added : " Let it deepen till we die !
 A monastery build we on this grave :
 So from this grave, while fleet the years, that prayer
 Shall rise both day and night, till Christ returns
 To judge the world—a prayer for him who died ;
 A prayer for one who sinned but sins no more."

The church is built, and " the one true greatness" more and more takes possession of Oswy's spirit. At the same time he advances in power. He is named Bretwalda, for until then the Seven Kingdoms have seen no king to be compared to Oswy the Christian. The envy of Penda is excited ; his rule in Mercia is the greatest standing barrier against Christianity, and he is ready to give credence to the rumour that the power of the Christian king is the result of Christian sorcery. He sends his son Peada to Northumbria, to learn if it be true ; but, as if there were, indeed, some witchery in the new religion, the mission has an ending strange beyond his dreams. Peada becomes a Christian, and takes in marriage the daughter of Oswy. He embraces the truth only after long inquiry and meditation ; and an image from nature aptly describes the changes which day and darkness bring to his fluctuating belief ; the later the hour the more is the mind willing to be influenced from without, and to recognize, within, its own depths of feeling ; so Peada says of the great truths he contemplates, that each evening—

Distinct they shine like yonder mountain range ;
 Each morning mists conceal them.

When the news of his conversion spreads into Mercia, the subjects of Penda dread his rage against Peada. " Will he slay his son ?" is the question asked on all sides with white lips. But Penda declares the man he scorns is he that vows himself to serve some god, yet breaks his law and " walks, a lie." Let Peada

serve his Christ; but it is the kingdom of Northumbria that shall die.

"Man nor child,"
He sware, "henceforth shall tread Northumbrian soil,
Nor hart nor hind; I spare the creeping worm:
My scavenger is he."

He musters his innumerable mass of warriors; chiefs of many a principedom and province join him.

Mightier far than these
Old Cambria, *brooding o'er the ancestral wrong*
The Saxon's sin original, met his call,
And vowed her to the vengeance.

Hearing of the advance, Oswy first strives to make peace; and then, in prayer for victory, vows to God the virginity of his child, and lays before the altar twelve caskets "heaped with gems and gold"—the peace offerings rejected by Penda, and now the price of twelve future monasteries. The Northumbrians march under white standards of "the Mother-Maid and Babe Divine." The Mercians and their allies are completely routed, turning their arms upon each other in confusion, and swept away in their headlong retreat by the sudden overflow of the swollen river—

Penda scorned to fly:

Thrice with extended arms he met and cursed
The fugitives on rushing. As they passed
He flung his crownèd helm into the wave,
And bit his brazen shield, above its rim,
Levelling a look that smote with chill-like death
Their hearts that saw it. Yet one moment more
He sat, like statue on some sculptured horse,
With upraised hand, close-clenched, denouncing Heaven:
Then burst his mighty heart. As stone he fell
Dead on the plain. Not less in after years
Mercian to Mercian said, "Without a wound
King Penda died, although on battle-field;
Therefore with Odin Penda shares not feast."

Yet we are told—and it is a striking illustration of that age of sudden-springing generous faith when the good mingled closely with the evil—Penda, the strength of the heathen power, left Christian sons, and daughters who took the veil. To follow the poem—Oswy, in fulfilment of the vow, sends his child to the Abbess Hilda, "who made her Bride of Christ;" and the monasteries he raises become twelve centres of productive labour on the soil and of charity to the poor. Years pass; he is at length "an old king glory-crowned." He desires to go forth from his

kingdom as a pilgrim, and to end his days in Rome. But Heaven wills otherwise, and he is stayed by the hand of death.

Long sleepless t'ward the close
 Amid his wanderings smiling, from the couch
 He stretched a shrivelled hand, and pointing said,
 "Who was it fabled she had died in age?
 In all her youthful beauty, holy and pure,
 Lo where she kneels upon the wintry ground,
 The snow-flakes circling round her, yet with face
 Bright as a star!" so spake the king; and taking
 Into his heart that vision, slept in peace.

This seems to be the fitting end for the legend; but the pleasure of resting finally upon a beautiful fancy is sacrificed for the usefulness of finishing the narrative, and one or two historical facts carry us a few lines farther down the page, and a long way off from our small share in the old king's delusion. It is to be remarked that in the versified legend the most felicitous parts are of the poet's creation. The manner of Oswy's conversion is entirely imaginary. Bede tells us that at his order, not by his own hand, Oswin was slain; that afterwards a monastery was built on the spot, and prayer was daily offered for the soul of the murdered king and for the living king who had caused his death; that Utta, the priest, was despatched to Kent to bring Edwin's daughter, Eanfleda, to be Oswy's bride; and subsequently we find Oswy not only a Christian in life, but persuading others to follow his example—"about this time, through the influence of king Oswy, the East Saxons again embraced the Christian religion." Somehow, it is clear a great change has come to Oswy; Bede does not tell how; but the poet brings Eanfleda to solve the difficulty, and his creation becomes the key-stone of his legend, while the incident of the dying warrior is skilfully invented to help out the explanation. As for the scene in which the historian gives most detail—the banquet scene where Oswin proves his meekness—the legend in verse falls short even of Bede's account.

The more we seek to determine the source of our pleasure in certain parts of this poem, the more we are inclined to believe that the best of the legends, and the best passages of all the "Legends," are those where, as the preface says, the original record being brief, "all except the fundamental facts had to be supplied." In every story, from that of Augustine to that of Bede, the "fundamental facts" are not worked in to form the brightest portions; the most brilliant points are of pure imagination, supported only by a knowledge of the people and the period. In the "Consecration of Westminster Abbey," the fisherman's vision of the pile with its "kindling windows," and

all his impression of the glory of the heavenly rite within, does not equal in poetic felicity the description of the procession on the river next day. The latter event would seem to be far less promising; but an abundance of airy detail is supplied. The fancy is given free play, and with admirable results. Old Thames becomes the scene of a pageant that can scarcely be reconciled with the identity of the many-bridged flood. The wharves, the crowd of craft, the smoke-clouded city, all disappear—or almost disappear, for there are still, even in the early days, the small beginnings of these things. We see, instead, a river “brightened with banners of a thousand boats,” and gladdened with the anthems of the consecration rite, and with the glitter of “the cross in silver blazoned or in gold.” It is a river banked by grassy slopes and orchards near the old church of St. Paul, and with reedy shallows farther up, and waves strewn with chaplets and green branches. The London of the first Christian age rises dimly to the mind with a distant echo of its festive happiness; and last of all comes a realistic touch, reproducing in its aspect of that day the one work of man’s hands that has kept its place in the scene, and that is familiar to us still.

Alone the Julian Tower

Far down the eastern stream, though tap’stries waved
From every window, every roof o’er-swarmed
With anthem-echoing throngs, maintained, unmoved,
Roman and Stoic, her Cæsarean pride;
On Saxon feasts she fixed a cold, grey gaze;
’Mid Christian hymns heard but the old acclaim—
“Consul Romanus.”

Again, in “The Penance of St. Laurence,” the vision of St. Peter described by Bede does not suggest the most poetic passage. The author has discovered elsewhere in the chronicle that King Ethelbert, Queen Bertha, and the great St. Augustine himself are buried in the church where St. Laurence keeps his night watch; and of all who read the legend there will be few to deny that its beauty lies in the old man’s tearful and self-reproachful prayer at each of these tombs. The accessories of the scene are made to do their part—the ice-cold moon ascending “from the *dark fringe* of a rainy cloud,” and creating alternate gleam and gloom; “the vast, void nave” itself; the mat, and deer skin, and stone pillow, the old man’s couch; the one glittering lamp; the tomb where King Ethelbert sleeps marble-shrined, and, far away beyond a space of dark shadow, the grave whereon lies “the Patriarch’s statued semblance as in sleep.” The aged monk, creeping from stone to stone, is the one figure that moves through the deserted church; and the whole scene

is admirable, for one has a remembrance of the lay brother "with lamp in hand" gone now with the rest, and a consciousness of the monastery outside, where the bitter blast blows through "windy corridors and courts stone-paved." There is a whole imaginative structure built here upon very little; but as the description is given, not together in the poem, but in scattered detail, our preference lies still with the prayers of the exiled bishop, and these are purely the poet's creations; for though St. Laurence watched and prayed, we are not told that he prayed to the dead King and Queen of Kent, and to his sainted predecessor in the See of Canterbury. In the versified legend, he recalls to King Ethelbert the happy bygone time when "the Bride of God" set her pure foot on English shores, and he, the king, welcomed her, and gave her his palace, and built that abbey:—the days when he saw "his realm made one with Christ's," his race, "like angels ranging courts of heaven." Then at Bertha's tomb he makes his farewell prayer—the briefest of the three, yet perhaps the most inspired; for the Christian queen, that welcomed Augustine, seems long ago to have become a chosen heroine with the poet who places her praise so touchingly upon the lips of St. Laurence, the departing exile.

Thou tenderest Queen and sweetest,
Whom no man ever gazed on save with joy,
Or spake of, dead, save weeping! Well I know
That on thee in thy cradle Mary flung
A lily, whiter from her hand, a rose
Warm from her breath and breast, for all thy life
Was made of Chastities and Charities—
This hour thine eyes are on the Vision bent
Whereof the radiance, ere by thee beheld,
Gave thee thine earthly brightness. Mirrored there,
Seest thou, like mote in sunbeam well nigh-lost,
Our world of temporal anguish? See it not!
For He alone, the essential Peace Eterne,
Could see it unperturbed. In Him rejoice!
Yet, 'mid thy heavenly triumph, plead, O plead
For hearts that break below!

At St. Augustine's grave he weeps—

Ah me! ah me!

There was a Laurence once on Afric's shore:
He with his Cyprian died.

Then follows his deep sleep, and his half waking ere the dawn, when "a Venerable Shape, compact of light," approaches his couch, and from the Prince of the Apostles he receives the assurance that, at all risks, he must still hold his See and

remain on English ground. The mild and compassionate reproach is a beautiful and poetical, if unwarranted, rendering of the version of the story given by Bede; but the return of the bishop to face death before the king, and the subsequent change of King Eadwald's purpose, transfer us to less poetical situations.

In like manner, profuse and imaginative detail, or even imaginative scenes, throw the strictly historical element into the shade elsewhere. For instance, St. Frideswida, in the forest, makes a sort of pre-Raphaelite picture in words—something very fair and bright to look upon, and clear and graceful of line; but though we naturally expect more of St. Frideswida at Oxford, the Oxford pictures are far less impressive, because less distinct—with the exception, perhaps, of the incident of her touching charity to the leper. Even the last legend of all, the death of the Venerable Bede (which certainly is a subject for poetical treatment), does not quite come up to our expectations. But some of Bede's preaching, founded on his own writings, goes as far beyond anticipation, and so do many portions of the discourses of St. Cuthbert. There are, in fact, many beauties in the legend last referred to; but they are so far apart from the narrative, that most of them might be taken as excerpts, and, with a touch at the beginning, made complete by themselves. For instance, the *Three Lives of Womanhood* could be transformed into a separate poem, and the conception would carry all its excellence with it. The same is true of the tale of the monk, who wrote against heresies a book "like tempest winged from God," but whose right hand alone fell to dust in the grave; it is also true of the very different story of the keen-witted thane, who, being enjoined a penance of a hundred days' fast, cancelled the debt "a hundred days' in one," by imprisoning ninety-nine of his friends and lieges to share with him an unwilling fast of twenty-four hours.

Altogether, the work leaves the impression that if the fancy had been given more freedom, if the scope of the legends had been somewhat narrowed, and if they had contained a little more description and a little less narrative, we should have had a greater abundance of poetry, and, perhaps, a nearer view of the Saxon saints. But then we should have had less history, and a less instructive illustration of the period; and both these things made part of the original plan. It was a design most difficult of execution, and, where there is a difference between the merits of the first and second book of "*Legends*," we have no hesitation in ascribing it to the peculiarly historical character of the subject of the second, and the breadth given, with commendable purpose, to the plan. It was natural to expect some

such difference between the two accounts of the planting and spreading of Christianity. As we suggested at the outset, the difference between the two races, the predominance of the supernatural and miraculous in one account of conversion, the emotional and traditionary character of its records, and the calmly historical character of those of the other, all point to a vast difference in the facility of the task of telling for the two countries the tale of the first age of faith. And yet with a scrupulous care for the historical side of the work, the second set of "Legends" are, on the whole, far less imaginative, and drawn more accurately from their source than were the first; and fitness for poetic treatment is no longer the guide to the selection of subjects, for some are chosen for other stated reasons, and some beautiful episodes from Bede, and many legends of the Saxon saints not recorded by him, have been judged outside of the author's plan.

There is another difference to be noted between the "Legends of St. Patrick," and those of the "Saxon Saints." The present volume is entirely of blank verse; an agreeable interruption to the uniformity of the other was made by several legends being in rhyming verse, the parts of the Ossianic legends being given at intervals in ballad-metre, and the verse being broken by many changes, with very pleasing effect. Might not the effect produced in such legends as the "Monks of Bardeney" have been enhanced by using a similar medium of dialogue, even at the cost of lowering a stately poem to the level of a forcible ballad? And do not many of the incidents in the other legends suggest that, isolated, they might have been wrought into admirable short poems, flowing in any one of the stanzas in which their writer has proved himself of old to have no ordinary skill? It is true that large narrative portions would have been lost; but we remember some fragments of haunting melody from the same source as these weighty poems, and the remembrance makes us for once not sure that utility is the supreme good, or, at least, that it is not dearly bought at the cost of beauty, which, in such hands, could not fail to be utility also, since it would be like the persuasive beauty of holiness. But we do not forget that blank verse is facile and easily adapted to the different parts of a wide subject, and especially of a historical subject. We do not forget either that our English tongue, abundantly, well nigh supremely, rich in all else, is sadly poor in rhymes. Five centuries of verse writing have not rendered null Geoffrey Chaucer's lament that "rime in English hath soch scarcite;" and most bards since his time have felt it, as he did, "a great pennaunce" to know with what ease foreign brethren of the craft can fling off their verses. But there is

good in the seeming disadvantage. Necessity is the mother of invention: energy springs from difficulty. The "flour of hem that make in Fraunce" had in Chaucer's time outdone us; but native energy has been at work, in this, as in all else, nerved to greater effort by the difficulty itself; and long ago we have left French verse far in the background, while our literature of rhymed poetry stands on a level—for quality, though, we are thankful to say, not for quantity—even with the melodious Italian and the assonant Spanish. Nor is this the only good of "soch scarcite." Our literature has been wholesomely restrained in quantity by the fetters of rhyme; and so are the efforts of the individual. They are ruled, and their outcome is not only marked with the energy of a difficult art, but it is more compressed. Now, when there is a natural current of poetry in the mind, and when blank verse is the chosen metre, there is always a tendency to diffuseness. The result is likely to be—as in the case even of some poems of renown—a number of scattered gems with a large and unsatisfactory setting, of but little value in itself. Perhaps there is at the present day only one poet who is a perfect master of this tempting and perilous measure—one only who so balances every thought, and so times and varies the cadence, and polishes every phrase, and adjusts every word, that tedium is banished, and the most prose-like metre of the language becomes the most melodious. On the other hand, when blank verse is avoided and a rhyming measure chosen, there is the opposite danger—that of producing rhyme and nothing but rhyme, melody and nothing else. And this is a far more common kind of failure in our days. If Sir Philip Sidney said in his time that most English verse was "a confused masse of words with a tinkling sound of ryme barely accompanied with reason," what would he say of much of the later nineteenth-century verse? Are there not one or two poets whom it is the fashion to praise (as well as a whole school of second-rate rhymers), whose work might be entitled, not, alas! songs without words, but songs without sense? Tricks of endless alliteration and *tours de force* in rhyme supply their melody; their profundity is nothing more than the shallows unwholesomely perturbed; their genius is not of the clouds, but of the fogs, wherein it appears somewhat large and mysterious; a voluptuous turn of fancy helps to counterfeit poetic fire; and all the while clever management of rhyme and rythm is the one thing that covers their multitude of defects. If on one side, then, there is in blank verse the chance of falling into diffuseness and prose, on the other there is, in a rhyming metre, the danger of pleasing the ear with sound without satisfying the mind with thought. Of course there are a great many grada-

tions before these extremes of error are reached on either side, and we should look vainly for a poet who has not erred in one direction or the other, just as we should for any human work continuously and altogether perfect. There is no golden key to security here, any more than there is to genius or to excellence in art. But, granting inspiration to begin with, we do not think there is a safer guide than the habit of compression. There seems, therefore, to be more hope of excellence in rhymed than in unrhymed metre. The sonnet, with its many rhymes and its condensation of thought, is for these reasons not only the briefest and most harmonious, but, as many will say, the most beautiful form of poetry. The Poet of the Lakes loved to bound his inspirations by its narrow limits, though he had travelled more miles of blank verse than most men, often on the heavenward heights and often on low and rugged ground; and perhaps his most uniform excellence lies in his sonnets. Nor need we go so far for an example. There are pages of our own poet's Saxon and Celtic "*Legends*" that please for the moment well, but pass, with their histories, their pictures, their voices, utterly away from the mind; but there are two sonnets on "*The Miserere in the Sistine Chapel*," that live in the memory like its prolonged echo, and that make up in twenty-eight lines an unmistakable success not easily forgotten.

But from the versification of the Saxon legends we have been carried away to the polished verse of the best writer of unrhymed measure, and to the most unpoetic writers of rhymed measure—those who with some amount of fashion on their side give us less poetry than music of words. Far be it from us to contrast the present volume with either; there could not be a more ill-assorted comparison. For we do not place even the desirable degree of word-melody anywhere on the same level to which poetry inspired by faith ascends alone; nor would exquisite finish, carried to the utmost, weigh with us in comparison with that treasure of truth which removes our own poetry of religion to a totally different region from all other efforts of verse. But without comparison or contrast, it is quite legitimate to trace in the successes or failures of non-Catholic poetry, the possible successes or failures of our own. If blank verse has been a treacherously easy medium for many, so may it be for others. On the other hand, if there is a peril in rhyme it is well to see whence the delusion may spring. And finally, if, as we have suggested the best safeguard is condensation and compression, we have reason to lean towards rhymed verse, as giving most hope of care and brevity; and as an additional assurance that we are looking in the right direction, we have noted the frequent excellence of the sonnet,

where a great soul of thought has to be held in the small frame of fourteen lines.

There is, however, another element in poetry besides metre which it will be interesting to advert to; that is, the choice of words. In this choice lies a great deal of the poet's art. There is more in the mechanism of verse than the ordinary reader of poetry dreams of. The words that please the ear and haunt the memory owe a large part of their power to the succession of sound, which, itself passes unnoticed or seems accidental. It may appear to be no more than the result of chance, but it is a chance directed unconsciously by an inspired taste, or by a perception too quick to be marked even by its possessor. In other cases, and perhaps in nearly all, the happy combinations are distinctly purposed, though, again, it may be unconsciously, for practice in any art turns excellence to a habit. Probably there is seldom a case where the author himself fully analyzes at the time the power of what he is creating, and yet creates it well. The best art in the melody of words is the art that has become a second nature; the inspiration grows cold while it is calculating how to find expression. For instance, we may be sure that in one of the finest stanzas of the "May Carols" the words were chosen instinctively, not deliberately; indeed, one has to examine very closely to find whence their melody comes—

O Earth, some orb of singing souls
Brings down to thee *thy* Pentecost.

The alliteration of "singing souls" strikes us at first. But there is something of the kind, too, in "earth" and "orb." And then the secret dawns upon us; the music of the line lies in its perfect cadence, the sound growing full and forcible from "earth" to "orb" and from "singing" to "souls." The seeming and the perfect alliteration, and the swell of the vowel-sound at the close of the second foot and of the fourth, give to "O Earth, some orb of singing souls," a melody that could not be accounted for by the similarity of the two last words alone. This feat of unconscious art reminds us of a line from Spenser which has in a still greater degree a beauty at first mysterious—"Such as a lamp whose life doth fade away." Here one is apt to ascribe success to Spenser's well-known alliterative taste. But then comes the question, why would not "lamp" and "light" have done as well; and though there is an advantage in the pathetic allusion to the flame dying, one discovers that there is something gained, too, in having no hard dental consonant to break the flow of the sounds, but letting the "f" of "life" form an alliteration with "fade," where an assonance ends the line in character with its spirit of soft-

ness. All these nice distinctions of wording are by no means to be despised, though they can make only one of the lesser merits of verse. They are not forgotten by the author of the "Legends;" he uses—and has never, like so many others, abused—the art of words; still in this case more attention to it would have improved the verses. But in the choice of words the sound and smoothness are, after all, a minor consideration compared to the sense they express; and there are many passages where they are so selected as to give admirable touches of description, or to imply rather than express an imagery underlying the real meaning and not interfering with its clearness. Such occurs in the description of the swollen river on a stormy night, when—

through the clouds
A panic-stricken moon stumbled and fled,
And wildly on the waters blast on blast
Ridged their dark floor.

Or, again, to take words that are figures, and yet themselves occur in a figure of speech—

like that last beam
Which, when the sunset woods no longer burn,
Maintains high place on Alpine throne remote,
Or utmost peak of promontoried cloud.

The "Alpine throne" somewhat interferes with the beauty of the rest, but in the last verse there is a fine example of the force of one descriptive word. Falls and breaks in the style, are, indeed, somewhat frequent. There is a tendency not only to mar the smoothness of a passage by an unpolished phrase or thought; but also to prolong a felicitous idea beyond its natural climax and make a sudden downfall at the end. For instance, the last line seems superfluous in the story of the monk whose right hand alone decayed in the grave, and who coming in vision tells the reason:

Inferior tasks
I wrought for God alone. Building that book
Too oft I mused, "Far years will give me praise."
I expiate that offence.

The same may be said of one of the best passages in Bede's discourse to the people; the last line carried us beyond the point where a pause would have given rest upon its loftiest thought:—

Put on Christ's garments. Fools shall call them rags—
Heed not their scoff! A prince's child is man,
Born in the purple; but his royal robes
None other are than those the Saviour dyed,
Treading His Passion's wine-press all alone:
Of such alone be proud.

And, to finish the ungrateful task of finding flaws where so much is to be commended, we may note that there is sometimes a poetical thought which has escaped in prose-like words : as where, on the same page with a fine parallel between Creation and the coming of Faith, we discover such verse as :—

The heroic heart
Beats to the spiritual cognate, paltering not
Fraudulent with truth once known.

In the poetry of the "Legends" we do not miss what is elsewhere a beautiful characteristic of their author's work. We have left it to be dwelt upon last, because it is a peculiar merit that shows his poetry in the light under which we like best to remember it. He is a lover of nature, a sympathetic observer, and at times an apt describer. But all this others are, and to an incomparably greater degree. There are others more inspired, more eloquent, and more skilled in reproducing for our mind the aspect the world wears in their sight. But the Catholic poet, excelled in all else, claims a higher place than the rest because of one grand privilege. His distinction is, that, in gazing upon the material world, his tendency is always to mingle its beauties with a light from the spiritual world. Nature is for him to be interpreted by Religion, and Religion to be illustrated by Nature. Now the world is seen by him soul-stirred in worship; now thronged with visible types of spiritual truths; now clothed with a new radiance, and seen by spiritual sight to be one vast symbol of the ritual of the Church. Seek where we will, there is no other merit in his work to be even compared with this characteristic of his inspiration. It was beautiful and most prominent in the "May Carols," but it had shown itself before they were written, and lives on through everything else, making good his claim to the title of a Christian poet. For him Nature has "sanctuaries and shrines;" and so fair does the world become that he need not stretch imagination far to see its possible resurrection—"O Earth, thou shalt not wholly die!"—or when the May-time has filled its very fields and hedgerows with spirit-light, there breaks forth a yearning question :—

Ah, tell me! in the heavenlier sphere
Must all of earth have passed away?

For him, the winds sing their anthems; the forest trees make the aisles of a sanctuary; the sparkles of sunlight upon water are like souls springing from-out eternity. When the last trees relent to the embrace of May they are heart-touched at last, like sin-hardened men subdued to the welcome of grace. When the sea murmurs its "sob suppressed" along the shore-line, it is like the audible thrill of adoration when the Host is raised in

"some chapel on the Irish hills." In the early year the world's Pentecost comes with the rolling music of winds above the woods, and with the leaves fired beneath by "the golden-tongued and myriad light;" and when the year draws to a close the autumn colours are glorified as "hues pontific." It is a noble thought thus to show the world most beautiful in perfect unison with our faith and with our worship. If we seek for the same spirit in the "*Legends of the Saxon Saints*," we shall find it still abiding. In the description of St. Cuthbert's life on the "little rocky islet" of Farne, an image is taken from nature, to tell how earthly thoughts and memories crossed, without disturbing, his contemplation; for he had not separated himself from the world beyond; his brethren were still in his heart, and his hermitage was accessible not only to them but to the sinful and sorrowful. Yet his prayer went on, and his soul was firm in peace; the things of the external world tell us how, and show what symbols they may become for one to whom they are interpreters of truths unseen. We are told:—

He saw by day

The clouds on-sailing, and by night the stars;
And heard the eternal waters. Thus recluse
The man lived on in vision still of God
Through contemplation known; and as the shades
Each other chase all day o'er steadfast hills,
Even so, athwart that Vision unremoved,
For ever rushed the tumults of this world,
Man's fleeting life, the rise and fall of States,
While changeless measured change.

And when he returns to his hermitage in his last days the image is reversed, and he is said to have seen—

Once more, like lights that sweep the unmoving hills,
God's providences girdling all the world
With glory following glory.

The reflection of Religion from Nature is given with perfect ease in the parables of Cuthbert the Bishop to his peasant flock; but we find it reappearing abundantly, if less avowedly, elsewhere; and it comes with good effect when the death of Ceadmon is approaching, and the monks hear the great deep roaring in the distance and sobbing round "Whitby's winding coast":—

They heard, and mused upon eternity,
That circles human life.

There are, no doubt, in other poets countless examples of sacred types drawn from Nature, and of glimpses of its worship of the Creator; but we know of none who so often betrays, as

a constant habit of mind, the tracing of heavenly truth through earthly beauty. The loving loyalty to the Church, which distinguishes all his work, has in this manner its outcome in many of the smallest details. His poetry and his Catholicism are inseparable.

We have long ago expressed our opinion that there is yet no great poet among our Catholic writers. We are sure they one and all agree with us; and there is amongst us no writer of verse in whom the knowledge of truth and the appreciation of its beauty has not called forth a yearning for one far more gifted than himself to be sent to do the grand work possible for a great Catholic poet. Such there may be in the times to come—a man of faith, with a “heart of hearts” and with the might of eloquence, turning to its highest use the most sublime and the most powerful art known to man. What are the other arts beside it but faint, and limited, and transitory? It can speak to the whole world, and to all time, and it alone can give anything like full interpretation of one human soul to all the rest. It is unlike every other art in its power over men. Have not nations marched to war with pulses quickened by a few words, sung first at the home-hearth and last by the watch-fire? Has not the rage of a city in tumult been increased by rhymes at the barricades? How many are there for whom the spell of a few verses was the beginning of darkness and error! The atheism of our days, the doubt that robs nations of their inherited faith, the love of luxury that saps their strength, all these are spread by an army of poets and poetasters, whose share is large and continuous in the unholy work. May we not, then, by its force for evil calculate what might be the force for good of this marvellous, much-abused gift? It is no unfruitful boon that we desire, no airy possibility of blessing, but a very tangible good, when we long to have our times and our country feel the influence of a great Catholic poet. While yet it is not granted to us, all praise to those who give their energy, heart-whole so far as it goes, to the praise of Christian truth and the glory of the Church. And of this much at least we can be sure, that the Heaven-sent poet of the future, if ever he come, will have his course foreshadowed by two characteristics of a writer of to-day. He will see creation in light reflected from the knowledge and worship of its Creator; and he will find the key to Nature’s “sanctuaries and shrines” in the veneration of her who was praised in the “May Carols.” He will be in supreme excellence for after days what in a lesser degree the author of the “Legends of the Saxon Saints” is for ours—the lover of Nature illumined by Faith, and one of Our Lady’s laureates.

ART. VII.—POPE LEO XIII. AND MODERN STUDIES.

1. *Encyclical Letter of Pope Leo XIII. on the Restoration of Christian Philosophy.* Translated by F. RAWES, D.D., with a Preface by his Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. London: Burns and Oates. 1879.
2. *Der Heilige Thomas von Aquino.* Von Dr. KARL WERNER. Drei Bänder. Regensburg: G. J. Manz. 1859.
3. *Elementa Philosophiæ Christianæ.* Auctore P. F. ALBERTO LEPIDI, O.P. 2 vols. Parisiis: Lethielleux. 1875.
4. *Institutiones Philosophiæ Speculativæ ad mentem Sti. Thomæ Aquinatis.* Auctore, J. M. CORNOLDI, S.J., in Latinum versæ a Dominico Agostini, Venetiarum Patriarchâ. Bononiæ. 1878.

THE important Encyclical of the Holy Father, *Æterni Patris*, has now been before the world for five months, and theologians, scholars, and devout Catholics generally have had time to analyze it and to understand its drift and its recommendations. It has become quite clear that it is intended to effect a very great work; to bring about unity in Catholic philosophy, and this by the universal adoption of the philosophic teaching of St. Thomas of Aquin. We say *philosophic* teaching, rather than theological; because theology, as a science, depends upon philosophy. In theology, even taking that word in a sense much wider than the science of "Catholic" truth, Catholic divines may be said to be agreed. There are numerous controversies, no doubt, in the treatises on God and on the Incarnation, on Grace and on the Sacraments; but they are not controversies which affect ultimate conclusions; and they will always, or nearly always, be found to rest on differences in philosophy.

It cannot be that Pope Leo XIII. intends to extinguish for ever all disputes in the Schools of the Catholic Church. That would be neither practicable nor, it may be said, desirable. But the field of human speculation, growing wider, as it does, with every generation of thinkers, is so vast that the unassisted lights of the average Catholic flock are insufficient to distinguish the good from the bad, the valuable from the dross, the poisonous from the pure; and, therefore, the Popes have been accustomed, from epoch to epoch, to interfere and to narrow the limits of legitimate discussion. Sometimes it has been that Catholic thinkers have broached dangerous doctrines, or put forth pernicious novelties; sometimes it has been that the brilliant

but unsound speculations of non-Catholics have seemed to be making too great an impression on Catholic teaching; and again at other times it has been that occasion has been taken to praise particular doctors or to commend particular books. It is the office of the Holy See to defend and protect Catholic truth. In the execution of this office it is infallible beyond the limits of strictly theological matter; and even where its infallibility technically ceases, its voice must command the assent and adhesion of those who belong to the fold of Christ's Church.

In a very true sense the Church has been long committed to the Scholastic Philosophy. The terminology of the Church's detailed doctrine is entirely Scholastic and Aristotelian. In the Holy Scriptures terms are used loosely, and there is no trace of "science," except in some of the writings of St. John. Even the "science" of the fourth Gospel, however, falls in marvellously with the Aristotelian terminology. In the centuries before St. John of Damascus there was immense speculation and interminable discussion. That discussion cannot certainly be said to have been altogether about words and terms; the development of the Creed remains to attest the contrary; but it may safely be said that if there had been a recognized meaning for a certain half dozen terms there would have been much less discussion and much less deceiving of the unwary. Yet no one can have even an elementary knowledge of how St. Thomas of Aquin uses the early Fathers without being aware that all their commendable terminology is easily reducible to the terms of Aristotle's philosophy. When St. John of Damascus gave the Church in the eighth century the first scientific body of theology, he proceeded avowedly on the lines of the same philosophy. Before St. Thomas or even St. Anselm had put pen to paper, the doctrine of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Holy Eucharist, the Sacraments, and Grace was developed into an orderly "science" by means of Aristotelian teaching on "Person," "Generation," "Substance," "Matter and Form," and "Habit." What was effected by Peter Lombard, and, in an infinitely more finished measure, by St. Thomas himself in the "Summa," was to extend, complete, and correct the exposition of doctrine in the terms of Aristotle. He dispersed the mist by procuring and using the best copies of the master; he showed in greater detail the connection of present with past; his width of view unexpectedly removed a host of difficulties, and his acute analysis discovered a thousand new points of agreement. The Church has, therefore, been committed in a very important sense, to the Aristotelian philosophy for many centuries before Pope Leo XIII. spoke in commendation of St. Thomas. But it never was true, and it is not true now, that the Church has committed herself to any point, proposition, or

doctrine of that philosophy, except in as far as she has adopted it in detail. Aristotle is not, and never was, the Church's teacher. She found his terms, the very best scientific terminology that human thought had conceived and wrought out, ready to the hand; and since it was absolutely essential that she should use some set of terms, she chose Aristotle's.

The term "Scholastic" philosophy differs from the term "Aristotelian" philosophy. But they only differ as a tree from its trunk. The Scholastic philosophy is that wide scientific application of Aristotelian terminology to the development of theological teaching—including the purely philosophical matters preparatory to it—which has been going on from the days of John of Damascus to those of Franzelin and Zigliara. And therefore it is no reversal of Catholic tradition, but the opposite, when the Pontiff offers us for our use the works of St. Thomas. And we admit, as has already been stated about Aristotle, that what the Pope commits us to is not "St. Thomas," but the "truth" and the "wisdom" of St. Thomas. But the solemn act recently performed would undoubtedly have very little meaning if it did not mean that the Pope holds and asserts that St. Thomas, throughout his works, except in unimportant details, simply teaches what is wise and true.

The questions which, more than any others, are occupying the minds of theologians and of Catholics generally at this moment are principally two: viz., first, Why has the Holy See spoken so strongly at this particular time, in commendation of the philosophy of St. Thomas of Aquin? and secondly, What, in brief, is the philosophy of St. Thomas of Aquin? It will be well to attempt an answer to each of these inquiries.

It would be to misconceive the spirit and scope of the Encyclical to think that it was intended to bring about some violent change or to sound the warning signal of a revolution. There is no special crisis in philosophical matters at the present moment. The sickness of the age is one which is both chronic in its character and more fundamental than any question of the schools. When serious thinkers deny the possibility of knowing whether there is a God or not, of distinguishing matter from spirit and man from the universe, the precise refutation or the demonstration which is to convince them will hardly be found in any "Summa" of the Middle Ages. Yet the present moment has been chosen by Pope Leo to issue a strong exhortation to cling to the "philosophy" of St. Thomas of Aquin, and it is not difficult to understand that the moment has been chosen well. What Catholic thinkers want is, *Unity in truth*. Not unity only, nor mere essays and trials after truth; but a clear hold of

one true system. Catholic divines and cultured laics have to keep their own faith sound and healthy, therefore they must have a sound philosophy; they have to instruct and confirm the younger generation springing up around them, and therefore they must have something more than hypothesis and theory to stand upon and start from; and they have to confront the physicists and the agnostics, and therefore—since they cannot answer one tithe of their arguments and questions for sheer want of time—they must meet them with the only influence which can dispense with detailed discussion, that is, the unveiled and unbroken Truth. The Encyclical is rather a domestic warning than a plan of campaign. It is an order to the household to attend to its own health rather than a call to go forth and fight. The Catholic flock has been wasting its time with second-rate teachers; it has been divided, outside the domain of Faith, into sets and parties; its best men have spent a lifetime in elaborating systems to which the last touch had scarcely been given when they were found to be worthy of condemnation. Life is too short to allow each generation and each eminent professor to think out an original scheme of things. And therefore the Pope steps in, as Popes have been in the habit of doing ever since St. Peter denounced the “proud words of emptiness” of certain teachers of his own day, and exhorts the flock over which he rules to cling fast to a teacher whom God had gifted above his fellows, whom time has tried, and whom the ages and the Church have stamped with their approval. Pope Leo says that, on the whole, the philosophy of St. Thomas of Aquin is truth; he wishes us, therefore, not to lose our labour in searching and asking, but to go to St. Thomas and master the “golden wisdom” we shall find in him.

What the exact effect of this exhortation will prove to be, we shall inquire later. Meanwhile, let it be observed that the words of Pope Leo are much more the confirmation and approval of a movement which has been long going on, than a new departure. The restoration of Thomist philosophy has been slowly proceeding for nearly half a century. In 1838 Victor Cousin could boast* that his Eclecticism was almost supreme in Europe wherever metaphysics were studied. Galluppi had introduced it into South Italy; Mancino had naturalized it in Sicily; Rosmini was criticizing it severely, but courteously, in North Italy; Schelling in Germany and Sir William Hamilton in England—the one “the greatest thinker,” the other “the greatest critic” of the age—were occupied with discussing it; whilst even in the United States Brown-

* In the Preface to the 3rd Edition of “*Fragments de Philosophie Contemporaine*.”

son had defended it in brilliant articles against the sectaries whom afterwards he was to attack much more seriously. Cousin may perhaps be cited as the supreme instance of what a Christian thinker can do who does not adopt St. Thomas. Profound, brilliant, and Christian, he nevertheless succeeded in founding absolutely nothing. The philosopher who would add to the world's ideas must begin where other men left off. No tree can grow in one generation; and the thinker who undertakes himself to plant the seed and exhibit the fruit of a philosophical system can no more do so than the Indian juggler can make a tree really grow before the eyes of his audience. Where the Thomistic philosophy had hidden its head in those days it is difficult to say. It seems certain, however, that in the schools of the religious orders the old philosophy was generally taught. We say generally, for the fact that at this very time, or a little earlier, Padre Ventura was occupying the first chair of the Dominican order and of the Christian world—the professorship of the Sapienza—shows clearly enough that the Thomism of many a famous school was not very strict. But a change was coming. In 1840 certain priests of Naples, the oldest and most able of whom was Cajetan Sanseverino, founded a religious scientific periodical called *La Scienza e Fede*, and shortly afterwards Sanseverino began the composition of that able and painstaking work, “*Philosophia Christiana cum Antiquâ et Novâ comparata*,” in which the Thomist philosophy, if not vindicated on every point, is systematically set forth and intelligently explained. His object was to “compare” the teachings of the Fathers and the Scholastics—especially of St. Augustine and St. Thomas—with the views of other philosophers, ancient and modern, and thus to show plainly and clearly that the “Christian” philosophy had solved every problem and fairly grappled with every difficulty which ancient or modern had proposed. For this purpose it was necessary, before everything else, to find out what the Christian philosophers had really said: to vindicate them from those ignorant and absurd charges which it was then the fashion to bring against them; to show up the Protestant and Rationalist historians who had written out their systems for many a generation, and had found in their pages every kind of error and impiety, superstition, materialism, false mysticism, and Pantheism itself. The work, which unhappily the lamented death of the author has left unfinished, is a mine of varied information and strong, sensible discussion. Its character as a pioneer enterprise and a polemic deprives it to some extent of that flow and serenity with which ideal philosophy ought to be treated. But it has done good work, and its fruit remains.

Meanwhile other champions were appearing in the field. The formidable array of the *Civiltà Cattolica* were bringing their erudi-

tion, their keen sense of faith, and their indefectible continuousness to the succour of Christ and philosophy. Two men especially have merited well of the cause. Father Matthew Liberatore continues to this day the work that he begun nigh forty years ago. He has argued and entreated, discussed and ridiculed, in favour of Christian philosophy: he has written courses, condensed them into compendiums, marched with slow but strong perseverance through the jungles and primeval forests of original speculation, and been always ready to encounter with mild rhetoric or formal syllogism, in serviceable Latin or flexible Italian, the orthodox and heterodox opponents who have risen in his path. With him was joined—too soon, alas! to be separated—Aloysius Taparelli, a man who might have done much had he been spared. His great Essay on Ethical Science may be too pedantically precise with a precision which becomes mathematics rather than morality; its writer may not have taken up with sufficient confidence the lines of the "*Secunda Secundæ*," but he is deeply philosophic, he is deeply Christian, and he has committed himself to no brilliant error or new and original mistake.

In France, the increased attention which was then being turned to the Middle Ages in general, produced a considerable effect on the revival of the Scholastic Philosophy. Cousin himself edited and annotated a great many works and fragments of mediæval writers. The work of Hauréau* is well-known. Such books as Remusat's "*Saint Anselme*," Tailliandière's "*Scotus Erigena*," Charma's "*Lanfranc*," Montel's "*Mémoire sur St. Thomas d'Aquin*," and Abbé Baujeat's "*Vincent de Beauvais*" both showed the direction the current was taking and helped to make it the stronger. It is true that, in those days, the scholastics were not sought for or valued on account of their scholasticism. The revival of interest in the great doctors and teachers of the Middle Ages was part of that romantic revival which began from Chateaubriand, and which has so strongly influenced the historical, poetical, and literary activity of France up to our own times. Still the various memoirs, studies, and biographies had their use. They were a first glance into an unknown region. Their authors, like many other discoverers, often came away with the wrong story, and made too much of the wrong things. But they showed the way, and others were not long in following to better purpose.

The great work of Father Joseph Kleutgen, "*Die Theologie der Vorzeit*," ("*The Theology of Past Times*,") appeared in 1853. It had one defect, and one great excellence. The defect was, that it was too much concerned with refuting such purely

* "*Histoire de la Philosophie Scholastique*."

German innovators as Günther and Hermes—men who were only plodding and obstinate pedants, and unworthy of elaborate refutation. It is quite true that it was necessary, at the moment, to attack their systems; but the space devoted to them is a drawback to Father Kleutgen's work. But this drawback was more than counter-balanced by one great merit; the author went straight to St. Thomas, and gave his readers a first-hand acquaintance with the incomparable wealth of the "Summa." This first work, which was soon translated into Italian and French, was followed a few years later by another, of far more importance in its effect on philosophic teaching. This was "Die Philosophie der Vorzeit." It is the only existing work, with the exception of that of Sanseverino, and of Dr. Karl Werner, which gives the Scholastic Philosophy at once from pure Thomistic sources, and in a literary and readable form, as distinct from the academical form of "courses" and "text-books." At the same time, it seems doubtful whether the influence of Father Kleutgen's book has been in direct proportion to its ability and thoroughness. In Catholic and domestic circles the impulse to return to St. Thomas would first be felt by priests, who were obliged to study some kind of philosophy as part of their course. Now the clerical schools, in Italy at least, and wherever Italian influence spread, were under the sway of Father Liberatore. It is from his larger work, and from his admirably condensed "Compendium," that thousands of the present generation of the clergy have imbibed their Scholastic Philosophy. The weakness of Father Liberatore is two-fold; he gives us too little of St. Thomas, and he is not successful in his treatment of distinguished thinkers whom he attacks. It would be ungrateful, and indeed extremely stupid, not to acknowledge his immense services in familiarizing a generation with the terminology of Catholic philosophy. Perhaps it was only by such work as his that the pure Thomism to which we are now exhorted, has become possible. Father Kleutgen's elaborate "Philosophy" takes us to St. Thomas. Perhaps even with him a hypercritical considerer would have a fault to find. To know St. Thomas well one must know St. Thomas first, and the sixteenth and seventeenth century Jesuits second. Those gigantic intellects—Suarez, Viva, Vasquez, and De Lugo—are not commentators on the master; they are nearer to being rivals. The true commentator is such a man as Cardinal Catejan, the Salamanticenses, Cardinal Gotti, or, in a lesser way, Billuart—thinkers who sit at the feet of the Angel of the Schools, who accept, as a first principle, that whatever he says is right, and strain and strive to reproduce, illustrate, and defend his every phrase. Their method may not be one which leads to new discoveries. Yet, with St. Thomas for master, it is

more probable than not, in a given case, that to penetrate his thought is to get at the truth, and to travel on his path is to make progress. At any rate, this is what the Pope is recommending. Father Kleutgen loses in force and concentration by his not having the true bigotry of a disciple. This, however, as we have said, is hardly necessary to draw attention to. He who reads Kleutgen will know St. Thomas fairly well.

It will hardly be disputed, perhaps, that the book which has done most to send the present generation to St. Thomas is the "*Philosophia Christiana*" of Sanseverino. This work, as we have already said, is by no means an exclusively Thomistic manual. It travels over a wide region, vindicates the early Fathers, quotes continually from St. Augustine, makes considerable use of most of the thirteenth century Scholastics, and speaks with great respect of Scotus. But its pages contain, on every point treated, numerous and apt citations from St. Thomas. It is concerned very frequently—too frequently, indeed—with the refutation of the heterodox. But there is a judicial fairness, a sticking to the point, and an easy calmness about the work which give one the idea, not of an advocate, but of a strong mind thoroughly convinced. Then the author's immense reading, and the numerous references to thinkers of every school, have enabled professors and students to carry on for themselves the researches begun in the book itself. The moment, therefore, that the Ontologistic school crumbled to pieces, the eyes of Catholic professors were turned to Sanseverino. We have only to regret that the work is so far incomplete, and that neither physics, anthropology, nor ontology has been treated by a writer who has done so much for the Aristotelian logic and for Christian psychology.

The great work of Werner, named at the head of this article, is primarily a biography of St. Thomas. But the whole of the third volume—that is, more than 800 large pages—is dedicated to a history of St. Thomas's philosophy. It traces the history of the part which has been played by that philosophy in the development of theology, and in the discussions and polemics of the schools of Divinity; it describes the systems, antagonistic to Aristotle and St. Thomas, which have been put forward from the time of Scotus to the present day; and it goes through the story of the fortunes of Thomism itself, and the various development which the followers of the Master in all ages have given to one side of it or to another.* It is a work which names and discusses, with complete learning, nearly every philosophic writer of

* Dr. Werner is largely quoted in Archbishop Vaughan's "*Life of St. Thomas of Aquin*;" but the citations are principally from the biography proper.

weight from the thirteenth century down to our own times.* If we do not mistake, it will begin to be in great request as soon as inquirers really begin to study St. Thomas for themselves. It will prove a very complete and serviceable guide-book.

We may fairly say that, for the last five-and-twenty years, a new text-book of Scholastic Philosophy has appeared every two or three years. We need merely mention, in addition to those already commemorated, such names as Roux Lavergne, Goudin (reprinted), Tongiorgi, Palmieri, Gonzalez, Cornoldi, and Agostini. All these writers are professed and enthusiastic Thomists; all are not equally steadfast in adhering to the principles of their Master. But, taken as a whole, the movement of the schools has, for a quarter of a century, been steadily towards Thomism. One after another, false and heterodox systems, one-sided, if orthodox systems, brilliant but exaggerated systems, have culminated, waned, and expired. One after another, innovators, rhetoricians, declaimers, discoverers, system-mongers, and would-be reformers, German, Italian, and French, have perished in the very noise of their own renown. Some of them have been struck by the anathema of the Church; others have come perilously near the fire, and have only escaped burning because they were above all things obedient Catholics; and others, again, having laboured long and truly for the kingdom of God, have had the good fortune to make the Christian world forget the enthusiastic speculations on which they had fondly built their hopes, not of fame, but of usefulness to the cause they loved. Each year the seminaries, schools, and professorships of Catholic theology and philosophy have given up some unsatisfactory "system" or "course," and looked out for a text-book which professed to keep closer to St. Thomas. Many of us have seen the process going on under our own eyes; how Reid was gradually dropped; how Whateley no longer satisfied the mind; how (though this would only hold of contemporaries of Plancus) Watt's *Logic* was put away among the old books; how the young professors who were bitten with Ontologism and carried away by Brownson, and were performers in the "*Commedia del Ente*," gradually calmed down and studied the "*intellectus agens*." The Catholic schools have been drawing together, and it is not a moment too soon. The enemy himself has, during the same time, marvellously simplified his attack. The war is no longer a war of outposts. The question is not whether Jesus Christ is God, but whether there is a God; not whether there is a life to come, but whether there is such a thing as reasoning man distinct from brute; not whether this or that is right, or

* There is, of course, no mention either of Father Kleutgen's books, or of the "*Philosophia Christiana*" of Sanseverino.

that other true, but whether right and wrong, and truth, and external things exist at all. And even though this Agnosticism, this Phenomenalism, this dumb and brute necessity, be only old shades under new names, yet because the world is now so much more close together, thinking men must take sides much more absolutely than they have ever done before, and the battle is practically universal. Minor issues are still fought out in by-ways and in corners; but the noise of the main engagement drowns all else. Therefore it was time for Catholics to have done with groping and feeling, with trying and tasting, and to rally round some one standard. Their holy faith does not depend upon philosophy. Yet, humanly speaking, so needful is philosophy to faith, that, even whilst the blood of the martyrs was freshly flowing—even while the echoes of apostolic voices could still be heard—the holy Fathers seized on Aristotle and on Plato, to press their true wisdom into the service of the Kingdom of God. True philosophy is universal truth; and faith cannot shine, or walk, or grow without the aid of natural truth. And, therefore, true philosophy is as necessary for the victory of revelation as the soil is for the plant. If a thinking people is converted without philosophy, that is, the use and display of true natural reason, it is a miracle; and miracles, though possible, are not to be counted upon. If the imposing array of hostile science is to be confronted with a science (of Revelation) as imposing as its own, it must be by the effort and the effect of human natural reason and truth—always, it need not be said, assisted and illuminated by Divine grace. God has given His holy Revelation: to prepare human minds to receive it, to form it into a body of science, and to strengthen and adorn it from year to year, from century to century—this He has left to the reason and the zeal of grace-aided man. But all must work, and no one must pull down. The great cathedral may take a thousand years to build; it is no matter, provided only that every age does its part, and no other building of the time rivals its pre-eminence. But if a century comes when the builders grow slack, when the scaffoldings are deserted, and the unwrought materials are left in rude heaps; when the skilful hands and heads are down in the streets planning chapels, and temples, and meeting-houses; then the great Church decays and wastes, and some rival interest, some new and white-fronted hall of trade, or law, or so-called science, seems to usurp the foremost place in the interest of men. All must work and none must waste. Therefore there must be one philosophy.

What that philosophy must be has now been proclaimed by a voice there can be no mistaking and no disobeying. Signs were not wanting that the warning was coming. Pius IX. often spoke on philosophic matters, and he always pointed to St. Thomas.

In the letter of 15 June, 1857, in which he condemned the errors of Günther, as well as in that to the Bishop of Breslau, of 30 April, 1860, in which he treated the teaching of Baltzer, he spoke (though without mentioning St. Thomas) of the Thomistic doctrine of the soul's being the only and the immediate "form" of the body, and of the unity of man, in terms which made it quite clear that he held that doctrine to be the truth. The well-known condemned Proposition of the Syllabus (extracted substantially from the Brief on the Munich meeting, *Tuas libenter*, Dec. 21, 1863), showed much more clearly and emphatically that the Holy See held the method and principles of the Scholastics to be perfectly suitable to the age in which we live. Another remarkable utterance of Pius IX., foreshadowing what was coming, occurs in the letter sent by him, 23 July, 1874, to Doctor Travaglini, founder of the periodical *La Scienza Italiana*, and co-founder with Father John Mary Cornoldi, S.J., of the Philosophico-Medical Society of St. Thomas of Aquin. "We observe with pleasure," he says, "that you . . . have resolved to admit into your Society none except those who hold and will maintain doctrines laid down by the Holy Councils and by this Holy See, and in particular *the principles of the Angelic Doctor concerning the union of the intellectual soul with the body of man, and concerning substantial form and primary matter.*" This is a very strong recommendation, and it raised a considerable controversy;* but moderate and judicial minds, like Mgr. Czaacki† and Mgr. Parocchi, the eminent Archbishop of Bologna,‡ considered that nothing further than a recommendation was intended, and that the opposite school were still free to teach their views. But at length, on August 4 of the present year, on the feast of St. Dominic himself, appeared the Encyclical, which seems to have given to the Church, finally and for ever, the Dominican or Thomist doctrine as the safe, true, and only philosophy. What the Holy Father really means, how his intentions are to be carried out, and what will be the practical effect on Catholic teaching we are now briefly to inquire.

1.—At the outset it must be clearly understood that the Encyclical *Aeterni Patris* does not define any proposition as of

* One of the chief litigants in this controversy was Father Paul Bottalla, S.J., Professor in the Theological Faculty of the Catholic University of Poitiers, who in two *brochures*, "*La Composition des corps d'après les deux principaux systèmes qui divisent les écoles Catholiques,*" and "*La lettre de Mgr. Czaacki et le Thomisme,*" strongly maintained anti-Thomistic views on the points in question, insisting that no restriction of freedom was intended by the Holy See in the words referred to.

† Lettre à Mgr. Hautecœur, Recteur de l'Université Catholique de Lille."

‡ Letter to Father Cornoldi, of 4th August, 1877.

faith nor impose any duty of interior belief or acceptance of any dogmatic formulary. There is a strong recommendation in it, and, as we shall see, even a definite command; but no doctrinal definition. The reasons for this we need not enter into, but they will be clear at once to everyone who considers. It is true, however, that the Encyclical is *ex cathedrâ*, the word of Pope Leo XIII. as Head of the Church of Christ.

2.—The Encyclical has a definite purpose, and does a very definite thing. What it does is, in a word, just this: it expresses a wish, in terms as strong as it is possible for a wish to be expressed, that the Scholastic Philosophy, especially as taught by St. Thomas of Aquin, be taught in all Catholic schools. The strength of the Pope's wish—amounting, we may fairly say, to a command—comes out very remarkably on a cursory inspection of the Letter itself. Let us confine ourselves merely to the latter part, where the Pope comes to speak of St. Thomas. He calls him the prince and master of all the Scholastics, the pride and safety of the Catholic Church. He quotes several strong expressions of the Popes, his predecessors, among which may be cited the important words of Blessed Urban V. to the University of Toulouse: "We will, and by these presents we enjoin on you, that you follow the teaching of the Blessed Thomas as true and Catholic teaching, and promote it to the utmost of your power;" and those of Innocent VI. that "every one who differs from St. Thomas may be suspected to be wrong." These emphatic testimonies, spoken in ages differing from our own, are here reproduced by the present Pope as suitable to the latter half of this nineteenth century. Pope Leo adds, in summing up his whole pronouncement, that it is a proof of the truest wisdom on the part of those who recently have been striving to restore philosophy, to have made it their purpose to reinstate and to vindicate the teaching of St. Thomas. He says that many of the bishops are moving in the same direction: "I praise them," he says, "very much (*vehementer*) and I exhort them to go on in their design;" and he would have all the bishops to know that there is nothing he desires more ardently (*nihil nobis esse antiquius et optabilius*) than that they should give all their students the means of studying St. Thomas. Then he goes on to give the reasons for this "eager desire" (*quæ faciunt ut magno id studio velimus*). Passing over these for the present, we note further expressions, in the peroration of the Letter, of the same wish. "We exhort you all, Venerable Brothers, with the greatest earnestness (*quam enixe*) to reinstate and to propagate far and wide the golden wisdom of St. Thomas—unto the safety and glory of the Catholic faith, the advantage of society, and the progress of all the sciences." "Let your professors instil into the minds of their scholars the teaching of St.

Thomas, and let them make it quite clear that no other is so solid and so excellent. Let academies"—we should call them societies or institutes—"founded by you, or to be founded in the future, illustrate and defend it, and use it in the refutation of the errors of the times." "Take heed that the wisdom of Thomas be drawn from the fountain head. . . . and keep away the young from foreign and unwholesome admixture" with the purity of Thomistic teaching.

This much, therefore, seems incontestable, that the Pope wishes all the Bishops of the Catholic Church to teach in their seminaries and other high schools the philosophy of St. Thomas, and nothing which is at variance with it. But to make the matter yet more clear, let us cite two sentences from the Brief of October 15th last, addressed to Cardinal de Luca, Prefect of the Congregation of Studies.* The Pope thus describes the purpose of the recent Encyclical: "We earnestly exhorted the Bishops to join their efforts with ours to restore to the Catholic schools, and replace in the post of honour it formerly held, that ancient philosophy"—he has just called it the philosophy, by excellence, of St. Thomas—"which has been pushed out and almost abandoned." Then, after mentioning how pleasing it has been to him to receive the numerous protestations of obedience and adhesion which have reached him, he says: "Wherefore, Venerable Brother, we most earnestly desire (*illud nobis est magnopere in optatis*) that the doctrine of St. Thomas, which is pre-eminently conformed to the truths of faith, may be revived without delay in all Catholic schools (*in omnibus Catholicis Athenæis quamprimum reviviscat*), and especially in this city, the capital of the Catholic universe." He then mentions that he has taken measures to have taught, in the Roman Seminary, in the Gregorian College (the famous Roman college), in the Urban College, and other institutions, Philosophy purely according to the views and principles of St. Thomas (*secundam mentem et principia Doctoris Angelici*); he begs Cardinal de Luca to promote the formation of associations and academies for the same purpose; and he announces his intention of bringing out a complete, authentic, and magnificent edition of the Holy Doctor's works, with the best commentaries that exist. In all this he hopes for the unanimous support of the Episcopate. Henceforward, then, there can be no doubt that the Pope "wishes" all Catholic professors to teach, and all Catholic students of philosophy to learn, the philosophy of St. Thomas of Aquin.

3.—This being so, the question will at once be asked, as indeed it has been asked already, whether it follows that the Pope has ordered us to accept as true every proposition and dictum of

* The text of this Letter is printed in our present number.

St. Thomas. To this the reply is simple. He has not ordered us to "accept" anything whatever. He has directed the philosophy of St. Thomas to be "taught." If an objector insists that the Pope would never order us to learn a system which was not true, or which he did not himself think true, we may admit that this is so ; but the admission requires some explanation. The Encyclical implies the truth of the Thomistic philosophy. But an "implied" pronouncement of the Holy See is no ground, as such, for any obligation on the conscience. We say, as such ; that is, by virtue of its being a pronouncement. So far, then, the truth or falsehood of Thomism is unaffected by the present Encyclical. Thomism was, some of it already a part of Catholic faith, some of it next door to faith, much of it very intimately bound up with faith. The present Encyclical adds no new decision to what is already decided, and does not alter directly the status of any philosophic proposition. But it is quite true that the expression of the wish and order of the Holy Father has increased the extrinsic motives for accepting Thomism as a whole, and has also widened the margin whereon it would be rash for questioners to tread. To put it plainly and simply : the Pope has emphatically told us to teach and to learn Thomism ; but that is part of the Pope's peculiar business ; therefore I, as a Catholic, will be ready and willing to accept Thomism, in the absence in a given case of strong and overpowering motives to doubt it. At the same time, supposing such adequate motive to exist, there would be no new obligation to accept this or that particular Thomist view ; though to *teach* in opposition to St. Thomas, at least in the case of official Episcopal teachers, is now against the "wishes" of the Holy See.

That the Holy Father really means "St. Thomas," and no one else, is evident, as we have seen, on the very face of his recent utterances. This Encyclical, it must be carefully noted, is not a mere vague and general exhortation to seek the truth, in philosophic matters. The Pope, it is true, will not reject what is rightly and wisely said, by whomsoever said.* But to use this as an argument that he recommends Catholic philosophy to take the lantern of the eclectic and wander about the earth in search of teachers, accepting a dole of truth from each, would be to stultify the Pope, and to make the Encyclical well nigh idle words. There may be an apple here and there on many a tree of the orchard, and even beyond its bounds, but the Sovereign Pontiff desires his children to shake one particular tree. Life is short, questions are many, unity is absolutely essential, a few minor

* *Edicimus libenti gratoque animo excipiendum esse quidquid sapienter dictum, quidquid utiliter fuerit a quopiam inventum aut exogitatum.*

mistakes are no great matter. Therefore, we are to go to St. Thomas.

Moreover, it is vain to suppose that one can take St. Thomas and leave Aristotle. The mind of Aristotle, on every substantial and leading matter, it may safely be affirmed, of logic, of metaphysics, and of ethics, is simply the mind of St. Thomas. Doubtless, St. Thomas has corrected or rejected his master on very many points. But one brief reflection will show that they are, for all that, substantially identical. What is St. Thomas's teaching on syllogism, on the composition of material things, on the process of understanding, on good and evil? These are cardinal points in philosophic science, and no one doubts for a moment that, in treating them, the Greek sage and the Christian doctor are virtually one.

What then, after all, *is* this Scholastic and Thomistic philosophy, which is the subject of an encyclical which will certainly mark the commencement of an epoch in Catholic teaching? The question is a difficult one to answer had we a volume at our disposal. But it must be shortly attempted.

The Scholastic begins by accepting, without much inquiry, his own existence, the trustworthiness of his external senses, and the reality of external things.

Looking over the universe of things—himself, the visible world, and the Maker of both—he makes the generalization that it is divided into things which change, and the One who does not change. Investigating things that change, he swiftly perceives that change does not mean the substitution of one thing for another, as if bubbles burst and other bubbles came in their place, but that it implies, first, an element of sameness, permanent, but undetermined, and, secondly, a determination ready to succeed as soon as an existent determining element has passed away. This wide general view of things is called the principle of Power and Act. It penetrates the Scholastic philosophy as colour penetrates material masses; so that whether you look at the outside of things or the inside, whether you break mountains into lesser mountains, or separate the atoms of dust with a microscope, it is always present and always to be detected. The Scholastic, having thus widely surveyed whatever is, looks more nearly at the mutable universe. He sees three grand classes of being—the unintelligent world, intelligent man, and the world of man's mental creation. He finds that in corporeal substance there is, as everywhere, change, and therefore the indeterminate element and the determining. Living or not living, corporeal things change really into one another; and, as an old substance decays, a new substance, somehow the same yet somehow different, takes its place. This view he generalizes under the name of the principle

of Matter and Form ; in other words, that all corporeal substance is composite, and its composition consists of substantial act and substantial power, or, of substantial form and primary matter. Fixing his abstractive gaze, now, on one single substance, he is speedily aware that there are other diversities and other changes besides those which are substantial. Substances—and by substances the Scholastic means whatever has a separate existence—change not only into one another, but change in themselves whilst continuing to be the same substance. Thus he arrives at the generalization of Substance and Accident. These three wide categories, power and act, matter and form, substance and accident, are the keynotes of all the Scholastic philosophy. With their help, the Scholastic investigates the rules, the principles, the co-ordination and classification of everything that exists. He first finds them, it is true, in visible and sensible things ; or, rather, his intelligence, the participated similitude of the Infinite Intelligence, sheds on these things its own light and surrounds brute matter with luminous spheres, true to the outlines of matter, yet projected by itself. From the physical world he carries the deep-reaching analysis into the world of spirit, the world of ideas, and the world of logical form. He finds they hold good everywhere. Wherever they shine, chaos vanishes and order reigns, the thought mounts on high, and the horizons of the mind enlarge. With them he discusses the engrossing questions which brighten a life of metaphysical study ; the origin of ideas, the faculties and operations of the mind, and the moral nature of man. By their instrumentality he can classify and consider in orderly array the great doctrines of Revelation itself. The Catholic Church has accepted his generalizations and his terminology. The revelation of the Holy Trinity has become a “science” by means of the Scholastic philosophy ; the precious materials of Holy Scripture and of the Fathers on the incarnation of Jesus Christ have been moulded into a glorious group of heavenly symmetry by Aristotelian generalizations ; and the world of grace and of the sacraments—a world which Pagan thought never once anticipated—is mapped out into provinces and filled with human light and colour by the mechanism and alchemy of a man who wrought far back in times when no ray of Gospel light could penetrate these shades of death wherein he laboured. And, lastly, by the help of these Scholastic institutions, the philosopher and the divine come nearer to knowing the Infinite Himself. It need not be said that their abstractions and their divisions must needs stop short on the outskirts of the impenetrable light of the Godhead. There is nothing of what is called “accident” in God, but all is His personal Self ; there is nothing material ; there is no power, or passivity, or indetermination,

but only pure, and complete, and perfect Act. Yet by these very negations God is known. By taking all the words of perfection, of goodness, and of beauty which man has coined for his use in regard to things around him, and by throwing down with an effort of the mind-directed fancy all limit, every barrier, every bound, he is able to make for himself a divine language, which his tongue may employ, stammering and as it may, to keep before his soul and heart some inadequate picture of Him whom none can comprehend but Himself.

If it be asked what useful purpose can these generalizations serve, and these abstractions, the answer must be that such things are "science," and the want of them the absence of science. Discovery and experiment are noble exercises of the powers of man; but they are not science. When all has been tried, and all discovered, there is only a heap, not a system. When discoverers begin to lay down principles and laws, there is the beginning of science, notwithstanding that such beginning is too often, in these days, only the simulacrum of science and not its reality. But it must be remembered that there is a possibility of seeing a whole science in a single individual thing. For the discovery of the comparatively narrow laws of special physics a thousand instances may or may not be required; for the formularization of the general laws of being a simple example may suffice. A single visible thing, like the straw or the stick in the brook, which the weaver, Frost, seizes on to rest his web, may set free the mental intuitions and give a shape to their embodiment. Such mental operations do not give the world bread, or fuel, or medicine. But they give cultured minds, intellectual systems, and a universe of spiritual experience. They are for the few; but they tell in the long run on all the masses of men. Art, physical science, mechanical discovery, enlightened patriotism, military prowess, and social refinement, have always in every age depended largely on mental philosophy.

As for physical science, as properly understood, it cannot be too emphatically stated that it is not touched by the present Encyclical, or by the Scholastic philosophy. Physical science means the discovery of physical facts, and the deduction from facts of special laws. The universal laws of physics, as laid down by Aristotle and St. Thomas, have nothing to say, either for or against, to such investigations and generalizations. As long as any law is only generalized fact, or experience stated as a principle, that law comes under special physics, not general philosophy. The laws of philosophy do not depend on experiment at all. They are intuitions from a single instance; therefore no amount of experiment can affect them, and they cannot affect experiment. The principle that all material things are composed

of primary matter and a form has nothing whatever to do with any purely physical, atomic, molecular, or dynamical theory of matter. We say, purely physical—that is to say, confined to bodies or parts of bodies which the sense or the microscope can take note of. If a theory, atomic or otherwise, should lay down principles as to the constitution, not of a material substance, but of material substance *as such*, or as to the *origin* of matter, or as to the difference or identity between matter and spirit, then that theory is no longer physical or experimental; it is metaphysical, and must be dealt with by philosophy. We cannot at this moment say more as to the relations between the Scholastic Philosophy and modern science; but we hope to return to the subject. Meanwhile, in order to reassure any anxious Catholic physicist, let us quote, not the words of the Encyclical, though they are clear and emphatic enough, but those of a commentator on the Encyclical, who well deserves to be heard. Père Carbonelle, S.J., started, about three years ago, the *Société Scientifique de Bruxelles*, and at the same time a quarterly journal called the *Revue des Questions Scientifiques*. He was honoured by a letter from Leo XIII., dated 15th January, 1879, in which the Pontiff declared that the idea of promoting physical science in union with Catholic principles was “opportune,” and exhorted the Society by all means to persevere. Père Carbonelle, in the recent (October) number of the *Revue*, speaks as follows. It is to be observed that he has just been mentioning, in indignant terms, certain ultra-Scholastic Catholics, one of whom had said that Father Secchi was no better than Moleschott and Buchner, whilst another had rejected the infinitesimal calculus because it “reposed on an error contrary to revelation”—

It is evident that the Pope attaches great importance to the development of scientific theories, and the Encyclical itself contains proofs of this, though its immediate object was philosophy. Should we correspond with these wishes of the Pope by abandoning to irreligious scientists a portion of the ground covered by science, and by thus seeming to justify, by misplaced timidity, the very accusation of tyranny which we denounce? . . . Do you believe that the Pope accepts as auxiliaries those who contradict him, and make out that there is real opposition between the principles of the Scholastic philosophy and most of the great theories of modern physics? . . . Instead of narrowing our limits of action, the Encyclical has really widened them. Without changing our programme—without adding philosophy to these subjects which we profess to treat—we learn from it how “Scholastic philosophy, wisely set forth, would give strength, luminousness and additional resources” for the development of theories of science. This pronouncement will certainly be loudly re-echoed among our own ranks, as it will be all the world through. It will not be barren. . . . Let us thank the initiator of this great movement;

let us follow in the direction he has pointed out, and prove to him, by redoubled activity, that we understand his idea, and cordially enter into his designs" (p. 410).

So much, for the moment, on the effect which the Encyclical may have on the study of physics. But what we are now directly concerned with is the effect it will have in the schools of philosophy and theology. The Pope, in this most grave Letter, does not speak directly of theology. That unity in scientific principle and method which, as we have said, it is the object of the letter to bring about, already exists, at least to a considerable extent, in the schools of theology. Nevertheless, the Pope most certainly has in his view the teaching of theology. This is evident, because in the first place he quotes a long passage of Pope Sixtus V. in praise of Scholastic *theology*, for the purpose of saying, as he does in his own words, that Scholastic theology derives all its excellence "only from the right use of that *philosophy* which the masters of the schools have wisely and generally agreed to adopt even in their theological lectures." It is clear, moreover, that there can be no such theory as a science of theology without philosophy; and if a philosophy must be chosen, no doubt now remains as to what philosophy the Pope recommends. The consequence of the Encyclical will be, then, the general adoption of Thomistic theology. Now it need not be said that in theology, as commonly taught, there are two distinct elements, viz., the conclusions, and the working out of the conclusions. A theology which contents itself with conclusions is only a magnified form of elementary catechism. But even as regards conclusions, it will, no doubt, happen that St. Thomas's opinions will now prevail. Considering, however, that the greater number of theological controversies turn precisely on the question of what St. Thomas's opinion really is, there will still be left ample room for discussion. And then, it must be remembered, unity means progress, not stagnation. If all are agreed, no time will be lost in discussing the present situation or disputing as to the ground which is actually occupied; but all can look forward and bend their whole energy to fresh developments and further discoveries in the realms of truth.

But we cannot help anticipating that a great change will presently come about in the "method" of theological teaching. Want of time and the requirements of the Apostolic mission on the one hand, and modern controversy and literature on the other, have combined to abridge and attenuate, in many of our schools, at home and on the Continent, the course of theology proper. The Encyclical *Aeterni Patris* is a distinct indication that the Holy Father wants this subject to be reconsidered. Scholastic philosophy is no light matter to learn, and, when

learnt, it is meant to be used. We, therefore, look forward to a movement in a threefold direction. First, Theology will be treated with more development, after the manner of the Scholastics. The great subjects of Catholic teaching which make up revelation, as distinguished from the *preambula Fidei*—God, the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, the Holy Eucharist, and Divine Grace—will receive a fuller and more extended consideration, by means of the terms, views, and methods of the great Scholastic doctors. To carry this out with even fair completeness will take time; and therefore it may be prophesied that the course of theology will now be longer than it has been. Secondly, the text of St. Thomas himself will receive greater attention than hitherto. It is, to some extent, a prevailing opinion that the *Sums* of the Angelic Doctor are rather a repertory of conclusions than a developed course of theology. The truth is that St. Thomas himself, especially in the great *Sum*, has applied the terms and science of Aristotle to every department of Catholic truth, with a thoroughness of exposition which students can only realize by reading the original. It is true the “*Summa*” is an abridgment; no one who goes through, for instance, the commentaries on the “*De Anima*,” but must marvel at the way in which the great Doctor, in the later work, compresses whole columns of philosophic discussion into a pregnant *sortes* or a few brief *enthymemes*. But, for all that, the “*Summa*” is long enough to contribute the most admirable mental and theological training which can possibly be given to a student. What we look for is, that our seminaries will read the greater “*Summa*,” if not article by article, at least such a selection of articles as may fairly represent it. Thirdly, It would take not one but several papers to show how the *Encyclical* will affect the study of the Scripture and of the holy Fathers. Such courses as that of Cardinal Franzelin we hold to be among the truest developments of Scholastic Theology. It would also take us long to discuss its bearings on moral theology, on modern religious controversy, and on the war with Agnosticism, Sensualism, and other Rationalism. But this may be said, that its effects will be to make priests and cultured laymen study the enemy less and trust to their own arms more. In a very true sense, it is a disadvantage and a drawback to have read heterodox literature; it troubles the mind, taints the imagination, disturbs the serenity of the orb of truth, and, to say the least, takes up time and room. On the other hand, if Catholicism and St. Thomas’s exposition of it are true, nothing can be more powerful, both as a means of mental culture and as a resource for the persuasion of others. But the power of Catholic truth, in this sense, depends upon its being in the mind as a broad kingdom, extended, developed,

defined, and perfect in every part. The Scholastic exposition is exactly adapted to bring about this happy effect; and, therefore, the more one studies St. Thomas the less one need know, by actual experience or first-hand acquaintance, of those numberless modern books whose very multitude sometimes tempts the Catholic apologist to despair.

We have dwelt on Scholastic Theology, because Scholastic Theology means Scholastic Philosophy. And here for the present we leave the subject. How Thomism is related to the origin of ideas, to physical science, to modern liberties and theories of government, what text-books are best, and what methods of teaching are most effective—these, with many other considerations and details, we look forward to being able to treat in future Articles.

ART. VIII. — THE ALLEGED GALLICANISM OF MAYNOOTH AND OF THE IRISH CLERGY.

THE Article on "Theology, Past and Present, at Maynooth," published in the October Number of the DUBLIN REVIEW,* plainly calls for a reply from the College, the traditions of whose theological school it represents in so unfavourable and, as I shall show, so misleading a light.

§ 1. *Introductory.*

In that Article Maynooth is charged with having "for nearly half a century" "carefully" cultivated and propagated through the lectures of her professors, and through her authorized text-books, in "dogmatic" and in "moral" theology, "the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne"—a theological system which, at least as regards its dogmatic tenets, no theologian can hesitate in stigmatizing in terms of as strong emphasis as those employed by the learned writer of the Article, as so essentially at variance with the fundamental principles of ecclesiastical subordination as established in the Church by her Divine Founder, that if Maynooth could in truth be charged with what is thus set down against her she should unquestionably plead guilty to that further count of this formidable indictment, in which it is so circumstantially alleged that, through her influence and action, "the Irish clergy" became imbued "*to the core*" with the principles

* "Theology, Past and Present, at Maynooth," by the Very Rev. Dr. Neville, Rector of the Catholic University of Ireland. DUBLIN REVIEW, October, 1879, pp. 449, &c.

and tenets of this "alien theology," which thus "balefully affected the youth and manhood of the Irish Church, . . . misdirecting their professional studies, and, *if not entirely estranging* their feelings of allegiance, *at least sensibly weakening them* towards the true object of Catholic loyalty"—the Holy See.*

Thus arraigned, Maynooth, of course, cannot allow judgment to go by default. She pleads not guilty. And she claims for her reply a fair hearing; not, indeed, from Irish readers—for in Ireland, judgment has long since been given in her favour—but from those in England, and in more distant lands, where her history, and the living evidences of the work of her earliest years, cannot be so familiar as they are at home.

For many reasons I am anxious that the duty of repelling those statements, which has thus been forced upon me, should be discharged in the most purely abstract and impersonal way. I should, indeed, be desirous, if it were possible, to avoid even the most distant reference to their author, or to his past or present official position in the educational hierarchy of the Irish Church. But, unfortunately, it is not possible for me, without some such reference, to state my main reason for writing at all in refutation of statements which I dare say many old and zealous friends of the College may be of opinion should rather be allowed to pass unnoticed, as so obviously at variance with known facts as to carry with them their own refutation. That course, indeed, I should perhaps have adopted if those statements had been put forward in the anonymous form favoured by other Reviews. But I find it impossible—and I am reminded on all sides that it is impossible—to allow them to pass unrefuted now, placed as they have been on permanent record, attested by the signature of a writer whose official positions, past and present, are such as could not fail, in the absence of a formal protest in the next number of the REVIEW, to lead the ecclesiastical historian of a future age to regard them as unquestionable.

But having thus disposed of all necessity to make further reference to the learned writer of the Article, I shall endeavour to deal with the statements it contains, altogether abstracting from their authorship, and viewing them solely as regards the so-called "facts" which they set forth. Of those statements, then, I shall select three, which seem to me to comprise the entire gist of the charge with which I have to deal. And lest, from the strangeness of some portions of this charge, I should

* The passages marked in this paragraph as extracts from the Article will be found in the October number of the REVIEW, on pages 455 and 461.

seem to do injustice to the distinguished author of the Article, I shall set them down in his own words—first, however, stating, as it surely is not out of place for me to do, that as regards the really objectionable portions of the statements, there is not in the Article, from first to last, any proof, or attempted proof, put forward in sustainment of them: they come before us resting solely on the unsupported authority of the writer, who, notwithstanding all the weight that would unquestionably be due to his opinion if there were any controversy on the merits of the theological questions involved, cannot surely object to our desiring something beyond mere statement, something in the shape of evidence, when the question raised is exclusively one of historical fact.

Although, however, the burthen of disproof does not lie upon me, I should not have thought of writing at all, if I were not in a position to undertake it and to place beyond question, as I hope to do before the close of this Paper, the utter impossibility of reconciling the statements of the Article with the ascertained facts of the case—facts, of which, fortunately for the theological reputation of the College, abundant and incontrovertible evidence is still extant and forthcoming.

§ 2. *The Three Counts of the Indictment.*—(1) "*The careful Cultivation in Maynooth, for nearly half a century, of the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne;*" (2) "*The College Class-Books, its faithful expression;*" (3) "*The Irish Clergy thus Gallicanized to the core.*"

Let us, then, take the three statements in the words of the Article itself. The first is this:—

I. Gallicanism in dogmatic theology, Gallicanism in moral theology, *the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne, the Gallicanism of the Clerus Gallicanus of the last century*, was the teaching brought to Maynooth by the French refugee professors, and there *carefully cultivated* for nearly half a century (p. 455).

Furthermore, lest any misconception should exist as to the full meaning of the charges thus conveyed, it may be well to quote from the Article the circumstantial exposition of this "Gallicanism of the Sorbonne," as set forth with characteristic precision of statement by the writer himself.

The dominating influence of the Sorbonne . . . which unfortunately stands before us in history as the mouthpiece of the *Clerus Gallicanus* . . . contributed, and largely, to make the whole Church of France appear to be responsible for Gallicanism.

The French theology of the eighteenth century exhibits two anomalous departures from the common teaching: first, *Gallicanism*; second, an exorbitantly severe system of Ethics. . . . The former had for its end

and object the upholding of the *Libertates Ecclesiæ Gallicanæ*, which it did *per fas et nefas*. . . . "The Declaration of the Gallican Clergy, 1682," is the authorized exponent of Gallicanism. . . . [Then follows a transcript, in full, of the famous Four Articles of the Declaration.]

The gist of those Four Articles . . . lies in three points—the depression of the Pope, the exaltation of the King, &c.

Article I. takes from the Pope all *temporal* power, direct or indirect. . . . [His *spiritual* power] is restricted in Article II., in which it is declared subject to the authority of a so-called "General" Council, in the event of a collision between the two. Article III. does not consider the Apostolic power sufficiently depressed by making it subject to a General Council; it finds it necessary "to moderate the use of that power," at least in France, by holding "the rules, customs, and institutions of the kingdom" exempt from its control. All these deductions being made, *very little* even of *spiritual authority* remains to Peter and his successors. . . . [Article IV.] Though he still is permitted to retain a leading part in matters of faith, even there, too, he is dependent; his judgments, "to be or not to be," hang on the word of the Church. [In other words, this Article denied that the Pope, even when teaching *ex cathedra*, is infallible.] (pp. 456-459).

Having before us this circumstantial account, given by the writer himself, of the body of theological tenets designated in his Article as "the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne and of the *Clerus Gallicanus* of the last century," the theological system which, as he alleges, was, "for nearly half a century," so "carefully" cultivated in Maynooth, we may now proceed to the second and third counts of the indictment. They are as follows:—

II. The treatises of Delahogue, *De Ecclesia*, &c., are its faithful expression. . . . Louis Ægidius Delahogue, Doctor of the Sacred Faculty of Paris, Fellow of the Sorbonne, and Professor *Emeritus* of Theology in the Sorbonne Schools, "*cælum non animum mutans*," was chosen Professor of Dogmatic Theology in the Seminary of Maynooth, and lectured, and composed treatises, for the successive generations of the students thereof. Those treatises they were *obliged to purchase*. They were their *class-books*. There was *no alternative* from the Sorbonne theology for them, except what lay silent in the tomes of the College library, sources of knowledge which, as we have already seen, they were not at all encouraged to approach (p. 461).

III. Hence, as an inevitable consequence, the Irish clergy became *Gallican to the core*. . . . An alien theology . . . thus balefully affected the youth and manhood of the Irish Church . . . if not entirely estranging their feelings of allegiance, at least sensibly weakening them, towards the true object of Catholic loyalty (p. 461).

§ 3. Reply to the Third Count.—*The alleged Gallicanism of the Irish Clergy.*

For reasons which will be obvious as we proceed, I think it

advisable to take up, in the first place, the *third* of the three statements I have set forth. With regard to it, I have elsewhere said that "I should feel I owed an apology to the venerated Episcopacy and Priesthood of Ireland if I were to assume that such a statement stood in need of any refutation or contradiction from me."* Of this remark, the learned author of the statement has said that he fails to find the point.† As the point, then, is of the most vital importance in the case, lying in fact at the root of the main issue involved, I must endeavour to explain it. But I should have thought—as, indeed, I know that very many who have read my statement are satisfied—that its meaning was sufficiently obvious to stand in need of no exposition from me.

Before proceeding, however, to explain it, I may say that I have seen with much satisfaction that in referring to my words, the learned writer of the Article has formally and unreservedly disclaimed any reference in his statement to "the *existing* Episcopacy and Priesthood of Ireland, in any sense." So far, no doubt, this is satisfactory. But inasmuch as at the same time, in the same letter—as, indeed, in the three letters that he has written on this subject in the leading Catholic newspapers of London and of Dublin—he has reiterated the statements of his Article, steadfastly persisting in characterizing them as "facts," it becomes necessary for me to clear away the misconception which appears, though, as it seems to me, most unaccountably, to have hitherto prevented him from at once apprehending the full force of the refutation of those statements, furnished by the very admission he has so explicitly made.

I have, indeed, no doubt that nothing could have been farther from his intention, when writing the Article that has given rise to all this unpleasantness, than to refer in any sense to the existing Episcopacy or Priesthood of Ireland. But, unfortunately, it is not his intentions, but his statements, that we have to regard with apprehension, as the possible materials of future ecclesiastical history. It is with his statements alone, then, that I have to deal. And I have little doubt that on reflection he will see that, understood in their plain, and indeed their only possible sense, they necessarily refer to not a few—and these not the least distinguished or least venerated members—of our existing Episcopacy and Priesthood.

Maynooth College was opened in 1795. Its first "half century" closed in 1845. But, not to strain points, let us go back even ten years, and take 1835 as the close of the period of

* See Letter in the *Tablet* of November 15th, 1879.

† Ibid. November 22nd, 1879.

"nearly* half a century," which the Article specifies as the period during which "Gallicanism" was "carefully cultivated" in the College, with the "inevitable consequence" of Gallicanizing "the Irish Clergy to the core."

Now, as I am armed with such a distinct disclaimer as to the existing members of the Irish Episcopacy and Priesthood, I am free to remind the learned writer of the Article that even within our College walls of Maynooth we can point to living evidences of the untenableness of the statements he has made. More than one respected member of our present College community completed his theological course in Maynooth within the period specified—one, indeed, so far back as the year 1827, and I am in a position to state on his authority that, even at that early date in our Collegiate history, so far from there having been any "cultivation of Gallicanism" in the teaching of the house, that theological system, so justly stigmatized in the Article, was on the contrary regarded, and of necessity regarded, by the authorities of the College in so unfavourable a light, that, if any Professor of Theology had so far forgotten his duty to the Holy See as to teach those doctrines,

* Not the least unsatisfactory incident of the unpleasant discussion raised by the publication of the Article has been that subsequently to its appearance in the REVIEW, its learned author, in various letters to the newspapers, while varying his phraseology so as to convey, to some extent, the impression that he had partially withdrawn from the position at first taken up, has nevertheless continued in express terms to maintain the accuracy of the statements originally published; they are statements of "facts," "facts" of which he is "well satisfied," "facts" which he will not abandon until they are "satisfactorily refuted."—(See his Letters in the *Tablet* of November 8th and 22nd, 1879.)

But, indeed, as I have just observed, the change of phraseology employed in those letters in the actual reproduction of the statements themselves, does not in reality imply anything inconsistent with what was stated in the Article: "*well into this century*," "*a good portion of this century*," and "*some forty or fifty years ago*" (the phrases employed in his last Letter in the *Tablet*, November 22nd), are expressions fully compatible with that originally employed in the Article, especially if this be understood in the restricted sense in which I have above interpreted it, so as to designate a period ending in 1835, now forty-four years ago.

I do not insist, then, on those passages in the Article that might justify me in bringing down the period of "nearly half a century" to a date subsequent to 1835. But it may be well to note that such passages do occur—as, for instance, the passage in which the incident regarding the Blessed Alphonsus is related (p. 455), to which I shall again have occasion to refer; and the passage where the "Gallican" period, and that later time, when "theology of a different stamp" was taught in the College, are so sharply contrasted, "the *fifth*, sixth, and seventh decades of this century" being set down as the designation of the period when the dogmatic teaching of the College was in a condition satisfactory to the learned writer (p. 462).

the inevitable result would have been his removal from the professorial office, within the very narrowest limits of time required for the observance of the forms prescribed in the College statutes. Then as to the Bishops of Ireland, without entering into details, it will suffice to say that not a few members of our existing Episcopacy were students of Maynooth within the period specified. And the same is necessarily true of every priest in Ireland who studied in Maynooth, and who completed his collegiate course not later than the year 1835.

I am quite sure that not one of those included in the various classes I have enumerated will for a moment hesitate to accept the assurance so unreservedly tendered, at least to this extent, that the learned writer of the Article did not *intend* in his statement to refer to them. And I am no less sure that I may take the liberty of adding for him, that it was equally remote from his intention to refer to any of their contemporaries, whether bishops or priests, so many of whom, after a life of splendid devotion to the work of their ministry, have already passed to their reward.

But, then, I am entitled to ask, to what generation of the Irish Clergy, educated in Maynooth, do these statements refer? How far back are we to go? Surely the writer of the Article, anxious as he may be to uphold the accuracy of what he has written, ought not to be unwilling to accompany me a few steps farther than he has yet advanced in his admissions, and to acknowledge that we should go far indeed into the recesses of Irish ecclesiastical history, and bring to light the records of some period that has hitherto eluded the researches of our most painstaking ecclesiastical antiquaries, before we could hope to find a generation of Irish bishops or priests, of whom it could be said that they would not have looked with horror on such a theological code as that "Gallicanism of the Sorbonne," so truthfully described as recognising "but little even of spiritual authority in the successors of St. Peter," and as "sensibly weakening," "if not entirely estranging," "the feelings of allegiance" of those by whom it was adopted "towards the true centre of Catholic loyalty"—the Holy See. Surely it would not be too much for me to regard it as undeniable that to find a generation of the Irish Clergy imbued to the core with tenets such as these, we should at all events go back to some period of our history so remote, that to account for the existence of a creed so abnormal in the Church of Ireland, it would be futile to refer to the theological influence of a College that was not in existence ninety years ago. *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc*, is bad logic: *non post hoc, ergo non propter hoc*, is unanswerable.

But this is not the point with which I am now immediately concerned. As I do not wish to argue from postulates that may be disputed, or to engage in a discussion that more properly belongs to the province of the ecclesiastical historian of the Irish Church in the early part of the present century, I must, I fear, proceed on the supposition that the learned writer of the Article has not withdrawn, but merely modified, his statement regarding the "Gallicanism" of the Irish clergy. Confining myself, then, to the fact, as to the *existing* Episcopacy and clergy, conceded by him in his last Letter to the *Tablet*, I must endeavour to point out the fallacy so obviously underlying his supposition that even this fact, so unreservedly acknowledged, can by any possibility be reconciled with his assumed "facts" regarding the "cultivation of Gallicanism" in the College for the period specified in the Article. The fallacy is this: It is assumed that when the College is charged with having "carefully cultivated, for nearly half a century, the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne," with the "inevitable" result of Gallicanizing "the Irish Clergy," the "clergy" thus referred to are persons no longer in existence. For, having taken a certain period in the past history of the College, he considers that, inasmuch as he spoke only of "the clergy of the *corresponding period*," his statement could not have referred to any of the clergy of the present day.

Now, I am almost ashamed to spend so many words in pointing out—what, indeed, but for so obvious a misconception of it, I should have regarded as self-evident—that when, as here, there is question of the influence exercised on the priesthood of a nation by the teaching of an ecclesiastical college during a given period, "the clergy of the *corresponding period*" are not those priests who were engaged in the labours of missionary life, throughout the country, at the period when the tenets in question were being cultivated within the class halls of the College, but they are the priests of after years who, *having been students* of the College *during the period specified*, have then in due course passed from its halls to their various spheres of priestly duty, and, after an interval of thirty, forty, fifty, or sixty years, are to be found, some in the professor's chair, some in the ministry of the parochial office, some in the dignity and labours of the Episcopate.

Now, as I have already pointed out, we have amongst us to-day in Ireland living witnesses, Priests and Bishops, who were themselves students of the College, not merely within the first half-century of its existence, or before the year 1835, but in the first quarter, nay, *in the first decade*, of this century. I must, indeed, confess myself utterly unable to comprehend how

a writer to whom these facts are known, can nevertheless consider that such statements as those he has made regarding the theological teaching of the College could possibly be true, if the existing members of the Episcopacy and Priesthood of Ireland had in no sense been affected by the baleful influence he has so justly stigmatized.

And, following up the chain of proof thus placed in my hands, may I not appeal to my readers, many of whom, I have no doubt, have a distinct recollection of no small section of the Irish clergy of forty or fifty years ago? The clergy of that day numbered, of course, among them many who had been students of our College in its earliest years. Were those venerable men "Gallicans to the core?" Did they recognise "*but little even of spiritual authority in St. Peter and his successors?*" Were their "feelings of allegiance to the true centre of Catholic loyalty *at least* sensibly weakened, if not entirely estranged?" And, if not, what, I may ask, becomes of the so-called "fact," that a "baleful influence" "inevitably" leading to those sad results was exercised by the College not only in its early years, but for well nigh the first "half-century" of its existence?

And here, perhaps, I should mention, as I am sure I may venture to do without being deemed guilty of any breach of confidence, that from one most venerable member of the Irish hierarchy—whose words, final and conclusive, as regards the main issue raised in this discussion, I have elsewhere quoted,* and shall again have the honour of quoting, in much ampler form, before the close of this Paper—I have received, since the opening of this most unpleasant controversy, a warm Letter of congratulation on my having come forward in "defence of the old theological teaching of Maynooth." The testimony thus brought into court has other value besides the forcible illustration with which it furnishes me of the connection that subsists between the existing Episcopacy and Priesthood of Ireland, and the very earliest days of our collegiate history. For it is the testimony of a witness who entered the College as a student in the year 1808; who began and completed his theological course under the professorship of Dr. Delahogue, the "French refugee," now arraigned as having introduced into Maynooth the baleful influence of the alien theology of the Sorbonne; of a witness, in fine, who more than fifty years ago, before the Royal Commission of 1826, gave sworn testimony, formally and decisively negating the allegation, now once more resuscitated, that any such line of teaching had been followed by Dr. Delahogue, or by any of the

* See Letter in the *Tablet*, November 15th, 1879.

theological professors of the College, of whom he had himself been one for no less than eleven years.

I do not know, indeed, whether I am not over-sanguine in my hope that by the overwhelming array of evidence I am now enabled to adduce, I shall succeed in convincing the writer of the Article that he has been grievously mistaken in the view he has formed of the early history of our theological school. At all events, with a view of more effectually securing his attention to the documentary evidence I am about to adduce, I must ask him, and, I trust he will pardon me for thus pressing the matter on his attention, to remember that— notwithstanding his public and repeated professions of his readiness to receive information or correction, whether publicly or privately tendered,* and to withdraw his statements if a refutation of them be forthcoming,†—he has hitherto ignored the important and, as it seems to me, conclusive testimony to which I have now referred, although it had already, in the most formal and explicit manner, been publicly brought under his notice.‡ I may add that he has also, and in the same manner, evaded, by ignoring it, the other point, of scarcely less importance, to which I had on the same occasion given publicity, that Dr. Delahogue, in his Treatise “*De Ecclesiâ*,” so far from “faithfully expounding the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne,” on the contrary, most formally declines to defend or to propound either of the two leading distinctive theological tenets of that paradoxical system—the alleged fallibility of the Pope when acting as supreme teacher of the infallible Church of Christ, and the alleged subjection of his supreme ecclesiastical jurisdiction to that of a so-called “General” Council, acting in opposition to his authority. I think, indeed, I have some fair grounds of complaint, that, after I had taken no little trouble in endeavouring promptly to put an end to all possibility of further controversy by thus plainly setting forth these two substantial points of evidence, the only response was a Letter in the *Tablet*, emphatically reiterating the statements originally made, and challenging a refutation of them, while utterly ignoring the fact that any evidence whatever had as yet been adduced in reply to them, on the part of the College.§

If I were engaged in a merely personal controversy I should perhaps feel justified, and even called upon, to close it here. But, as my main object in writing is to place, upon permanent

* See Letter in the *Tablet*, November 8th, 1879.

† Ibid. November 22nd, 1879.

‡ Ibid. November 15th, 1879.

§ Ibid. November 22nd, 1879.

record, in the pages of the DUBLIN REVIEW, a statement of the evidence by which the allegations made against the College, are so abundantly refuted, I must not allow my former ill success in convincing their learned author to deter me from now proceeding to set forth, as I am publicly pledged to do, a fair and full statement of at least the leading points of the extant documentary evidence by which the statements of the Article are so unanswerably disproved.

As to this third statement, I feel that it is unnecessary to add another word to what I have now written in refutation of it. But I may, I trust, be excused for expressing a hope that what I have thus written has fully prepared the readers of my Paper for the conclusion to which the remaining portion of it will lead, that the *first* and *second* counts of this elaborate indictment are no less devoid of foundation and no less plainly at variance with demonstrable facts, than the history and public fame of the Irish Episcopacy and Priesthood during the present century so plainly demonstrates the *third* of those statements to be, and as, I may add, this statement is now, indeed, confessed by its learned author himself to be, if understood in what I have pointed out as its obvious, and, indeed, its only possible sense.

§ 4. *Reply to the First Count.—The Alleged Cultivation in Maynooth, for nearly half a century, of the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne.*

Before proceeding to set forth the evidence in refutation of the statement I have transcribed from the Article on this point, I would ask my readers to bear in mind that in the year 1794—the year immediately preceding that in which the College of Maynooth was founded—the well-known Bull *Auctorem Fidei*, in condemnation of the Jansenist and “Gallican” Synod of Pistoia, was issued by Pope Pius VI. Among other points, the Bull condemns the Synod for having inserted in its Decree on Faith this very “Declaration of the Gallican Clergy, 1682,” justly described in one of the passages I have quoted from the Article in the October number, as the “authorized expression” of the dogmatic “Gallicanism” therein described. The following are the words of the Bull:—

Neque silentio prætereunda est insignis ea, fraudis plena, synodi temeritas, quæ pridem *improbata* ab apostolica sede Conventus Gallicani Declarationem anni 1682, ausa sit in decretum *De Fide* inscriptum includere, *articulos in illa contentos palam adoptare* et solemnî professione obsignare.

Quo sane non solum gravior longe se nobis offert de synodo, quam prædecessoribus nostris fuerit de comitiis illis expostulandi ratio, sed et

ipsimet gallicanae ecclesiae non levis injuria irrogatur, quam dignam synodus existimaverit cujus auctoritas in patrociniū vocaretur errorum quibus illud est contaminatum decretum.

Quamobrem quae acta conventus gallicani praedecessor noster Innocentius XI. . . . post autem *expressius* Alexander VIII. . . . proapostolici sui muneris ratione *improbarunt, resciderunt, nulla et irrita declararunt*: multo fortius exigit a nobis pastoralis sollicitudo recentem horum factam in synodo tot vitiis affectam adoptionem, velut temerariam, scandalosam, ac praesertim *post edita praedecessorum nostrorum decreta, huic apostolicae sedī suamopere injuriosam* reprobare ac damnare, prout eam praesenti hac nostra constitutione reprobamus et damnamus, ac pro reprobata et damnata haberi volumus.

The learned writer of the Article has given public assurance—an assurance which I, on the part of the College, have not the slightest difficulty in accepting—that his intention in writing, and “the plain scope of his Article,” was “to exalt Maynooth,” and “to do honour to the living, without reflecting any discredit on the dead.” And, in thus explaining his personal view of the matter, he adds that “it must be remembered that Gallicanism was not, some forty or fifty years ago, in the bad odour in which it is at present, when *the Church of France itself* has repudiated it.”* Now, I had already shown, from the Episcopal testimony which he has so strangely ignored, that, quite irrespective of any action of the Church of France, this “Gallicanism” was, *more than fifty years ago*, in such “bad odour” in Maynooth, that an Irish Bishop—who, even at that early date was able to speak with the experience of *eleven years* in the Professorship of Theology—declared before the Royal Commission of 1826, that the doctrines so designated had never been adopted in the College, and this on the ground that they were regarded as leading to consequences “*subversive of the due independence of the Church.*” The learned writer of the Article of course may not, when writing it, have been aware of this important testimony; but we cannot suppose him to have been unaware of the strong indication of Pontifical disapproval of the Declaration of 1682, contained in the Dogmatic Bull *Auctorem Fidei*.

I must again, then, confess myself unable to comprehend the position he has taken up. In that Bull, surely we find a much more cogent reason for holding “Gallicanism” in bad odour than is furnished by the fact of its being now rejected by “the Church of France;” we find, too, a reason which, in the year 1795, when the College was opened, was fully as cogent as it is to-day. I trust, then, that he will have no further difficulty—as he seems, indeed, hitherto to have

* See Letter in *Tablet*, November 22nd, 1879.

had—in understanding why we in Maynooth should be unwilling that not merely “the *existing* Episcopacy and Priesthood of Ireland,” but also every previous generation of the Irish clergy, so far back at all events as the time when the College sent forth its first contingent of Irish-trained ecclesiastics, should be freed from the reproach thus sought to be cast upon them, and that the College, too, should be freed from the reproach sought to be cast upon her, that it was through her teaching they were imbued with the tenets, embodied in the ill-famed Declaration of 1682, a document, the adoption of which by the Synod of Pistoia, had, in the very year preceding the opening of the College, been stigmatized by the supreme teaching authority in the Church in terms of the strongest reprobation.

Might I not, indeed, assume that even if no evidence were forthcoming in defence of the College, it would be regarded as simply incredible, that in any ecclesiastical institution, even tolerated by the Archbishop of the diocese in which it was placed, and by the other Archbishops and Bishops of Ireland, a theological system thus—I will not say condemned, but, to use a milder term—discredited, by the Holy See, should have found a footing for even a single year, much less that it should have been “carefully cultivated for nearly half a century.”* But, as I have already

* I have before me, as I write, a Letter of the Most Rev. Dr. Troy, Archbishop of Dublin, and of the other Irish Bishops, trustees of the College, dated 17th November, 1796, written in acknowledgment of the paternal kindness of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda in sending a message of congratulation to the Bishops, on the boon conferred on the Catholics of Ireland by the Irish Parliament, in the establishment of the College of Maynooth.

In their reply, the Bishops, referring to the unhappy condition of the troubled times in which they lived, declare their conviction that such evils must be encountered “with the Word of Life, in sound doctrine.” In reference to the youth called to the inheritance of the Lord, to be trained up in the College in sacred discipline, “it is,” they say, “as your Eminence wisely remarks, a matter of the utmost importance to have them nourished with the food of sound doctrine, and restrained from noxious or suspected food.”

They also deplore that “even amongst those who profess themselves Catholics are found some who . . . endeavour to smooth down and weaken the dogmas of the church.” “To such,” they add, “we shall constantly oppose that renowned saying of Augustine, ‘That the doctrine of truth is placed in the chair of unity,’ and that, therefore, it is not lawful for any true Catholic to withdraw himself from the teaching of the Apostolic See, from which alone that great doctor, Jerome, earnestly desired to receive the rule of belief and of profession.

“This salutary rule of belief and of profession we have received from our predecessors, who were ever foremost in acknowledging and defending the divinely instituted supreme jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff over

stated, the absence of evidence is altogether on the other side. The allegations I am forced thus to combat rest solely on the unsupported statement of the writer of the Article. In reply to them, most fortunately for the theological reputation of the College, evidence in abundance is forthcoming—not merely the indirect testimony I have already adduced in the living evidences of the work of the College in the ecclesiastical training of the main body of the Irish clergy ever since the beginning of the present century, but, as I shall now proceed to set forth, direct documentary evidence of the most conclusive and irrefragable kind.

In adducing this evidence it is hardly necessary to premise that I do not for a moment think of asserting that in the earliest days of the College the full circle of doctrine defined in the Council of the Vatican was explicitly taught in Maynooth, as a theological creed in regard to which no difference of opinion could be allowed: in regard to some of these points, as for instance the infallibility of the Pope, the question was for many years—but by no means for so long a period as the learned author of the Article seems to suppose—treated, not merely as open to discussion within the limits of orthodox faith, but as one on which it might safely be left to the discretion of theological students, having before them a fair statement of the arguments on both sides of the question, to adopt the side which commended itself to their reason and judgment.* And here, perhaps—although, of course, it is by

all the faithful of Christ; the most sacred deposit of which dogma was committed to us, and we shall faithfully guard it inviolate, to be so transmitted to our successors.”

The Letter is signed also by the Very Rev. Dr. Hussey, the first President of the College. And it may not be uninteresting to note, as a curious coincidence, that the Cardinal Prefect to whom the Letter was addressed, was none other than Cardinal Gerdil, best known to theologians as the author, and subsequently the able defender, of the Bull *Auctorem Fidei*, in connection with the reference to which I have been led to transcribe this extract from the Letter of our Irish Bishops.

* It is interesting, and, I think, not altogether irrelevant, here to note that at the Royal Commission of Inquiry in 1826 the following evidence was given by the eminent Jesuit, Father Peter Kenney, who, I may add, was Vice-President of the College in the year 1812, under the Presidency of the Most Rev. Dr. Murray, then Coadjutor-Archbishop of Dublin—a combination of circumstances, indeed, that might almost justify me in treating the statements regarding the “Gallicanism” of the College in those days as scarcely needing disproof.

The following are the questions and answers in the Examination of Father Kenney, to which I would call attention:—

“In what Seminary were you yourself educated?—I studied in Palermo: I studied Theology there.

“Was the College at Palermo at that period under the care of the

no means necessary for the purpose for which I have undertaken to write—it may not be out of place to mention that a different, and more fully satisfactory method of dealing with the question was adopted in Maynooth at a much earlier period than the writer of the Article is at all aware.

A venerable dignitary of the Irish Church, who was a student of the College just fifty years ago, has authorized me to mention a fact regarding himself which, even if no other evidence were in existence, would be absolutely decisive on this point. "At the close of my College course," he says, "I was appointed to a place on the Dunboyne Establishment, but I went in preference to Rome, where I was anxious to study for a few years in the Schools of Theology. Dr. Cullen, who was then Rector of the Irish College, suggested to me, before coming home, that to give our Archbishop a proof that I had not mis-spent my time in Rome, I should make a public defence of the usual kind, to obtain the degree of Doctor in Theology. I was then directed to prepare a list of forty propositions, and, among them, as a matter of course, I put down the infallibility of the Pope, *a doctrine of which I had not, and could not have had, a moment's doubt or uncertainty from the time I had read that portion of the Treatise, "De Ecclesiâ," under my professor, Dr. O'Hanlon, in Maynooth.* The defence was made in the Collegio Romano—Father Perrone and others being the objectors. It so happened that the proposition selected for discussion was this very doctrine of

Jesuits?—Yes: my studies were performed in that College, which was a College of the Jesuits.

"Were you taught, either at Palermo or at Stoneyhurst, that the Pope was infallible, when teaching *ex cathedra*?—The proposition *did not come in the regular course of study.* I recollect it *was not to be found in the printed author that contained the entire course of our theological studies*; but I am not quite sure that the Professor *may not have expressed his own opinion, or at least given arguments for and against it.* I am, however, quite certain that he left every one to follow the opinion that each one, after mature consideration, deemed best; and thus each man exercises his own judgment in deducing arguments for his own opinion from the Holy Scriptures, and from the authorities cited in the defence of either side of the question.

"The question was rather whether any particular doctrines taught in those places of instruction with regard to that point were of that character as would *naturally lead* a young man to adopt the idea that the Pope was infallible, always admitting it was a matter of freedom whether he should believe it or not?—*I do not recollect any other instruction, public or private, given for that object.*"

We shall afterwards see how strikingly similar to this line of teaching was that pursued in Maynooth in the early days of the College. See pages 226 and 229, for the evidence of Drs. Anglade and Slevin; see also the evidence of Dr. Higgins (p. 232) as regards the Roman University.

the Pope's infallibility. *I defended it there in the Roman College, simply and solely from what I had learned in Maynooth; for, as it happened, from my being engaged in the study of other portions of the theological course, I had never received a word of instruction about it, or heard a reference to it, during the two years that I was in Rome.*"

But the question, as I have already said, is not, whether, fifty years ago, the doctrines defined in 1870, by the Vatican Council, were then explicitly taught in Maynooth, but whether then, and for long afterwards, the College, as alleged, was on the contrary engaged in "carefully cultivating" the discredited system of Gallicanism, and in cultivating it so as inevitably to imbue, with its baleful tenets, the Irish clergy, to the core. On this issue, then, I proceed to set forth the leading heads of the direct, documentary evidence still extant—taking, in the first place, the evidence given by the Theological Professors of the College before the Royal Commission of 1826—evidence, it must be remembered, given under circumstances where all the interests of the College and of its staff would obviously suggest that, so far as could be done within the limits of truthful statement, every evidence of an "Ultramontane" tendency in the teaching of the College should, as far as possible, be kept in the background, and every evidence of a contrary tendency be brought forward in the strongest light.

Under these circumstances, then, Dr. Anglade, the Professor of Moral Theology, and himself a "French refugee," was examined by the Royal Commissioners. Almost at the outset of his examination he was asked whether as a member of the Sorbonne he had "subscribed" the Four Articles of the Gallican Church. His answer is significant, and is so strongly suggestive of the well-known passage in which the great "Sorbonne" theologian Tournelly practically acknowledges the hopelessness* of attempting to reconcile the doctrine of the Fourth Article of 1682 with the records of early ecclesiastical history, that it may be of interest to transcribe it here:—

You are a member of the Sorbonne?—I am.

As a member of the Sorbonne, did you subscribe the Four celebrated Articles of the Gallican Church?—I do not think we were obliged to *subscribe* anything; but we were *obliged* to defend them in our theses, *otherwise our theses would not have been easily admitted.*

* "Non dissimulandum, *difficile* esse in tanta testimoniorum mole, quae Bellarminus et alii congerunt, non recognoscere Apostolicæ Sedis seu Romanæ Ecclesiæ certam et infallibilem auctoritatem; at *longe difficilius* est ea conciliare cum Declaratione Cleri Gallicani, a qua recedere nobis non permittitur."—TOURNELLY, "Tractatus de Ecclesia," Quæst. 5, art. 3. (Tom. 2, p. 134, Ed. Paris, 1739.)

Then, after some questions regarding the First of the Four Articles (which denies the *temporal* power* of the Pope in the dominions of other sovereigns, outside his own temporal States), Dr. Anglade's examination turned on the points raised by the Second Article, affirming the subjection of the Pope's authority to that of a so-called General Council.

Will you have the goodness to state whether, according to your experience, you think the principle of the Second Article is generally held at Maynooth?—*I do not think* that question was ever discussed. . . . The clergy of France did not wish to say that doctrine was to be held by all nations.

You cannot say what is the prevailing opinion at Maynooth, as to whether the Council be or be not above the Pope?—*I never heard* anything about that Article : the *essential* Article was the *First*.

But it must be remembered that Dr. Anglade was Professor, not of Dogmatic, but of Moral Theology, and we shall afterwards see that in reference to this Second Article the Professor of Dogmatic Theology was able to give most explicit testimony as to its rejection in Maynooth. Then, after some questions regarding the Third Article, not relevant to our present inquiry, the Commissioners proceeded to examine Dr. Anglade as to his views regarding the Fourth Article, and, "French refugee" though he was, he could give no more favourable testimony, as regards the "cultivation" of "Gallicanism" in Maynooth, than this:—

In your opinion is the principle of the Fourth Article held at Maynooth in general?—*I think* that is the general *opinion*; but one *may be* for one side, and another for the other; we disclaim it entirely *as an article of faith*.

The answering in cross-examination by which this portion of the evidence is followed up, shows plainly enough of what a moderate type was the "Gallicanism" of this "French refugee," at least so far as regarded the other Articles, outside the question of the Pope's universal Temporal Power:—

Do you hold it possible that anything can become an Article of the Catholic faith which you now swear to be erroneous?—*I do not*.

* I do not dwell on this point; for it is, of course admitted, by the writer of the Article that the transition from "Gallicanism," which he supposes to have taken place at the close of the period specified in his Article, did not involve any change of teaching as regards this special point. In the evidence given before the Royal Commission of 1853, I find it stated on authority that I am sure he will not question, that "we [the Professors of Theology of that day] hold that the Pope has no temporal power, direct or indirect" (Evidence, Part 2, p. 57). And again:—"Perrone, a living author, a decided Ultramontane . . . omits entirely the question of the Pope's temporal power" (Ibid. p. 354).

You now swear that the Pope has no civil or temporal power?—
I do.

Do you hold it possible that it ever can be stated by the Church to be an article of faith that the Pope has civil or temporal power?—*No.*

If the Pope and a Council properly constituted were to declare to-morrow that *the Pope was infallible*, would it not then become an article of faith, binding on all good Catholics?—*It would.*

With regard to *the deposing power* . . . if the Church should declare that, in holding that doctrine to be erroneous, you and others, who are of the same opinion, have been mistaken, should you, as a good Catholic, feel bound to lay aside that opinion?—I think the Church can never decide that; therefore, with respect to the supposition what I would do if the Church define it, *that supposition never can be realized.*

But, fully convinced as I have always been, from the personal testimony of those whose memory goes back to those early days, as to the utter absence of "Gallicanism," as regards the *teaching* of even the French professors, I confess that it was not until recently, on carefully reading through the Report of the Royal Commissioners of 1826, with the view of ascertaining how far the evidence then given corresponded with my previous impressions, that I became aware of the extent to which those founders of our theological school shrank from adopting, *even as a matter of decided personal opinion*, the "Gallican" view of doctrines such as the Infallibility of the Pope.

Thus, towards the close of his examination, Dr. Anglade was asked many questions regarding this doctrine.

In France (he says), *I think* it is the more *general* opinion that he is not infallible; as to what takes place in *other countries* it would be difficult to form a judgment . . . *we are not obliged to believe that he is not infallible.*

Can you form *any judgment* as to which opinion is considered the more probable at Maynooth?—*I could not tell that.* I can judge for myself; but I cannot tell what is in the mind of others.

May we ask, which do *you yourself* consider the more probable opinion?—*I could not precisely decide positively.*

Can you say whether either of the two opinions is taught at Maynooth, as being "probabilior," that is, *more probable* than the opposite opinion?—*I do not think anything like that is taught in Maynooth*; they confine themselves to the proposition such as it is announced in the Treatise. [This proposition, as we shall see, instead of setting forth, as alleged in the Article in the October Number, a "faithful exposition" of the Sorbonne theology, was nothing more than a carefully-worded justification of the clause in the oath of allegiance then taken by Catholics, that the doctrine of the Infallibility was not an *article of Catholic faith*—as, of course, it was not until defined at the Council of the Vatican in the year 1870.]

On this testimony of Dr. Anglade, then, the only one of the French refugee Professors examined before the Commission, I make but one comment, asking, as I must, how the teaching of Maynooth, as thus described by this so-called "Gallican," differed from that of the Jesuit College of Palermo as described by Father Peter Kenney?*

The evidence of Drs. Slevin and Higgins, so far as regards the alleged "cultivation of Gallicanism" is substantially to the same effect as Dr. Anglade's.

With regard to Dr. Slevin's evidence, I am aware that an enormous, and, indeed, an almost incredible, amount of misconception prevails. I should wish, then, to note the following points in reference to him—premising, however, as perhaps I ought to do, that, as regards the refutation of the statements in the October Number of the REVIEW, I am in no sense concerned with any testimony or with any opinion of his:† at the date of the Commission he had been but three years in the College, and he died in little more than a year afterwards: he had never been a student of Maynooth, nor had he been a "pupil" of "the French refugees;" he had made his studies in a Spanish college, that of Salamanca, and whatever influence he could by any possibility be supposed to have exercised in the way of "Gallicanizing" the Irish clergy during the four years of his connection with the College, would represent the influence not of France, but of Spain. Having premised all this, I note the following points:—

In the first place, Dr. Slevin's testimony is concerned almost exclusively with the question of "the deposing power" of the Pope, and the cognate question of the supposed Papal claim of authority to set free the Catholics of Ireland from their allegiance to the sovereign of these realms.‡ Voluminous as his evidence is, occupying no less than eighty-two pages of the Official Report, the references to the Pope's *spiritual* power are exceedingly few and scant.

Secondly, Dr. Slevin—whatever may have been his views regarding Papal prerogatives—never was, in the ordinary sense of the term, "Professor of Theology" in Maynooth. His

* See above footnote, pp. 223—4.

† It may not be altogether out of place to add that the observation thus made in reference to Dr. Slevin is also applicable to the one or two prominent Irish ecclesiastics of the earlier portion of this century—in no way connected with Maynooth—whose theological views, as we learn from the records of the time, were unmistakably tinged, to a greater or less degree, with "Gallicanism."

‡ See above.

official status was that of Prefect of the Dunboyne Establishment; his influence, therefore, such as it may have been, extended only to the few students who, at the close of their theological course in the College, attained the distinction of election to the Dunboyne Establishment, and whose number he sets down, in one of his answers to the Commissioners as amounting, at that time, to only *eleven*.

Thirdly, there is not, from first to last, in Dr. Slevin's voluminous evidence a single word to indicate that he *either taught to his students, or accepted as the principles of his own theological opinions*, the body of doctrine set forth in the Gallican Declaration of 1682—the document which, it will be remembered, is explicitly named by the writer of the Article as the “authorized exposition” of the theological system alleged by him to have been “carefully cultivated” in Maynooth.

Fourthly, even as regards the doctrine of Papal Infallibility, it is perfectly obvious that Dr. Slevin's evidence, so far from showing that the “Sorbonne” doctrine was taught generally in Maynooth, on the contrary, shows plainly that *it was not taught by Dr. Slevin himself*, and that, even as regards his own individual *opinion* on the point, while it is plain that he leaned somewhat towards the negative view, and, to a certain extent, regarded it as the *more probable opinion*, he expressly guarded himself against having it supposed that he at all undervalued the strength of the arguments by which the doctrine of the Infallibility is maintained. The statements to which I refer are the following:—

Is it your opinion that the majority of Catholics think that the Pope may err?—*So far as my knowledge extends, I think the majority of Catholics are inclined to embrace the opinion that he may err.*

When you say that they are *inclined* to embrace that opinion, the Commissioners would naturally conclude that you do not mean to say that they have actually embraced it, but that they consider it a matter of great doubt?—I mean to say that they consider it the *more probable* of the two opinions: on such a point it is impossible to decide with certainty. . . . I think the majority of Catholics consider this opinion as the *more probable*. I speak from *my own* experience.

Do you mean to say that it is a probable opinion that he may be infallible?—I mean to say that the majority of Catholics consider the other opinion as the *more probable*; speaking, *however*, from *my own* experience.

Do you mean to say that they are both probable, by the expression “more probable”?—*I do mean that both opinions are probable; opposite opinions may both be probable when cogent reasons weigh on both sides.*

You have said that you think the majority of Roman Catholics

with whom you are acquainted are *inclined* to the opinion that the Pope is fallible?—I have stated that as my *opinion*.

Of course there is a considerable number, though according to your impression not the majority, who are not of that opinion?—*Certainly so*.

Have you any means of forming a judgment what proportion of the present Roman Catholic Bishops of Ireland may be of opinion that the Pope is infallible?—I do not know the sentiments of our Bishops on that head.

Then for aught you know they may be unanimously of opinion that the Pope is infallible?—They may be so.*

On a subsequent day the examination, or perhaps I should rather say the cross-examination, of Dr. Slevin on this point was resumed. In the course of it, the witness pointed out the distinction between rejecting a doctrine as untrue, and declaring merely that it is not an article of faith.

We merely declare in the oath of allegiance (he says) that we do not hold it as an article of faith, but we may hold it as an opinion. . . . It is one thing to say that a doctrine is *not certain*, and another to declare that it is *false*. . . . We declare that the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility is *not certain*, but we do not abjure it as *false*.

Then in a foot-note he adds a remark, which, like the similar observation made by Dr. Anglade, as quoted on page 227, is not uninteresting to note, as conclusively disposing of a difficulty by which even many Catholics felt embarrassed when it was raised by Mr. Gladstone some few years ago. I allude to the allegation that, before the granting of Catholic Emancipation, the State had been assured by the representatives of the Church in England and in Ireland, that not only was the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility not then an article of Catholic faith, but that it "*could not become*" one, that it "*was no part of the Roman Catholic Faith, and never could be made part of it.*"† I mention this matter here, not, of course, for the sake of merely repeating what has so often been stated, that Mr. Gladstone's statement was absolutely devoid of all foundation in

* The severe comment of the *Quarterly Review* on the general character of this portion of Dr. Slevin's evidence will be found below, on page 235.

† "*Vaticanism*," by the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. London, 1875 (pp. 49 and 109). It seems worthy of at least brief mention here that, when collecting, as he did, with such painstaking care, every vestige of evidence he could discover in support of his statements that, in the period preceding Emancipation, the Catholics of these countries had given it to be understood that they rejected the "*Ultramontane*" views of the Pope's spiritual authority, Mr. Gladstone was unable to adduce even the smallest fragment of evidence in his favour from the Reports of the Maynooth Commissions. It was not that those Reports escaped his notice; for in his pamphlet on "*Vaticanism*," he makes, in regard to another matter, no fewer than *nineteen* references to one of them.

fact, but rather for the sake of calling attention to the distinct declaration to the contrary thus formally made by the Prefect of the Dunboyne Establishment, as well as by the Professor of Moral Theology, and recorded in the Blue Book of the Royal Commission of 1826. For, in connection with Dr. Slevin's exposition of the distinction between declaring, as was then declared with truth, that the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility was *not an article of faith*, and declaring that it was *not true in point of fact*, he states most formally in a foot-note,—*subsequently added*, and thus showing his conviction of the importance of guarding himself against possible misconception on the point,—the following most noteworthy declaration:—

What is at one period only a matter of opinion . . . *may afterwards become an article of faith*, when by a declaration of the Church we acquire *evidence* of the point having been revealed.

But to proceed. Dr. Slevin is examined as to his own method of dealing with the question in class.

The students [of the Dunboyne Establishment] are at present *eleven* in number: the Commissioners beg for your opinion as to what proportion of that number of eleven do actually believe, without being bound to believe, that the Pope is infallible in spiritual matters?—A matter of opinion can never be an object of divine *faith*, and therefore (accurately speaking) cannot be *believed*; it may be held as a mere opinion . . . therefore none of my students can *believe* the infallibility of the Pope, speaking with correctness; *they may hold it as an opinion*; whether any of them do, in fact, hold it as an opinion, *I cannot positively say*, but I am *inclined* to believe they do not.

Not one of them?—I am *inclined to think* none of them hold it, as the more probable opinion . . . I am *inclined to think so*, but *I cannot positively assert this*, because it is a maxim with me in all matters of opinion, after explaining the reasons *pro* and *con*, to leave it to their judgment to adopt which opinion they please. . . .

Have you explained to them the grounds *pro* and *con*, with respect to that opinion?—When the question was discussed in our class we weighed the arguments advanced on both sides, without coming to any decision. . . . I will state that in favour of the infallibility of the Pope *very strong* texts of Scripture are quoted.

Here, then, again I ask, how, even in Dr. Slevin's case, the method pursued in Maynooth, of treating this question, differed from that of the Professors of the Jesuit College of Palermo, as described by Father Kenney?

We now come to the evidence of Dr. Higgins, who was the Professor of Dogmatic Theology in the College at the time of the Commission. His evidence is instructive in more ways than one. One of the strangest and most unaccountable misconcep-

tions under which the writer of the Article labours, is that during what he terms the short period of transition from the evil days when Gallicanism was so carefully cultivated in the College to the better time when "Dr. Patrick Murray with his associate professors lectured on dogmatic theology of another stamp in the *fifth, sixth, and seventh decades*" of the present century,—“the Irish-born theologians of the College” having by that time “forced their way through the lines of Gallicanism,” and “formed a successful junction with the grand theological army of the Catholic Church,”—there was “no local discountenancing of the old teaching,” “*no importation of professors trained up in other schools*,” &c. &c. Has the name of Father Edmund O'Reilly, and the memory of his career as a theological professor in Maynooth, been so soon forgotten? He, surely, was an “imported” professor, trained up in other schools; for he came to us from the Roman College of the Jesuits; and I need not say that coming to us thus, he needed no change of opinions to entitle him to a place in that “grand theological army,” in which he at once became a trusted leader.

But, long before the time of Father O'Reilly, the Chair of Dogmatic Theology in Maynooth was filled by a professor trained in the Roman schools. In the very beginning of his examination, Dr. Higgins informed the Commissioners that before coming to Maynooth as professor he had spent five years in Rome, during three of which he was engaged in attending the theological lectures at the Roman University, in preparation for his degree of Doctor in Theology.

Unfortunately, Dr. Higgins was not in a position to give testimony as to the actual teaching of Maynooth, for he had been appointed professor but a few weeks before. But his evidence is of vital importance in another aspect, as contributing a further proof that the mode of treatment then adopted in Maynooth in regard to doctrines such as the infallibility of the Pope was in full accord with that pursued even in Rome itself.

In reference to the teaching in the Roman University, Dr. Higgins says:

I studied in the University at Rome; all I can say with regard to those doctrines is that I was as much at liberty to discuss them freely in Rome as I could be at Maynooth; . . . because, as they do not form any part of our faith, we treat them as mere opinions, and as opinions they were *perfectly open to discussion*. I do not mean to say that any professor *taught* the Gallican doctrine . . . but those of the University gave an exposition of the arguments *pro* and *contra*, leaving the students to determine for themselves.

Again, he is asked:—

Is it maintained at Rome that the Pope has civil or temporal power out of his own States?—*I never heard it maintained.*

Was the doctrine taught?—I did not hear the contrary doctrine taught: I heard the arguments exposed.

Will you state what was your own opinion?—As to the doctrine of the temporal power of the Pope, my own opinion was that it was perfectly erroneous . . . and I can add also that such was the opinion, as far as I could ascertain, *of all the students in the University without any exception.*

Do you subscribe to the principle [in Dr. Delahogue's Treatise] that it is no article of the Catholic faith that the Pope is infallible?—I do; because it is the truth that it is no article of the Catholic faith.

The question is a mooted question in the Roman Catholic Church?—Yes, it is a question *left free for professors or students to discuss as they may think proper.*

Under this head—as I am, of course, confining my extracts to the evidence of those who were engaged in the actual teaching of Theology in the College—I shall quote but one other witness, the Most Rev. Dr. MacHale, the present venerated Archbishop of Tuam, then Bishop of Maronia and Co-adjutor of Killala. His Lordship was examined partly as an Irish Bishop, but chiefly as an ex-professor of Dogmatic Theology in Maynooth. It would, indeed, have been difficult to select a witness more competent to testify as to the actual teaching of the house; for he had been for *eleven years* in charge of the class of Dogmatic Theology, during the first six of which he had thus held office as the assistant, and occasionally the *locum tenens*, of Dr. Delahogue. The professorial career thus indicated began so far back as the year 1814: Dr. MacHale had entered the College in 1808; surely, if “Gallicanism” had ever flourished in Maynooth, it must have been in full vigour then.

Dr. MacHale's examination, which turned chiefly on such questions as the disestablishment of the Protestant Church, and the authority of the Pope to depose the King of England, was exceedingly protracted. It lasted four days, and occupies thirty-eight pages of the Official Report. At its close, the Bishop was asked whether there was “anything further that he wished to state to the Commissioners,” and in these circumstances—a point of no little importance to bear in mind, as showing that the statements made in reply were, in the fullest sense of the word, volunteered—he spoke as follows:—

My examination . . . turned partly on the authority of the Pope to depose kings; and I wish distinctly to state that on that subject my conviction is that the authority of kings, or whatever name the supreme magistrate may be called in any country, is supreme, and totally independent of any spiritual authority. . . . I can *therefore* state that

the Ultramontane opinions were not taught in the College of Maynooth. . . . But, at the same time, *I wish distinctly to declare that we did not adopt* what are generally called the opinions of the Gallican Church, *contained in the four propositions of 1682*, which are connected with the Gallican liberties.

The opinions of the Ultramontanes would seem to us to be destructive of the authority of kings; and the other opinions, if pressed to the consequences of which they seem susceptible, would appear also to be *subversive of the due independence of the Church*.

In reference to this observation, the Commissioners interposed a question. The interruption afforded the Bishop an opportunity, of which, fortunately, he fully availed himself, to place beyond all possibility of question the inaccuracy of the view that "Gallican" opinions were cultivated in Maynooth—a view which even then, as we shall see, was entertained by persons not familiar with the actual working of the College.

Can you point out in what particular principles the Gallican Church appears to you to go too far?—In saying that the opinions of the Gallican Church appear to me to go too far, I refer *principally* to a proposition in which they say that they will defend the decree of the Council of Constance, regarding the superiority of Councils over Popes. . . . The Council of Constance was convened at a time when the peace of the Church was distracted by the contending claims of three rival pontiffs, and therefore it was necessary to restore peace to the Church by an exertion of power beyond any former example. . . . The case is solitary in the history of the Church. . . . To extend the principle of that extraordinary case to ordinary occurrences in the Church seems to be a principle *pregnant with danger*. . . . That justifies me in saying that I would think it *dangerous* to embrace the Gallican liberties. . . .

I may further state, *as a fact*, that in the full sense of the term *they never were taught in the College of Maynooth*; nay, Dr. Delahogue himself, a native of France, showed one of those minds that are superior to prejudices of country or of education; and, content to follow the defined line of Catholic doctrine, *he did not obtrude particular opinions on the College*.

It may be well also to add that in his work on the Evidences of the Catholic Church Dr. MacHale has expressed himself to the same effect in still stronger language. I regret that the passage, which is a long one, is also one to which I could not do justice without transcribing it in full, and thus still further extending my Paper beyond the limits of reasonable moderation—limits, indeed, which I fear I shall be deemed to have already very notably transgressed. But I may briefly mention that in the course of the passage, the Gallican doctrine, affirming the subjection of the Pope's authority to that of the General Council of the Church, is designated by such epithets as "re-

volutionary," "unnatural," "fraught with schismatical consequences," and "repugnant to the language of our Redeemer, and to the usages of the first and purest ages of the Church."*

Here, then, so far as regards the testimony of the witnesses examined by the Royal Commissioners in 1826, I close my case; and I feel that I can safely afford to close it without a word of comment of my own. If comment, however, were needed, it would be amply supplied by the paragraphs in which the *Quarterly Review* of the day summed up the evidence regarding the theological teaching of the College, in a review of the Parliamentary Blue Book then recently published. I acquiesce in the suggestion which has been made to me, that I ought not to lose the opportunity of bringing forward a testimony that is so singularly explicit. The passage is as follows:—

The doctrines [commonly known as Ultramontane] are, indeed, directly opposed by what are termed the Gallican Liberties, which are contained in four propositions drawn up by the French clergy in 1682. The first very clearly denies the temporal power of the Church; the second insists on the supremacy of General Councils over the Pope; the third affirms that laws and usages in the Gallican Church, and also in others, should subsist with variation; and the fourth, that the judgment of the Pope is not above being reformed or revised unless it has obtained the assent of the Church.

To these doctrines all were obliged to subscribe who took degrees at the Sorbonne; and few, if any, of the French prelates ever disputed their justice and propriety.† *It has so often been said that the Irish clergy also had agreed to them, that we really supposed this to be the case; and we have consequently been surprised to find that the policy*

* See the entire passage in the 2nd Volume of the work referred to—“Evidences and Doctrines of the Catholic Church,” by the Right Rev. John MacHale, D.D., Bishop of Maronia and Coadjutor Bishop of Killala, Dublin, 1828. (Vol. ii. pp. 49–53.)

† We need not be surprised at this error in the statement of a Protestant reviewer. It is by no means uncommon even among Catholics, more or less fairly informed as regards general views on the historical aspect of “Gallicanism,” to treat “Gallican,” and “French ecclesiastical of the 17th or 18th century,” as synonymous expressions. Ecclesiastical history, no doubt, has always borne explicit testimony to the necessity of distinguishing between them; but the full extent to which that distinction must be recognised, remained to be pointed out by M. Gerin in his marvellously interesting work revealing the secret history of the “Gallican” Assembly and Declaration of 1682, and of the tyrannical proceedings to which Louis XIV. and the Court party of the day were obliged to have recourse, to crush the manly resistance of the Sorbonne.

I may mention, as an illustration of the confusion of ideas that has suggested this note, that within the last few days I have met, in a work of unquestionable merit, and of established and well-deserved reputation,

of that Church has uniformly tended to support the Transalpine doctrines.

We do not in the least doubt that such is the case—*notwithstanding the equivocating answers of Dr. Slevin*, who “imagines” that the Roman Catholic Bishops do assent to them; for, when the only Bishop who appears as a witness is examined—Dr. MacHale—he states distinctly that he does not approve of those doctrines; that when he was Professor of Dogmatic Theology at Maynooth he never taught them; and during his whole residence there (seven years as student, and eleven as lecturer and professor) he never heard them inculcated. [Then is subjoined a foot-note setting forth the passages I have already quoted from Dr. MacHale’s evidence, and ending with the remark, “Dr. MacHale is, at all events, fair and explicit.”]

In this he is supported by other witnesses who add that even Dr. MacHale’s predecessor, Dr. Delahogue, an emigrant Frenchman, and a Doctor of the Sorbonne, where he must have subscribed them, did not attempt to urge these particular tenets.

“Who can doubt that this person’s conduct in thus surrendering his own opinions was influenced by the knowledge he possessed of the secret, if not the avowed, wishes of the Trustees? . . . *No more we think need be said to prove that the Irish Church does not, as a body, admit these articles, or permit them to be taught.**”

§ 5. *Reply to the Second Count.*—“*Dr. Delahogue’s Treatise ‘De Ecclesiâ,’ the faithful exponent of the Gallicanism of the Sorbonne.*”

It should be unnecessary for me to enter upon any formal examination of such an allegation as this, after the explicit

a passage plainly showing that the writer regarded even Fénelon as a Gallican! Without mentioning the name of the writer, which is by no means needed for the purpose of my illustration, I may transcribe the passage.

“In the list of *Classic Theologians* there is not to be found the name of a single *Gallican*. As an influential Churchman and finished orator, *Bossuet* occupies some space on that page of Church history; and for his gentleness of spirit, and polished scholarship, and noble docility, *Fénelon* is a man that his country should be proud of. But *neither* of them was a name of weight in Catholic Schools of Theology.

“As for the denial of Infallibility, it was quite open to the *Gallicans* to deny it at the time, but a sorry race indeed they were able to put on their arguments against it.”

* *Quarterly Review*, March, 1828, Article “Maynooth” (vol. xxxvii. pp. 471, 472).

In reference to the concluding observations of the Reviewer regarding the action of the Irish Church in regard to Gallicanism, I will add that to have acted otherwise would have been to manifest a singular disregard of some of her most glorious ecclesiastical traditions. A deeply interesting Article by the late Most Rev. Dr. Conroy, Bishop of Ardagh, in the “*Irish Ecclesiastical Record*” (June, 1870, vol. vi. pp. 501, &c.), sets forth the details of the persistent but fruitless efforts made in 1666 by the Duke of Ormond, then Viceroy in Ireland, to induce the Irish Bishops and

statement I have just quoted from the evidence of Dr. MacHale and the no less conclusive testimony of the other Professors of Theology examined by the Royal Commissioners, invariably to this same effect: "We do *not* teach the 'Gallican' doctrine; for we confine ourselves to the doctrine laid down by *Dr. Delahogue*." In the presence of such testimony, a formal discussion as to the charge now made ought surely to be deemed worse than superfluous.

And there is another branch of the case that must not be lost sight of here. The theological class-books of Maynooth are not selected by the whim of individual professors. Their selection and maintenance as class-books without the concurrence of the Board of Trustees is an absolute impossibility; and the Board has invariably comprised the four Archbishops and a large number of the Bishops of Ireland. I feel that in view of such a fact as this it would be regarded as trifling with the kind attention of my readers if I were to enter upon the investigation of the truth of the charges now alleged against a Treatise which was maintained as the College class-book, not merely "in the early years of the history of the College," nor "well into the present century," nor "for a good part of the present century," nor for the period of "nearly half a century," ending in 1835, nor for the full "half century," ending in

clergy of the day to subscribe the Articles (much milder, indeed, than those of 1682) which Louis XIV. had unhappily extorted in 1633 from the timid theologians of the Paris "Faculty."

Perhaps not the least interesting portion of the Article is an extract from one of the documents in M. Gerin's work on the "Secret History of the Declaration of 1682"—the list of the Doctors of the Faculty classified "for Rome" and "against Rome," as drawn up for the information of the Court party by one of their secret agents. For in this list the names of six Irishmen occur. We cannot read the account given of them by the Court spy without a strong feeling that if "the Faculty" had contained a stronger infusion of such an element, the King would have received from it a check that would have turned him, long before 1682, from his career of threatened revolt against the Holy See.

Here are the names of the Irish Doctors, and the confidential estimate of their probable course of action:—

"Tyrrel, an Irishman. He is the agent of the missions which are carried on in his country, and consequently exceedingly attached to all the devotees and religious communities. *He is just the man to propose and defend with obstinacy whatever that kind of people would wish in favour of Rome.*

"Egan, an Irishman. A would-be important man, closely attached to Tyrrel, and consequently to his Roman opinions. He has few followers, but *knows his theology.*

"Nugent. A peculiar character; a good scholastic, devoted to Rome, like those of his nation. He is very obstinate.

"O'Molony, an Irishman. *For Rome.*

"O'Phelan. *Irish in everything.*"

1845, but for many years afterwards.* Is it to be supposed that any Board, consisting—as regards a matter of this nature—exclusively of Irish Bishops, would have thus sanctioned the perpetuation of so baleful an influence as that which should inevitably be exercised by a theological class-book, the faithful exponent of “an alien theology,” recognising “but little even of *spiritual* authority” in St. Peter and his successors, and “at least sensibly weakening, if not entirely estranging, the feelings of allegiance” of the great body of the Irish Clergy “towards the true centre of Catholic loyalty?” I am fully confident that the learned writer has not even yet realized the full extent of all that is implied in the statements he has made, and has since so steadfastly persisted in characterizing as “facts.”

It may, nevertheless, be deemed advisable that I should here make some short reference to the abundant and satisfactory evidence in disproof of the statement on this head, which is to be found in the Treatise itself.

In the first place, then, let us take these two distinctive, fundamental, theological tenets of Gallicanism, the alleged fallibility of the Pope, even when acting as supreme authoritative teacher of the Church, and the alleged subjection of his supreme authority to the authority of a so-called “General” Council—doctrines so utterly at variance with the fundamental principles of the Treatise “*De Ecclesiâ*,” that the mere omission of them, and of the special pleading by which the “Gallicans of the Sorbonne” endeavoured to impart to them some air of plausibility, was almost in itself sufficient to insure the practical adoption of the opposite doctrines, now defined dogmas of Catholic faith.†

* In the Board Book of our Trustees, I find a Resolution of November 11th, 1847, directing the President of the College to contract for the printing of a fifth edition—consisting of 1000 copies—of Dr. Delahogue’s Treatise “*De Ecclesiâ*.”

† There is a sad interest in reading a statement bearing on this aspect of the “Gallican” controversy, which I find in the evidence of 1826—the person examined being a former student of the College who had unhappily apostatized from the faith.

Inaccurate, as might be expected, in many statements of fact, his evidence on this matter shows a clear appreciation of the untenableness of the Gallican tenets—an appreciation which I am sure was by no means singular among the students of the house, and which in itself would have formed a most serious obstacle to the “Gallicanizing of the Irish Clergy,” if any “French refugee” had thought of attempting such an experiment in Maynooth.

“There is a doctrine,” says this witness, “taught in the Maynooth Treatise, that the Pope is the centre of communion for all Christian Societies, that is, *they can never break with him nor from him*. . . . Now, as long as the Pope is regarded as the centre of union, round which all other Christian

How, then, does Dr. Delahogue deal with those fundamental articles of the Gallican creed? *He distinctly and formally declines to defend, or to propound, them at all, merely referring for an exposition of the questions at issue, to three or four writers whom he names, and foremost among whom—strange as it may seem to those whose only impressions regarding his Treatise are those derived from the Article in the last Number of the REVIEW—he names in the first place, Cardinal Bellarmine!* So that, in fact, the only thesis or statement on those topics in Dr. Delahogue's Treatise is one in which, not without apology, he formally proves that the Gallican doctrine on those points was not in any sense *heretical*. His proposition, then, does not *deny* the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility; it asserts merely, what was then unquestionably true, that it might be denied without the guilt of heresy or schism. Dr. Delahogue in a prefatory note, apologizing, as I have said, for introducing the question in this form, mentions that the defence of the proposition, as thus laid down, was necessary for the justification of the clause in the Catholic Oath of Allegiance which as then prescribed by Act of Parliament (33 Geo. III.) contained the clause, "I declare that it is not an article of the Roman Catholic faith, neither am I thereby required to believe or profess that the Pope is infallible."

Again, it may not be uninteresting to note that the references, in another portion of the Treatise, to the questions regarding the famous Letters of Pope Honorius are, perhaps, scarcely less significant than the formal omission of the Gallican thesis just mentioned.

In the absence of a formal thesis maintaining the infallibility of the Pope, Dr. Delahogue might well have spared himself

Churches must rally, the doctrine of his infallibility follows of course, as it appears to me, because if the Church can never break with him, he must be infallible, or the Church may err in adhering to him, and this would arraign the infallibility of the Church itself, as maintained by all Roman Catholics."—Evidence of the Rev. John Cousins. Maynooth Report, p. 354.

This, indeed, was the famous argument by which Fénelon confuted the "Gallicans" of 1682.

"Omnes Cisalpini [*i.e.*, Gallicani] unitatis amantes credunt apostolicam sedem esse, ex institutione Christi, aeternum catholice communionis fundamentum, centrum, atque caput.

"Atqui luce clarius est apostolicam sedem non fore aeternum catholice communionis fundamentum, centrum, atque caput, si definiret aliquid haereticum a tota ecclesia credendum.

"Ergo omnes Cisalpini unitatis amantes credunt, aut saltem credere debent, apostolicam sedem ex institutione Christi nunquam posse definire aliquid haereticum a tota ecclesia credendum" (Dissertatio de S. Pontificis Auctoritate, cap. 3).

the labour of dealing with those Letters at all. As affecting the general doctrine of the infallibility of the Church, they present not the shadow of a difficulty : most unquestionably they were not "accepted by the Universal Church ;" on the contrary, when produced in the sixth General Council of Constantinople, they were received, at least by the Bishops there assembled, with the strongest marks of disapproval. But, not satisfied with this one line of defence, strong and unassailable as it is, Dr. Delahogue, Fellow and ex-Professor of the Sorbonne though he was, adopts the course—which is anything but "Gallican"—of contending, in the first place, "*against Bossuet and others,*" that the charge of Monothelism cannot be established against the Pope ; and, secondly, of maintaining in a distinct proposition that the Letters in question, even if it could be shown that they contained erroneous doctrine, were *not* issued by the Pope *ex cathedra* as dogmatic decrees.

However else this mode of dealing with such questions may be justly designated, at least it cannot be regarded as a "faithful exposition" of the theology of the Declaration of 1682, nor as in any way calculated to estrange or to weaken the feelings of allegiance of the Irish Clergy to the Holy See.

But I feel that I have dwelt too long upon a point which I had commenced by apologizing with such good reason for undertaking to discuss it at all.

§ 6. *The alleged "Gallicanism" of Maynooth in Moral Theology.*

Although I feel that I have more than sufficiently dealt with those portions of the Article which affect the theological reputation of the College as regards its dogmatic teaching, it will, I dare say, be considered that my task is not yet completed.

For, the founders and early teachers of our theological school have been charged also with what is called "Gallicanism" in Moral Theology—a designation under which the writer of the Article explains that he refers to the "exorbitantly severe" or rigid system that undoubtedly for many years held its ground in Maynooth. And I happen to know that while all those who have any recollection of the College in the period to which the Article refers are loud in their testimony as to the general groundlessness of its statements, some, at all events, of the staunchest friends of the College, not familiar with the circumstances to which I am now about to refer, are of opinion that on this branch of the case—as regards the rigid tendency of the system of Moral Theology cultivated in Maynooth for many years—he has succeeded in making a point

against the estimable men by whom our Irish theological school was founded. It gives me pleasure then to think that in this respect especially, it has fallen to my lot to do justice to their memories.

Here are the leading statements of the Article on this head:—

Maynooth got her first professors *from France*, and with them an importation of *genuine French* theology. *French* theology was exclusively studied by her *alumni*, and *French* theological authorities alone consulted by them for generations. . .

We must be understood as speaking of the *French* theology of the *past*; for, the French theology of our times has, almost universally, wisely assimilated itself to the *received standards* of the theological teaching throughout the Church.

But a *bitter set* of exclusivists were those early French professors. . .

Liguori himself, even after his beatification, was not safe from censure. A student on one occasion venturing to quote an opinion of his was abruptly checked by the professor, who gave his estimate of our great guide in moral theology thus:—"Homo equidem eximie pietatis, sed perditus laxus."

And this professor was *only the pupil of the Frenchmen*.

What an unreasoning intolerant was that *Gallicanism*!

Gallicanism in dogmatic theology, *Gallicanism in moral theology* . . . was the teaching brought to Maynooth by the French professors, and there *carefully cultivated* for nearly half a century (pp. 454, 455).

The French theology of the eighteenth century exhibits two anomalous departures from the common teaching: First, Gallicanism [in dogmatic theology]; second, an exorbitantly severe system of ethics . . . the latter rendered the following of our Lord anything but a "*jugum suave*" . . . In this part, however, it was *not altogether* as singular as in its [dogmatic] Gallicanism. Its position was *not entirely* as isolated (pp. 456, 462).

At first it would seem on reading this admission that the writer was about to acknowledge that Maynooth might *possibly* have derived at least her system of Moral Theology from some other less tainted source. But, no; for he immediately adds:—

The schools of Maynooth, and through them the Irish priesthood, *of course*, imbibed the French ethics *from the same sources* that had imparted to them the *French dogma*! (p. 462).

And then, after some further observations to the same effect, and many expressions of regret as to the evil wrought by the direction given at the outset to our teaching of Moral Theology, the Article is brought to an effective close by an extract of a few words from one of the old College class books, recording in unmistakable terms the strength and sincerity of Dr. Delahogue's antagonism to the system of Probabilism, opposed,

as he believed it to be, to the pure morality of the Christian law.

This then is the branch of the case with which it now remains for me to deal.

Now, I am of course not going to deny or to question the obvious and unquestionable fact that, of the two schools of Moral Theology—that which is designated sometimes as “the benign” or “moderate,” and sometimes as “the probabilist,” school, from the general character of its teaching, or from its distinctive fundamental tenet of Probabilism; and that which, on the other hand, is, for the corresponding reasons, designated as “rigid” or “Antiprobabilist”—the latter, and not the former, continued for many years to give the tone to the teaching in our classes of Moral Theology in Maynooth.

But, I must ask, what has all this to do with Gallicanism? I have, I think, in the preceding portion of this letter, made it sufficiently obvious that if any system of theology had presented itself for acceptance in Maynooth, or in Ireland, with no other credentials than the *testamur* of “the Sorbonne,”* its chances of obtaining a footing amongst us would have been slight indeed.

It is no doubt true that the Moral Theology which found most favour in France, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was that of the more rigid school. It is even true that among the theologians of that nation, the current of opinion in the direction of rigid and of antiprobabilist views ran so high as to bear away with it some of the most eminent writers of a school whose normal leaning was as decidedly in the opposite direction—the theologians of the Society of Jesus—a fact, in proof of which, if proof were needed, it would suffice to mention the name of Antoine, a theologian unquestionably entitled as a dogmatic writer to no mean place even among his brethren of the Society, but, as a moral theologian, so decidedly rigid in tone as to be selected by St. Alphonsus on more than one occasion as a typical, and indeed as an advanced, representative of the views of the rigid and Antiprobabilist school. But even if it

* To avoid the unnecessary introduction of new elements of controversy, I have throughout my reply acquiesced in the use of the phraseology employed by the learned writer of the Article in designating the theological system embodied in the Gallican Declaration of 1682.

I have, however, acquiesced in it only under mental reserve, and with the purpose of entering, as I now do, a formal protest against it before the close of my letter.

M. Gérin, in his work on the secret history of the transactions connected with the Assembly of 1682, has made it plain beyond question that the Faculty of the Sorbonne, not only steadfastly and courageously resisted the Four Articles, but in truth never received them.

were true that every French theologian who had ever written was an extreme and uncompromising advocate of the most rigid code of morals ever formulated within the communion of the Church, all this would be absolutely of no avail in an attempt to connect in any way with Gallicanism the tendency to rigour which characterized, in its earlier years, our school of theology in Maynooth. For, in this respect, as those who are familiar with the early history of the College are aware, Maynooth is, if it be possible, even more thoroughly proof against the allegation of "Gallicanism" than, as I have shown, she undoubtedly is in regard to her school of Dogmatic Theology.

Let us consider for a moment the incident of the rebuke administered by one of the Professors of Theology, as mentioned by the writer of the Article, in the case of a student who had quoted some opinion of Saint—or, as he then was, the Blessed—Alphonsus. The name of the Professor is not mentioned in the Article; but as the incident is one with which we are all familiar, as handed down by tradition among the College *notabilia* of former days, I fortunately have no difficulty in supplying the omission, and in stating that the Professor in question—Dr. Magennis—was one, the mere mention of whose name is sufficient, in the minds of all who knew him, to overturn at once the entire structure so carefully built up in the Article, as to the connection of the rigid principles of our school of Moral Theology, with the alleged predominating influence of "Gallicanism" in the College. Noted among the Professors of his day, as Dr. Magennis was, for the decided, not to say extreme, character of his views on every subject of which he undertook to treat, and for the emphasis of the language in which he usually gave expression to them, he was, I am assured, not more decided in his views or more emphatic in his language on any other topic than in his outspoken maintenance of unmistakably "Ultramontane" opinions in Theology. It is, indeed, a somewhat curious coincidence that of the many interesting and valuable communications I have received from Irish priests, old students of *Alma Mater*, bearing to me the expression of kindly wishes, and directing my attention to sources of evidence and to facts that might prove useful in her defence, the last is one that has reached me only to-day, the writer of which says—"When I was reading my first year's Theology, under Professor Magennis—now over forty years ago—he one day denounced Gallicanism in the most earnest manner and in the strongest language. Having given us a thorough history and explanation of the matter, he concluded by saying—'This, gentlemen, is what is called Gallican liberty, but what I call Gallican slavery.'" Applicable then to "Gallicanism" as

such epithets as "intolerant," and "unreasoning" may be, their application will have to be justified on some other grounds than the rigorism—however we may deplore it—of so decided an anti-Gallican as Dr. Magennis of Maynooth.

Thus then we are brought face to face with the question, What influence was it that so favoured the more rigid views, as to secure their acceptance as the groundwork of the Moral Theology of Maynooth, and to enrol under the standard of Antiprobabilism men who otherwise differed so widely as the refugee Doctors of the Sorbonne and their Ultramontane "pupil"?

The answer to this question will come, I have no doubt, on many as a startling surprise. Hitherto, I dare say, it has been known to few besides the older members of our College community. But for many reasons I am satisfied that the time has come to make publicly known, as I am now afforded a singularly favourable opportunity of doing, that the influence which guided—and we need have no doubt in the circumstances wisely guided—the footsteps of our infant school of Moral Theology in the direction of the more rigid, rather than of the milder, views of Christian morality, was an influence that was not likely in Maynooth, or in Ireland, to be disregarded, or to be lightly shaken off—the influence of the voice of the Holy See, speaking to us, all but directly, through its official organ the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda.

And here perhaps it may be well to make mention of a fact that probably is but little known except to those who have been led in the discharge of their professional duty as Professors of Theology to investigate the history, in its varying phases, of the prominence attained at various periods of the Church's history, now by one, now by the other, of the great rival schools in Moral Theology.

It is not easy indeed now to realize it, but it is nevertheless an unquestionable fact, that the period is by no means remote when even in Rome, and in Colleges, like that of Propaganda, most directly subject to the personal influence of the Sovereign Pontiff, the class book—not merely in use, but held in high esteem—was the Moral Theology of Antoine, a work in which the views of a decidedly advanced section of the "rigid" school were propounded, and those of the "moderate" theologians, even to their fundamental tenet of Probabilism, were repudiated and refuted as carefully and as emphatically as might have been looked for in the writings of Anglade or of Delahogue himself. Antoine, in his Treatise did not of course deny that the following of our Lord is described by Himself as a "jugum suave." But, as he expresses it when answering, in his defence of Antiprobabilism, an argument deduced by the Pro-

babilist writers, in favour of their moral system, from those consoling words of our Lord: "*Jugum Christi est equidem suave; sed non per laxitatem doctrinæ.*" Such then was the tendency and teaching of a work which, until a comparatively recent date, was in daily use as a class book by the Professors and students of the Propaganda and of other Colleges in Rome—a testimony of high approval, intensified not lightly by the fact that the edition which was thus used, and from which I have just quoted, bore upon its title-page and in its introductory leaves, a formal announcement that it had been specially prepared for the use of the students of Propaganda,* under the personal sanction of so learned a Pontiff as Benedict XIV.†

It is in fact no exaggeration to say that at the time of the foundation of our College and for long afterwards, the "rigid" theology was as carefully cultivated in some of the Roman schools as even the learned writer of the Article himself could have imagined the Gallican dogmas ever to have been in Maynooth. The Colleges of the city comprised in fact two sets of schools in Moral Theology, the "rigid" and the "moderate," as clearly marked in their characteristics, and as definitely localized, as were the schools of the Thomists and the Scotists, the Augustinians and the Jesuits, in regard to certain disputed points in dogmatic theology. Hence warm discussions,

* In his introductory letter to Benedict XIV., the Editor refers to the high esteem into which Antoine's work had come, in no small degree as the result of the commendation of his Holiness, "quo," he says, "*præ ceteris digna habita est quæ in Collegio de Propaganda Fide adolescentibus ad sacras missiones destinandis explicaretur.*"

† Towards the end of the article in the October number of the REVIEW, the learned writer speaks of "*Benedict XIV. and St. Alphonsus Liguori*" as "two names standing for more in theology than all the rigorist writers together," and of having by their "authority" and their "arguments" "finally excluded rigorism from the schools."

He surely cannot have been aware of the fact mentioned above. Indeed, but for his reference to the work "*De Synodo Diocesana*," I should have supposed that the name of Benedict XIV. was thus introduced by a slip of the pen, in place of some other name intended by the writer. Benedict XIV. was most decidedly not an advocate of the "moderate" views: on the contrary, his leaning, as can easily be inferred from his writings, is unmistakably in the opposite direction.

As to "the whole of the eleventh book of his *Synodus Diocesana*" being "devoted to the confutation of rigid opinions," I cannot even conceive on what grounds the statement has been made. There is certainly no foundation for it in the work itself. In the edition now before me, the book in question occupies 172 pages. The first seven chapters, occupying 109 pages, have reference to a totally different subject. The remaining seven chapters, thus occupying 63 pages, are no doubt occupied with the examination of questions as to the alleged undue rigour of certain Episcopal decrees. But of the entire seven, no fewer than five, occupying 44 pages out of the entire 63—so far from being written in support of the allegations

when the occasion presented itself, in the Conferences of the Roman clergy, on such questions as the granting of absolution to children of tender years—discussions, no less warm, in the more restricted circle of one or another of the national Colleges, among those who, as priests or as students, had been indoctrinated in the moral teaching of schools representing conflicting views on this and similar questions—were, I am assured by one who lived as a priest in Rome, not more than forty years ago, incidents by no means of rare occurrence, even at that comparatively recent period. And if we go still further back, for thirty or forty years, to the time when Maynooth was founded, we come upon a period when the Antiprobabilist and rigid views were sustained by influence so strong and so widespread that it would have needed all the theological instinct of a great Saint and Doctor of the Church like Saint Alphonsus himself, to foresee that within so short a period as has since elapsed they would have been practically banished from the schools.

It was then at a time when the actual position and future prospects of the conflict between Probabilism and Antiprobabilism, with their attendant sequels of “moderate” and “rigid” views throughout the entire field of morals, were involved in deep obscurity, that the opening of the new theological school of Maynooth, and the direction to be given to its teaching, occupied the anxious thoughts of the Bishops of Ireland.

Bearing in mind, indeed, the circumstances of that troubled

in question, and thus of the more “moderate” views—are occupied with an elaborate defence of those Episcopal enactments, and in confutation of the charge of undue rigour brought against them! Thus then there remain but two chapters—occupying 19 pages out of the entire 172—which could by any possibility be regarded as affording any shadow of foundation for the statement made regarding the whole book: and even those chapters do not, *except in one solitary point*, deal with the theological question, properly so called, as to the general existence or non-existence of an obligation, but discuss solely the propriety of the action of a certain Bishop in introducing the obligation in diocesan Synod, by a legislative act of his own. I should perhaps add that there is not throughout the entire Treatise referred to, any other Book to which the statement could be regarded as intended to refer.

A singular commentary on the other statement, that “everywhere throughout his writings Benedict XIV. quotes with respect and approbation the representatives of benign opinions,” is furnished by the fact that the learned Pontiff is, on the contrary, specially remarkable for the respect and approbation with which he quotes the writings, not merely of moderately “rigorous” writers, but even of those who for their rigour are classed among the representatives of the Jansenist school. I need mention the name only of Van Espen, and refer to the terms of characteristically strong emphasis in which Father Ballerini, in his *Notes on Gury* (Part ii. § 778), has expressed his disapproval of this feature of the writings of Benedict XIV.

time, we may well doubt if the thought had even occurred to any Bishop in Ireland that the standard of Probabilism and of moderate views should be set up in the new College. But we can have no doubt that if such a thought had been for a moment entertained, it was promptly abandoned on the receipt of the first official communication from the Holy See to the Episcopal Trustees of the College. I have already referred to this letter in connection with another point: we shall now see that it is a document of no less avail to us as regards the moral, than as regards the dogmatic, teaching of the College.

The official instruction conveyed by it to the Bishops is definite and unmistakable. It is no homily on the text of the "*jugum suave*." Nor does it give the uncertain sound of a vague admonition to steer a safe middle course between the excessive laxity of some and the excessive rigour of others. It warns the Bishops of one danger only, the danger on the "liberal" side, admonishing them merely to take heed that "the excessive and wanton *liberality* of some in laying down the rules of morals" shall be so "*avoided*," that "the mildness and suavity of Evangelical charity *shall never be dissociated from that salutary severity which is characteristic of Christian teaching*."*

In the circumstances of the time such an admonition could have had but one meaning. But if any doubt were possible as to the "*salutary severity*" to which the Cardinal Prefect referred, it would have been dispelled by the knowledge of the fact that the Cardinal Prefect himself was an advocate, by no means undistinguished in the schools, of the more rigid or Antiprobabilist views—a fact of which no moral theologian will call for ampler evidence than is presented by the Treatises on Human Acts and on Conscience, in the tenth volume of the ordinary twenty volume edition of his Eminence's erudite and well-known works.

Moreover I should mention that in addition to the letter of the Cardinal Prefect, an indication, if possible more decisive, of the leaning of the authorities at Propaganda, was conveyed to the Bishops by the gift, for the use of the College of a large number of copies of the "*rigid*" and "*Antiprobabilist*" *Treatise of Moral Theology by Antoine*, to which I have already had occasion more than once to refer.†

* Letter of the Cardinal Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda to the Episcopal Trustees of Maynooth College, 19th July, 1796.

† In the Catalogue of Authors, prefixed by the Redemptorist Father, Haringer, to the Ratisbon edition of the Moral Theology of Saint Alphonsus, published in 1846, the name of Antoine is marked with the symbol * † employed by the learned compiler to designate "*auctores*

Such then is the true story of the origin of that tendency to the more rigid opinions, which no doubt for many years in its earlier history characterized the teaching of Maynooth. And painful as this controversy has been to me, I cannot but feel that it has had at least this one aspect that I am able to contemplate without regret. It has given me an opportunity to bring forward, and place on record, as I have now done to the best of my ability, the evidence that will, I trust for ever, dissipate the idea—entertained, as I have discovered, by many who have studied in the College in comparatively recent times—that our school of Moral Theology had during no short period of its early history remained subject to an influence that from its infancy had given to it a direction at variance with the mind of Rome.*

And may I not ask what now are we to think of the statement with which I undertook to deal in this section of my letter, and which indeed so many kind friends of *Alma Mater* had assured me was the only allegation in the Article that could present any difficulty to me in my reply, that in regard to the “notable departure of the Theology of the French Church from the common teaching,” “in the excessive rigour of its moral theology,” the schools of Maynooth, and through them the Irish Priesthood, *of course* imbibed the French ethics *from the same source* that had imparted to them the French dogma? We now know that “the French ethics,” with its rigour which at present seems to us so excessive, was imbibed from the Moral Theology of Antoine, which had been the College class-book for many years, and which had come to us from Rome herself.†

rigidos.” And Antoine is explicitly, and indeed most justly, described as an “auctor valde rigidæ sententiæ.”

Gury, in his List of Authors, gives the following description:—“In severiores generatim doctrinas propendit ultra modum.”

Saint Alphonsus repeatedly refers to him as a decidedly advanced “rigidist.” Thus, for instance in the *Homo Apostolicus*, Tract. 16. n. 108, Antoine and Habert are cited as “auctores doctrinæ valde rigidioris.” And in the “Moral Theology” (Lib. 6. n. 505.), he is cited thus:—“Antoine qui inter rigidos auctores nostri temporis non infimum habet locum.”

* Since this was written, I have received a letter from the Rector of the Irish College in Rome, stating that he has ascertained, by careful inquiry, that Antoine was the text-book at Propaganda certainly as recently as 1830, and perhaps later.

† A revered Irish Bishop wrote to me thus, a few days ago:—

“I can say that when I was a student in Maynooth, *Gallicanism* was not taught, nor, as far as I know, held by any of the College authorities.

“The only Professor who could be charged with what is called “Gallican” strictness in Moral Theology was the Professor of the first year’s class of Theology, Dr. Magennis, with whom Antoine was a favourite.

“But on such questions as the infallibility and authority of the Pope,

§ 6. Conclusion.

Little more remains for me to add except indeed to express my thanks for the kindness which has afforded me the opportunity of placing before the readers of the DUBLIN REVIEW this statement of the justification on which the College relies.

I have throughout endeavoured—and I trust not unsuccessfully—to keep within the terms of the only restriction that accompanied the editorial intimation, so kindly given, of compliance with my request that such an opportunity should be afforded. I have abstained from “breaking new ground,” and have confined myself to “a refutation of the statements made in the October number of the REVIEW, in regard to the theological teaching of the College within the period therein specified.”

I trust I am not over sanguine in my hope that the public have heard the last of this unpleasant discussion. I am not indeed without some confidence that the learned writer of the Article will himself feel satisfied that its statements cannot be maintained. The actual testimony of those very professors of theology, whose teaching has been called in question—especially when we bear in mind that this testimony was given in a direction altogether divergent from that of prejudice and of personal interest—ought surely to be accepted as conclusive on that branch of the case which regarded the doctrines that they taught. And no less confidently may I claim that, on the other branch of it regarding the source from which those

he was certainly most sound; so, I need not tell you, were the others, Doctors O'Hanlon, Carew, McNally,” &c.

This testimony is important in more ways than one. First, it puts into plain words the idea that exists in a more or less hazy form in many minds, as to the teaching of the College having once been “Gallican” in Moral Theology. Its teaching was Gallican, inasmuch as it retained the spirit of Antoine—the class book sent to us from Rome. Antoine, no doubt, was a Frenchman and a “rigidist”; but he was, in the technical sense of the term, no more of a “Gallican,” than Fénelon, or M. Louis Veuillot.

Moreover the testimony is important inasmuch as it deals with the very period that has been singled out for special denunciation by the learned writer of the Article. The Professor of Moral Theology referred to as noted for his advocacy of “rigid” opinions, is the same who was introduced to the readers of the DUBLIN REVIEW, as “only the pupil” of “the Frenchmen,” and as consequently justifying, by his strange and unhappy words in regard to the “Blessed Alphonsus,” the reviewer's application to “Gallicanism,” of the epithets “unreasoning” and “intolerant.”

Facts such as this—and I could, if space permitted, adduce many similar instances—may help me in endeavouring to convince the learned writer of the Article, of the impossibility of writing of Maynooth as he has done, without referring, of necessity, to many members of “the existing priesthood and Episcopacy of Ireland.”

principles that unquestionably influenced the Moral teaching of the College were imbibed, the unimpeachable testimony of contemporary documents shall be regarded as no less conclusive. At all events I feel that if I have not succeeded by this twofold array of evidence in bringing home conviction to the minds of all whose interest in the maintenance of the reputation of the College has led them to follow the course of this lengthened discussion, it would be utter waste of time on my part, and a most unjustifiable demand on the kindness of the Editor of the DUBLIN REVIEW, for me to think of prolonging this controversy by another letter or another line.

So far as I am concerned, then, the controversy is at an end. In this I speak, of course, in reference solely to the statements already publicly made, with which alone I have felt called upon to deal. But I feel confident that even if their learned author should deem it advisable to prolong, by another letter, the discussion he has raised, the observance of the same editorial rule which so far has exercised its salutary influence in keeping the discussion within its original bounds, will preclude the possibility of its entering upon any new phase which would involve the necessity of a further reply on behalf of the College. The statements to which I have taken exception are singularly clear and circumstantial. I claim to have thoroughly disproved them. I am confident they will not be reaffirmed. And I most earnestly trust that if they be withdrawn, it will not be to replace them by others—whether substantially different, or differing from them only as modified statements of what they so emphatically and so circumstantially allege—a result which, of course, could not fail to impose upon me the doubly painful duty of a further reply.

Even at the risk of seeming unduly to prolong this letter, I do not wish to bring it to a close without assuring the learned writer of the Article that on one point at least he need not fear that any possibility of misconception exists which should render it necessary for him to reiterate an assurance he has already so formally and so unreservedly given. He has publicly stated that in his Article he had no thought of writing anything derogatory to Maynooth; that, on the contrary, he meant rather to exalt the College; that his object in writing was to do honour to the living, and that he conceived he was doing so without in any way throwing discredit on the dead. He had no doubt charged them with having not only taught, but carefully cultivated, the theological system whose authorized exposition is the Gallican Declaration of 1682; but even in this he did not consider he was discrediting them, for in his view

of "Gallicanism," it was not "forty or fifty years ago"—that is to say, from 1829 to 1839—"in such bad odour as it is at present, now that it has been repudiated by the Church of France."

All these assurances, so frankly tendered, I feel confident that I, on the part of the College, am justified in most unreservedly accepting. Indeed it is not too much for me to say that I know of no one to whom it should not be matter for regret that anything should have occurred in connection with this painful controversy, that could have even suggested the idea that any such assurance should not be regarded as altogether superfluous. But, at the same time, I must ask to have it remembered that the question involved is not a question of intention, but of actual statements, most publicly made, and again and again reiterated; that those statements did not regard the theological aspect, odious or otherwise, of "Gallicanism," but the alleged "fact" that it had been taught, and even "carefully cultivated" in our College; and that the prompt denial, and now the explicit refutation, with which I have felt it my duty to meet these statements, are but the natural results of my knowledge of how utterly at variance those statements were with historical fact,* and how injurious to the reputation of our theological school they are deemed to be by many of its oldest living *alumni*.

By one of these my attention has recently been directed to a testimony of vital importance in this controversy—the evidence given by the late Most Rev. Dr. Furlong, when he was examined, as one of the then Professors of Theology, before the Maynooth Commissioners of 1853. By a fortunate coincidence it happens that he had been examined also before the previous Commission of 1826. Here then we have a witness with whose testimony I may well bring this letter to a close. His

* At a risk of retracing to some extent my steps over ground already traversed, I wish to insert here a reference to a truly invaluable piece of evidence, which has just been placed in my hands by a venerable priest who was a student of the Dunboyne Establishment more than fifty years ago.

It contains the "Theses" selected for public defence by the Dunboyne students in the year 1819. As regards the doctrine of the Infallibility of the Pope, the proposition is worded in exact conformity with that in Dr. Delahogue's Treatise. And it is immediately preceded by a thesis affirming—in direct contravention of the Second Gallican Article—the supreme authority of the Pope, *in universam Ecclesiam*—that is to say, over the entire Church, not merely as regards its *individual* members, but in its *collective* capacity in the widest sense.

Dr. Murray in the *Prænotanda* to the very proposition selected from his treatise on the Church, by the writer of the article, as conclusive evidence on the thorough revolution that had taken place in the teaching of

first examination was at a date anterior to that "forty or fifty years ago" to which I have just now referred; and he was then a student of the Dunboyne Establishment, having fully completed his College course, commenced so far back as the year 1818. His second examination was in 1853—a date decidedly subsequent to that supposed revolution in the teaching of the College, the result of the struggle described in the fancy sketch of the learned writer of the Article, in which he represents the Professors of Theology as "forcing their way through the lines of Gallicanism," and thus effecting "a successful junction with the grand theological army of the Catholic Church." At all events, we need not be surprised to find that Dr. Furlong was appealed to by the Commissioners of 1853 as a witness of great experience. Here then is his testimony:—

You were examined before the former Commission, were you not?—Yes.

You have now had a considerable experience of the College: Is there any change in the class of doctrines taught upon dubious points within your knowledge?—*I know of none.*

The same spirit prevails now which did at the time of the former investigation?—*Yes; I am not aware of any difference, save that a more decided bias prevails generally in favour of the infallibility of the Pope and his authority in spiritual matters.*

Here then we have the conclusive testimony of a witness speaking from actual personal knowledge of the two periods which it was the aim of the article in the October number of the REVIEW to bring into such sharp contrast. He, though he had lived in the College as student from 1818 to 1825, as Dunboyne student from 1825 to 1827, as Dean from 1827 to 1834, as Professor of Rhetoric from 1834 to 1845, and as Professor of Theology from 1845 to the date of his examination in 1853, knew nothing of the deadly conflict which the learned

the College from its early days—the Proposition affirming the supremacy of the Pope over the entire Church even in its collective capacity—tells us with his usual clearness that the distinctive note of the Gallican doctrine on this point was their refusal to adopt the phrase in *universam Ecclesiam*, insisting, as they did, that the Pope, though superior to each portion of the Church throughout its entire extent, in *universa Ecclesia* did not possess jurisdiction over the universal Church—in *universam Ecclesiam*—as a whole. (*Tract. de Ecclesia*, tom. iii. p. 747.)

In this phrase, in fact, we have as distinctive a note of anti-Gallican teaching on the really fundamental point at issue in the controversy, as the word *homousios* or *consubstantialis* is in the rejection of Arianism.

And this distinct, unmistakable, rejection of the Gallican theory we now find recorded in the most authentic and trustworthy source of evidence—the Thesis Book of the Dunboyne Students in the year 1819.

writer of the Article so graphically describes as having been fought out within the College at some date, not specified indeed except by vague reference to the fifth decade of this century, but thus necessarily comprised within the period covered by Dr. Furlong's experience. Yet Dr. Furlong knew of "no change" in the class of "doctrines taught in the College" through all that long experience, from first to last. *More decided*, no doubt, as we have already seen, had become what he describes as the *bias* in favour of the doctrine of the Pope's infallibility: this was, of course, the natural tendency of the train of thought sure to prevail in any Irish Theological College where free scope was afforded for its development; and the incident mentioned in the earlier portion of this letter shows at what an early date in our history that full development was attained in Maynooth.

Thus, then, I bring my Paper to a close. I cannot do so without an expression of the deep regret which, in common, I am sure, with all who are zealous for the honour of *Alma Mater*, I feel that, especially on an occasion such as this, she should have been deprived of the services of one who could have sustained her cause in a manner worthy of its greatness. But, fortunately for her fame, it was a case in which there was little need for aids that are beyond my reach to furnish—for the graces of rhetoric or the resources of literary skill; and in which, therefore, without much risk of disaster, she might afford to dispense with the pleading of an abler advocate, and to rest satisfied with the only service that it has been in my power to render—a plain, straightforward statement of the evidence on which she relies.

WILLIAM J. WALSH,
Vice-President of St. Patrick's College, Maynooth.

LETTERS OF POPE LEO XIII.

LETTER ON THE STUDY OF ST. THOMAS OF AQUIN,
AND A NEW EDITION OF HIS WORKS.

*Venerabili Fratri nostro Antonino Episcopo Prænestino,
S. R. E. Cardinali de Luca, Sacro consilio Studiis regundis præfecto,*

LEO PAPA XIII.

VENERABILIS FRATER NOSTER SALUTEM ET APOSTOLICAM BENEDICTIONEM.

JAMPRIDEM considerando experiendoque intelleximus, teterrimum quod adversus Ecclesiam ipsamque humanam societatem modo geritur bellum, citius feliciusque, opitulante Deo, componi non posse, quam rectis sciendi agendique principiis per philosophicas disciplinas ubilibet restitutis; ideoque ad summam totius causæ pertinere sanam solidamque ubique locorum refluere philosophiam. Litteras idcirco Encyclicas ad universos catholici orbis Antistites nuper dedimus, quibus pluribus ostendimus hujus generis utilitatem non esse alibi quærendam, quam in philosophia christiana a priscis Ecclesiæ Patribus procreata et educta, quæ fidei catholicæ non modo maxime convenit, sed etiam defensionis et luminis utilia adjumenta præbet. Eam ipsam, decursu ætatum, magnis fecundam fructibus a S. Thoma Aquinate, summo Scholasticorum Magistro, quasi hereditario jure acceptam commemoravimus; in eaque ordinanda illustranda et augenda mentis illius vim virtutemque sic enituisse, ut cognominis sui mensuram Angelicus Doctor cumulate implemisse videatur. Majorem autem in modum Episcopos hortati sumus ut, collatis Nobiscum viribus, excitare aggrediantur motam gradu et prope collapsam philosophiam illam veterem, scholique catholicis redonatam, in sede honoris pristini collocare.

Nec mediocrem animi lætitiā ex eo percepimus, quod Litteræ illæ Nostræ, divina ope favente, primum ubique obsequium et singularem animorum assensum nactæ sunt. Cujus rei testimonium Nobis luculentum impertiant plures Episcoporum ad Nos ex Italia præsertim, ex Gallia, Hispania, Hibernia, perlatae epistolæ, sive singulares, sive plurium ejusdem provinciae vel gentis communes, egregia animi sensa præferentes. Nec doctorum hominum suffragium defuit, ultro et reverenter datum, cum insignes eruditorum Academiae eundem plane ac Sacrorum Antistites animum Nobis scripto declaraverint.—In his autem litteris placet maxime obsequium auctoritati Nostræ et huic Apostolicæ Sedi præstitum; placent mens et judicia ab auctoribus prolata. Una est enim omnium vox, una sententia, notari et tuto designari Litteris illis Nostris quo tandem loco sit præsentium malorum radix, et unde petenda remedia. Omnes consentiunt humanam rationem, si a divina fidei auctoritate discesserit, dubitationum fluctibus et præsentissimis errorum periculis esse propositam; hæc

autem pericula facile evasuram, si ad catholicam philosophiam homines perfugerint.

Quamobrem, Venerabilis Frater Noster, illud Nobis est magnopere in optatis, ut S. Thomæ doctrina, fidei veritati apprimè conformis, cum in omnibus catholicis Athenæis quamprimum reviviscat, tum maxime in hac Urbe, principe catholici nominis, quæ ob eam causam, quod est sedes Pontificis Maximi, debet optimarum doctrinarum laude ceteris antecellere.—Huc accedit quod Romam, catholicæ unitatis centrum, soleant adolescentes ex omni terrarum loco frequentes celebrare, nullibi, quam penes augustam B. Petri cathedram, germanam incorruptamque sapientiam satius hausturi. Itaque si philosophiæ christianæ, quam diximus, largiter hinc copia defluerit, non unius Urbis finibus conclusa tenebitur, sed ad omnes populos, velut abundantissimus amnis, manabit.

Sic igitur primo loco curavimus ut in Seminario Romano, in Lyceo Gregoriano, in Urbaniano aliisque Collegiis, Nostræ adhuc auctoritati obnoxii, philosophicæ disciplinæ secundum mentem et principia Doctoris Angelici, enucleatæ dilucide, copiose tradantur atque excolantur. Et maxime in hoc omnem vigilare curam et contentionem doctorum volumus, ut quas ipsi doctrinæ opes ex voluminibus sancti Thomæ diligenter collegerint, easdem explicando, dilatando, suaviter, et fructuose auditoribus impertiant.

Sed præterea quo magis hæc studia vigeant et floreant, curandum est ut amatores philosophiæ Scholasticæ in ejus gratiam sedulo, quod possunt, entantur; maxime autem in societates coeant, cætusque identidem habeant, in quibus studiorum suorum fructus singuli in medium adducant, et in communem afferant utilitatem.

Hæc autem judicia mentemque nostram Tecum communicare volumus, Venerabilis Frater Noster, qui sacro Consilio præes studiis disciplinarum regundis, certa spe freti, nec industriam, nec prudentiam Tuam hac in re Nobis defuturam.—Te profecto non latet doctorum hominum cætus sive Academias, nobilissimas veluti palæstras fuisse, in quibus viri ingenio peracri et doctrina præstantes cum se ipsi utiliter exercerent de maximis rebus scribentes ac disputantes, tum adolescentes erudirent, magno cum scientiarum incremento. Ex hoc optimo more institutoque jungendi vires et intelligentiæ lumina conferendi, extiterunt illustria Doctorum collegia, alia pluribus simul disciplinis addicta, alia singularibus. Vivax fama et gloria eorum permansit, quæ, Romanis Pontificibus non uno nomine faventibus, ubique floruerunt, ut in hac Italia nostra, Bononiæ, Patavii, Salerni, et alibi alia. Cum igitur tanta fuerit laus et utilitas in voluntariis hisce hominum cœtibus ad excolendas perpoliendasque disciplinas coeuntium, cumque ejus utilitatis et laudis plurimum adhuc supersit, certum Nobis est eodem uti præsidio, quo consilia Nostra plenius perficiamus.—Scilicet auctores sumus, ut cœtus Academicus in Urbe Roma instituatur, qui S. Thomæ Aquinatis nomine et patronatu insignis, eo studia industriamque convertat, ut ejus opera explanet, illustret; placita exponat et cum aliorum philosophorum sive veterum sive recentium placitis conferat; vim sententiarum earumque rationes demonstret; salutarem doctrinam pro-

pagare, et ad grassantium errorum refutationem recensque inventorum illustrationem adhibere contendat.—Idcirco Tibi, Venerabilis Frater Noster,¹ cuius perspecta habemus ornamenta doctrinæ, celeritatem ingenii, studiumque rerum omnium quæ ad humanitatem pertinent, id negotii damus ut propositum Nostrum exequaris. Interim rem altius consideres; cumque rationem excogitaveris quæ consiliis Nostris opportune respondeat, litteris expressam Nobis inspicendam subijcies ut probemus et auctoritate Nostra muniamus.

Demum quo latius spargatur ac disseminetur Angelici Doctoris sapientia, constituimus omnia ejus opera de integro in lucem edere, exemplo S. Pii V, Decessoris Nostri, rerum gestarum gloria et vitæ sanctitate præclari; cui quidem in ea tam felix contigit exitus, ut Thomæ exemplaria jussu illius evulgata, permagni sint apud viros doctos, summoque studio requirantur. Verum quanto plus editio illa est rara tanto magis alia desiderari coepta, quæ nobilitate ac præstantia cum Piana comparari possit. Ceteræ enim cum veteres tum recentiores, partim quod non omnia S. Thomæ scripta exhibeant, partim quod optimorum ejus interpretum atque explanatorum careant commentariis, partim quod minus diligenter adornatæ sint, non omne tulisse punctum videntur. Certa autem spes est, hujusmodi necessitati consultum iri per novam editionem quæ cuncta omnino sancti Doctoris scripta complectatur, optimis, quoad fieri poterit, formis litterarum expressa, accurateque emendata; iis etiam adhibitis codicum manu scriptorum subsidiis, quæ ætate hac nostra in lucem et usum prolata sunt. Con-junctim vero edendas curabimus clarissimorum ejus interpretum, ut Thomæ de Vio Cardinalis Cajetani et Ferrariensis, lucubrationes, per quas, tamquam per uberes rivulos, tanti viri doctrina decurrit. Obversantur quidem animo rei gerendæ cum magnitudo, tum difficultas; nec tamen deterrent quominus ad eam magna cum alacritate quamprimum aggrediamur. Confidimus enim in re tam gravi, quæ ad commune Ecclesiæ bonum magnopere pertinet, adfore Nobis divinam opem et concors Episcoporum studium, et prudentiam atque industriam Tuam, spectatam jam et diu cognitam.

Interim præcipuæ dilectionis testem, Apostolicam benedictionem Tibi, Venerabilis Frater Noster, ex intimo cordis affectu impertimus.

Datum Romæ apud S. Petrum, die 15 Octobris an. 1879, Pontificatus Nostri Anno Secundo.

LEO PP. XIII.

LETTER ON THE WORKS OF ST. ALFONSO.

*Dilectis Filiis LEOPOLDO JOSEPHO DUJARDIN et JULIO JACQUES,
Presbyteris e Congregatione Sanctissimi Redemptoris.*

LEO PP XIII.

DILECTI FILII, SALUTEM ET APOSTOLICAM BENEDICTIONEM.

LICET universum iam orbem pervaserint, non sine amplissimo christianæ rei emolumento, scripta Sancti Doctoris Alphonsi Mariæ de Ligorio, dilecti filii, ea tamen magis adhuc magisque vul-

gari desiderandum est et ad manus omnium traduci. Scitissime nam Ille catholicas veritates omnium captui accommodavit, omnium morali regimini prospexit, mirifice pietatem omnium excitavit, et, "in media saeculi nocte errantibus viam ostendit, qua, eruti de potestate tenebrarum, transire possent in Dei lumen et regnum." Et sane firmis-
simis argumentis divinam revelationem munivit contra Deistas; veritatem Fidei nostrae strenue defendit; efficacissime asseruit Immaculatum Deiparae Conceptum; nervosissime propugnavit Romani Pontificis Primatum et Infallibile Magisterium; divinae Providentiae consilia in comparanda per Iesum Christum hominum salute docte pieque illustravit; Psalmos et Cantica aptissimis ad fovendam Clericorum pietatem commentariis exposuit; Ecclesiae gloriam ostendit in triumphis Martyrum; editis historia Haeresum et Opere Dogmatico acriter perstrinxit haereses omnes, sed praesertim Jansenianos et Febronianos profligavit errores tunc maxime gliscentes, et monstrosarum illa opinionum segete graves, qua nunc religiosae civilisque societatis fundamenta quatuntur: et quam ipse iam tunc ea perspicacia fuit insectatus, ut pleraeque e *propositionibus* post saeculum in *Syllabo* damnatae ab eius scriptis nominatim refutatae conspiciantur: imo "praedicari verissime possit, nullum esse nostrorum temporum errorem, qui, maxima saltem ex parte, non sit ab Alphonso refutatus." Et ne quid dicamus de Morali Theologia ubique terrarum celebratissima tutamque plane praebente normam quam conscientiae moderatores sequantur, frigescentem Ipse caritatem per crebras doctasque lucubrationes asceticas, veluti subditis igniculis, fovit, aluit, provexit; ac praesertim erga Dominum Nostrum Iesum Christum eiusque dulcissimam Matrem, quorum amore, miro cum fidelium profectu rigentia quoque corda succendit. Et in hisce omnibus "illud in primis notatu dignum est, quod, licet copiosissime scripserit, eiusdem tamen opera inoffenso prorsus pede percurri a fidelibus posse, post diligens institutum examen, perspectum fuerit." Gratulamur itaque, dilecti filii, vos dogmatica omnia et ascetica sanctissimi et doctissimi Parentis vestri scripta, sive latine sive italice edita, in gallicam vertisse linguam, tum quia haec omnibus ferme populis nota latius proferre poterit fructus laborum egregii Doctoris, tum quia vobis potissimum arduum id munus demandatum fuit, qui et alias iam de indole, doctrina, sanctitate eorumdem operum scribere debuistis, et, uti filii facilius et plenius aliis assequi poteratis spiritum Parentis. Imo ipsi quoque gratulamur incepto vestro, eo nomine, quod cum Sanctus Auctor saepe in scriptis suis Angeli Scholarum doctrinam se sequutum fuisse gloriatur; ex huiusmodi recentioris Ecclesiae Doctoris erga illum obsequio nova Sancti Thomae doctrinae laus accedat et gloria, quae gravius etiam commendat instaurationem illam christianae philosophiae, quam Nos studiosissime per recentes encyclicas litteras Nostras ad Angelici Doctoris mentem exigendam suasimus. Successum itaque nuperae isti operum Sancti Alphonsi editioni* ominamur amplissimum

* "Œuvres complètes, dogmatiques et ascétiques, de St. Alphonse de Liguori." Traduites par les Pères Dujardin et Jacques de la Congrégation du très Saint Rédempteur. Twenty-eight volumes. Casterman, Tournai.

Nostrisque et votis vestris plane respondentem; ac interim superni favoris auspicem vobis, dilecti filii, ac toti Sanctissimi Redemptoris Congregationi Benedictionem Apostolicam paternae Nostrae benevolentiae testem peramanter impertimur.

Datum Romae apud Sanctum Petrum, die 28 Augusti 1879, Pontificatus Nostri anno secundo.

LEO PP. XIII.

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF THE
"SOCIÉTÉ SCIENTIFIQUE" OF BRUSSELS.

*Dilectis Filiis Praesidi ac Membris Societatis Scientificaе Bruxellis
constitutae*

LEO PP. XIII.

DILECTI FILII SALUTEM ET APOSTOLICAM BENEDICTIONEM.

GRATAE Nobis advenerunt litterae vestrae una cum Annalibus et Quaestionibus a vobis editis, quas in obsequentissimum erga Nos et Apostolicam Sedem pietatis testimonium obtulistis. Libenter sane agnovimus Societatem vestram quae a scientiis sibi nomen fecit, et quae tribus tantum abhinc annis laetis auspiciis ac Jesu Christi Vicarii benedictione Bruxellis constituta est, magnum iam incrementum cepisse, et uberes fructus polliceri. Profecto cum infensissimi religionis ac veritatis hostes nunquam desistant, imo magis magisque studeant dissidium rationem inter ac fidem propugnare, opportunum est ut praestantes scientia ac pietate viri ubique exurgant, qui Ecclesiae doctrinis ac documentis ex animo obsequentes, in id contendant, ut demonstrent *nullam unquam inter fidem et rationem veram dissensionem esse posse*; quemadmodum Sacrosancta Vaticana Synodus, constantem Ecclesiae et Sanctorum Patrum doctrinam affirmans, declaravit Constitutione IV^a. de fide catholica. Quapropter gratulamur quod Societas vestra hunc primo finem sibi proposuerit, itemque in statutis legem dederit, ne quid a sociis contra sanam christianae philosophiae doctrinam committatur; simulque omnes hortamur ut nunquam de egregio eiusmodi laudis tramite deflectant, atque ut toto animi nisu praestitutum Societatis finem praeclaris exemplis ac scriptis editis continuo assequi adniantur. Deum autem Optimum Maximum precamur, ut vos omnes caelestibus praesidiis confirmet ac muniat: quorum auspicem, et Nostrae in vos benevolentiae pignus, Apostolicam benedictionem vobis, dilecti filii, et Societati vestrae ex animo impertimur.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum, die 15, Januarii 1879. Pontificatus Nostri Anno Primo.

LEO PP. XIII.

Notices of Catholic Continental Periodicals.

GERMAN PERIODICALS.

(By Dr. BELLESHEIM.)

1. *Katholik.* August—November.

DR. HENSE finishes his speculative treatise on the Fire of Hell. Without failing in respect for the scholastics, he proceeds, in explaining the nature of the fire, from the results obtained by modern science. According to Professor Tyndall it is not only by fire that warmth can be produced, but also by the motion and friction of matter. Fire exerts its power by entering between the parts of which a body is made up, and communicating to them its own movement. The effect is, that whenever the expansion of the body has attained a certain degree, some parts of it will be attracted by oxygen in the air, whilst the remaining parts become coal and ashes. Applying these principles of physics to the Catholic doctrine, we can easily conceive eternal punishment as a fire, although not material, excited and maintained by the vibratory movements of the atmosphere, "as an ocean of fire, burning as long as the movement is kept up." On the other hand, Christian teaching informs us that after the resurrection the bodies of all men will be incorruptible, since by an ordinance of Almighty God their single molecules will cling together with such cohesion as to resist even the most formidable dissolving power. But, for this very reason, the punishment of the damned becomes all the more intense, from the perpetual conflict between the fire, which tends to burn and dissolve them, and the gift of incorruptibility, which neutralizes every opposite power. The idea of some German divines, of a "more spiritual fire," cannot be accepted. Another momentous question, carefully treated by Dr. Hense, touches on the possibility of any *pure spirit* being liable to the torments of fire. Since burning can only be conceived as a movement, and finally as a dissolution and consumption of certain parts of a body, the question arises, how the fire can exert its power on the human soul, which from its very nature, being most simple, excludes composition of parts. We may concede that a material agent like fire, under certain circumstances, could exercise its powers and become, in a certain sense, an impediment to the soul; but we deny that it ever could produce in the human soul, when separated from the body, any *sensitive* pain. To such pain the soul can only be subject when it is in the state of a *forma completa*, united with its complement, the body. After death, of course, it cannot lose its sensitive faculties, since they are rooted in its substance; but what it is temporarily deprived of, is the possibility of making use of them. S. Thomas answers the question, "*Utrum anima separata pati*

possit ab igne corporeo?" in the following words:—"Patiuntur igitur ab igne corporeo substantiæ incorporeæ per modum *alligationis* cujusdam." (Suppl. qu. 70.) The material fire, according to S. Thomas, is like a fetter, detaining the soul in a certain place. It cannot be denied that this punishment is a grievous pain for the spirit, inasmuch as by its nature it can move wherever it likes. Its essence being totally simple and most noble, it necessarily experiences a profound reluctance to be tied down to matter which is not its form. Our author, although fully adopting S. Thomas's doctrine, does not fail to bring into prominence the development it has received from Soto, Suarez, Lessius, and Petavius, who unanimously teach that besides this "imprisonment" caused by the fire, there is also positive pain from the fire.

Professor Brück, of Mayence, author of a well-known class-book of Ecclesiastical History, continues his studies on the Emancipation of Catholics in Great Britain and Ireland. These are very clever and most useful contributions, gathered from a good many English books hitherto almost totally unknown in Germany, and containing excellent lessons for German Catholics in our own days. It is to the so-called Irish Veto that we attach the deepest interest. The English Government was very willing to concede emancipation; but unfortunately this benefit was to depend on certain conditions which gave rise to eager dissensions amongst English Catholics themselves, and between English and Irish Catholics. The Government stretched out one hand to help Catholics, but with the other they sought the right of interfering with the nomination of the Catholic Bishops. In England the Government met with assistance on the part of some Catholics; only one prelate strongly opposed it and fought on the side of the Irish, who declined to accept a State endowment rather than admit any State influence in the appointment of the Bishops. This great man was Bishop Milner, who, after being calumniated and strongly opposed by the opposite side was, on his arrival in Rome, duly praised for his courage and patience by Pius VII. Much confusion was excited and fuel added to the fire by the letters of Mgr. Quarantotti, whilst Pius VII. by his letters, February 1st, 1815, to Archbishop Troy, of Dublin, soothed the passions of the Catholics, by declaring that a Veto could not be denied to the Government of Great Britain, and would not, if duly exercised and within certain limits, endanger the interests of the Church. Most fortunately Catholic Emancipation was obtained from Parliament without any condition, and by a Pontifical decree, dated June 1st, 1829, the so-called "domestic election" of the Bishops was instituted for Ireland. The Irish Veto afterwards at several times came up in the transactions of the Holy See with Prussia, Hanover, and the States of the Ecclesiastical province of the Upper Rhine. The Pope enjoined the Cathedral Chapters not to elect as bishops any person "minus grata" to the Government, and previous to the election to inform themselves about those persons who might be "minus grata" to the Government. In practice the Chapters obeyed

this command of the Pope by sending up to Government a list of the candidates, asking them to expunge those who might not be agreeable. But German Catholics have to complain that, under the influence of political passion and the instigation of hostile lawyers, a new unconditional Veto has been excogitated. Hence the See of Fribourg in Baden is now vacant for more than ten years.

I contributed to the *Katholik* an article "Edinburgh and Presbyterianism," describing the beautiful capital of Scotland and commenting at greater length on the transactions of the "Assemblies" held in Edinburgh during the month of May. I also laid before the Catholic public an exhaustive account of the "Scelta di atti episcopali del Cardinale Gioacchino Pecci Arcivescovo-Vescovo di Perugia, ora Leone XIII. Sommo Pontefice." This precious compilation has been published by special command of the Holy Father, who not only from the exalted position he occupies, but also for the vastness of his learning, his unflinching courage in defending the inalienable rights of the Church, and the sanctity of his life, claims our deepest veneration. The collection consists of homilies, pastoral letters and remonstrances sent either by himself, or in unison with his brothers in the episcopacy, to the Italian Government, which from the very beginning of the new kingdom was very heavy on the diocese of Perugia. Very instructive is the Pastoral Letter on the Temporal Government of the Holy See, and the attempt to establish Protestant schools in Perugia. Worth reading also is the long Pastoral dated March 1st, 1864, "On Errors against Religion and Christian Life." It may justly be styled an anticipation of the "Syllabus Errorum," since it refutes most of the errors condemned in that solemn Pontifical decree. A special interest belongs to the Pastoral "on the position to be held by the clergy in our times." One point prominently insisted on by Cardinal Pecci is the *liberty of the Church*, which, being an institution of the supernatural order, never can degenerate into a mere slave, or instrument (vassallaggio) of any secular power. Lastly, we become acquainted with Cardinal Pecci as patron of the study of S. Thomas's works. He instituted the "Accademia di S. Tommaso" in Perugia, whose statutes are here laid before us.

2.—The *Historisch-politische Blätter* (September-December) afford two contributions by Dr. Zoerg, the principal and well-known editor of this Review. They treat the work of the Rev. Professor Janssen, of Frankfort-on-the-Main—"The History of the German people from the end of the Middle Ages," and Dr. Pastor's "Attempts at Reunion in the Reign of Emperor Charles V." I propose contributing to the next issue of the DUBLIN REVIEW a thorough criticism of Janssen's most learned work, which has been hailed by the whole of Catholic Germany as a first rate specimen of historiography. Dwelling at present on Dr. Pastor's book, I remark that he is a worthy disciple of Professor Janssen: his history of the Reunions breathes the same spirit, and shows similar scholarly attainments. It is gathered from the best sources, at first hand, and from a good many unprinted docu-

ments in Roman and German archives. The several "Interims" are accurately examined, and it is clearly shown that the doctrine of the "justitia imputativa," taught by Gropper at Regensburg, was not of Italian origin, but, on the contrary, due to Albert Pighius, a Flemish divine, the teacher of Gropper himself. We often meet, in the German diets and religious disputations of that time, the name of the future Archbishop of Armagh, Vauchop (Vaucopius, of Dr. Moran, *Spicilegium Ossoriense* I., 13). Dr. Pastor will go on to examine, in the following volumes, the attempts at reunion made afterwards by Bossuet, Spinola, Molanus, and Leibnitz. Owing to the kindness of the late King George V. of Hanover, he will be able to bring out a good many unknown documents. Other articles give lengthy accounts of the late Professor Gfroerer's posthumous work, "Byzantine Histories." This author was a convert from Protestantism and ranks foremost amongst German scholars by his great work, "Gregory VII. and his Time." The second volume of the "Byzantine Histories" consists of two separate parts: the first dwells on the neighbouring peoples, as the Serbs and Bulgarians; the second on the foundation and development of the Eastern Empire. The author lays before us a picture of the Cæsaropapismus, which by degrees poisoned the life of the State, and in this period resulted in those unhappy efforts of iconoclasm which alienated the Italian people from Byzantium, and led to the foundation of the temporal power of the Holy See. Very striking, but very true, is the comparison traced by the author between the condition of the Byzantine Empire under Justinian, and the unhappy state wherein France was plunged by the autocrat, Louis XIV. The third volume describes the condition of the empire from the time of iconoclasm till the downfall of Constantinople.

3.--*Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*. (August—December). F. Bauer continues his instructive comments on the French Jansenists. They published, from 1732, an ecclesiastical review under the name of "Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques," a small paper which went to the utmost lengths in calumniating the church and bishops, and mocking at her institutions. One of the principal editors was Bellegarde du Pac, Canon of Lyons, who, after abdicating his canonry, proceeded once a year to Utrecht, in order to defend the interests of his party. He also often travelled into Austria, where he conversed with the Josephine reformers, chief amongst whom were Van Swieten and Abbot Wittola, editor of the "Vienna Ecclesiastical Gazette," a paper which closely resembled the "Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques." The editor of the French paper was seized and thrown into the Bastille. Afterwards the Review gave rise to a long contest between the king and the parliament of Paris. After the Restoration, the "Nouvelles" came out as "Revue Ecclésiastique," and then as "Observateur Catholique," the principal editor being Abbé Quettée, the author of an ecclesiastical history of France in twelve volumes, which was solemnly condemned by the second provincial Council of Bordeaux, 1850. F. von Hummelauer contributes an essay on "The Christian Past Ages and Physical Science." F. von Hummelauer leads us through all centuries, showing how the

Fathers and Doctors of the Church cherished the study of nature, whilst they protested against those who subjected this noble study to their preconceived theories, and banished the Creator from the work of His hands.

4.—The *Literarische Rundschau* gives a review of F. Nilles's "Kalendarium Manuale Utriusque Ecclesiæ," Vicomte de Meaux' "Luttes Religieuses en France," and Canon Morgott's "Mariology according to S. Thomas of Aquin." I beg to call particularly the attention of the Catholic clergy in England to this valuable book (120 pp., Herder, Freiburg), of which an Italian translation is now in the course of preparation. The author, with incredible diligence, sets forth from the manifold works of S. Thomas whatever the great Doctor has left written about the Mother of God; his book is founded on the great commentators of S. Thomas, whilst modern Italian, German, and Spanish scholars are largely consulted. In regard to the question whether S. Thomas taught the Immaculate Conception or not, Canon Morgott is very successful in proving that the doctrine of the saint, although differing in words from the dogma, can be substantially reconciled with it. The scholastic doctors, as Benedict XIV. remarks, distinguish between "generatio activa et passiva;" by the first, the vegetative and sensitive part of the soul, by the second, the soul as gifted with reason and free will, is infused in the body. The dogmatic Bull of Pius IX., therefore, denying the conception of Mary in original sin refers to the "generatio passiva." S. Thomas, in admitting it, speaks only of the "generatio activa."

ITALIAN PERIODICALS.

La Scuola Cattolica. 31 Ottobre, 1879. Milano.

The Necessity of Public Life.

BOTH the *Civiltà Cattolica* and the *Scuola Cattolica* have been lately treating of the important subject of the intervention of Catholics in public life, the former in its number of October 18th, and the latter in that of October 31st; but, while the article in the *Civiltà Cattolica* treats in particular of the public life of Catholics in Italy, and is addressed as a kind of salutation and encouragement to their brethren about to assemble in the Fifth General Congress at Modena, the article in the *Scuola*, keeping the same object in view, the desirableness, nay, the necessity, of Catholics taking part in public life for the defence of their vital interests, both as members of human society and as Christians, treats the subject in a more general way. It shows, first, the necessity of this public life; next, it inquires who are the persons called upon to have a share in it; and, finally, it points out what ought to be the qualities of the proposed athletes. Under all these heads it has excellent remarks. We must content ourselves with a brief allusion to the second section, where a conclusive reply is given to those who would have the clergy stand entirely aloof from public life, and on no account intervene in any political question. The

writer here points out that the questions which now divide men into two opposite camps can no longer be called political. They are social, moral, and religious. He proceeds to enumerate a few questions which might be regarded as appertaining exclusively to the political domain, and pertinently asks whether such is the field of modern controversy. Everything that concerns human existence in society is now called in question; all is to be recast in a fresh mould. It is no longer a conflict regarding matters of practical detail, the distribution and allotment of duties and rights, but there is a clamour for the abolition of all rights and duties. Marriage, the family, the rights of property, everything which concerns man's social and moral being is menaced. The controversy of the day is, moreover, eminently a religious controversy, since, if heretofore this or that branch of the sacred tree was assailed, either by the pretensions of human reason or by heresy, now it is atheism which would lay the axe to the very root of the tree itself. What means lay instruction, a State without religion, legislation which makes abstraction of all religious belief, humanity constituted as its own end? What does all this mean but the abolition of all religion and the repudiation of Christian principles in the government, in the family, and in every social relation. But are not the clergy the teachers of Christian principles, the natural guardians and judges of religion and morality, whether as applied to government, the family, or the individual? An atheist may deny this; but a Catholic never can without ceasing to be such. The very atheist himself, while denying it in his own person, and rejecting ecclesiastical ministrations for himself, cannot, in virtue of liberty of conscience, which he admits, refuse to recognize in Catholics the right to refer to the clergy in all those matters. The writer then proceeds to show most clearly how the clergy is not a foreign body, something which has, as it were, dropped from another planet, but an organic portion of the nation, sprung from its bosom and united to it in a most intimate manner; that its maxims are the sole civilizing maxims, that its interests are identical with those of morality, order, public and private peace. Or shall it be said, asks the writer, that the clergy are aliens from the nation because the nation has taken to following another road? Could a father be described as having become an alien to his children when they have chosen to leave his house and give themselves over to a licentious life?

30 Septembre. *Administrative Elections of 1879.*

IN the number of the *Scuola Cattolica* for September 30th there is a notice of the last administrative elections, which it had deferred thus late that it might act as an incentive to Catholics now that by means of parochial committees they are about to begin their preparations for next year's elections. Many advantages have been obtained, but greater may be in store if care be taken to avoid the faults that have been committed, and profit be derived from past experience. The administrative elections of 1879 have certainly been far more success-

ful to Catholics than they were during former years. Rome, Venice, Naples, Florence, Palermo, and other minor cities may be pointed to as examples; not to speak of many little communes. And even where it has not been possible to procure the election of Catholic candidates, the number of votes in their favour is largely increased. The policy generally pursued by the electoral committees has not been to limit themselves in their list of candidates purely to Catholics, a proceeding concerning which the reviewer has a caution to give later on. The Revolution, which deluded so many incautious persons in its early stages by its false theories and corrupt philosophy, has begun now to manifest openly the disastrous consequences ensuing on a general subversion of ideas, principles, authority, institutions; and this is leading all worthy, honest, and sensible people to look about them, and feel serious apprehensions. The menace directed against the natural institution of the family has alarmed Italians much, and they have come forward to gather round that larger family, the commune, which as it is the aggregate and centre of individual families, so also is it their natural and firmest support. The commune comprehends the most vital interests of all citizens, and since no impediment as regards conscience exists in its case, nor any necessity to have an express authoritative permission to intervene in its affairs, all are at liberty here to combine in joint action. Catholics, however, do not merely know that this is lawful, but they have the additional incentive of the Holy Father's expressed desire that they should take their part in municipal affairs. With them the manifestation of such a desire is equivalent to a command.

The increased electoral movement has, besides, received a fresh impulse from the extension and consolidation of the new organization of Catholic action in Italy. It is not sufficient to draw up at the last moment a list of Catholic candidates to be proposed to electors; the electoral movement, to be successful, needs a patient and diligent revision of that list, as well as other preliminary measures. Hence the parochial committees, which, in their double character of circumscription and of permanence, are so admirably fitted for this task, have been found to afford very opportune assistance. It is to the municipalities that one must look for the means of emerging from the present miserable state. Upon them principally depends the good or bad turn of public affairs. Let the municipalities be renovated; this is the great work now for Italians to achieve. The administrative elections are, moreover, a school of discipline and organization which will prepare Catholics (if the time should come when that may be allowable through the permission of the Holy See, which at present it is not) to take part in political elections. But, apart from this, the concurrence of Catholics in the municipal elections is an object in itself, and a perfect work in itself. Many Catholics think it desirable, in drawing out the lists of candidates, to include as much as possible the names of men belonging to the most moderate of existing parties, in order to glean in their camp some votes, and thus have better prospects of success. Certainly the immediate object of any party in an electoral contest is

success. But if, to attain this end, transactions and compacts amongst each other may suit the revolutionary parties, Catholics ought to be very cautious in entering into any such combinations with them. Catholics ought to be on their guard against uniting in any common action with the notorious enemies of their faith. Catholics cannot boast of a triumph when the successful candidates are Liberals, albeit accepted by themselves. Neither can they boast of a triumph when, to secure the success of candidates accepted by them, the electors of other parties concurred. It is not to be denied that even amongst our adversaries there may be found honest men, men who have good intentions, and are sincerely desirous of the public welfare. But such men are very rare, and it is not very easy to recognize them with any security. This, however, is not the question. Catholics have two objects in taking part in the administrative elections; the one material, that is, good administration; the other moral, to secure a worthy representation in public affairs. It is clear that the moral object must always be far superior to the material. Now although honest Liberals may, through their ability and integrity, satisfy the requirements of material administration, they assuredly cannot satisfy those of a worthy representation of the faith and sentiments of Catholics. If, therefore, the second object cannot be attained, still more, if, with the certainty or at the expense of losing it, the first is alone aimed at, this is wrong. Rather ought the first object to be renounced. No doubt the ruin of finances, the waste of public money, and the wild extravagance of the municipalities, are matters which ought to move and interest all. But if it be most important to get men into them who will repair all this ruin, and arrest the progress of the evil, more desirable still is it to effect the moral regeneration of the municipality, that in it society may find its much-needed safeguard. The Christian spirit must enter into the commune, manifest itself in the teaching of the schools, in the management of pious works, in filial relations with the Church, in resistance to the revolutionary spirit, which would be the destruction of society. He only whose own breast is warmed by Christian charity can understand all this, and respond to such a mission. Catholic electors ought to unite to give their suffrages to men of this character.

The writer concludes by recommending most strongly to Catholics the establishment and propagation of committees for the work of Catholic Congresses. They have already effected signal good, and incalculable advantage may be anticipated from their multiplication and increased efficiency.

There have been a series of solid articles on the Syllabus and the Rule of Faith appearing for some months past in the *Scuola Cattolica*. Both that periodical and the *Civiltà Cattolica* have, of course, noticed at considerable length the Encyclical of the Holy Father. They have also given several able articles in succession on the subject of Emile Ollivier's insidious and mischievous book, *L'Eglise et l'Etat*.

FRENCH PERIODICALS.

Revue des Questions Historiques. Oct. 1879. Paris.

La Date et les Recensions du Liber Pontificalis.

UNDER this title the Abbé L. Duchesne, of the Catholic University of Paris, writes, chiefly in reply to an article by G. Waitz in the "Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde" (T. iv. part 2), "On the Different Texts of the Liber Pontificalis." In 1877, the Abbé Duschene had published an essay* on the same "Liber," inquiring into its date, the MSS., and the sources of it. The German writer thinks differently from the French on several "important points." The French writer is not convinced and writes again. He hopes to put forth his opinions in better form in the annotated edition of the "Liber Pontificalis," which he has already commenced.

The Abbé looks for the date of the first edition of the "Liber" between the years 514 and 530. The first date is given by the passages borrowed from compositions evidently written during the contest of Pope Symmachus († 514) with the antipope Laurence. The second date from the Felician abridgment, which evidently saw the light about 530. But, for other reasons, the "Liber Pontificalis" is judged to have been drawn up before 530: 1°. The synchronism of Popes with the Emperors, and the consular dates which are wanting after Pope Damasus and reappear towards the end of the fifth century. As to the consular dates for Hormisdas, John I., and Felix IV., they reproduce exactly the formulæ found on the Roman epitaphs of the same years: an indication that the author of the "Liber" did not copy tables of the consuls, but followed the usage of his own time. 2° The character of the composition before and after the commencement of the sixth century. The composition grows more exact and historical from the time of St. Leo (440), whilst, previously, legendary documents are frequently made use of; but about the time of Anastasius II. and Symmachus the narrative differs little from history strictly so called, events being narrated as from personal acquaintance. 3° The same conclusion is strengthened by the polemical character of the "Liber Pontificalis;" in defending the Popes and carefully detailing the contentions of the anti-popes. During one of the agitated periods of rivals to the Papal authority it evidently was written; doubtless during that of Laurence against Pope Symmachus, which lasted a dozen years, and profoundly troubled the Roman Church. The crisis gave rise, we know, to a whole literature; and there is even a collection of the lives of the Popes written after the death of Symmachus by a partizan of Laurence. This last work indeed is the Laurentian "Liber Pontificalis," and challenges comparison with the Catholic! And if the former is really of the time of the schism, which no one doubts, why not also the Catholic?

* "Etude sur le Liber Pontificalis," in the Bibliothèque des Ecoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome. Année 1877, 1er fascicule. Paris, Thonin.

As to the *first* compilation (*redaction*) of the "Liber Pontificalis," the Abbé Duchesne argues as follows:—There are two classes of MSS. At the head of the one stands that of Lucca (A), at the head of the other that of Naples (B). What is called the Felician Catalogue (F), or recension of 530, is not a first copy afterwards added to, but only an abridgment of, an earlier copy. The same may be said of the Verona manuscript, published by Bianchini, and which is here called the Cononian (C), because it ends at Pope Conon (687). Waitz contends that the text A has given by abbreviations the texts F and C, but that the text B, compared with A, is nearer the common original. The Abbé contends that the text A (Lucca) is both the more ancient and complete. This he proves, by detailed comparisons of the texts, thus—C and F are shown to be abridgments (but by independent writers, isolated and probably unaware of each other's work) of an older text, which is designated FC, and A and B, recensions of an anterior text, designated AB. The comparisons show that F and C have many omissions in common; but, strangely, both resume the narrative in the same terms. And this coincidence is only in those parts where the complete text AB may be lawfully suspected of not being primitive. FC is not, therefore, a *résumé* of AB, but a reproduction of an anterior manuscript. The article gives these comparisons, carefully instituted at length, with passages relating to the "Life of Symmachus," "Life of Hormisdas," of "John I," of "Felix IV," &c.

Having established a complete distinction between AB and FC, the Abbé decides that FC is anterior to AB. The gaps in the latter, in notices regarding Hormisdas, Symmachus, and John I, show that FC cannot be derived from it. This admission is made with regret, for does it not diminish the authority that we had believed might be attributed to the "Liber Pontificalis"? However, there still remain to be determined—if FC represents the original abridged, and AB the original altered—first, the connection between the two, and, secondly, the date of the latter. This double determination will show that the authority of the "Liber Pontificalis" loses little by this new conclusion, and that its testimony acquires in some cases a greater precision. For, from the discussion of these two points of connection and date, the learned author concludes:—

First, that the "Liber Pontificalis" was compiled shortly after the death of Pope Symmachus (514).

Secondly, that there were manuscripts of the first edition (*redaction*) (FC) which ended with the notice of Felix IV. This is very ingeniously proved (p. 518).

Thirdly, that these manuscripts no longer exist, but from them were made the abridgments ending with Felix IV. and with Conon.

Fourthly, that the actual text (AB) represents, up to the death of Felix IV. inclusively, a recasting (*remaniement*) of the primitive text, executed about the year 539.

And lastly, that of the two families of manuscripts of the actual text, that which has the Lucca (A) manuscript as its type is the nearest to the common original.

It is impossible in a brief *résumé* to compress the minute and lengthened argument on texts, style, &c. The article is both well and pleasantly written, and an admirable example of close observation and original research.

Notices of Books.

A Defence of Philosophic Doubt. By ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR, M.A., M.P. London: Macmillan.

A MOST healthy reaction shows signs of setting in against the Antitheistic Philosophy. Of late years, it seems to us, Theists have exhibited a good deal too much deference to that philosophy. They have urged, indeed, most forcibly and inexpugnably, the utter wreck of *morality* which would inevitably ensue, if the principles, now so current among scientific men, were to spread throughout the community: but of those principles on their *intellectual* side, they have spoken (it seems to us) with very misplaced deference. And this deference is the more regrettable, because the scientists themselves are much given to swagger. These commonly speak, as though their own intellectual position were impregnable and even unassailable; nay, as though their method of argument might be taken as a standard, by which all other methods should reasonably be measured. Mr. Mallock has set an admirable example of resistance to this pretentious bounce; and, in the DUBLIN REVIEW of last July, a contributor commemorated the singularly great value of his labours. Mr. Balfour, whom we are now to notice, is very far from possessing that keen theological insight, or that epigrammatic brilliancy of expression, which distinguish Mr. Mallock. But, on the other hand, he is a good deal more versed in hard philosophical thought, and in solid philosophical studies. In fact, we shall be a good deal surprised, if this work do not originate a new era in English philosophy.

How contemptuous is his tone towards the philosophical system of existing scientists, will be plain by a few specimens. "The system" of these scientists, "is, as a whole, incapable of any rational defence" (p. 315). "I am not acquainted with any kind of defect to which systems of belief are liable, under which the existent scientific system of belief cannot properly be said to suffer" (p. 293). "Science, as it is now cultivated, is a system of belief which, for anything we can allege to the contrary, is wholly without proof" (p. 287). Nay, the existing scientific system, as a whole, is "self-contradictory and therefore impossible" (p. 292). Certain "eminent authors" are "anxious to purvey for that apparently increasing class of persons, who aspire to be advanced thinkers, but who like to have their advanced thinking done for them. . . . Yet it would have required, I should have thought, much less philosophical know-

ledge and philosophical acumen than that possessed, for example, by Mr. Leslie Stephen or Professor Huxley, to suggest to their mind doubts as to the rational character of the dogmatic system in which they so confidently put their trust" (pp. 308, 309). And all these statements derive ten-fold importance from the fact, that they do not proceed from some ignorant and random writer, but on the contrary are based on a course of abstruse and searching philosophical investigation. We do not deny that some of Mr. Balfour's successive statements impress us as being over-strained. But taking them on the whole, we are quite confident that the existing race of scientists—including such psychologists as Mr. Herbert Spencer and Dr. Bain—will find themselves entirely unable to resist his knock-down assault. Nor would it at all surprise us if they shirked the difficulty by preserving profound silence on Mr. Balfour's volume; and if they indulged in a hope (somewhat like that of the proverbial ostrich) that the book will escape the notice of others, because *they* are afraid to look it in the face.

Few occupations would have interested us more, than that of examining Mr. Balfour's structure as a whole, and dwelling in detail on our respective points of agreement and disagreement with him. In particular we should have liked to compare his criticisms of Mr. Stuart Mill with those which we have ourselves put forth from time to time. But we have neither leisure nor space for this; and we must content ourselves with a brief statement, on one or two salient and critical points.

We have already said, that Mr. Balfour's *destructive* criticism is (in our humble judgment) as regards its essential particulars entirely irresistible. But his *affirmative* position is (to say the least) eccentric. This position is explicitly exhibited in his chapter on "Practical Results"; but it is implied in many earlier parts of the volume. There are two great co-ordinate and rival "systems of belief"—he considers—the system of "Religion" and the system of "Science." Neither of these can be truly said to rest on any solid basis of reasoning whatsoever. Nevertheless I "feel a practical need for both" (p. 320); and for this reason accept them both as true. Not, indeed, that any "legitimate argument can be founded on the mere existence of this need or impulse" (p. 320). Still "men ought not to give up on speculative grounds" "any great principle" (p. 145). Since, therefore—such is Mr. Balfour's conclusion—neither "Religion" nor "Science" has as yet received any kind of reasonable proof, and yet a belief in both is to me a necessity of existence, I *will* believe in both. As centuries pass on, perhaps one or other, or the two, may receive satisfactory proof; and, if so, things will be in a very much more satisfactory state. Such is the outcome of Mr. Balfour's argument; and it presents a memorable instance indeed of the straits to which non-Catholic philosophy may drive a singularly fair and upright mind. On our side we would reply in some such way as the following.

As far as Religion is concerned, we dissent more strongly than we can well say from Mr. Balfour's assumption, that no sufficient grounds can be drawn out for its truth. Whether it be Theism, or Christ-

ianity in general, or Catholicism in particular, we are quite confident that superabundant intellectual warrant can be exhibited for firmest belief. This, however, is a question which obviously it did not fall within Mr. Balfour's plan to discuss. As regards "Science"—for the most part no doubt we are heartily at one with Mr. Balfour in his crushing criticism of the various philosophical theories on which scientists have rested their speculations. But still we have two adverse comments to make even on this head. First, it seems to us that the author quite amazingly underrates the amount of proof furnished to the truth of "Science," by the experienced *verification* of its various conclusions, and by the opportunity given to every one of repeating that verification. In page 303, indeed, he seems alive to the force of this consideration. In speaking of "Science," he refers to "the palpable witness which material results bear to the excellence of its methods." But, in page 147, he says that "verification is not a separate or distinct kind of proof." Surely it is a kind of proof *entirely* separate and distinct. When "Science" tells me (see Mill's "Logic") that the combination of any oil and any alkali produces a soap—surely the fact, that I can try the experiment on any oil and any alkali I please, gives me a proof different in kind from any which I can have, *e.g.*, for the Blessed Trinity. There may be entirely conclusive arguments for the fact, that this latter dogma is divinely revealed: we are confident there *are*. Still there is not this particular argument.

As regards the philosophical basis of "Science"—we wrote a few words thereon in an article on "Ethics" which appears in the present number, before we had read Mr. Balfour's book. Our humble view is briefly this: In the first place, the scientists of this day generally pride themselves on the logical satisfactoriness of their philosophical position; and regard with a contempt, which is itself contemptible, every appeal to *implicit* grounds of belief. This swaggering and self-confident attitude is shown triumphantly by Mr. Balfour to be ludicrously indefensible; to be more like the ranting of a tyrant in burlesque, than the utterances of any grave thinker. Nevertheless, we can by no means go Mr. Balfour's length, in regarding the conclusions of "Science" as destitute of full foundation in reason. And this is our second adverse criticism on Mr. Balfour's attitude towards the scientists. We will take two doctrines in particular, on which (as he truly says) the whole fabric of "Science" rests; viz., (1) the persistence of the universe, and (2) the uniformity of nature. We may concede to him that as yet no course of argument has been explicitly exhibited, which conclusively establishes these two doctrines. But then we appeal to what Catholic philosophers call the "*sensus naturæ communis*." See, *e.g.*, Liberatore's "Logic," n. 201. The intellect is so formed, says that philosopher, as to arrive at truth by the working of its own laws, whether or no it *reflect* on its various movements. If, therefore, it be found that there are judgments universally accepted by all mankind—and which only became more deeply rooted as one generation succeeds another and as knowledge makes advance—we may be certain that those judgments are true; even though

we may not have succeeded in analyzing the process, whereby man's intellect has advanced to their formation. Prominent in their number are those of which we speak: the persistency of the universe, and the uniformity of nature. The true philosopher (we consider) takes for granted the truth of these and similar judgments, and labours as best he can to transform implicit reasoning into explicit argument. We cannot, however, here enlarge on this theme, which will occupy an important place in future articles of our philosophical series.

There is one other particular in Mr. Balfour's volume, to which we are very desirous of calling attention. Most reasonably the author lays great stress throughout on those "*ultimate beliefs*," which are necessary as the foundation of all possible knowledge. Now (as he most acutely points out)—although these beliefs have no *reason* other than themselves, because (by hypothesis) they are *ultimate*—yet they certainly have *causes* other than themselves. As he tersely puts it (p. 291), they are "*products*," though they are not "*conclusions*." But now may not their *causes* be such as to throw doubt on their *trustworthiness*? My mind is so constituted, as to account certain judgments self-evidently true. But how *comes* my mind to be so constituted, according to the theory of evolution, which is just now in fashion? No other cause can be conceived for this momentous fact, except that the prolonged operation of psychical and physical causes has duly issued in this result. But what power have I of knowing, or even of reasonably guessing, that a mind thus generated possesses the singular privilege of exemption from false avowments? And this difficulty is by no means exclusively urgent against the theory of *evolution*. Suppose we fall back on (what we of course account the true) doctrine of *creation*: the same difficulty recurs in a different shape. "We might imagine it to be a conclusion derivable from our ultimate beliefs, that those beliefs are implanted in us by a being, who had the power, and invariably had the wish, to mislead and deceive us" (p. 275). And even as things are, what power have I of knowing, or even of reasonably guessing, that I have not *in fact* been created by such a being? It is simply impossible to escape from this dilemma, until we take refuge in that theory of certitude, which was universally held by the philosophers anterior to Descartes. If our readers will look at the earlier part of our article on "*Ethics*," they will see more clearly what we here intend. And we offer this theory as a *terra firma* to Mr. Balfour, who seems grievously in *need* of a *terra firma*.

We repeat, however. The eccentricity of Mr. Balfour's affirmative position in no degree lessens the incontrovertible force of his destructive arguments. We only long for the day, when Mr. Herbert Spencer, or Dr. Bain, or Professor Huxley shall attempt an express reply to the volume.

W. G. WARD.

De Virtutibus Infusis. Prælectiones quas habebat CAMILLUS MAZZELLA, S. J. Romæ. Typ. Propaganda Fide. 1879. Londini: Burns et Oates.

FATHER MAZZELLA'S name as a Professor of Theology and as a writer is too well known to require any commendation from us of this new work from his pen. Holding, as he does, the important Chair of Theology in what ought to be the Roman College, he has given to the world, as he formerly did when at Woodstock, the fruits of his professional lessons in a volume of some eight hundred pages. His subject is the "Infused Virtues;" and we have an elaborate discussion of Faith, Hope, and Charity, with a short Article on the "Gifts of the Holy Ghost." After the preliminary observations, the author chiefly expends his labour in the important subject of Faith, which occupies by itself some 450 pp. out of the volume. We find discussed the "object" of Faith, the "act" of Faith, the office of the Church in regard to Faith (including a fairly complete treatise on the inspiration and interpretation of Scripture), and the office of Reason before and after Faith. Every theological reader will know at once how fertile is each of these grand divisions. Father Mazzella is both learned and practical. He knows how to uphold the lofty traditions of his chair, and to handle, in the spirit of his great predecessors, the most intimate and difficult problems of scholastic theology; as witness his clear exposition of the controversy between Suarez and De Lugo in regard to the "ultimate" analysis of the act of Faith. And he is not above giving full and useful explanations in such matters as the various "notes" with which the Church is accustomed to brand condemned propositions.

Father Mazzella is not a Petavius or a Franzelin. We do not expect to find in his pages that immense mass of orderly learning which has been left behind him by the former, or those luminous generalizations from Scripture and the Fathers which the latter has given to a generation that had almost ceased to believe in the possibility of novel treatment in theology. Father Mazzella is a teacher; he weighs other men's words; he analyzes the arguments of by-gone giants; he enforces on neophytes the necessary knowledge without which they cannot be called educated divines. There seems to be an unusually large amount of quotation in this work. If we had a fault to find it might be that he confines his citations to one region alone of the scholastic universe. St. Thomas of Aquin, of course, is an exception; but, after that exception, it is seldom we meet any name cited at length save the great Jesuits of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The great Dominican school is hardly referred to; the Franciscans are quoted, but very rarely. In regard to the form of the work, we cannot but think that Father Mazzella's excessive use of the explicit syllogism is apt to be repulsive to readers. We are enthusiastic advocates of strict syllogistic discussion in the class-exercises of students, but in a published work, which is not meant as a mere manual for class, a freer manner would have both saved valuable space and made it more easy for the reader to follow the argument.

Das Salomonische Sprachbuch. Uebersetzt und erklärt, von Dr. AUG. ROHLING, Professor der Theologie an der K. K. Carl-Ferdinand Universität in Prag. Mainz: F. Kirchheim, 1879. (*Solomon's Proverbs*, translated and explained by Dr. AUG. ROHLING, Professor of Theology in the University of Prague. Mayence: Kirchheim. 1879.)

WE are still suffering from the havoc which the Revolution wrought in the monastic orders and in Catholic universities. To a great extent learning has fallen into the hands of the Philistines, and nowhere is this disastrous result more easy to perceive than in the field of Old-Testament exegesis. The vast majority of Hebrew grammars, of commentaries on the Hebrew Scriptures, of introductions to the Old Testament, which have appeared during the century, have come from Protestants and Jews. Mostly, these books are written in an infidel or semi-infidel spirit. Even the better Protestant commentators are Protestant after all. We have often wished that we had at least one commentary on every book of the Hebrew Bible, written in a Catholic spirit, and at the same time abreast of recent historical discoveries, and of that great advance which has been made during the last sixty years in Hebrew philology. For this reason we welcome Dr. Rohling's present work with the most sincere pleasure. He has given us a commentary on a very difficult book of Holy Scripture, a commentary which is written in an eminently Catholic spirit, and which at the same time supplies the young scholar with all that he need have, to master the difficulties of the Hebrew text.

In a very clear introduction of some twenty pages, Dr. Rohling clearly states the different views entertained by modern critics on the authorship of the book. He conveys an intelligible and fair idea of the arguments adduced by Ewald, Hitzig, Delitzsch and other well-known critics, and he defends the traditional view with strong and sensible reasons. We have found the commentary itself, which covers nearly 400 pages, exceedingly clear. Pains are taken to develop the connection of ideas; points of grammar and lexicography are carefully considered, and much matter of great theological importance will be found—e.g., in the treatment of the famous chapter on the Eternal Wisdom.

There is a valuable appendix in which Dr. Bickell's theory on Hebrew metre, which Dr. Rohling adopts, is tested by being applied to the book of Proverbs throughout. We do not possess Dr. Bickell's book, and we could have wished that Dr. Rohling had explained the theory of this distinguished Catholic scholar on Hebrew metre more fully. We must also protest against Dr. Rohling's habit of using Roman letters to express Hebrew words, a purpose for which Roman letters are utterly unsuitable. To write Greek words in Roman letters would be barbarous, but to write Hebrew under the Roman character is a sheer impossibility. Indeed, Dr. Rohling covers his Latin letters with a series of dots and marks, so that he, in fact, invents a new and very ugly alphabet. We are also disposed to regret Dr. Rohling's habit of digressing from the subject in hand, and

making remarks upon things in general. But after all these are slight blemishes in a very useful and excellent commentary.

Die Prophezei des Joel und ihre Ausleger von den ältesten Zeiten bis zu den Reformatoren. Von ADALBERT MERX, Doct. Theol. et Phil.; Beigegeben ist der äthiopische Text bearbeitet von Prof. S. A. DILLMANN. Halle: Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses. 1879. (*The Prophecy of Joel and its Interpreters, from the Earliest Times down to the Reformers.* By ALBERT MERX, Doct. Theol. et Phil.; with an Appendix, containing the Ethiopic Text, by Prof. Dr. A. DILLMANN. Halle: Published at the Orphanage. 1879.)

THERE can be no doubt about the learning and industry which this book displays. By far the larger part is occupied with a history of all that has been written on the prophet Joel, by Fathers of the Church, by Jewish Rabbins, by Catholic mediæval writers, by Luther and Calvin. This part of his work Dr. Merx, already well known as one of the most distinguished among Syriac scholars, seems to have done most thoroughly and completely. In fact, he has supplied us with a very useful introduction to the history of Old Testament exegesis. It has always appeared to us that there are few things less interesting than a long catalogue of opinions culled from authors of all sorts and all ages on the meaning of a particular text. The reader becomes wearied with the interminable series of divergent interpretations; he finds them hard to follow at the moment, and impossible to remember afterwards. But Dr. Merx has made his history of interpretation at once interesting and instructive. Each commentator is treated separately. An account is given of his method of interpretation. We are told enough about his life and circumstances to make us understand his position, and the influences under which he came. Then we have a full analysis, with considerable extracts, from his commentary on Joel, so that we end with a tolerably clear idea of his way of looking at Scripture, and the reasons which led him to take a particular text in a particular way. Many will welcome the account given of the Rabbinical commentaries. This is a subject which is beyond the reach of most students, and in which Dr. Merx is evidently quite at home. Even the theologian will find much useful information in this section of the book. We may refer especially to the account given of the views which Maimonides held on prophecy, and the comparison of his views on this subject with those of St. Thomas. Of course Dr. Merx writes like a Protestant, but on the whole he is fair and dispassionate.

We cannot say so much for the first hundred pages of the book, in which Dr. Merx attempts to ascertain the date of Joel and the meaning of his prophecy. There is nothing in the text of Joel himself which absolutely obliges us to place him at any definite period of Jewish history; but it is plain, from the place assigned to him among the Minor Prophets in the Hebrew Canon, that early Jewish tradition regarded him as one of the earliest prophets. The Septuagint places him later, but still

before the exile. Modern scholars as a rule have been content to follow the early tradition on this point; and we cannot but think they are right. Joel had seen the land of Judah desolated by drought and by swarms of locusts; he summons the people to penance; he warns them that the "day of the Lord" is near. The people seem to have been obedient to the Divine call. "The Lord hath been zealous for his land and hath spared his people" (ii. 18; so the Vulgate, and this is undoubtedly, as Dr. Merx himself admits, the sense of the Hebrew text as it stands). Then Joel tells the people that the day of the Lord will indeed come, but that it will be a day of wrath—not for the Jews—not at least for the "residue whom the Lord will call" (ii. 32), but for the heathen. God will judge them in the valley of Josephat, while upon the true Israel he will pour out his Spirit. All seems to indicate an early date. The enemies of Judah are not the Assyrians or Chaldeans, but Tyre and Sidon, and the Philistines. Joel counts upon the submission of the people. He does not speak to "a rebellious house," like Ezekiel. He has not even the difficulties which beset Isaias. As we have said, we do not believe it possible to fix an exact date; but when Ewald places him in the early part of the reign of Joas, *i.e.*, about the middle of the 9th century B.C., he probably makes a good guess at the truth.

Dr. Merx, on the other hand, places Joel about 400 B.C. He supposes that the locusts were merely seen in apocalyptic vision, with an allusion to Exod. x. 14. "The prophet," says Dr. Merx, "places himself (in imagination) at the end of time, and addresses himself to the generation which is to see the last judgment." Nothing can be more forced. "Tell you of this," the prophet says, "to your children, and let your children tell their children, and their children to another generation." We wish we had space to consider Dr. Merx's supposed indication of a late period in the prophecy. We must be content with a single specimen; it is a fair sample of the arguments employed. Joel puts great stress upon the "meat offering," while the earlier prophets, according to Dr. Merx, who holds the most extreme views on the late origin of the Pentateuch, never mention the "meat offering" with respect. Surely when Isaias says, "Bring no more a meat offering of vanity" (Is. 1—13, Heb. text), he does approve of the meat offering and objects to its profanation, otherwise we must suppose that Isaias rejected every part of the temple service, a conclusion too extreme for Dr. Merx and much too extreme for common sense.

Compendium Theologiæ R. P. Thomæ ex Charmes, Ordin. Minor. Cap.
Ad usum Examinandorum edid. Dr. DE ESSEN. Ratisbon: Manz.

TO those who are preparing for passing their examination before taking holy orders, we recommend this new edition of a small but valuable manual of theology. F. Thomas ex Charmes, together with F. Gervasius, of Breisach, both of them Capuchins of the seventeenth century, have left us excellent manuals of theology, distinguished

by a simple, clear, but correct explanation of the Catholic doctrine. This present edition is accurate and beautiful, and deserves a wide circulation.

Meletematum Romanorum Mantissa. Recensuit Hugo Laemmer.
Ratisbon. Manz. 1875.

THE author of this work, widely renowned in Germany for his scholarly attainments, was formerly Professor of Protestant Theology in the University of Berlin, but as early as 1858, when comparatively a young man, was converted to the Catholic Church. His conversion was prepared by his book on the "Pre-Tridentine Catholic Theology at the Time of the Reformation," on which the Berlin professors passed a most eulogistic judgment. In examining whatever had been published on the part of the Catholic divines at the time of the Reformation *before* the Council of Trent, Dr. Laemmer very soon detected that they exactly agreed with the Canons of that Council itself. Being ordained priest he betook himself to Rome, and with unrivalled diligence began to examine the archives and libraries of the centre of Christendom. Mgr. Marini used to say that the archives of the Holy See, from the vast quantity and immense value of their documents, excel all other archives in Europe, being the archives not of one country, but rather of every Christian land. For thorough knowledge of the immense manuscript treasures heaped up in Rome, there is amongst German divines, not even excepting the late Father Theiner, none to be compared to Dr. Laemmer. In the course of time he published a new and accurate edition, with Latin translation, of Eusebius's Ecclesiastical History, "Anecdota Romana," "Monumenta Vaticana, una cum fragmentis Neapolitanis et Florentinis," "Für Kirchengeschichte des 16 und 17 Yahrhunderts," "De Leonis Alatii Codicibus qui Romæ in Bibliothecâ Vallicellanâ asservantur Schediasma," "Scriptorum Græciæ Orthodoxæ Bibliotheca selecta," and "In decreta Concilii Ruthenorum Zamosciensis animadversiones Theologico-canonicæ." When the Prince-Bishop of Breslau, Dr. Foerster, celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of his priesthood, he was presented by Dr. Laemmer with the "Mantissa." I will first indicate the contents of the book and afterwards touch on the most prominent matters, principally those in which English Catholics may be interested. After the Prolegomena follow—(1) De constitutione Joannis XXII. quæ incipit: Quia vir reprobus. (2) Apparatus ad Græciæ Orthodoxæ Scriptores Critici. (3) Analecta Tridentina. (4) Ex actis consistorialibus et diariis pontificalibus. (5) Anecdota Borghesiana. (6) Ex Schedis Sirleti, Baronii, Bellarmini. (7) Spicilegium Jansenisticum et Quietisticum. (8) Segmina varia. The Mantissa opens with two important documents taken from *Cod. Vatican.* 7187, a criticism of Cardinal Bellarmin on the aforesaid Constitution of John XXII., and a reply written, by command of Paul V., by Mgr. Penia, Spanish auditor of the Rota. Bellarmin adduces as his principal argument for this bull not being inserted in the *Corpus* of the Extrava-

gantes, its departure from the Bull of Nicholas III., "Exiit qui seminat." Penia is very severe, sometimes, it seems to me, too severe, in confuting Bellarmin. But, after all, we agree with Penia's view: "Neither Nicholas nor John did err; each of them has spoken truly and in accordance with the Gospel about the poverty of Christ and the Apostles . . . because Christ has instituted two states of poverty for two classes of the perfect, and it was these divers states which the Pontiffs were explaining in their respective constitutions." *Cod. Vallicel.* 61, gives a minute account of the discussions held in the consistory June 10th, 1521, about the title to be conferred on Henry VIII. of England, in recognition of his book on the Seven Sacraments. Cardinal Wolsey, in a letter to Leo X., asked for such a distinction. Several propositions were made; for instance, to give the king the title "Orthodoxus" or "Gloriosus." It was finally agreed to bestow on him the name of "Fidei Defensor," a title borne by the English monarchs to our own days. *Cod. Corsin.* 42, contains the solemn decree by which Clement VII. declared the marriage between Henry and Catherine to be valid and indissoluble. *Cod. Corsin.* 680, gives a succinct history of Mary, Queen of Scots, written in Italian, whilst the acts of Consistory in *Cod. Corsin.* 145, refer to the death of the unhappy princess in a very unusual manner: "Elisabetha vero, ut immanitatem magis indicaret expleretque suam, ejus caput in cubiculum ad se afferri jussit, eoque ipso die per civitatem regia pompa equitavit" ("Mantissa," p. 232). On the contrary, Queen Mary's body was interred in Peterborough Cathedral and brought to Westminster Abbey only in the reign of her son James I. From "Mantissa," page 261, we may gather the effect produced in Rome by the βασιλικὸν δῶρον of King James I. The claim on the part of princes to unlimited power over the religion of their subjects was supported, though unconsciously, both by a great many English Catholic priests, who thought it to be lawful to take the oath of allegiance, and by the book published in France by Barclay "De Potestate Papæ: an et quatenus in reges et principes seculares jus et imperium habet." The Nuncio at Paris, Ubaldini, writing to Cardinal Borghese, styles the book which the English Arch-priest had written with a view to justify himself, "pestilentissimo in favore del giuramento." ("Mantissa," 256, 295.) From several letters directed by the Cardinal Secretary of State to the Nuncio in Belgium we learn how great was the solicitude of the Holy See for the English exiled for their faith. The section, "Ex Schedis Sireti, Baronii et Bellarmini," presents us with several precious documents of those great ecclesiastics, hitherto unknown. We cannot but be deeply impressed in reading the nine short but thoughtful letters of Baronius, at a rather advanced period of this religious life, to his beloved parents. From a letter of Cardinal Bellarmin we learn that it was he himself who asked Cardinal du Perron to urge on the Pope the necessity of dissolving the Congregation de Auxiliis, because most Catholic divines disliked the doctrine of the *prædeterminatio physica*. The Pope followed this advice. In the "Spicilegium Jansenisticum et Quietisticum," we meet with the "judicium Cardinalis de Lugo de libro de frequenti communione" (published

by Arnould), the letter written by the Louvain University in order to prevent Urban VIII.'s Bull against the Jansenists from being published, a report of the recantation of Molinos, and a long account written by Bossuet, "de Quietissimo in Galliis refutato," in order to vindicate the course he had followed in his difference with Fénelon.

B.

De Martyrologio Romano Parergon Historico Criticon. Scripsit Hugo Laemmer. Ratisbon: Manz. 1878.

THE student of liturgy will take no small interest in Dr. Laemmer's last work on the Roman Martyrology. For a long time our author has been said to be occupied in writing Cardinal Baronius's biography. Certainly he would be the right man to undertake a task encompassed by considerable difficulties. Perhaps no one in Germany is so thoroughly conversant with the manuscripts of the Roman archives concerning Baronius. This learned treatise on the Martyrology is for the most part filled up with details about Cardinal Baronius. Dr. Laemmer principally dwells on two points. He inquires, first, who were the men appointed by Gregory XIII.'s decree, 14th January, 1584, to prepare the new edition of the Martyrology. Secondly, he directs himself to the establishing of those principles of criticism by which the members of the Commission were guided in their important work. Laemmer refutes Father Theiner's opinion, who erroneously thought Baronius to be the only editor, mistaking a copy of the Martyrology with notes by Baronius for the autograph itself. On the contrary, there were in the Commission, besides Cæsar Baronius, Silvius Antoniarus, Ludovicus de Torres, Aloysius Sirletus, Gerhardus Vossius, and others; but Baronius, whom Cardinal Sirletus had appointed a member, was foremost amongst his colleagues. The results of their labours are not entirely free from objection; but whatever, according to the literary means of that time, was in their reach, they have fully attained. D'Achery and Martène had not then edited the "Martyrologium Hieronymianum," nor Rosweyd the "Martyrologium Romanum Parvum," nor had the Bollandists published the true Martyrology of Bede purified from the arbitrary editions of Florus. Besides his occupation as member of the aforesaid commission, Baronius devoted his energy to supply the new edition with notes, both critical and historical, some of which by command of the Pope were attached to the edition of 1584. Lastly, Baronius wrote a learned introduction to the Martyrology, prefixed to the new edition of Benedict XIV. and Pius IV. It was his brother in religion, Giovenale Ancina, who afterwards assisted Baronius in bringing out a new edition of the Sistine Martyrology at Antwerp, from the Plantinian Press. We are deeply indebted to the immense exertions of Dr. Laemmer for having put before us the pains taken by Cardinal Baronius in performing his great task, and the intercourse he entered into with divines in Italy, Spain, France, and Germany. Dr. Laemmer ends with a criticism of the recent

editions of this liturgical book. May the *πάρεργον* very soon be followed by the *ἔργον*, viz., the long expected biography of Cardinal Baronius. B.

Ungedruckte Anglo-Normannische Geschichtsquellen. Herausgegeben von F. LIEBERMANN. Strassburg, 1879. 8vo. (Inedited Materials of Anglo-Norman History. By F. Liebermann).

WITHOUT attempting to deny the present advantages of the plan adopted for the publication of the Rolls series of "Chronicles and Memorials," its warmest advocate cannot but feel that it is attended with drawbacks that must seriously detract from the permanent value of the collection. It is hard to complain of an undertaking of this nature, which, in twenty years, has added to the library shelves its goodly row of more than a hundred and fifty volumes; yet the fact remains, that, however excellent the editions of some authors or chroniclers may be, the value of others is seriously affected by the failure to observe a due order in selecting the works for publication. There was good reason in the rule first laid down, that inedited materials should have the preference. Much depended, however, on the immediate choice of such materials. This choice, it is to be feared, was not always determined by a single view to future usefulness. There is one class of English historical memorials which was neglected by the editors of the 17th and 18th centuries, and which has hitherto been almost untouched in the Rolls series, viz., the *minor* annals. It is quite natural that editors should not have readily turned their attention in this direction. There is nothing to invite, and little to reward their labour: the documents are scattered; the MSS., from the number of later entries in various hands, are frequently troublesome; and, whilst the matter is meagre, the task of tracing much of it to its sources is laborious and irksome; finally, after this process is completed, there is little new in what is left, since these annals have themselves been frequently adopted as a foundation, or have been otherwise worked up, by later compilers.

But in this relation, precisely, of the greater to the lesser annals lies the importance of these latter; a relation to the clearing up of which hardly anything has as yet been done in England. Whilst engaged in preparations for an edition of portions of some English chronicles for the *Monumenta Germaniae*, the editor of the volume now under notice found himself under the necessity of examining these long despised minor annals, in order to gain a basis for the criticism of better known and more generally favoured works. Without aiming at systematic completeness, he has found means—to use the words of a competent judge, Professor Pauli, in the Göttingen *Nachrichten*, 1879, p. 330—of at last letting in light on the smaller English annals.

The minor annals here collected are fourteen in number. Those from Canterbury, as being partly (up to the year 1130) in Anglo-Saxon, hold the place of honour; others follow from Reading, Peterborough, St. Edmundsbury, Colchester, St. Albans, Winchester,

Rochester, St. Augustine's Canterbury, Chichester, Battle, and Plympton; these last being one of the rare and scanty remnants of historical memorials from the monasteries of Devon. Each piece is preceded by an introduction, giving an account of the MS. from which it is derived, with a notice of such new, original, or corrected information as it may afford; the sources are indicated in the margin, and the borrowed matter is shown in the text, by variations of type, with a minuteness which may perhaps not fully commend itself to an English eye; the text is illustrated by abundant notes; the index is excellent.

The editor has bestowed particular care on his print of the older Winchester Annals (p. 61, *sqq.*), and on those of Rouen (p. 35, *sqq.*) The interest of both is purely literary; the former for their connection with the ancient Latin annals which preceded the extant Saxon Chronicles, and which seem to have found their way to some Continental monasteries in the ninth century; the latter, which were brought to England at the Conquest, as forming the groundwork, henceforward, of so many English annalistic compilations. The discussion on the later "Winchester-Waverley Annals" (pp. 173—182) deserves attention, as bearing on the origin and mutual relation of several of the important works comprised in Dr. Luard's "*Annales Monastici*."

The St. Edmundsbury Annals are of considerable value for the reign of King John. The years 1200 to 1211 are derived from the same (lost) source as Roger of Wendover's Chronicle; while, therefore, affording few additional facts, their importance is not slight in enabling us in some degree to see how the St. Alban's monk, by insertions here and there, or at times by a slight twist in his statement of facts, gave the particular colouring to his narrative, which has been unreservedly allowed by later historians. The resemblance to Wendover ends with 1211. The events of the year 1212 are told at considerable length (pp. 150—155) by a contemporary, who had the best sources of information: unfortunately, the mutilation of the MS. has deprived us, at a critical moment, of the help of a writer, whose trustworthy guidance in the all-important events of the next few years would have been of the greatest value.

The Chichester Annals (p. 87) afford a succession of Bishops of Selsey somewhat different from that generally received. To the hagiologist the notice of a hitherto unknown translation of the relics of St. Grimbald in 934, will be of interest (p. 88); as also the examination in Anselm's absence of the relics of St. Elfege, at Canterbury, in 1105 (p. 5), which the editor, in all probability rightly, brings into connection with the celebrated dispute in Lanfranc's time as to the sanctity of the English archbishop.

The three last pieces in the volume are of a different character: Hermann's "Miracles of St. Edmund the Martyr," the second part of Eadmer's "Miracles of St. Anselm," and three fragments of Matthew Paris's "Life of Stephen Langton." The late Sir Frederick Madden some years ago discovered a single scrap of this lost "Life"; the present editor has had the good fortune to find two more leaves. He has subjected these remains to a sharp criticism, which does justice to Matthew's methods, but is not calculated to raise our esteem for his scrupulousness, or his accuracy in this particular case.

Of Hermann's miracles of St. Edmund, a small portion (not here

repeated) had already been printed (not in England, but) by Martène in the 6th volume of his "*Amplissima Collectio*;" the larger and most interesting part of the work appears for the first time in Dr. Liebermann's book. The author was not an Englishman by birth, though, like his contemporaries, Folcard and Goscelin, he had become in many ways English in thought and feeling, and used his pen to celebrate the glory of an English saint. This change does not prevent him from casting back, now and then, a longing glance to the glorious land of France (pp. 231, 244): Paris is to him a spot in all things bright as paradise (p. 231), whilst London is only the wealthiest of English cities—a home of the great and powerful, but with no saints of its own (p. 235). Though in a strange land, and himself apparently not a Norman, Hermann made his way in the world. He became secretary to Bishop Herfast, of Elmham, to whom he would seem to have been somewhat akin in character. The sounding wordiness of the servant corresponded to the pomposity and pretentiousness of the prelate, his master, as described by Malmesbury. From his confidential position, Hermann was privy to all Herfast's designs, and of course deeply concerned in that scheme of his for transferring the Episcopal See (which eventually passed, through Thetford, to Norwich) from the old decayed town of Elmham to the richly endowed Abbey of St. Edmundsbury. The Abbey was the more an object of desire, inasmuch as its privileges, exemptions, and pre-eminences gave it a position of independence not at all in accordance with the views of the diocesan. Much of the burden of the long and bitter struggle fell on Hermann; it was he who conducted the correspondence with Rome, and he was continually at the Bishop's side when urging on his suit in William's court at home. St. Edmund carried the day, but Hermann remained with his master up to his death. Then he saw his opportunity, and going over straight from the Bishop's chancery into the ranks of the opposition, he joined the community of St. Edmundsbury. Here, too, he was not suffered to remain long in obscurity: he became the Abbot's official in spiritualities, and Abbot Baldwin's right-hand man, as he had been Bishop Herfast's.

Although its inflated style makes the work anything but pleasant reading, the author has known how to relieve the sameness of the stories he has to tell by so many interesting incidents and personal notices that he throws a welcome side light on English life, and some points of English history of the second half, especially, of the 11th century:—

Canute's care for the education of young clerics (p. 236); Edward's encouragement of learning (p. 238); a graphic picture of a swaggering Danish noble (p. 243). The sea passage in the eleventh century is described: the ship holds about 60 passengers; six-and-thirty beasts, sixteen horses with a heavy cargo of merchandize, complete the equipment; in a three days' storm all these last (with the exception of the horse of the hero of the tale who takes care not to let him go) are thrown overboard (p. 262). Elsewhere (p. 281) another such boat is mentioned as carrying about 64 people, who were all on their return home from Rome. The pilgrimage thither was not confined to the higher classes. A villanus of St. Edmundsbury is noticed as making the journey—a man doubtless

in a comfortable position in life since he brings back with him from the holy city some crystals which were fine enough to be offered to his patron (pp. 270, 272). The treatise contains several notices of the cultus of this English saint abroad, notably at Lucca, in the Cathedral of which city an altar was raised in his honour:* incidentally we learn that the floor of that church was at times strewn with fragrant thyme leaves, instead of the straw or rushes used in our Northern clime. Dr. Freeman may find a word or two on behalf of a favourite idea, though Edward perhaps is hardly an "imperial king" (p. 233) according to his mind. Of course the great personages concerned in the St. Edmundsbury struggle are not forgotten.

The Miracles of St. Anselm are of inferior value, though any memorial of a man of the capacity and eminence of Eadmer, especially when he comes to speak of himself, cannot fail to be of interest. The editor has prefixed to this section a carefully drawn up and appreciative account of this Canterbury monk, who played a not unimportant part in the history of his time; and if we may detect here and there (p. 214 *sqq.*, pp. 298, 299) echoes from a region where the omnipotence of the State is an article of faith, and the omnipotence of God is practically regarded as an exploded belief, they will be overlooked in view of the desire so scrupulously manifested to do no injustice to the personages whose character is discussed. We may conclude by repeating the wish expressed (p. 302) for a new and complete edition of the works of Eadmer; and would add, for ourselves, a hope that the task may fall to one so competent for it as the Editor of the present volume.

Irish Saints in Great Britain. By the Right Rev. PATRICK F. MORAN, D.D., Bishop of Ossory. Dublin: Gill & Son. 1879.

THIS work is a brief record of services rendered to England and Scotland by Irish Saints, more than a thousand years ago. Its interest and importance from an historical point of view are very great. Saints' lives are the main element in the history of the formation of Christendom, and around their names the battle between faith and unbelief is ever going on. In our own times a complete revolution has taken place in the historical literature of England, to be attributed, in great part, to the Oxford movement which, with its reverence for antiquity, has brought the reign of Hume and Gibbon to an end. In 1852 the leader of that movement gave his services to Ireland, and from the foundation of the Catholic University we may date the emancipation of Irish history from the withering influence of the infidel and Protestant tradition.

In 1864 Bishop Moran, then residing at Rome, brought out his *Essays on the Early Irish Church*. Just six years before that time, in 1860, O'Curry, under the inspiration of Cardinal Newman, had electrified the literary world by the publication of his lectures on the *Manuscript Materials of Ancient Irish History*, and in Mgr. Moran's

* From the difference of style it would seem probable that Hermann has adopted (pp. 258—261) the actual words of his informants' narratives.

work, which is a model of erudition and severe criticism, we find the relationship and harmony of the traditions of Rome and Ireland.

In a popular style, but with careful adhesion to authority, the present work deals with the historical relations of the Sister Islands in a somewhat similar manner. The roving and settlements of the ancient Scot are difficult to follow until the time when, converted to Christ by St. Patrick, the mother country sent messengers to sanctify and civilize her scattered children. High up in the North at Caithness, where, as Lord Strangford tells us, "the old women are to this day singing songs about the O'Driscolls of Cork,"* Bishop Moran has found authentic records of the labours of St. Finbar, the patron of that city (p. 180). He follows the gentle and glorious St. Aidan (p. 222) from the sacred isle of St. Senanus, where the Shannon wrestles with the Atlantic, to Iona and Lindisfarne, and the regions of Northumbria, which the Saint won to Christ, and so with a long line of Sainly Missionaries whose names are links in the golden chain which bound the two islands together in days when Saints were the leaders of the people.

We may add that not the least remarkable portions of Bishop Moran's work are the specimens which he gives in the notes (pp. 15, 25 and 28) of blunders on the part of incompetent and careless writers of Saints' lives. It is carrying disregard of ancient authorities too far to imagine that they can be used without a knowledge of the Latin language in which they are composed.

Reviews and Discussions, Literary, Political, and Historical: not relating to Bacon. By JAMES SPEDDING. London: C. Kegan Paul. 1879.

IN this volume Mr. Spedding has collected nineteen essays written by him for various periodical publications during the last forty-five years. The subjects which they discuss are exceedingly varied, ranging as they do from "Negro Apprenticeship in 1838," to "The Merchant of Venice at the Prince of Wales's Theatre in 1875:" from "The Wakefield Theory of Colonization," to "A Question Concerning a Supposed Specimen of Shakspeare's Handwriting." The author is conscious that with the occasions which elicited them, "the particular value which they then possessed has passed away." He thinks, however, that they still have their use. "Each of them," he writes, "may be regarded as a chapter in the history of the question it deals with; and as they were all written carefully, and upon good information, and with no other object than to represent the case truly, as it then appeared to me, it has been thought worth while to collect them into a volume, where they may be found by those whom they concern" (Pref.). One of the most generally interesting essays is that on Mr. Tennyson's Poems, and it must be satisfactory to Mr. Spedding to find that now, in the year 1879, the popular verdict fully recognizes the

* "Philological Letters and Papers," p. 178.

justice of the highly appreciative judgments passed by him, in 1845, in the "Edinburgh Review," not without the excitement of a certain amount of trepidation in the editorial breast, as appears from a rather amusing introductory note. This paper is full of sound and judicious criticism, as a specimen of which take the following passage :

All that is of true and lasting worth in poetry must have its root in a sound view of human life and the condition of man in the world; a just feeling with regard to the things in which we are all concerned. Where this is not, the most consummate art can produce nothing which men will long care for; where it is, the rudest will never want audience, for then nothing is trivial; the most ordinary incidents of daily life are invested with an interest as deep as the springs of emotion in the heart—as deep as pity, and love, and fear, and awe. In this requisite Mr. Tennyson will not be found wanting. The human soul, in its infinite variety of moods and trials, is his favourite haunt; nor can he dwell long upon any subject, however remote apparently from the scenes and objects of modern sympathy, without touching some string which brings it within the range of our common life. His moral views, whether directly or indirectly conveyed, are healthy, manly, and simple; and the truth and delicacy of his sentiments is attested by the depth of the pathos which he can evoke from the commonest incidents, told in the simplest manner, yet deriving all their interest from the manner of telling. See, for instance, the story of "Dora," and "The Lord of Burleigh." What is there in these that should so move us? Quarrels and reconciliations among kindred happen daily. Hopeless affection, secretly, without complaint, cherished to the end, is a grief commoner than we know of. Many a woman marries above her natural rank, and afterwards dies of a decline. How is it that we do not pass these stories by as commonplace—so like what we see every day that we want no more of them? It is because they are disclosed to us, not as we are in the habit of seeing such things, through the face they present to the outward world, but as they stand recorded in the silent heart, to whose tragic theatre none but itself (and the poet) may be admitted as a spectator. And many a lighted drawing-room is doubtless the scene of tragedies as deep as Hamlet, which pass into the long night unwept, only for want of some *vates sacer* to make them visible (p. 288).

The Last Days of Bishop Dupanloup. Edited by LUCIAN EDWARD HENRY, B.A. London: R. Bentley & Son. 1879.

THIS small volume of about seventy pages contains a record of the last days of the great Bishop of Orleans, written by friends who were with him when he died. Criticism is disarmed by the prefatory statement that the pages were originally not intended for publication. The Archbishop of Albi thought, however, that they threw light "upon the side less known and most to be admired of the soul of the great bishop," and obtained permission to give them to the world. This statement explains both the matter of these records and the manner in which they are penned; the latter is eminently French; but English readers, bearing the above in mind, will not care to criticize an excess of sentiment and exclamation, and some other peculiarities of style.

The book does throw light on what is doubtless little known of the Bishop of Orleans, and what certainly, when known, will command admiration—his minute fidelity to his priestly duties, his wonderful spirit of prayer, his simplicity, charity, and consuming zeal for souls and the Church. It is a precious record, lifting the veil of obscurity from the intimacy of friendship and the last solemn days of illness, and the translator deserves our thanks for making it more accessible to the English public.

The last visit that Bishop Dupanloup paid, away from the friends with whom he died, was to the house of a neighbouring priest, who however was out when the bishop arrived. The latter sat down to read his Breviary whilst waiting, and presently overheard a girl asking for the priest to go at once to her dying mother, who lived in a poor cottage on the mountain near. In spite of his years and infirmities, of the distance, of the approaching night and already-falling rain, the bishop set off to this sick-call, confessed and consoled the poor woman, and then set out for the home of his friends, who were already anxious on account of his delay. Night overtook him; he was soaked with rain. Along the lonely and often dangerous mountain paths, with only a boy-guide, he had to make his way in the utter darkness, at no little peril to himself. He only thought of thanking God that he had found such faith and well-instructed piety in that humble and remote cottage.

During the last weeks of his life it was written of him by his intimate friends—

We invariably find the activity of his intellect to be intense; his hours of labour alternate with those of prayer at stated times, in spite of physical weakness which might have been supposed to interfere therewith. At the same time, each morning, when walking on the terrace, his orison was duly paid, followed by preparation for mass; then mass, and afterwards the hymn of praise and thanksgiving; this was succeeded by three hours and a half spent in hard study in his room before lunch. During the afternoon, letters, as usual, were perused and answers dictated; reading, pencil in hand, was gone through, including the Breviary, study of the Holy Bible, and the rosary; for this bishop, accused of "being more of a politician than a priest," spent five hours daily in his devotions, and not more than thirty minutes in running over the newspapers.

There is much in the book which we have not space to quote—his opinions of men, books, and events, anecdotes and traits of character—that will be of scarcely less interest than the picture of his holiness. When souls whom he knew were in peril or sin, he pleaded for grace or conversion with the wrapt constancy of a saint. He offered up "almost continuous prayer, departing, even on principle, from the most stringent of his arrangements in order to prolong his vigils, to repeat again and again the long rosary (of fifteen decades), and so to calm the paternal anguish which consumed him."

His last words, just before he was seized with the attack which almost suddenly killed him, were: "To-day, again, I have succeeded

in going through my Breviary." Then he took up his beloved rosary. Very soon after, he breathed his last. "His rosary remained in his hands. He had gone to heaven to finish it."

Lancashire Memories. By LOUISA POTTER. London: Macmillan. 1879.

A REVIEWER at the present day has a stereotyped phrase wherewith to confer the citizenship of the republic of Letters upon a meritorious book,—“It should be in every library.” But, alas! like so many other formulæ, this consecrating phrase, too, has grown to so mere a form—like the title of “Esquire”—that a critic instinctively avoids it. Besides, one’s library nowadays must be a reflex of the wide world,—a curious medley of things old and new, things useful and practical, whether to draw from or to refute. But then, we would have a “sanctum” in one corner of our library; a choice case, close by the fire’s glow, and within reach of the easy chair; a case of none but choicest and dainty volumes. Not books for study, or reference, or criticism, nor books of “one reading;” but books to be taken up again and again in leisure moments, ever fresh and ever delightful. Herein should be housed, warmly and honourably, our “Friends in Council,” our Longfellow and our Tennyson, our Bacon, and our “Don Quixote,” and our “Alice in Wonderland.” And—not to make a catalogue—we should certainly find a place in it for “Lancashire Memories.”

In one sense “Lancashire Memories” recalls strongly “In my Indian Garden,” itself a treasure of our fireside book-case, and which we introduced to our readers last year. That is to say, Mrs. Potter’s book breathes just as delightfully, quaintly, naïvely, of old Lancashire, as Mr. Robinson’s does of India, and yet two books could hardly be more strangely unlike. The charm of “In my Indian Garden” was a sweet out-of-door breathing of garden life; it was a perfume of the vegetation of an Indian garden, mingled with the droll humour and philosophy of its animal life, so intensely realized as to make us feel as though we had experienced it all ourselves. But all this sympathy with nature as such is absent in Mrs. Potter. Her’s is another charm—it is entirely human. It is no mere garrulous and amusing gossip of an old woman of eighty summers, but it is all this, with a crispness and smartness of epigram, a freshness of naïveté and candour, and a glow of good-humour and kindliness. In epigram she is good enough to recall George Eliot. How terse and telling are these little bits:—

A high fruit-wall was covered with plum-trees . . . very good in themselves, and all the better from a little difficulty in getting them (p. 29).

Or:—

If one straw had got into that lanthorn, we must inevitably have been suffocated; but no straw did. We incurred dangers that would have sent

the mammas of the present day into hysterics; but we had no mammas and no fears (p. 34).

Or better still:—

Our visits to her occurred at all festivals connected with good things to eat (p. 51).

At the village church the Countess of Riverton and her friends looked so apart from the rest of us, and so supremely above me, that I was a little startled once when she used her pocket handkerchief, as common people are in the habit of doing (p. 97).

We have marked many passages for quotation—one in almost every other page; but it will not do to go on. Yet who could refrain from citing this?—

I wonder what constitutes gentility? Not always birth; there are many vulgar people high-born. Certainly not money; for the “vulgar rich” has almost passed into a proverb. It is not talent; for authors and authoresses, though they may be clever, are not necessarily genteel. What is it? What is this myth that every one is so anxious to grasp? I believe in assuming to yourself and class that you are genteel; and only assume it enough, and all around you will come into the belief (p. 124).

And just one more:—

What wonders the putting in or leaving out a letter achieves in a name! That valuable *e* final to Smith and Brown is next best thing to a coronet. The omission of the *p* in Simpson, the *k* in Jackson, or the *i* in Jamieson, makes a wonderful difference in their gentility; it is only a pity the sound is the same. . . . What would Aylmer, or Leycester, or Wygrave be without their *y*'s? It adds centuries to the age of the family without further notice (pp. 138-9).

Could George Eliot do better?—

But Mrs. Potter is of no sarcastic mould. Her very banter is good-natured. How charming are her quaint, old, odd stories of Peggy Baines and “my Cousins,” of John the butler at Maudeslys! But not the least charm of the book is that, with all her freshness and humour, she is so perfect a “*laudatrix temporis acti*,” for is it not “remarkable how fruit has deteriorated” since her early days? and what modern girls can work as well and as much as “our cousins” did then? and “there are no real old grandmammas now; the race has gone out;” whilst, finally, “there is much less individuality now than there once was, that is certain. If I were to live to a hundred I should never see another Aunt Dorcas.” And if we were to live for very long, we should not meet many such companions as Mrs. Potter and her “Memories.”

The Roman Breviary. Translated out of Latin into English by JOHN, MARQUESS OF BUTE, K.T. Two Vols. Edinburgh and London : William Blackwood and Sons. 1879.

THESE two splendid volumes, the fruit of nine years' work, and the worthy tribute of a cultured Catholic to that Church which he has had the gift to recognise as his mother, are deserving of more than the brief notice we can at this moment accord them. When we state that each volume contains some 1500 pages (a portion, however, viz., the "Common" Office, being repeated), that there is an average of at least one foot-note, or reference, and at least five translator's annotations to the text, in every page, and that the great majority of these notes are concerned with matters of name, date, and citation; and when we consider that the whole text of the Breviary has been translated, newly and freshly, from the original Psalms, Hymns, Lessons, Anthems, Responsories, and Collects, the reader will easily understand that the labour must have been very great. We should hasten to add that Lord Bute has used the versions of others (chiefly Cardinal Newman) in the rendering of the hymns, and that in the Psalms, and in translating Holy Scripture generally, he has freely adopted existing translations when he considered them good.

A translation of the Breviary seems, doubtless, to some a little uncalled for. There is an idea that the Breviary is a book for priests, and perhaps, also, that there is just the slightest soupçon of a heterodox leaning in wishing to put a "Service Book" into the vernacular. This is a feeling which may be expected to vanish in its absurdity the moment it is reflected upon. No doubt there is some slight reason for it in the fact that there is a large party in the Church of England which is now extensively imitating, in English, our liturgical services, and which makes it a sort of reproach that we use an unknown tongue. There are times when innocent acts must be abstained from on account of scandal. But there is really nothing of the sort to be apprehended in the present case. A few Ritualistic clergymen will no doubt use this translation, and revel in the quaint effect of the antique phraseology in an English garb. A few "sisterhoods," and even congregations, will perhaps struggle for a short time with the big volumes and the small print; but it will do neither any harm. It will certainly not keep them a day longer from "going over." And, after all, the sacred words, the "prayers" of the Church, the uncompromising legends, and the influence of holy names, may be expected to be more than neutral—to be active—agents in preparing the way for the Faith. The Breviary is neither a secret formula nor a collection of mediæval legends. It contains, in its most authentic form, the spirit and mind of the Catholic Church as regards prayer and praise. Its selections of Holy Scripture are the most appropriate, its presentment of saints' names and virtues are the best and most deliberately considered, and its forms of invocation, adoration, and petition are the most truly and essentially Catholic of anything that exists outside the Missal and the Pontifical.

Lord Bute's work as a translator, let us say it at once, has been admirably done. His plan of proceeding is the only one really practicable. In rendering Scripture he has translated the Latin of the Breviary, not the Hebrew or the LXX., although he has made plentiful explanatory reference to both. In the Lessons of the second and third nocturns he has given, not a word-for-word translation, but a free and readable version, which, however, preserves, in a remarkable manner, the spirit of the original. It is in the rendering of the Legends of the Saints (the Lessons of the Second Nocturn) that he seems to have succeeded best, and to have really performed a feat in translation.

It would be easy to point out matters of detail, in an immense work like this, where difference of opinion might be expected. The Breviary is a sufficiently large subject to afford opportunities for infinite questioning. Many will resent "Elijah" and "Elisha." It is difficult to blame the translator for the occasional quaintness of his version. A work must be taken as a whole. If you build in a certain style you may have strange gargoyles and curious *bizareries* in figures and faces. The rule as to where quaintness is no longer affectation is not easy to lay down. Perhaps the question is one of degree. If you are consistently quaint, you are not quaint but archaic. At any rate, the occasional names and verbs which, in Lord Bute's excellent English, make themselves felt with a slight shock on the unaccustomed ear, even in the general flow of his evenly old-fashioned diction, have the effect of adding wonderful life to the picture. Doubtless some minds, afflicted with importunate associations, will be amused or offended with some of his expressions. But this wears off, and the real power of the translation comes home, more and more, at every reading.

Even the clergy may learn a great deal from a translation of the Breviary. It is not merely that they will find in this version useful and pregnant notes, numberless brief bits of information, supplied just at the right moment in the fewest words, exact references to the Homilies and other writings of the Fathers, which, perhaps, will send them to the original to finish what the Breviary merely begins; but the effect of seeing the familiar—too familiar—Latin turned into new forms of speech will be, as De Quincey says, to "brighten its suggestiveness," and give it a new power over the imagination. As for the laity, they have here what they never had before—the whole Breviary in English. But even if it were of no use whatever, this translation would be welcome as a work of art. To the Breviary itself it is what engraving is to painting. A noble monument of the past, not antiquated, but only ancient, has here been reproduced with loving and laborious devotion, and the result is worthy the long spaces of studious leisure and seclusion which the work has required.
